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Willkommen in Frankfurt!
Welcome to Frankfurt!
Dear participants,
On behalf of myself and my colleagues 
Professor Dr. Klaus Günther and Pro-
fessor Dr. Lorenz Schulz, it is my great 
pleasure to welcome you to the 25th 
World Congress of the International As-
sociation for Philosophy of Law and So-
cial Philosophy (IVR) in Frankfurt am 
Main.
You will ﬁ  nd a detailed time schedule 
of the congress in this booklet, which 
also includes the scripts of the plenary 
lectures (as far as they were available in 
time). For plenary lectures held in Ger-
man, please ﬁ   n d  e n c l o s e d  a n  E n g l i s h  
translation or an English abstract.
I would like to take this early opportu-
nity to thank all those involved in the 
preparation of the congress for their ac-
tive support. In particular, I would like 
to thank the research assistants of my 
chair, Ms. Ass. jur. Diana Goldau and 
Mr. Dr. Sascha Ziemann, who bore the 
main burden of the organizational ar-
rangements. 
We wish you an academically enriching, 
inspiring and pleasant stay in Frankfurt.
Professor Dr. Dr. h.c. Ulfrid Neumann
Willkommen in Frankfurt!
Liebe Tagungsteilnehmer,
auch im Namen meiner Frankfurter 
Kollegen Prof. Dr. Klaus Günther und 
Prof. Dr. Lorenz Schulz möchte ich Sie 
zu dem 25. Weltkongress der Internati-
onalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und So-
zialphilosophie (IVR) in Frankfurt am 
Main sehr herzlich begrüßen. 
Den genauen Ablauf der Tagung entneh-
men Sie bitte diesem Heft, das auch die 
Plenarreferate (soweit sie uns rechtzeitig 
zur Verfügung gestellt werden konnten) 
enthält. Den Referaten, die in deutscher 
Sprache vorgetragen werden, ist eine 
englische Übersetzung bzw. eine engli-
sche Zusammenfassung beigefügt. 
Schon an dieser Stelle möchte ich mich 
bei all denen bedanken, die uns bei der 
Vorbereitung des Kongresses tatkräf-
tig unterstützt haben. Ein besonderer 
Dank gilt den wissenschaftlichen Mit-
a r b e i t e r n  a n  m e i n e m  L e h r s t u h l ,  F r a u  
Ass. jur. Diana Goldau und Herrn Dr. 
Sascha Ziemann, die die Hauptlast der 
organisatorischen Vorbereitungen ge-
tragen haben.
Wir wünschen Ihnen einen wissen-
schaftlich ertragreichen, anregenden und 
angenehmen Aufenthalt in Frankfurt.
Professor Dr. Dr. h.c. Ulfrid Neumann
Welcome to Frankfurt!7
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Academic Program
Sunday, 14 August 2011
14.00 – 18.00 Registration
19.00 Welcoming evening
Monday, 15 August 2011
8.00 – 18.00 Registration
9.00 Opening
9.30 – 10.15
Prof. Dr. Samantha Besson 
University of Fribourg / Switzerland 
International Human Rights and Equality
10.15 – 11.00
Discussion 
Chair: Prof. Dr. Anne Ruth Mackor
University of Groningen / Netherlands
11.00 – 11.30 Coffee break
11.30 – 12.15
Prof. Dr. Tercio Sampaio Ferraz 
University of São Paulo / Brazil
Die Erosion subjektiver Rechte als Folge der technischen Entwicklung (Patent-
recht, Urheberrecht) 
(The Erosion of Legal Rights through Technical Developments 
(Patent Law, Intellectual Property Law))
12.15 – 13.00
Discussion 
Chair: Prof. Dr. Ricardo Guibourg
University of Buenos Aires / Argentinia
13.00 – 14.30 Lunch
14.30 – 16.30 Special Workshops / Working Groups
16.30 – 17.00 Coffee break
17.00 – 18.30 Special Workshops / Working Groups
19.30 / 20.00 Reception City of Frankfurt
Tuesday, 16 August 2011
9.30 – 10.15
Prof. Dr. Klaus Günther 
Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main
Unviolability as a Legal Concept
10.15 – 11.00
Discussion
Chair: Prof. Dr. Günter Frankenberg 
Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main
PROGRAM
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11.00 – 11.30 Coffee break
11.30 – 12.15
Prof. Dr. Seana Shiffrin 
University of California, Los Angeles / USA
A Thinker-Based Approach To Freedom Of Speech
12.15 – 13.00
Discussion
Chair: Prof. Dr. Rainer Forst 
Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main
13.00 – 14.30 Lunch
14.30 – 16.30 Special Workshops / Working Groups
16.30 – 17.00 Coffee break
17.00 – 18.30 Special Workshops / Working Groups
20.00
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Robert Alexy 
Christian-Albrechts University of Kiel
The Existence of Human Rights
Wednesday, 17 August 2011
9.30 – 10.15
Prof. Dr. David Dyzenhaus
University of Toronto / Canada
The Morality of Legality: A Hobbesian Account
10.15 – 11.00
Discussion
Chair: Prof. Dr. Chongko Choi
Seoul National University / Korea
11.00 – 11.30 Coffee break
11.30 – 12.15
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Stanley Paulson 
Washington University in St. Louis / USA
The Very Idea of Legal Positivism
12.15 – 13.00
Discussion
Chair: Prof. Dr. Marek Zirk-Sadowski
University of Lódz / Poland
13.00 – 14.30 Lunch
14.30 – 20.00 Excursion Heidelberg
Academic Program
Thursday, 18 August 2011
9.30 – 10.15
Prof. Dr. Marijan Pavčnik 
University of Ljubljana / Slowenia
Methodologische Klarheit und/oder gegenständliche Reinheit des Rechts?
Bemerkungen zur Diskussion Kelsen – Pitamic (Methodological Clarity or
Substantial Purity? Notes on the Discussion between Kelsen and Pitamic)
10.15 – 11.00
Discussion
Chair: Prof. Dr. Alexander Bröstl, University of P. J. Šafárik, Košice / Slovakia
11.00 – 11.30 Coffee break
11.30 – 12.15
Prof. Dr. Hiroshi Kamemoto
Kyoto-University / Japan
How should Legal Philosophers make Use of Economic Thinking?
12.15 – 13.00
Discussion
Chair: Prof. Dr. Sandra Marshall 
University of Stirling / UK
13.00 – 14.30 Lunch
14.30 – 16.30 Special Workshops / Working Groups
16.30 – 17.00 Coffee break
17.00 – 18.30 Special Workshops / Working Groups
19.30 Concert
Friday, 19 August 2011
9.30 – 10.15
Prof. Dr. Olivier Jouanjan 
University of Strasbourg / France
The philological Turn: History and Metaphysics in Savigny
10.15 – 11.00
Prof. Dr. Carl Wellman 
Washington University in St. Louis / USA
The Internationalization of the IVR
11.00 – 11.30 Coffee break
11.30 – 12.15
Discussion
Chair: Prof. Dr. Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, 
Jagiellonian University Krakow / Poland
Chair: Prof. Dr. João Maurício Adeodato
Federal University of Pernambuco / Brazil
12.15 – 13.00
Dr. Adrian Künzler,
Yale Law School / USA
Cost-Beneﬁ  t-Analysis and the Quest for Wealth Maximization: How to Embrace 
Complexity and Uncertainty (IVR Prize Lecture)
PROGRAM
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13.00 – 14.30 Lunch
14.30 – 16.30 Special Workshops / Working Groups
16.30 – 17.00 Coffee break
17.00 – 18.00 Special Workshops / Working Groups
18.00 – 19.00 General Assembly
20.00 Farewell dinner
Saturday, 20 August 2011
Excursion / Sightseeing Tours (optional)
Program Sunday, 14 Aug 2011
HOF / House of Finance
HOF / E.01 / Deutsche Bank
14.00 14.00-18.30 
EC meeting (non-public event) 18.30
HOF / House of Finance
CAS / Casino-Gebäude / Casino Building
Foyer / Entrance Hall
19.00
Starting at 19.00
Welcoming Evening
CAS / Casino-Gebäude / Casino Building
HZ / Hörsaalzentrum / Lecture Hall
HZ Foyer / Entrance Hall
14.00 14.00-18.00 
Registration 18.00
HZ / Hörsaalzentrum / Lecture Hall
PROGRAM
Academic Program – Detailed 12 13
A
c
a
d
e
m
i
c
 
P
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
–
 
O
v
e
r
v
i
e
w
Program Monday, 15 Aug 2011
HZ / Hörsaalzentrum / Lecture Hall
HZ 1/2  HZ 7 HZ 8 HZ 9 HZ 10 HZ 11 HZ 12 HZ 13 HZ 14 HZ 15
08.00 Starting at 
08.00 
Registration
09.00
09.00 
Opening
09.30-10.15 
PL Besson
10.00 10.15-11.00 
Discussion
11.00
11.30-12.15 
PL Sampaio 
Ferraz
12.00 12.15-13.00 
Discussion
13.00
14.00
14.30-
18.30 
SW 61
14.30-
18.30 
SW 8
14.30-
18.30 
SW 44
14.30-
18.30 
SW 19
14.30-
18.30 
SW 14
14.30-
18.30 
SW 40
14.30-
18.30 
SW 78
14.30-
18.30 
SW 65
14.30-
18.30 
SW 6
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
Starting at 19.30 
Reception City of Frankfurt, Town Hall 
(For detailed information please see invitation in the delegate pack)
HZ / Hörsaalzentrum / Lecture Hall
HOF / House of Finance
E.01 / 
Deutsche 
Bank
E.21 / 
Paris
E.22 / 
Commerz-
bank
1.27 / 
Dubai
1.28 / 
Shanghai
2.45 / 
Boston
3.36 / 
Chicago
3.45 / 
Sydney
08.00
09.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
14.30-
18.30 
SW 48 
14.30-
18.30 
SW 41
14.30-
18.30 
SW 56
14.30-
18.30 
SW 34
14.30-
18.30 
SW 59
14.30-
18.30 
SW 68
14.30-
18.30 
SW 10
14.30-
18.30 
SW 1
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
Starting at 19.30 
Reception City of Frankfurt, Town Hall 
(For detailed information please see invitation in the delegate pack)
HOF / House of Finance
Program Monday, 15 Aug 2011
PROGRAM
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IG / IG-Farben-Hochhaus / IG-Farben Building
251 254 454 457 0.251 0.254 0.454 0.454
08.00
09.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
14.30-
18.30 
WG 8.2
14.30-
18.30 
WG 8.1
14.30-
18.30 
WG 5.1
14.30-
18.30 
WG 5.2
14.30-
18.30 
WG 19
14.30-
18.30 
WG 26
14.30-
18.30 
WG 4
14.30-
18.30 
WG 18   
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
Starting at 19.30 
Reception City of Frankfurt, Town Hall 
(For detailed information please see invitation in the delegate pack)
IG / IG-Farben-Hochhaus / IG-Farben Building
Program Monday, 15 Aug 2011
RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
1.101 1.102 1.301 1.302 1.303 2.101 2.102
08.00
09.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
14.30-
18.30 
SW 67
14.30-
18.30 
WG 12.1
14.30-
18.30 
WG 11.2
14.30-
18.30 
WG 11.1
14.30-
18.30 
SW 62
14.30-
18.30 
WG 7
14.30-
18.30 
SW 28
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
Starting at 19.30 
Reception City of Frankfurt, Town Hall 
(For detailed information please see invitation in the delegate pack)
RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
Program Monday, 15 Aug 2011
PROGRAM
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RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
3.101 3.102 3.201 4.101 4.201 4.202
08.00
09.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
14.30-
18.30 
SW 24
14.30-
18.30 
SW 75
14.30-
18.30 
SW 36
14.30-
18.30 
WG 24
14.30-
18.30 
WG 25
14.30-
18.30 
WG 16
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
Starting at 19.30 
Reception City of Frankfurt, Town Hall 
(For detailed information please see invitation in the delegate pack)
RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
Program Monday, 15 Aug 2011 Program Tuesday, 16 Aug 2011
HZ / Hörsaalzentrum / Lecture Hall
HZ 1/2  HZ 7 HZ 8 HZ 9 HZ 10 HZ 11 HZ 12 HZ 13 HZ 14 HZ 15
09.00 Starting at 
09.00 
Registration
09.30-10.15
PL Günther
10.00
10.15-11.00
Discussion
11.00
11.30-12.15
PL Shiffrin
12.00 12.15-13.00
Discussion
13.00
14.00
14.30-
18.30 
SW 61
14.30-
18.30 
SW 8
14.30-
18.30 
SW 44
14.30-
18.30 
SW 5
14.30-
18.30 
SW 51
14.30-
18.30 
SW 21
14.30-
18.30 
SW 64
14.30-
18.30 
SW 18
14.30-
18.30 
SW 23
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
20.00 Starting at 
20.00
PL Alexy
(Special 
Lecture)
HZ / Hörsaalzentrum / Lecture Hall
PROGRAM
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HOF / House of Finance
E.01 / 
Deutsche 
Bank
E.21 / 
Paris
E.22 / 
Commerz-
bank
1.27 / 
Dubai
1.28 / 
Shanghai
2.45 / 
Boston
3.36 / 
Chicago
3.45 / 
Sydney
08.00
09.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
14.30-
18.30 
SW 32 
14.30-
18.30 
SW 49
14.30-
18.30 
SW 17
14.30-
18.30 
SW 35
14.30-
18.30 
SW46
14.30-
18.30 
SW 66
14.30-
18.30 
SW 33
14.30-
18.30 
SW 79
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
20.00
HOF / House of Finance
Program Tuesday, 16 Aug 2011
IG / IG-Farben-Hochhaus / IG-Farben Building
251 254 454 457 0.251 0.254 0.454 0.454
08.00
09.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
14.30-
18.30 
WG 28.1
14.30-
18.30 
SW 73
14.30-
18.30 
SW 2
14.30-
18.30 
SW 16
14.30-
18.30 
SW 4
14.30-
18.30 
SW 32.2
14.30-
18.30 
WG 32.1
14.30-
18.30 
SW 37
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
20.00
IG / IG-Farben-Hochhaus / IG-Farben Building
Program Tuesday, 16 Aug 2011
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RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
1.101 1.102 1.301 1.302 1.303 2.101 2.102
08.00
09.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
14.30-
18.30 
SW 50
14.30-
18.30 
SW 76
14.30-
18.30 
SW 52
14.30-
18.30 
WG 12.2
14.30-
18.30 
WG 47
14.30-
18.30 
SW 39
14.30-
18.30 
SW 28
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
20.00
RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
Program Tuesday, 16 Aug 2011
RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
3.101 3.102 3.201 4.101 4.201 4.202
08.00
09.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
14.30-
18.30 
SW 53
14.30-
18.30 
SW 45
14.30-
18.30 
SW 42
14.30-
18.30 
SW 29
14.30-
18.30 
SW 60
14.30-
18.30 
SW 70
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
20.00
RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
Program Tuesday, 16 Aug 2011
PROGRAM
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Program Wednesday, 17 Aug 2011
HZ / Hörsaalzentrum / Lecture Hall
HZ 1/2  HZ 7 HZ 8 HZ 9 HZ 10 HZ 11 HZ 12 HZ 13 HZ 14 HZ 15
08.00
09.00
Starting at 
09.00 
Registration
09.30-10.15 
PL Dyzen-
haus
10.00 10.15-11.00 
Discussion
11.00
11.30-12.15 
PL Paulson
12.00 12.15-13.00 
Discussion
13.00
14.00
... Starting at 14.30
Excursion to Heidelberg
(For detailed information please see invitation in the delegate pack)
...
20.00
HZ / Hörsaalzentrum / Lecture Hall
HOF / House of Finance
E.01 / 
Deutsche Bank
E.21 / 
Paris
E.22 / 
Commerz-
bank
1.27 / 
Dubai
1.28 / 
Shanghai
2.45 / 
Boston
3.36 / 
Chicago
3.45 / 
Sydney
08.00
09.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00 14.00-17.00
EC meeting (non-
public event)
Starting at 14.30
Excursion to Heidelberg
(For detailed information please see invitation in the delegate pack)
15.00
16.00
17.00
17.30-19.00
Nominations 
Committee meeting 
(non-public event)
18.00
19.00
20.00
HOF / House of Finance
Program Wednesday, 17 Aug 2011
PROGRAM
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IG / IG-Farben-Hochhaus / IG-Farben Building
251 254 454 457 0.251 0.254 0.454 0.454
08.00
...
14.00
... Starting at 14.30
Excursion to Heidelberg
(For detailed information please see invitation in the delegate pack) 20.00
   
IG / IG-Farben-Hochhaus / IG-Farben Building
RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
1.101 1.102 1.301 1.302 1.303 2.101 2.102
08.00
...
14.00
... Starting at 14.30
Excursion to Heidelberg
(For detailed information please see invitation in the delegate pack) 20.00
RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
3.101 3.102 3.201 4.101 4.201 4.202
08.00
...
14.00
... Starting at 14.30
Excursion to Heidelberg
(For detailed information please see invitation in the delegate pack) 20.00
RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
Program Wednesday, 17 Aug 2011 Program Thursday, 18 Aug 2011
HZ / Hörsaalzentrum / Lecture Hall
HZ 1/2  HZ 7 HZ 8 HZ 9 HZ 10 HZ 11 HZ 12 HZ 13 HZ 14 HZ 15
08.00
09.00
Starting at
09.00
Registration
09.30-10.15 PL 
Pavcnik
10.00 10.15-11.00 
Discussion
11.00
11.30-12.15 
PL Kamemoto
12.00 12.15-13.00 
Discussion
13.00
14.00
14.30-
18.30 
SW 61
14.30-
18.30 
SW 55
14.30-
18.30 
SW 7
14.30-
18.30 
SW 5
14.30-
18.30 
SW 31
14.30-
18.30 
SW 21
14.30-
18.30 
SW 72
14.30-
18.30 
SW 65
14.30-
18.30 
SW 15
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
Starting at 19.30
Concert, Concert Hall of the Lessing Gymnasium
(For detailed information please see invitation in the delegate pack)
HZ / Hörsaalzentrum / Lecture Hall
PROGRAM
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HOF / House of Finance
E.01 / 
Deutsche 
Bank
E.21 / 
Paris
E.22 / 
Commerz-
bank
1.27 / 
Dubai
1.28 / 
Shanghai
2.45 / 
Boston
3.36 / 
Chicago
3.45 / 
Sydney
08.00
09.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
14.30-
17.30 
SW 32 
14.30-
18.30 
SW 26
14.30-
18.30 
SW 17
14.30-
18.30 
SW 69
14.30-
18.30 
SW 74
14.30-
18.30 
SW 12
14.30-
18.30 
SW 63
14.30-
18.30 
SW 54
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00 18.00-19.00
IVR Section 
President’s 
Meetings 
(non-public 
event)
19.00
Starting at 19.30
Concert, Concert Hall of the Lessing Gymnasium
(For detailed information please see invitation in the delegate pack)
HOF / House of Finance
Program Thursday, 18 Aug 2011
IG / IG-Farben-Hochhaus / IG-Farben Building
251 254 454 457 0.251 0.254 0.454 0.454
08.00
09.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
14.30-
18.30 
SW 27
14.30-
18.30 
WG 9.1
14.30-
18.30 
WG 13.1
14.30-
18.30 
WG 14.1
14.30-
18.30 
WG 15.1
14.30-
18.30 
WG 2.1
14.30-
18.30 
WG 3.1
14.30-
18.30 
WG 22.1  
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
Starting at 19.30
Concert, Concert Hall of the Lessing Gymnasium
(For detailed information please see invitation in the delegate pack)
IG / IG-Farben-Hochhaus / IG-Farben Building
Program Thursday, 18 Aug 2011
PROGRAM
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RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
1.101 1.102 1.301 1.302 1.303 2.101 2.102
08.00
09.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
14.30-
18.30 
SW 50
14.30-
18.30 
SW 9
14.30-
18.30 
SW 11
14.30-
18.30 
SW 22
14.30-
18.30 
SW 58
14.30-
18.30 
WG 21.1
14.30-
18.30 
WG 29.1
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
Starting at 19.30
Concert, Concert Hall of the Lessing Gymnasium
(For detailed information please see invitation in the delegate pack)
RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
Program Thursday, 18 Aug 2011
RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
3.101 3.102 3.201 4.101 4.201 4.202
08.00
09.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
14.30-
18.30 
WG 31.1
14.30-
18.30 
SW 3
14.30-
18.30 
SW 25
14.30-
18.30 
SW 71
14.30-
18.30 
SW 30
14.30-
18.30 
WG 1.1
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
Starting at 19.30
Concert, Concert Hall of the Lessing Gymnasium
(For detailed information please see invitation in the delegate pack)
RUW / Gebäude Recht und Wirtschaft / Building Law and Economics
Program Thursday, 18 Aug 2011
PROGRAM
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Program Friday, 19 Aug 2011
HZ / Hörsaalzentrum / Lecture Hall
HZ 1/2  HZ 7 HZ 8 HZ 9 HZ 10 HZ 11 HZ 12 HZ 13 HZ 14 HZ 15
08.00
09.00 Starting at 09.00 
Registration
09.30-10.15 
PL Jouanjan
10.00 10.15-11.00 
PL Wellman
11.00
11.30-12.15 
Discussion
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10.00-12.00
Tour: Discover Frankfurt
(For detailed information please see delegate pack)
Tuesday, 16 Aug 2011
10.00-12.00
Tour: Frankfurt – Goethe‘s Hometown
(For detailed information please see delegate pack)
Wednesday, 17 Aug 2011
14.30–20.00
Excursion to Heidelberg
(For detailed information please see delegate pack)
Thursday, 18 Aug 2011
10.00-12.00
Tour: Frankfurt – Architectural Highlights of more than 1000 years
(For detailed information please see delegate pack)
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Frankfurt Palmengarten Tour
(For detailed information please see delegate pack)  
Saturday, 20 Aug 2011
Optional:
1. Tour: Romantic Rheingau, 2. Tour: Romantic Rothenburg
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Overview
Monday, 15 Aug 2011
9.30-10.15 Samantha Besson, University of Fribourg / Switzerland 
International Human Rights and Equality
11.30-12.15 Tercio Sampaio Ferraz Junior, University of São Paulo / Brazil 
Die Erosion subjektiver Rechte als Folge der technischen 
Entwicklung (Patentrecht, Urheberrecht)
Erosion of subjective rights by reason of technical development 
(Patent, Copyright)
Tuesday, 16 Aug 2011
9.30-10.15 Klaus Günther, Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main 
Unviolability as a Legal Concept
11.30-12.15 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, University of California, Los Angeles / USA
A Thinker-Based Approach To Freedom Of Speech
20.00 Special Lecture
Robert Alexy, Christian-Albrechts s-University of Kiel
The Existence of Human Rights
Wednesday, 17 Aug 2011
9.30-10.15 David Dyzenhaus, University of Toronto / Canada
The Morality of Legality: A Hobbesian Account
11.30-12.15 Stanley L. Paulson, Washington University in St. Louis / USA
The Very Idea of Legal Positivism
Thursday, 18 Aug 2011
9.30-10.15 Marijan Pavcnik, University of Ljubljana / Slowenia
Methodologische Klarheit und/oder gegenständliche Reinheit des 
Rechts? Bemerkungen zur Diskussion Kelsen – Pitamic
(Methodological Clarity or Substantial Purity? Notes on the 
Discussion between Kelsen and Pitamic)
11.30-12.15 Hiroshi Kamemoto, Kyoto University / Japan
How should Legal Philosophers make Use of Economic Thinking? 42 43
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PLENARY LECTURE 
International Human Rights 
and Equality
Prof. Dr. Samantha Besson, 
University of Fribourg / Switzerland
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 9.30 h – 10.15 h
Location HZ 1/2
Abstract:
Recently, a few authors have tried to 
link international human rights to 
equality and equal status in particular, 
and hence to ﬁ  ll a gap that was left open 
not only by human rights theorists but 
also by equality specialists. Neglect for 
that connection is attributable both to 
the lack of interest for international law 
and politics beyond domestic bound-
aries that has long plagued theories of 
egalitarianism, but also to the resilience 
of foundationalist and especially monist
approaches to the justiﬁ  cation of huy-
man rights. Even though the egalitar-
ian dimension of international human 
rights has now been uncovered, more 
w o r k  i s  n e e d e d  o n  w h a t  t h a t  n o r m a -
tive ideal means in this context. My ar-
gument unravels in four steps. A ﬁ  rst 
s e c t i o n  p r e s e n t s  w h a t  c o n c e p t i o n  a n d  
kind of equality I have in mind. In the 
second section, I explain how human 
rights are related to equality and how 
human rights theory can explain that 
connection together with their uni-
versal justiﬁ   cation. The third section 
explains what the implications are for 
international human rights and es-
pecially international human rights 
law . In a fourth section, I draw some 
of the implications of the egalitarian 
dimension of human rights to explain 
the relationship between international 
anti-discrimination rights and equality, 
on the one hand, and between inter-
national human rights law and equal-
ity more generally, on the other. The 
tensions between ideal and non-ideal 
political theory, on the one hand, and 
between international and domestic 
equality, on the other, that often ob-
scure the connections between those 
different themes will be unpacked and 
made the most of in the course of the 
argument.
About the author:
Samantha Besson is Professor of Public 
International Law and European Law 
at the University of Fribourg (Switzer-
land) and Co-Director of the Europe-
an Law Institute of the Universities of 
Bern, Fribourg and Neuchâtel (Switzer-
land). She holds a degree in Swiss and 
European Law (University of Fribourg 
and Vienna), a Magister Juris in Euro-
pean and Comparative Law (University 
of Oxford), a PhD in Law (University 
of Fribourg) and a Habilitation in Legal
Theory and Swiss, Comparative, Euro-
pean and International Constitutional 
Law (University of Bern). Her publica-
tions and research interests lie in Eu-
ropean and international law and legal 
and political philosophy, and in particu-
Friday, 19 Aug 2011
9.30-10.15 Olivier Jouanjan, University of Strasbourg / France
The philological Turn: History and Metaphysics in Savigny
10.15-11.00 Carl Wellman, Washington University in St. Louis / USA
How Should We Legal Philosophers Make Use of Economics?
12.15-13.00 IVR Prize Lecture
Adrian Künzler, Yale Law School / USA
Cost-Beneﬁ  t-Analysis and the Quest for Wealth Maximization: How 
to Embrace Complexity and Uncertainty 44 45
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PLENARY LECTURE
Die Erosion subjektiver Rechte als 
Folge der technischen Entwicklung 
(Patentrecht, Urheberrecht) 
Erosion of subjective rights by 
reason of technical development 
(Patent, Copyright)*
Prof. Dr. Tercio Sampaio Ferraz Junior, 
University of São Paulo / Brazil
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 11.30 h – 12.15 h
Location HZ 1/2
* Note: 
The Lecture will be held in German.
Abstract: 
Every thing has become so intricate that 
for its mastery an exceptional degree of 
understanding is required. For it is not 
enough any longer to be able to play the 
game well; but the question is again and 
again: what sort of game is to be played 
now anyway? Wittgenstein: Vermischte 
Bemerkungen1
The reﬂ  ection that I propose in this pre-
sentation has the subjective right that 
refers to the so-called immaterial prop-
erty as its core. Without sticking to dog-
matic distinctions between copyright, 
industrial property rights, and between 
the normative protections afforded to 
distinctively different objects such as 
trademarks and patents, industrial de-
1  Ludwig Wittgenstein: Culture and Value/
Vermischte Bemerkungen, ed. By Von Wright, 
Blackwell, 2006, MS 118 20r: 27.8.1937.
lar in human rights law and theory. Be-
sides publications in French, she is the 
author of the monograph The Morality 
of Conﬂ   ict: Reasonable Disagreement 
and Law (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 
2005). She co-edited the collections of 
essays Deliberative Democracy and its 
Discontents (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2006) 
w i t h  J o s é  L u i s  M a r t í ,  L e g a l  R e p u b l i -
canism: National and International 
Perspectives (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford 2009) with José Luis Martí and 
The Philosophy of International Law 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010) 
with John Tasioulas. In 2009, she start-
ed workin on a monograph on the legal 
theory of human rights which she plans 
to complete while on research leave at 
the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin dur-
ing the academic year 2011-2012.
signs, trade names and artworks, what 
particularly interests me is the author-
ship phenomenon and the set of legal 
institutes, which in western tradition, 
h a v e  c o m e  t o  q u a l i f y  t h e  a u c t o r  a s  
someone who holds the rights of his/
her intellectual, or also called immate-
rial production2.
The characterization of copyright (Ur-
heberrecht) constitutes, for the pur-
pose of this reﬂ  ection, a rich source of 
doctrinal debate. New cases and the 
diversity of uses or forms of exploring 
intellectual products require constant 
interpretation of the rules that apply to 
them from doctrines and jurisprudence. 
More than that, given the quality of in-
novations as to the exploration regimes 
and the new forms of distribution via 
new media technologies, they demand 
reﬂ  ection even regarding its nature. It 
is noticed that in doctrinal disputes in 
favor of one or another regulatory so-
lution for a hypothetical case, the pan-
elists start from contradictory answers 
about key issues such as: what is copy-
right? which product is protected? what 
is the intellectual work? what is the 
purpose of its protection?
The classic structure of copyright de-
ﬁ   nes it as property rights, especially 
with regard to its economic exploita-
tion.3 It is property in the broad sense 
that the phrase acquires in the constitu-
2  See K. Larenz: Allgemeiner Teil des Deut-
schen bürgerlichen Rechts, Beck, München, 
1967, p. 299.
3  See Bittar, Carlos Alberto. Direito de Au-
tor. 3. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2000, p. 10-
11.
tional text (any property right, or prod-
uct susceptible to economic valuation). 
In the words of Portuguese civilist José 
de Oliveira Ascensão, “(...) there is a 
speciﬁ  c constitutional sense of owner-
ship; and this sense does not coincide 
with the property sense, real maximum 
right, which is regulated by the Law of 
Things”.4 The property, for example, 
referred in the Brazilian Constitution 
(1988), is not conﬁ  ned to real rights; it 
also covers rights relating to intangible 
things. And, given that incorporeity, it 
is understood as personal property.
In this regard, it is worth noting that 
Brazilian Copyright Law (Law No. 
9.610/1998) provides that “copyright is 
reckoned, for legal purposes, as person-
al property” (art. 3).
It is known that the increasing use of 
computing and the consolidation of the 
world wide web, profoundly changed 
the possibilities of communication be-
tween individuals and private and pub-
lic corporations, with consequences for 
the subjective right of property of the 
author. In fact, these changes in social 
relationships bring about the perception 
that the liberty of creating intellectual 
products go on to depend on possibili-
t i e s  o f  a c c e s s  t o  a n d  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e s e  
new technologies and the information 
disclosed therein.
From this perception, two topics have 
become essential in the so-called in-
formation networks societies: on the 
4  Ascensão, José de Oliveira. Princípios 
constitucionais do direito de autor. Revista Bra-
sileira de Direito Constitucional, n. 5, jan./jun. 
2005, p. 434. 46 47
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rule, as, for instance, the problem of 
determining whether a contract signed 
through the Internet should be consid-
ered a contract between absent parties 
or between present parties; or it may 
be global regarding the topoi that orga-
nize the legal system, such as the con-
ceptualization of the notion of freedom 
within an environment of computer in-
formation.
From this perception, the topics, relat-
ing to IT policy, are closely related to 
disputes within the scope of legal dog-
matics.
Take, for example, the intense debate 
over what should be the model or form 
of the preponderant subjective right, ad-
opted for the use of software. The criti-
cisms are mainly based on those who 
wish to break the proprietary model, 
which accentuates the patrimonial as-
pect of subjective rights.
In summary, the controversy boils down 
to the following. As creation, softwares 
are embedded in the traditional regime 
of intellectual property and copyright, 
which grants the author broad pow-
ers over his/her creation, including the 
power to exclude others. However, in 
this creation, there is a form of knowl-
edge, which becomes inaccessible or too 
costly to access, when the source code is 
closed. This dual nature, of creation or 
intellectual product with a well-deﬁ  ned 
practical use on one hand and knowl-
edge on the other hand, underlies the 
controversy.
The controversy faces the dogmatic use 
of language, which is typically legal. We 
are faced here with the ancient legal 
one hand, with respect to the disclosed 
information, the individual freedom 
before the control information and the 
need for the universalization of access 
to new information and, on the other 
hand, with respect to the vehicle infor-
mation, how to disseminate technologi-
cal knowledge and promote: both top-
ics, relating to information policy, are 
closely related to the law, either as a 
cause for changes in the legal system, 
a n d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  s u c h  c h a n g e s .  T h e  
theme of freedom in the virtual space of 
the communications network5 deserves 
therefore a reﬂ  ection, which causes im-
mediate repercussions on the notion of 
s u b j e ct i v e  ri g h t s  ( c o p yri g h t  a s  s u b j e c -
tive right of an author). Anyway, the 
deﬁ  nition of the opening or enclosure of 
computer literacy is still done through 
the deﬁ  nition of subjective rights con-
cerning this knowledge or the product 
of this knowledge, resulting, however, 
in signiﬁ  cant practical problems.
In fact, as a consequence of these rap-
id changes in the structure of society 
and society’s very perceptions of these 
changes, the understanding of the legal 
o r d e r  t h a t  r e g u l a t e s  i t  i s  a l s o  a l t e r e d .  
That is, even without changing the legal 
order, social changes of this magnitude 
cause, necessarily, a reinterpretation of 
the existing valid order. This reinterpre-
tation may be local, regarding a speciﬁ  c 
5  Ferraz Jr., Tercio Sampaio. A liberdade 
como autonomia recíproca de acesso à informa-
ção, in: Greco, Marco Aurélio & Martins, Ives 
Gandra da Silva (org.). Direito e Internet: rela-
ções jurídicas na sociedade informatizada. São 
Paulo, 2001, S. 241-248.
concept of the “nature of things”. The 
difﬁ  culty lies in attributing the nature 
of res to softwares, as the legal common 
sense does. Treating it as knowledge or 
as a product means to grant it features 
that it would have as a substrate. How-
ever, when compared to literary works 
by law (Law 9609/98, art.2o), the idea 
of substrate proves inappropriate.
Therefore, as the literary work does not 
exist without a deed (or a memorized 
speech), but is not limited to it, it is also 
difﬁ  cult to treat software as res.
Reﬂ  ection on immateriality
The difﬁ  culty in treating software as res 
or even as an intangible thing or yet as 
an immaterial object allows for a quick 
semantics incursion. The Latin word ma-
teria results from the attempt of the Ro-
mans to translate the Greek hylé, which 
originally meant wood (timber, lum-
ber, Holz, Bauholz)6. The Spanish word 
madera (in Portuguese: madeira) is remi-
niscent of that use the Latin word (ma-
teria). In reality, it referred to the wood 
stored in the workshops of carpenters. 
In that sense, something amorphous 
(from morphé), waiting for the form that 
it would be given by the carpenter. The 
form-matter dualism, therefore, remits to 
the term stuff, from the verb to stuff, as a 
world (“stuffed” world) that only comes 
to be when it becomes the ﬁ  lling (stuff-
6  See Heidegger: Zollikoner Seminare: Pro-
tokolle – Zwiegespräche – Briefe, Klostermann, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1987 (II - 3. März. 1966).
ing) of something. Hence, the material 
world as something that ﬁ  lls forms (stuff-
ing). The corresponding word in French 
is farce (in German Füllsel, Füllung, in 
English farcing), whence the possibil-
ity of understanding the material world 
(stofﬂ  iche Welt) as Farce (farce)7.
It is not my intention to enter the well-
known philosophical controversies on 
the subject. Although, in a dangerous 
synthesis, it can be said that this was the 
original sense of the form/matter dualism 
that was lost with the advent of modern 
experimental science (experiment as the 
controlled observation of sensory mat-
ter: res). It is this same dualism, however, 
that seems to return under the impact of 
information technology.
I will explain.
If the known tangible universe (hous-
es, furniture, chairs, tables, cigarettes, 
books, pictures, etc.) was until now the 
environment of our existence (Dasein), 
orienting oneself in the world meant to 
move between things, separating them, 
i.e. classifying them into different forms 
(tangible/intangible, movable/immov-
able, sensitive/intellective, material/
immaterial, etc), projecting them in 
regulated spaces: mine, yours, ours, 
theirs.
It is precisely this environment that has 
been changed by this non-thing (Und-
ing) we now call information. For the 
electronic images on the television 
screen, data stored on your computer, 
7  Vilém Flusser, Dinge und Undinge: phä-
nomenologische Skizzen, München/Wien, Carl 
Hanser Verlag, 1993. 48 49
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cease to be important. In its place appears 
a new relationship between man and 
world, i.e. the relationship between hu-
man being-electronic device, in which, on 
the one hand, the dependence relation-
ship is reversible: man carries his device 
(computer, phone) wherever he goes; on 
the other hand, he acts only as per the ca-
pacity of its appliance. In this reversibil-
ity, its activity depends on the activity of 
the other in a different way: neither me-
chanical nor organic, but in a network. 
In this new way of being, the device-man 
(Apparatmensch) seems to live together 
in classical terms, not in the factory as the 
place of negotium (nec otium, ascholé), 
but to exist in a kind of school (scholé, 
otium) to acquire information. Homo 
faber is replaced by a homo ludens. He 
does not deal with things (res) any longer 
or acts with his hands (to handle). The 
existence (Dasein) is no longer a drama 
(actio) and becomes a spectacle (show).
In this new world, the computer memory 
is a non-thing (Unding). Not quite im-
material, because it is not really consum-
able. Although it exists in enclosed things 
(silicon chips, lasers), is not an object of 
use10.
It is not at hand’s reach (at hand, vorhan-
den), although it is available (on hand, 
zuhanden). What still needs to be “done”, 
that is, what has to be apprehended and 
produced, is performed automatically by 
non-things (Unding), by programs.
In these terms, a technically sui gene-
10  Flusser, Vilém. Dinge und Undinge: phä-
nomenologische Skizzen. München; Wien, 
1993. 
that gives meaning to the existence 
(Dasein): the man is no longer, what he 
does, but he does what the machine de-
termines. To that extent, he is replace-
able, works in shifts and to be what he 
is, he leaves home and goes towards a 
d e v i c e  ( t h e  f a c t o r y )  t h a t  d o m i n a t e s  
him. The relationship is reversed: Man 
becomes a function of the machine. Le-
g a l l y ,  w h a t  i s  m i n e  a n d  y o u r s ,  t h e i r s  
and ours are organized according to 
captured spaces, abstractly conceived 
under the title of property: proper-
ty right. Namely, in the eyes of homo 
faber, the work force is only a means to 
produce an object for use or an object 
for exchange. In this society, a society 
dominated by the idea of     exchange, 
the right is regarded as a good that is 
produced (it is manufactured). It is the 
identiﬁ  cation of jus with lex. The good 
that is produced through the issue of 
standards is therefore an object of use, 
something that is owned, a space that 
is protected, acquired, which can be 
assigned. In short, something that has 
exchange value. Hence its own space: 
the subjective right as a realm, within 
the man rules independent of any oth-
ers will.9
But the third, the current industrial 
revolution, is the one that involves the 
substitution of machinery for electron-
ics, increasingly miniaturized into units 
of technological convergence. With this, 
the topology of the world environment is 
changed since the spaces of manufacture 
9  Savigny, Friedrich Carl von. System des 
heutigen römischen Rechts, I. 1840, S. 7.
ter. Hence, the need for ars and techné. 
And, for the sake of stability of the hu-
man activity in these conditions, came 
the need for fences around properties, 
for territorial boundaries around the city, 
for laws to govern behavior. In politics, 
the citizen has a “privilege” (in the so-
cial sense, not in the legal sense): he is 
the subject of jus civile and as such par-
ticipates in the government. There is no 
need, per se, for an opposition between 
“rights.” The connection of humans to 
their instrument (tool) is direct: disputes 
between private citizens do not have an 
original “right” as a foundation, but an 
insult (in a sacred sense: impurity).
The Roman vindicatio, for example, 
therefore is not a claiming of a thing 
(rei-vindicatio) in the sense of mod-
ern ownership, but a procedural status 
act (actio), in other words, an issue on 
relevance to the community of citizens 
(civitas) by reason of possession of land, 
(fundus approximately meaning, mem-
ber of the community or communal, 
to which the Greek correspondent is 
kleros)8.
With the second industrial revolution 
(a little over two hundred years ago), 
which came about with the invention 
of the machine, the world is changed by 
changing the man/extension relation-
ship, giving rise to the factories. The 
world of factories is the world of the 
man-machine. Its existence depends on 
the machine as a kind of tool designed 
and built from a scientiﬁ  c theory and 
8  Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Tü-
bigen, 1976, II. Halbband, VII, § 2º. 
holograms and programs are so impal-
pable that they seem to entirely escape 
the possibility of being grasped (capere) 
with our hands even upon understand-
ing/conceiving/grasp (conceptum/con-
cept/Begriff). Information in terms 
of computers has to do with technical 
equipment that allow the screens to 
present algorithms (mathematical for-
mulas) in the form of images, color im-
ages, moving images, even texts, text-
ﬁ  les (e-books) that have no matter to 
be put in a form (in-formed, shaped). 
On the contrary, it has to do with forms 
(numeric codes) that allow other worlds 
of forms to appear. This turns the cri-
teria for distinguishing the false from 
the true and, consequently, the correct 
(righteous, gerecht) from the incorrect 
(unrichtig, Unrecht), the object of an 
entirely new task. This happens be-
cause, unlike the traditional world in 
which the immaterial (form) allowed 
the matter to appear and its adequate 
condition (adaequatio) was taken, com-
monly, as a record of fact, now we deal 
only with virtual worlds.
To understand this transformation, the 
Anthropological strength of grabbing 
with your hands deserves to be under-
lined. Thus, if the ﬁ  rst “industrial revolu-
tion” of humanity came about with the 
invention of the tool as an extension of 
the hand (the chipped stone, the wooden 
staff, the arrowhead), the tool world was 
a device dependent (function) on hu-
mans for thousands of years. The man-
tool makes himself into what he is: the 
Carpenter does not make tables only, but 
due to his activity, he becomes a carpen- 50 51
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tion of information to be processed: oper-
ations are carried out in groups of human 
and artiﬁ  cial elements, whose outcome 
cannot be attributed to a single auctor.
Hence the problem faced today by the 
theory of the law (Rechtslehre): how to 
deal with the subjective right of the au-
thor (copyright) in the computer world?
Proﬁ  le of copyright on software
I start with the software, which use can 
be subject to rules, that, allowing or pre-
venting access to the source code, may 
deﬁ  ne its cognitive or merely functional 
character. This way, the legal regime ad-
opted deﬁ  nes the nature of the use of 
software and user interface with this in-
tellectual/intangible product. 
Initially, I use legal proﬁ   le assigned by 
the Brazilian legislation on the rights 
to software and the proﬁ  le  deﬁ  ned  in 
the Trade Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights-TRIP/GATT 47 to 
the right to software. In Brazil, as in the 
Berne Convention, this right is treated as 
copyright, being the software equivalent 
to literary works (Access to Information 
Act, Law 9609/98, art. 2). Such qualiﬁ  -
cation, as copyright (the Brazilian Law 
of Copyright, Law 9610/98) and not of 
Industrial Intellectual Property (Brazil-
ian Law 9279/96), brings an important 
legal consequence: what it protects is 
not the res, which speciﬁ  es the creation, 
but creation itself, expressed in a certain 
way (artistic). It is this aesthetic sense of 
the work and its originality, which jus-
tify the protection of copyright through 
A certain effective knowledge may prove 
inept to explain phenomena or to pro-
duce successful results in different appli-
cation contexts, so that knowledge is not 
a static set of information but a dynamic 
process of revision and improvement of 
such content. In other words, industrial 
production is converted into a complex 
network that makes use of information 
from (improperly speaking) several auc-
tores.
Thus, there is a qualitative distinction 
between accessing the program only in 
object code and the access that includes 
its source code. In the ﬁ  rst case, access 
to software is a simple computing solu-
tion, where the information content is 
accessed simply as the program’s rules. In 
the second case, access to the software is 
a “metaprogram” (computer knowledge).
In this new condition, the human be-
ing is under discussion not as a persona 
of concrete actions, but as a performer 
(Spieler), which does not act, but types. 
What is left of his hands are just the ﬁ  n-
gers. Instead of capturing (fassen) and 
conceiving (auffassen), seeing (schauen) 
and playing (schauspielern).
Therefore, in short, let’s point out the ele-
ments of the computing condition:
a) a new vehicle: computing envi-
ronment (electronic device);
b) a new way of playing: digitaliza-
tion;
c) a system for instantaneous and 
global communication; 
tralasian Journal of Philosophy 74, 4 (1996), 
pp.549-67. See also “Widerlegung” in science as 
pointed by Karl Popper (Conjecturas e Refuta-
ções, Coimbra, 2003).
ris relationship is inaugurated. Although 
the software written in natural language 
(source code) and software translated 
into machine language (object code) are 
equivalent in terms of computer pro-
cessing to which they are addressed, 
they are not equivalent with regard to 
the information content expressed by 
them.11 While the program in object code 
does not express any justiﬁ  cation of the 
functions that the commands perform 
in the program, the program in natural 
language (source code) grants access to 
justiﬁ  cation (metaprogram) insofar as it 
enables the understanding of each in-
struction and its function in the program. 
This, in turn, allows the programmer to 
understand the function of the program 
as a whole (metametaprogram).
As the access to source code allows an in-
dividual to control the reasons that make 
the program effective12, an opportunity 
arises for the program to be developed as 
to adapt to new situations or seek a solu-
tion to new problems. This feature is rel-
evant in view of the “defeasible” nature 
of the justiﬁ  cation, in other words, new 
data or new practical requirements can 
make information content not justiﬁ  ed.13 
11  Sartor, Giovanni. “Proprietà e comunio-
ne del sapere informatico”. In M. Bertani (ed.) 
Open Source, Milano, Giuffré, 126-153. Ref-
erences are from the manuscript available at 
http://www.cirsfid.unibo.it/~sartor/GSCirsfi-
dOnlineMaterials/GSPublications.pdf.
12  There is also reverse engineering that con-
stitutes a inductive method of reconstruction of 
the program in natural language from the ma-
chine language. 
13  Concerning “defeasibility” of knowledge 
and justiﬁ   cation before new circumstances 
see Lewis, David. “Elusive Knowledge”, Aus-
d) a “device” human being (Apparat-
mensch).
Hence the following “un-thingniﬁ  cation” 
(Verundinglichung) of intellectual/im-
material creations in computer terms: bit 
as intangible support (according to Bra-
zilian art. 7 of Law 9610/98). 
Indeed, the notion of intangibility is inad-
equate, since it is built from the nuclear 
physical perception of reality. Properly, the 
bit is not the denial of the tangible (tange-
re as touching with your ﬁ  ngers). There-
fore, a non-thing (Unding) is mentioned. 
The popularized term to express this new 
state or form of being is virtual. The vir-
tual, in this new sense, is not tangible or 
intangible; nor does it bear reference to 
the mere physical possibility by some skill; 
virtual not as a product of virtus/virtue, 
but as ludic, according to a code.
Hence the problem of protecting the con-
tents: not only intellectual creations, but 
also the database.
Take, for instance, the concept of re-
production. Before it was the setting in 
a tangible medium (print), now it is the 
electronic access: storage in digital form 
as an equivalent to reproduction.
This puts in check the storage as a tempo-
rary ﬁ  x, transitory or incidental in nature. 
This applies, for example, to reproduction 
for teaching purposes. Another example 
is remote access as a copy (electronic pro-
cessing and computer use).
Note, then, the convergence of three 
technical elements: digitalization, com-
pression, virtual transmission means. 
Faced with the virtual world, even when 
using artiﬁ   cial storage mechanisms, 
comes the question of criteria for selec- 52 53
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priated (there is no ownership), but the 
Software Law allows it to become inac-
cessible to others.
The apparent conﬂ  ict would be resolved 
when one observes that knowledge can 
be contained in the software itself, in the 
sense that only the owner has access to 
the justiﬁ  cation of the program, but does 
not own it, i.e. you cannot market it or 
legally prevent it from being used by 
others. But the difference, therefore, is 
de facto not legal. If the knowledge con-
tained in literary works is immediately 
disclosed and becomes common with its 
economic exploitation, in the case of soft-
ware, that knowledge can continue to be 
the copyright owner’s even if its use is li-
censed to third parties (where the license 
only allows for the execution of the pro-
gram in object code).
Thus, any extension of rights conferred by 
the author on his program to a third party 
is relevant in determining their function 
(right) as a propagator of knowledge or as 
a simple computing solution. This power 
of the author to modify the legal use of 
software is exercised through the license 
agreement (Law 9609/98, art.9), by which 
software rights are granted to third parties 
(action standards, as permission of use, 
distribution, modiﬁ  cation, etc).
Note that in the license agreement, the 
owner retains the power to change the 
legal status of the work, that is, unlike 
what happens with the intellectual prop-
erty, in which the res (as if it were res: 
thing, Ding), once transferred, will in-
tegrate the assets of the purchaser and 
the licensed work continues under the 
and dispose of their exclusive rights of 
use, which is incorporated by the legisla-
tion on software.
As regards such patrimonial rights, the 
holder of a copyright is the subject of dis-
tinct levels of rules: (i) primarily (rules of 
conduct) the holder of copyright holds, 
with exclusivity, the right to use the 
program, i.e., run it in a machine, copy, 
distribute and modify it (permission of 
use); (ii) secondarily (competence rules) 
the holder of copyright holds the power 
to alter the rules that deﬁ  ne its system of 
use, granting these rights to third parties 
in the whole or in part.16
By legal deﬁ  nition adopted in Brazil (Law 
9609/98, art. 1)17, such rights concern 
both the source code and object code and 
are independent of the registration of the 
work (art.2, § 3).
If the copyright is exclusive to the source 
code and the program in natural lan-
guage is the key to the justiﬁ  cation of the 
program, would there be, here, an exclu-
sive right to knowledge or the idea be-
hind the software?
16  For a discussion of the distinction be-
tween standards of conduct and competence in 
subjective rights, see Alf Ross. Sobre el Derecho 
y la Justicia, Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 1994, p. 
164 et seq. For a conceptualization of primary 
and secondary rules to explain the regulatory 
system, see Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford, 
1997, p. 79 et seq.
17  Law 9609/98, art. 1: Computer program 
is the expression of an organized set of instruc-
tions in natural or codiﬁ  ed language, contained 
in physical support of any kind, of necessary use 
in automatic information processing machines, 
devices, instruments or peripheral equipment, 
based on digital analog techniqu e, to mak e it 
function in the manner and for speciﬁ  c ends of 
11 (not in the original underlined).
the assignment of rights concerning the 
work.14 These rights over works (and not 
the works themselves) are considered 
personal property (Law 9610/98, art. 3).
As an expression of the intellect, the 
work reﬂ  ects and has an intimate con-
nection with the author’s personality, 
hence the moral dimension of such right, 
protected by warranties such as: claim-
ing authorship of the work, having the 
author’s name announced, keeping it 
unpublished, opposing to changes or acts 
that may harm the author’s reputation, 
withdraw the work from circulation or 
suspending any form of use previously 
permitted (Law No. 9610/98, art. 24/also 
Berne Convention). According to the 
Brazilian Law of Copyright, such rights 
are inalienable because they are related 
to the very personality of the creator (the 
law refers to inalienability and impos-
sibility to renounce, art. 27). With re-
gard to software, Law 9610/98 partially 
waives the author’s moral rights, remain-
ing only the right to demand the pater-
nity of the work and that of opposing to 
the reproductions that offend its honor or 
reputation (art. 2, § 1).
On the other hand, there is the protec-
tion of property interests that the author 
may have with respect to his creation. 
That is the order of the rules that grant 
the author the exclusive right of use, 
fruition and disposal (Law 9610/98 art. 
28).15 Under the legal system, authors are 
granted full powers to exploit their works 
14  Bittar, Carlos Alberto. Direito de Autor, 
Forense, São Paulo, 3a ed. 2001, pp. 30-31.
15  For the German Law: Larenz, p. 299.
At this point, it should be noted that 
rights (exclusive use, copy, modiﬁ  ca-
tion, etc.) fall back on the intellectual 
creation, i.e. the form of expression, not 
on the underlying knowledge. So that, 
in the ﬁ  eld of scientiﬁ  c works, “... the 
protection will fall on literary or artis-
tic form, not covering their scientiﬁ  c 
or technical content ...” (Law 9610/98, 
art. 7 § 3). There is no property rights 
for the knowledge involved in creating 
the software, once the idea is not sub-
ject to protection as copyright law (Law 
No. 9610/98, art. 8o, inc. I)18. Thus, al-
though it is perfectly possible to imple-
ment the rule of protection to the form 
of expression for literary works and at 
the same time, allow the propagation of 
knowledge or culture, as a non-appro-
priable product, in the case of softwares, 
in which the language is coded for ex-
ecution through a machine, copyright 
for the source code closes an apparent 
contradiction.
For example, a software can successful-
ly solve the problem of making a robot 
ﬁ  nd the exit of a room by using more 
than one sensor for receiving informa-
tion about presence/absence of obsta-
cles. Without access to the source code, 
however, knowledge can remain private 
to the programmer as could a particular 
idea of paraconsistent logic (which efﬁ  -
ciently processes contradictory informa-
tion) used as the underlying system of 
the programming. This knowledge, un-
der Copyright Law, may not be appro-
18  According to the Berne Convention, the 
„idea” is not subject to protection as “copyright”. 54 55
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vations produced by the original author 
himself may be appropriated, since, obvi-
ously, he does not celebrate the license 
and is not subject to copyleft. There-
fore, it is possible to create junctions in 
the communitarian production chain so 
that the same software can be developed 
in the free regime and have one of its 
derivations appropriated by the original 
author, which is then distributed in the 
closed regime.21
This form of exercising the competence 
of modifying the software, which makes 
its use free turns to the dissemination of 
the program and the knowledge that un-
derlies it, in terms of developing a com-
munitarian and mutual cognitive activity. 
The original computing solution is thus 
subjected to a dynamic of adaptations 
and derivations, so that the underlying 
knowledge is constantly improved and 
these improvements are not owned by 
any user, but remain shared by the com-
munity of programmers (rather than ne-
gotium: nec otium, knowledge/school: 
scholé, otium).
21  See Boyle, James. “The Second Enclosure 
Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain”, available at http://www.law.duke.
edu/journals/66LCPBoyle; Rifkin, J. The age of 
Access: How the shift from ownership to access 
is transforming modern life, London, Penguin, 
2000; Lessig, L. Free Culture: How Big Media 
Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down 
Culture and Control Creativity. New York, Pen-
guin, 2004; Benkler, Y. “Coase’s Penguin, or 
Linux and the nature of the ﬁ  rm”, The Yale Law 
Journal, 2002. Available at: http://www.ben-
kler.org/CoasesPenguin.PDF.
knowledge is a factual result of exercising 
that right.
The legal regime for the assumption 
that free software is not limited to open 
source, including, besides the right to run 
the program and study its source code, 
the right to reproduce, modify and redis-
tribute the software. These permissions 
to third parties, which consist of prima-
ry standards, are added to the so-called 
copyleft, in other words, the requirement 
that any derivations developed by third 
parties be licensed with the same rights, 
or what is the same thing, the prohibition 
of altering, in the derivations, the open 
use regime of the original work. There-
fore, copyleft is the revocation of third 
party competence regarding the disposi-
tion of the derivative work.20 This prohi-
bition (or revocation) acts at the second-
ary normative level.
This possibility of revoking the powers 
and rights of exclusive use of the author 
of the derivative work on the derivation 
does not imply violation of the preroga-
tives of the authorized author? Although, 
admittedly, the author of the derivative 
work is the holder of the rights to deri-
vation, the derivation itself depends, ac-
cording to Law 9610/98, art. 29, inc. III, 
on prior written permission of the origi-
nal work. By the argument a majore ad 
minus, if the originating author may 
20  It is, for example, the regime adopted by 
the GNU GPL (GNU General Public License), 
considered by the Free Software Foundation 
(FSF) as a prototype for the deﬁ  nition of free 
software. For this paper, we will consider as free 
the licensing that meets the FSF‘s deﬁ  nition (ac-
cording to: http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/
free-sw.html).
purview of the author.19 However, there 
is the possibility of total or partial as-
signment of property rights, in which 
case the purchaser becomes the owner 
of copyright (one may use, change the 
rules of use and oppose to use by others), 
incorporating its prerogatives, except for 
moral rights (Law9610/98, art. 49).
Legal regimes for use of the software
The existing rules on copyright laws and 
Software rights do not pre-determine the 
usage regime of the computer program, 
whether proprietary or free, granting, 
rather, the copyright holder broad dispos-
ing powers over the work. Such powers 
are compatible with both regimes. I thus 
examine some license arrangements rel-
evant to this presentation.
Permission to use the software can only 
cover the execution of the program in 
object code, in which case the licensee 
does not develop any cognitive activity 
and only “consumes” a certain comput-
ing solution. 
It may also cover the use of source code 
and the right to study the architecture 
of the program and adapt it to the needs 
of the licensee. In this case, the licensee 
acquires and is interested not only in 
the use of a speciﬁ  c solution but also in 
certain computing knowledge. This is 
the so-called open source software: free 
software. Remember that the subjective 
right rests with the object of creation, ex-
pressed in natural language, and access to 
19  Bittar, op. cit. p. 5.
prohibit the derivation, he may condi-
tion the use of the authorized derivation. 
Copyright, therefore, still maintains the 
original author’s rights on the derivation.
Speciﬁ  cally for software, bearing in mind 
that the moral right to revoke uses of 
previously authorized uses did not sur-
vive, the conditions for the use of deriva-
tive work must be present at the time of 
the authorization. Software Law is even 
clearer about the possibility of condi-
tioning, stating that “the rights of the 
authorized derivations by the holder of 
the rights of the computer program, in-
cluding its economic exploitation, will 
be owned by the authorized person who 
does so, except in contractual stipula-
tion stating otherwise” (Law 9609/98, 
art. 5). Thus, the contract may “revoke” 
the property rights and jurisdiction of the 
derivative author to determine the usage 
regime of the derivation by agreement 
between original author and author of 
the derivation. Obviously, the author of 
the derivative work still maintains moral 
rights to claim authorship and to oppose 
the offensive uses of his derivation.
With copyleft, established as a condition 
for permission of use, the derivations 
eventually produced, become effectively 
communitarian, in the sense that ev-
eryone is allowed to use in all its forms 
and no one is given the power to amend 
such classiﬁ  cation rules. The hypothesis 
of free software is signiﬁ  cant because it 
thus creates an effective chain of creation 
and production of computer knowledge. 
In fact, in this chain, only the originating 
producer holds the power to modify the 
free regime of the derivations. The deri- 56 57
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problematically, by the concept of private 
use in case of downloading.
This has to do with access as a faculty to 
be controlled. Take, for instance, the re-
lationship of the provider in the balance 
between property rights and right to pub-
lic use.
With this, we notice the presence of a 
new key concept: access, where there 
is a new sense of freedom. And, conse-
quently, a signiﬁ  cant change in the legal 
perception of subjective rights.
Subjective right: conclusion.
The classic notion of subjective rights was 
typically built on three factors: (i) a privi-
lege or exclusive advantage to the holder 
that is opposed by a duty of another or of 
all others; (ii) the jurisdiction or power to 
change this legal situation; (iii) the power 
to start procedures upon infringement of 
these rights by others.23
These typical traits of subjective rights are 
based on the notion of freedom as con-
ceived by economic liberalism founded 
on free enterprise and free market and 
where the State played only a protective 
role for those freedoms. It is a common 
knowledge that freedom in this concept 
has a double meaning: of no impediment 
and autonomy. In a negative sense, of no 
impediment, freedom has a connotation 
of resistance, being free is to ensure a 
space for action that resists the free ac-
tion of others. But freedom also appears 
23  This is a simpliﬁ   cation according to the 
dominant legal theory. See Larenz, op. cit. p. 216.
technology: text + image + drawings + 
sounds + photos + programs/software).
Moreover, not only man but also the ma-
chine itself “creates” works of aesthetic 
nature, where there is copyright without 
the author: who is the author? the cre-
ator of the program? 
Thus, arose in place of personalization, 
the functional character of the work and, 
consequently, the depersonalization: what 
determines the work is not the personal 
authorship, but the function it exerts.
Hence, for example, the need for an ef-
fort to identify global identiﬁ  cation sys-
tems for protected content, such as the 
so-called tattoo (type of mark or sign) for 
the opportunity to download a ﬁ  le.
Thus, the cultural object is not indepen-
dent of the creator or those who have ac-
cess to it. It is in terms of communication. 
Hence, its understanding as a necessarily 
social object. Not social in terms of indi-
vidual interaction (nuclear individuals), 
but access communication system that 
only has a social purpose in order to pro-
mote virtual access to culture: as a social 
product, it is only in the dimension of ac-
cess (to access).
This questions the concept of original-
ity, an apparent questioning in the case 
of multimedia. It is not about the quality 
of a substance – the work – either, but 
a functional reference of the work, itself 
perceived as a function of the triad au-
thor/work/public. Hence the uniqueness 
of the setting, with reference to central 
decision of disclosing intellectual creation 
or not, in other words, to make it a work 
or not. By law, only the creator is given to 
start the triad, i.e., the right “to conserve 
Non exclusive Exercise of the 
subjective right of the author
Thus, an important issue to address con-
sists in the character of resignation or 
not the exclusive rights of copyright, 
through licensing of the software under 
a free regime. For the integrated cogni-
tive activity triggered by the opening of 
the original software can be seen as an 
alternative mode of production to the 
model of property and market. As Yo-
chai Benkler shows, in this alternative 
model, which he calls “commons-based 
peer-production”, rather than production 
meaning cost to be paid by the exclusive 
appropriation of the beneﬁ  ts, the costs of 
hiring programmers and program testing 
are reduced to zero, and there is still suf-
ﬁ  cient motivation (given the large num-
ber of participants) for agents to develop 
the productive activity.22 
This affects the perception of the work 
as a manifestation of the personality of 
the creator versus new technologies. Es-
pecially when the creative act is not per-
formed by a subject/persona, but by a 
program (software) capable of producing 
another.
If the 19th Century understood the cre-
ative process as marked by the personal-
ity of the author, today, the creations re-
quire updates and upgrades, or by virtue 
of the interactive process (internet), or 
creation of derivative works (multimedia 
22  Benkler, Yochai, Coase’s Penguin, or 
Linux and the nature of the ﬁ   rm. Yale Law 
Journal. Available at: http://www.benkler.org/
CoasesPenguin.PDF.
the unpublished work” (mentioned in 
Brazilian Law, art. 24, III). Strictly speak-
ing, however, in the functional sense, it 
is the creation that is unpublished. The 
work exists only in the relationship with 
the public. 
This affects the notion of exclusivity: 
right to exclusive use versus virtual avail-
ability. 
Here, the introduced communicative re-
lationship is also regulated so as to safe-
guard the author against public acts, such 
as the right to oppose any act that may 
affect the integrity of the work so as to 
affect him in his honor or reputation (art. 
24, IV). In fact, the functionalization of 
exclusivity makes us realize that an im-
portant rule for this communicative rela-
tionship is ensuring the later manifesta-
tions of the author, through the work, as 
the right to “modify the work, before or 
after use” (art. 24, V). However, in this 
relationship, the public is safeguarded as 
well. Thus the author’s right to interrupt 
the communicative relationship, denying 
public access by “withdrawing the work 
from circulation or suspending any form 
of previously authorized use” is subject 
to a justiﬁ  cation grounded in the right 
to honor. Or the interruption of the rela-
tionship, by the author, who has a privi-
leged position to set forth his will univo-
cally, in regard to the group of undeﬁ  ned 
individuals comprising the “public”, will 
be admitted only “when circulation or 
use imply offense to his reputation and 
image” (art. 24,VI). 
This last rule is clearly directed towards 
the protection of the right to public ac-
cess to the work. This, in turn, is affected,  58 59
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[human beings] are the social context in 
which the limits of each one’s personality 
expands: autonomy, rather than anomie, 
of the individual is the directing image of 
the Constitution. Autonomy should be 
possible in vital spaces that are socially 
connected, where freedom of commu-
nication – or better: common freedom 
cannot be oriented to a limiting concept 
of protection to egocentric expansion, 
but should be understood as the exercise 
of freedom in reciprocity. This freedom 
is not to be free of others, but freedom 
through others.”28
In fact, one can go further, because this 
way, it changes the ancient principle 
that human dignity is focused on indi-
vidual freedom and one’s freedom ends 
where another’s freedom begins. Indeed, 
the environment where communication 
and reciprocity are means for individual 
achievement, dignity focuses on living 
in open communication with each other. 
And here we speak of “means” not as a 
“tool” but as “environment”. Thus, free-
dom in the information society could be 
well captured by the phrase “one’s free-
dom begins where the freedom of oth-
ers begins.”29 Based on this freedom, the 
lawful subject is thought not as an agent 
that dominates the computing products, 
but as an agent that communicates in the 
midst of such property. While the explo-
28  Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem. Rechtliche 
Rahmenbedingungen in Der neue Datenschutz 
Helmut Bäumler (org.) Neuwied/Kriftel, Luch-
terhand, 1998, p. 13. 
29  Ferraz Junior, Tercio Sampaio, A liber-
dade como autonomia recíproca de acesso à in-
formação, in Direito e Internet, RT, São Paulo, 
2001, pp. 241-247.
It is not quite “space” as res materialis or 
even immaterialis. Although it does not 
remove us from the space in which we 
live, culturally it overcomes it (aufhebt). 
We experience, of course, several uses for 
the word space: geographical or territo-
rial, space in the sense of physics, space as 
social, religious environment, regulating 
space (e.g.: domicile as opposed to resi-
dence, jurisdiction), political space (na-
tionality). In common usage, these uses 
interact, which allows us to deal with the 
spaces through categories. The so-called 
cyberspace, in this context, seems to re-
lease us from the territorial bonds, of reg-
ulatory jurisdictions or policies (rechts-
freier Raum), the ﬁ  niteness of a place, 
when casting us in the virtual ubiquity, 
which affects time in terms of simultane-
ity/speed. This causes legal negotiations 
(Rechtsgeschäfte) to be made without 
simultaneous physical presence and yet 
with simultaneous conﬁ  rmatory  wills: 
speedier and speedier webs the spider its 
spider web around the world 27.
From this perception of change in the 
conception of freedom in the comput-
ing ﬁ  eld, whose exercise takes place in 
a relationship of reciprocity, Wolfgang 
Hoffmann-Riem argues that “the right 
to informational self-determination is, 
therefore, not a privatistic defense right of 
the individual who opposes part of soci-
ety, but aims to allow each one to partici-
pate in communication processes. Others 
27  Immer schneller webt die Spinne ihr Netz 
um die Welt. Süddeutsche Zeitung (18.07.1995), 
cited by Flechsig, Norbert in Rechtsprobleme in-
ternationaler Datennetze, Becker, Jürgen (org.), 
Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1996, p. 57.
interpretation.24 Thus, there is hardly a 
substantial unity of subjective rights, but 
legal situations in which the set of appli-
cable rules allows for talk about subjec-
tive rights with their typical or atypical 
features, with respect to its construction 
in the modern era.25
In the scope of the information society, 
the classic notion of freedom as a space 
for action not restricted by the freedom 
of others, which manifests itself on prod-
ucts whose use excludes the use of oth-
ers, tends to suffer revision. As a matter 
of fact, it throws us onto a limit of ab-
straction, whose concept seems to go be-
yond an atypical alternative use. In the 
computing ﬁ  eld, in the absence of physi-
cal limitation, we deal with property (in-
formation and knowledge), whose use by 
one does not exclude use by others. In 
fact, it comes to be conceptually impos-
sible to deﬁ  ne that “one”. Not even as a 
“collective subject”. That is, the space of 
action may continue to be free regardless 
of the action of others. More than that, in 
this sphere, the action space for the sub-
ject is relevant in that it allows for com-
munication with others. Cyberspace26, 
for example, is only built as each space 
of     action for each subject is designed to 
communicate with the others, without 
which the environment itself becomes 
meaningless. 
24  For an analysis of the historical evolution 
of the concept of freedom and subjective right, 
see Ferraz Junior, Tercio Sampaio. Direito e Li-
berdade, in Estudos de Filosoﬁ  a do Direito, At-
las, 2nd ed. 2003, pp. 75 to 132.
25  According to Alf Ross, op. cit. p. 172 et seq. 
26  Essa expressão apareceu pela primeira vez 
num livro de ﬁ  cção cientíﬁ  ca de William Gibson.
in a positive sense of autonomy, of be-
ing able to determined for something and 
through the will use that determination 
valid for others.
The result of this freedom, built in the 
modern era, is the opening to opportuni-
ties for the individual to employ his prod-
ucts in the market without external con-
straints. In fact, this freedom is exercised 
through the property and rights to such 
property, hence the notion of privilege 
or advantage (i). Hence, also, the State’s 
protection against violations of these 
privileges, through the initiation of cer-
tain procedures (ii). Autonomy is insti-
tutionalized in the ﬁ  gure of the contract, 
which is reﬂ  ected in the construction of 
the subjective right as the power of dis-
position of the rights (iii).
This still usual dogmatic construction of 
subjective rights is guided by rules that 
assign duties and competences to indi-
viduals. But we must bear in mind that 
this constitutes a construction, and it in-
strumentalizes these rules. It is not easy 
in the current context, to argue that the 
subjective right constitutes an entity or 
substrate distinct from the rules, or that it 
contains the essence that would comprise 
those three hallmarks. 
Thus, the typical notion of subjective 
right meets a certain conception of free-
dom, which obviously endured and con-
tinues to endure mutations. With these 
mutations, the legal order or the inter-
pretation of the legal order changes, 
which allows for a reinterpretation of 
the very notion of subjective right with 
the underlying conception of freedom as 
a common place (topos) that guides this  60 61
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a concatenated system of concepts, In the 
computer world where the sense of com-
munitarian relations is inherent, its con-
cept seems to slightly slip into the sense of 
subjective legal situation (Duguit)34 and 
from there to precarious positions that 
homo ludens occupies in the network, 
more in the direction of a functional con-
ception (Bobbio)35. This happens, howev-
er, in a truly disturbing manner. For, in a 
world where the amount of information 
is highly complex, the capacity of an indi-
vidual memory overcomes the subjective 
situation, hence the problem of selecting 
information and the necessary actions in 
groups composed of human and artiﬁ  cial 
elements.
That is, the cultural revolution brought 
by the digital world makes us realize that, 
slowly, old and ﬁ  rm notions, such as sub-
jective rights, in addition to no longer be-
ing “the central concept of private law” 
(der zentrale Begriff des Privatsrechts 
– von Tuhr: 1910 – apud Coing), is no 
longer able to handle this disintegration 
into pieces (bits) of the complete struc-
ture of things. For the cultural and, to 
that extent, the legal revolution, which 
enables us to build alternative and par-
allel universes to the supposedly given 
world (Gegebenes), converts the sub-jecti 
– single individuals – in pro-jecti of sev-
eral worlds.
34  Traité de Droit Constitutionel, 3º Ed., 
tome I, p. 307 et seq.
35  Dalla struttura alla funzioni, Milano, Edi-
zone di Comunità, 1977.
In conclusion: for Helmut Coing, in the 
early 60’s (1962), the concept of sub-
jective right, even if not for everything, 
seemed essential for a scientiﬁ  c under-
standing (Erfassung) of private law. Ac-
cordingly, it still seemed to be essential to 
determine to whom the utility (Nutzung) 
and the power to dispose (Verfügungsge-
walt) of a speciﬁ  c legal position (Recht-
sposition) would be transferred (über-
tragen) to deﬁ  ne who is a legitimate part 
(wer zum Rechtsschutz berechtigt ist), in 
other words, to whom the right (wem 
das Recht zusteht) belongs to, above all 
to serve to maintain each one’s freedom 
(Freiheit des einzelnen) in society33.
Subjective rights are emerged and devel-
oped in a structural conception of law as 
for full immediacy of the transparency of dip-
lomatic activity, as shown by Celso Lafer in his 
paper Vazamentos, sigilo, diplomacia: a propósi-
to do signiﬁ  cado do WikiLeaks, in Política Ex-
terna, vol. 19, nº 4, mar/abr/maio, São Paulo, 
2011, p. 12: “The great sea of     information leaked 
by WikiLeaks has been revealing more or less 
questionable conduct. (...) The scandal, in addi-
tion to being a part of the political battle may 
also provide entertainment and trivialization of 
what is discussed in public spaces, generating, 
in the words of Mario Vargas Llosa, an “infor-
mative exhibitionism” that, besides questioning 
the dominance of the private, hinders the good 
functioning of democratic institutions. I would 
therefore say, in conclusion, that the WikiLeaks 
phenomenon is primarily a precedent that, facil-
itated by the Digital Revolution, manufactured a 
type of risk that undermines the fullness of the 
activity of informing, negotiating and represent-
ing the diplomatic function. I believe that not 
even human beings, in their unique individu-
ality, or the institutionalized diplomatic activity 
can support, with ease, the daily immediacy of 
the lights of full transparency”.
33  Zur Geschichte des Privatrechtssytems 
Frankfurt a/Main, 1962, p. 54.
violations of those rights, in other words, 
for the protection of this reciprocal free-
dom. The violation occurs precisely in the 
attempt to appropriate, i.e. the exclusion 
of agents members of this free activity. 
These rules give the subjective right a dis-
tinct conﬁ  guration from the classic: the 
author does not lose the advantage of us-
ing the product, but this advantage is no 
longer a privilege that excludes the other, 
to include it.30
The third revolution, the digital revolu-
tion, thus seems to be destroying the old 
public space. Ortega y Gasset31 has been 
overcome: In the current revolution of 
the masses – which occurs now – the cir-
cumstance becomes ego and the ego be-
comes circumstance.
With the substitution of writing by digits, 
the world of images replaces the world of 
concepts; the public space of the right be-
comes the space of appearance in a new 
sense: show, spectacle. Indeed, instead of 
reading, roaming.32
30  Although there is the possibility of priva-
tistic (exclusive) exploration, this is not the only 
way to beneﬁ  t from intellectual creation. The 
beneﬁ  t may be granted by the very interaction of 
an undetermined number of programmers who 
can enhance the creation, testing the work and 
developing it to solve new problems and adapt 
the original program to new requirements. In 
turn, this communication and the spread of use 
of software to create conditions for that comput-
ing knowledge to be standardized, which could 
mean a gain for the creator as it dominates the 
standardized technology.
31  La rebelión de las masas, in Obras Com-
pletas, II vol., Madrid, 1947, p. 19 (yo soy yo y 
mis circunstancias)
32  Take, for example, the preservation of 
the activity of informing, representing and ne-
gotiating, which in good faith, justiﬁ  es in a de-
mocracy, the existence of certain limits (rights) 
ration of the manufactured property (the 
machine world) is exercised with the ex-
clusion of others, the retribution due to 
the recognition of the value of digital au-
thorship is not exercised with the exclu-
sion of the public, but begins with it and 
assumes it.
For example: take a form, any linkable 
numerical algorithm; introduce this form, 
through a computer, in a plotter, ﬁ  ll this 
form as much as possible with particles, 
and observe: “worlds” will emerge.
But with one important difference.
In the digital world, the intellectual or 
cultural or immaterial product, whatev-
er it may be called, ceases to be the re-
sult of a process in which what is given 
(Gegebenes) is converted into something 
that is made (Gemachtes). In this pro-
cess, human activity diverts (entwendet) 
something (Gegebenes) from its natural 
course, to convert it (umwenden) into 
something manufactured (Gemachtes), 
to give it applicability (anwenden) in a 
market of exchanges (object of exchange) 
and use it (verwenden) as its own (object 
of use). In the digital process, it is just a 
spin (wenden) of one (pro)gram into an-
other (pro)gram.
Observe again, for example, the so- called 
“free” exploration of the software. In the 
relationship established by the free soft-
ware license, all licensees, patients of the 
exercise of their right to exploit the work, 
are also agents in the sense that they con-
sume the computing solution and at the 
same time, at least potentially, produce it 
and make it circulate. Moreover, to any 
member of the chain of licenses it is pos-
sible to seek judicial protection against  62 63
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of power, we do not only ask whether 
and how we should protect human be-
ings from harmful consequences for life 
and body, but also whether we should 
permit or prohibit the use of this power 
at all. The question is raised whether per-
sons have a right to do what they want 
with their own nature (and the nature of 
their descendants). That human nature 
is “inviolable” or not at one´s discretion, 
has already been debated with regard to 
abortion or to mercy killing. The legal 
concept of “inviolability” has its origin in 
a somewhat different context – the idea 
that fundamental human rights and hu-
man dignity are inalienable with regard 
to the state and its monopoly of power 
by which it can intervene in and dispose 
of the rights. Today the discussion focuses 
on the question whether persons should 
be prohibited to dispose of their rights 
and their dignity at their own discretion.
As a legal concept, “inviolability” (or in-
alienabilty) is paradoxical at ﬁ  rst glance. 
It is a common experience that human 
nature as well as human rights and hu-
man dignity are and can be violated. It 
happens every day. If one reads it not as 
a statement of fact but as a prohibition, 
the question is whether this concept adds 
anything to the standard instruments 
of legal protection against violations of 
rights and dignity. With regard to inter-
ventions in human nature this questions 
becomes even more severe, because we 
do not only deal with cases of third party 
violations but of voluntary interventions 
of the legal subject in its own nature. “In-
violability” then could mean that there 
might be a limitation of human inter-
  Jurídica“, São Paulo, Editora Revista  
  dos Tribunais, 1998;
•  “Estudos de Filosoﬁ  a do Direito”, 
  São Paulo, Editora Atlas, 2002;
•  “A Invenção do Futuro – Um 
  debate sobre a pós-modernidade e  
  a hipermodernidade”, São Paulo,  
  Editora Manole, 2005;
•  “Direito Constitucional”, São Paulo,  
  Editora Manole, 2007;
•  “Poder Econômico”, São Paulo,    
  Editora Manole, 2008;
•  “Introducción al estudio del  
  Derecho”, Madrid, Marcial Pons   
  Ediciones Jurídicas y Sociales, 2009;
•  “Introdução ao Estudo do Direito:  
  Técnica, Decisão, Dominação”, São  
  Paulo, Editora Atlas, 6ª edição, 2010.
PLENARY LECTURE
Unviolability as a Legal Concept 
Prof. Dr. Klaus Günther, 
Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 9.30 h – 10.15 h
Location HZ 1/2
Abstract:
Science and technology have increased 
the power of humankind to intervene 
in nature and to subdue nature to the 
intentions and purposes of human be-
ings. Francis Bacon`s famous equation 
of scientiﬁ  c knowledge with power has 
become a central part of the self-un-
derstanding of modern societies. Hand 
About the author:
Prof. Dr. Tercio Sampaio Ferraz Junior
Born in São Paulo, Brazil, on July 2nd, 
1941.
•  PhD in Philosophy at Johannes 
 Gutenberg-Universität 
  of Mainz (1968)
•  PhD in Law at University of 
  São Paulo (1970)
•  Privatdocent at University of 
  São Paulo (1974)
•  Full Professor at University of 
  São Paulo (1979)
Major publications:
•  Die Zweidimensionalität des Rechts
  als Voraussetzung für den Metho- 
  dendualismus von Emil Lask”, Anton  
  Hain Verlag, Meisenheim/Glan, 1970;
•  „Direito, Retórica e Comunicação“,  
  São Paulo, Editora Saraiva, 1973;
•  „Conceito de Sistema no Direito“, São  
  Paulo, Editora Revista dos Tribunais/ 
 EDUSP,  1976;
•  „Teoria da Norma Jurídica“, Rio de  
  Janeiro, Editora Forense, 1978;
•  „Democracia e Participação“, Brasília,  
  Editora Universidade de Brasília,  
 1979;
•  „A Ciência do Direito“, São Paulo,  
  Editora Atlas, 2ª edição, 1980;
•  „Constituinte - Assembléia, processo,  
  Poder“, São Paulo, Editora Revista 
  dos Tribunais, 2ª edição, 1986;
•  „Interpretação e Estudos da   
  Constituição de 1988“, São Paulo,  
  Editora Atlas, 1990;
•  „Função Social da Dogmática    
in hand with the process of increasing 
power over nature goes the experience 
of new risks and dangers for human life 
resulting from the use and abuse of this 
power. The examples range from railway 
accidents in the 19th century to the risks 
and damages caused by nuclear energy 
nowadays. As far as human life and body 
are concerned, civil law and public law 
developed new instruments to deal with 
these cases of accidents. What these ex-
amples have in common is that nobody 
challenged the practice of human inter-
vention in nature itself, only dangerous 
consequences of the scientiﬁ  c and tech-
nological use of nature are subjected to 
legal regulation. Only recently this pic-
ture has changed. Science and technol-
ogy today provide us with a new kind of 
power – with the power to intervene in 
human nature. Of course, human beings 
always had the ability to gain and to use 
knowledge about human nature in order 
to save them from illness and the danger 
of death. But today we are confronted 
with the possibility to change human na-
ture by enhancing human biology, e.g. by 
genetic engineering or neurological en-
hancement. With regard to this new kind 
*  Professor of Philosophy and Pete Kameron 
Professor of Law and Social Justice, UCLA. For 
enlightening criticism and commentary, I am 
grateful to Mark Greenberg, Jeffrey Helmreich, 
Barbara Herman, Heidi Kitrosser, Terry Sted-
man, participants in the Columbia Legal Theory 
Workshop, the Princeton Program in Ethics and 
Public Affairs and my free speech seminars at 
UCLA, and, of course, the members of the free 
speech discussion group from which this paper 
originates, especially Ed Baker and Steve Shiff-
rin. Terry Stedman also provided invaluable re-
search assistance. 64 65
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In saying a thinker-based foundation un-
dergirds the most important free speech 
protections, I mean ‘most important’ in 
a normative sense, and not in the sense 
that they are necessarily acknowledged 
as such, or at all, in contemporary free 
speech doctrine.2 My paper aims to iden-
tify strong theoretical foundations for the 
protection of free speech but not to pro-
vide the best theoretical account of our 
system or our current practices of pro-
tecting (or failing to protect, as the case 
may be)3 free speech. Articulating a the-
ory of free speech along the former, more 
ideal lines, provides us with a framework 
to assess whether our current practic-
es are justiﬁ  ed or not, as well as which 
ones are outliers. An ideal theoretical ap-
Amendment and the Scientiﬁ   c Method, 2005 
WIS. L. REV. 1479; Neil M. Richards, Intellectual 
Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008); Christina 
E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom 
and Responsibility in the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 159 (1997). Although Ed Baker’s writ-
ing often suggests a speaker-based approach, in 
email correspondence about a draft of this paper 
he indicated that his true sympathies lay with a 
thinker-based approach. E-mail from Ed Baker 
to Seana Shiffrin (Feb. 13, 2009) (on ﬁ  le with 
author).
2.   Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Methodology in 
Free Speech Theory, 97 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2011) (defending a normative approach to free 
speech theory that does not take explanation of 
extant doctrine as foundational).
3.  One free speech howler from the most 
recent term around which I would not care to 
tailor a free speech theory is Holder v. Humani-
tarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730–31 
(2010) (upholding Congressional prohibition 
of assistance to designated terrorist organiza-
tions, including its application to mere speech 
that provides advice on how to petition the U.N. 
or how to use legal means to resolve conﬂ  icts 
peacefully).
PLENARY LECTURE
A Thinker-Based Approach To 
Freedom Of Speech 
Prof. Dr. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 
University of California, 
Los Angeles / USA*
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 11.30 h – 12.15 h
Location HZ 1/2
Abstract:
Introduction
Many contemporary autonomy theories 
of freedom of speech champion the per-
spective and freedom of just one side of 
the communicative relation – usually, 
the speaker or the listener(s). Such ap-
proaches seem to neglect or subordinate 
the autonomy interests of the other rel-
evant parties. Other autonomy theories 
do not privilege one perspective on the 
communicative relation over another, 
but strangely treat the speakers’ interests 
and the listeners’ autonomy interests as 
rather discrete entities – disparate con-
stituents both demanding our attention. 
Both strands gloss over a source of justiﬁ  -
cation for free speech that both connects 
the two perspectives and recognizes the 
wider foundations that underpin their 
value (by contrast with the more narrow 
connections drawn between them by de-
mocracy theories). Speciﬁ  cally, both ap-
proaches celebrate one or more external 
manifestations of thought but do not fo-
cus on the source of speech and cogni-
vention inherent in human nature itself. 
But what could that mean if one does 
not refer to theological or metaphysical 
assumptions (e.g. the argument that hu-
man life is donated to us by God)? And 
what could that mean in a legal context?
About the author:
Klaus Günther, born in 1957, Professor of 
Legal Theory, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Procedure at Goethe University of Frank-
furt Faculty of Law (1998-); Co-Speaker 
Cluster of Excellence EXC 243 Formation 
of Normative Orders at Goethe University 
(2007-); Member of Board of Directors In-
stitute of Social Research (IfS) Frankfurt; 
Member of Board of Directors Institute of 
Advanced Study in the Humanities (For-
schungskolleg Humanwissenschaften) 
Bad Homburg v.d.H. (2006-); studied Phi-
losophy and Law in Frankfurt, First Law 
Degree Frankfurt 1983; Dr. jur Frankfurt 
1987; Habilitation Criminal Law and Phi-
losophy of Law Frankfurt 1997; Fellow In-
stitute of Advanced Study (Wissenschaft-
skolleg) Berlin 1995/96; Visiting Professor 
SUNY at Buffalo (2000), Corpus Christi 
College Oxford (2001), Maison des Sci-
ences de l`Homme Paris (2003).
tion – namely the thinker herself – and 
the conditions necessary for freedom of 
thought. I submit that a more plausible 
autonomy theory of freedom of speech 
arises from taking the free thinker as the 
central ﬁ  gure in a free speech theory and 
that we should understand freedom of 
speech as, centrally, protecting freedom 
of thought.
Hence, I propose to sketch a particular 
sort of autonomy theory of freedom of 
speech, namely a thinker-based foun-
dation for freedom of speech. Although 
this account does not capture all of the 
values of freedom of speech or yield a 
comprehensive theory of freedom of 
speech, a thinker-based foundation can 
provide a stronger and more coherent 
foundation for the most important free 
speech protections than rival free speech 
theories, including the more common 
speaker-based or listener-based autono-
my theories.  1
1.   I have explored some aspects of a thinker-
based approach in prior work. Vincent Blasi & 
Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia 
Board of Education v. Barnette, in CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW STORIES 433 (Michael Dorf ed., 2d ed. 
2009); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What is Really 
Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. 
L. REV. 839 (2005). I do not mean to represent 
Vince as endorsing the general thinker-oriented 
approach I outline above, however. Some other 
authors have explored aspects of thinker-based 
a p p r o a c h e s  a s  w e l l ,  a l t h o u g h  f r o m  d i f f e r e n t  
angles and with different emphases. See, e.g., 
CHARLES F RIED, MODERN LIBERTY 95–123 (2007); 
TIMOTHY M ACKLEM, INDEPENDENCE  OF M IND 1–32 
(2006); SUSAN W ILLIAMS, TRUTH, AUTONOMY,  AND 
SPEECH: FEMINIST T HEORY  AND  THE F IRST A MEND-
MENT 130–229 (2004); Charles Fried, The New 
First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to 
Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (1992); Dana 
Remus Irwin, Freedom of Thought: The First  66 67
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A good free speech theory should iden-
tify a non-contingent and direct founda-
tion for its protection. On the other hand, 
protection for commercial and non-press, 
business corporate speech is a less central 
matter, one that reasonably may involve 
weaker protections and may reasonably 
rely heavily on more instrumental con-
cerns. A good free speech theory should 
explain why commercial and business 
corporate speech may be different and 
why arguing for their protection may be 
a less straightforward matter.
Brieﬂ   y put, I believe these desiderata 
are best satisﬁ  ed by a thinker-based free 
speech theory that takes to be central the 
individual agent’s interest in the protec-
tion of the free development and op-
eration of her mind. Legal materials (by 
which I mean to encompass laws, regu-
lations, court rulings, and resolutions) 
and government activity inconsistent 
with valuing this protection are incon-
sistent with a commitment to freedom 
of speech. In my view, legal materials or 
activity may be inconsistent with valuing 
this protection in three main ways: (1) 
the legal materials or the government ac-
present no weaker of a case for protection. My 
aim is to develop an approach that does not rely 
on the idea that particular, personal expression 
is protected because its expression reasonably 
presents itself as akin to, or on a spectrum with, 
felt obligations of the speaker, interference of 
which would be unreasonable by the polity, but 
rather, an approach that is fully consistent with 
the admission that much personal and artistic 
speech is banal and unimportant in the grand 
scheme of things. A broader focus on the condi-
tion of the thinker, rather than on the (percei-
ved) signiﬁ  cance of the expression, seems better 
able to satisfy that desideratum.
which I mean there should not be a lexi-
cal hierarchy of value between them, nor 
should the protections for some depend 
dominantly on their playing an instru-
mental role in securing the conditions 
for the ﬂ  ourishing practice of another. To 
put it more pointedly, an adequate free 
speech theory will avoid the convolu-
tions associated with the more narrow 
democracy theories of freedom of speech 
and their efforts to explain why abstract 
art and music should gain free speech 
protection. Although a case could be 
made that the freedom to compose and 
to listen to Stravinsky is important to de-
veloping the sort of open personal and 
cultural character necessary for democ-
racy to ﬂ  ourish or that it feeds the “so-
ciological structure that is prerequisite for 
the formation of public opinion,”  5 that 
justiﬁ  cation is strained and bizarrely indi-
rect.6 In any case, the right of Stravinsky 
5.   See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy 
and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. X, 10 (forthcom-
ing 2011).
6.  Jim Weinstein offers a refreshingly can-
did admission of this difﬁ  culty. James Weinsten, 
Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of 
American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 201 1). No more successful is the 
argument that democracy theories will protect 
the arts because to understand one another and 
to form a conception about what should be a 
public matter, we must have access to the forms 
of expression others engage in and deem impor-
tant. See, e.g., Robert Post, Participatory De-
mocracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2011) (“So long as Brokeback Mountain, 
and indeed all forms of communication that 
sociologically we recognize as art, form part of 
the process by which society ponders what it be-
lieves and thinks, it is protected under a theory 
of the First Amendment that stresses democratic 
participation.”) This justiﬁ  cation is circuitous. It 
proach also supplies both a measure for 
reform and some structural components 
to form the framework to assess new 
sorts of cases.
Which freedom of speech protections 
ﬁ  gure among the most important is, of 
course, contested. My position in that 
contest is that a decent regime of free-
dom of speech must provide a principled 
and strong form of protection for political 
speech and, in particular, for incendiary 
speech and other forms of dissent, for re-
ligious speech, for ﬁ  ction, art – whether 
abstract or representational – and music, 
for diaries and other forms of discourse 
meant primarily for self-consumption, 
and for that private speech and dis-
course, e.g. personal conversations and 
letters, crucial to developing, pursuing, 
and maintaining personal relationships.  4
Further, all of these forms of expression 
should enjoy foundational protection, by 
4.  These are, of course, theoretically in-
formed, provisional starting points that strike 
me as highly intuitive, secure, illuminating, 
and important lodestars. Nonetheless, if a plau-
sible theory cannot be found that supports and 
explains these judgments or if a more plausible 
theory would reject them for good reason, these 
judgments should be revised or discarded. That 
is, I regard their identiﬁ  cation as just an early 
step in a process aimed at achieving reﬂ  ective 
equilibrium and not as ﬁ  xed or immutable ‘re-
s ul ts ’  th a t  m u s t  b e  a c c o mm o d a t e d,  n o  m a tt e r  
what the other theoretical costs. See JOHN RAW-
LS, A THEORY  OF J USTICE 17–21, 46–53 (Original 
ed. 1971) (discussing reﬂ  ective  equilibrium). 
Further, the argument that follows does not, 
largely, use these starting points as premises. 
So, subscription to these starting points is not 
a precondition for the argument’s success; it is 
merely that their accommodation and expla-
nation seems to be desiderata of a satisfactory 
theory.
to compose and of audiences to listen (or 
to cringe in non-comprehension) should 
not depend upon whether The Rite of 
Spring breeds democrats or fascists, or 
whether it supports, detracts from, or is 
superﬂ  uous to a democratic culture.7
is parasitic upon others’ developing the art form 
(which now we must have access to in order to 
understand them and their preferences) but ei-
ther: does not provide foundational support for 
their freedom to develop it, or if it does, the ar-
gument lacks a fundamentally and speciﬁ  cally 
democratic form that is independent of and logi-
cally prior to an appeal to the interests of the 
autonomous thinker.
7.  Joshua Cohen offers a far less narrow dem-
ocratic account of free expression, one grounded 
in his deliberative democratic approach. His ap-
proach shows sensitivity to the interests of the 
citizen qua thinker and his approach provides 
a more plausible grounding for art, religious 
speech, erotic speech, and other forms of speech 
that are not explicitly or even indirectly political. 
Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, 22 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 207 (1993), reprinted in JOSHUA COHEN, 
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, DEMOCRACY 98, 114–20 (2009); 
Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIB-
ERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185 (Jon Elster ed., 1998), re-
printed in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, supra 
at 223, 248–54; Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and 
Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
67 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997), 
reprinted in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, supra 
at 16, 32–34 (2009).
Although our approaches are fairly congenial, 
Cohen’s case for rights of personal, non-political 
expression is usually voiced in terms of what the 
citizen “reasonably takes to be compelling consi-
derations” or “substantial reasons” for expressi-
on (emphasis added). See, e.g., Cohen, Freedom 
of Expression, supra at 115–17; Cohen, Demo-
cracy and Liberty, supra at 248–50. By contrast, I 
ﬁ  nd unnecessary and over-demanding his stress 
upon agents’ having substantial, compelling or 
obligatory reasons for their particular expressi-
on. Putting aside the peculiarly intense drive of 
the single-minded artist, many citizens’ reasons 
for most of their speech, including a variety of 
images, melodies, artistic or quotidian thoughts, 
lack that charge. Nonetheless, in my view, they  68 69
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an explicit, albeit perhaps partial, elab-
oration of the interests of autonomous 
thinkers.
If we do value ourselves as rational agents 
with the capacities previously described, 
then I submit we should recognize a 
more articulated (though sometimes 
overlapping) list of interests that emerge 
from our possession of these valuable ca-
pacities.
Namely, every individual, rational, hu-
man agent qua thinker has interests in:
a. A capacity for practical 
and theoretical thought.
Each agent has an interest in developing 
her mental capacities to be receptive of, 
appreciative of, and responsive to rea-
sons and facts in practical and theoretical 
thought, i.e. to be aware of and appropri-
ately responsive to the true, the false, and 
the unknown.
b. Apprehending the true.
Each agent has an interest in believing 
and understanding true things about her-
self, including the contents of her mind, 
and the features and forces of the envi-
ronment from which she emerges and in 
which she interacts.
c. Exercising the imagination.
Rational agents also have interests in un-
derstanding and intellectually exploring 
non-existent possible and impossible en-
vironments. Such mental activities allow 
agents the ability to conceive of the fu-
ture and what could be. Further, the abil-
ity to explore the non-existent and im-
possible provides an opportunity for the 
sume that our possession and exercise of 
these capacities correctly constitute the 
core of what we value about ourselves. 
I will not say much to defend these as-
sumptions. I do not regard them as espe-
cially controversial. Indeed, many popu-
lar theories of freedom of speech only 
make sense if the individual mind and 
the autonomy of its operation (a notion 
I will say more about below) are valued 
and treated with respect. If we did not 
regard the autonomy of the individual 
mind as important, it is hard to see why 
we would value its expression or outputs 
in the way and to the degree that truth 
theories or democratic theories value 
speech. The same holds true of speaker-
based and listener-based theories.10 Still, 
each theory shares the presupposition 
that the autonomous thinker fundamen-
tally matters, speaker, listener, and de-
mocracies theories start from an interme-
diate point and hone in on one activity of 
the thinker, rather than on the thinker 
herself. Reasoning from the standpoint of 
the thinker and her interests can yield a 
more comprehensive, uniﬁ  ed foundation 
for much of the freedom of speech pro-
tection than is yielded by starting from a 
more partial intermediate point.
My aim in what follows is to show the 
supportive connection between valuing 
ourselves as so described and: (1) valuing 
Symposium, Do Children Have the Same First 
Amendment Rights as Adults?, 79 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 3 (2004).
10.  Some purely instrumental theories of 
freedom of speech that focus on the importance 
of controlling the excesses of state authority may 
differ on this point.
tivity may, on their face, ban or attempt 
to ban the free development and opera-
tion of a person’s mind or those activi-
ties or materials necessary for its free de-
velopment and operation; (2) the effect 
of the legal materials, or of the activity, 
may objectionably interfere with the free 
development and operation of a person’s 
mind; (3) the rationale for the materials, 
or the activity, may be inconsistent with 
valuing this protection.  8
In developing this position I will proceed 
from the assumption that, for the most 
part, we are individual human agents 
with signiﬁ   cant (though importantly 
imperfect) rational capacities, emotional 
capacities, perceptual capacities and ca-
pacities of sentience – all of which exert 
inﬂ  uence upon each other.9 I will also as-
8.   See also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, 
Death and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1135, 
1164–71 (2003).
9.   In some of us, these capacities are ﬂ  edg-
l i n g ,  p a r t i a l ,  o r  c o m p r o m i s e d .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  
agents with them have an interest in their de-
velopment and operation. Although the degree 
of development and future potential may make 
some difference in some cases and contexts, I do 
not think that, at base, a free speech theory de-
livers fundamentally different results depending 
upon whether we are discussing children, the 
mentally disabled, those suffering dementia, or 
fully formed adults. The most salient context in 
which degree of development might be thought 
normatively to make a difference, the school-
room, seems better explained by reference to 
time, place, and manner restrictions than to the 
developmental level of children. This, of course, 
is a normative claim and one that does not en-
tirely square with doctrinal developments over 
the last twenty years. For discussions of chil-
dren and the First Amendment see Blasi & Shif-
frin, supra note 1; Colin M. Macleod, A Liberal 
Theory of Freedom of Expression for Children, 
79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 (2004.) See generally 
speech; (2) valuing freedom of speech; 
(3) regarding speech as, in some politi-
cally and legally normative respects, spe-
cial. With respect to this last item, contra 
Fred Schauer, I deny that an autonomy 
theory of free speech must show that 
speech is special or unique with respect 
to its relation to autonomy, in order to 
justify strong protections for freedom of 
speech. It may succeed at that justiﬁ  ca-
tory project while articulating values that 
cast a broader net encompassing other 
forms of autonomous activity.11 Indeed, 
I regard it as a general strength of au-
tonomy theories that they explain the 
continuity between speech protections 
and rights of intimate association. But, 
although the plausibility of a theory of 
strong protections for freedom of speech 
does not depend upon its showing that 
speech is special, nonetheless, I do think 
speech occupies a special place in the life 
and politically germane needs of the au-
tonomous thinker. It is worth showing 
how it is both special and, at the same 
time, how it connects to other autonomy 
interests.
Autonomous Agents And 
Freedom Of Speech
Having stated my aspirations, let me 
move on to the argument. I begin with 
11.  Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Spe-
cial?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284 (1984). Some of 
Post’s criticisms of autonomy theories of freedom 
of speech appear to be versions of the complaint 
that such theories cannot explain why speech is 
special. See Post, supra note 5, at 3–4, 12. 70 71
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the individual one is by others. If what 
makes one a distinctive individual qua 
person is largely a matter of the contents 
of one’s mind,14 to be known by others 
requires the ability to transmit the con-
tents of one’s mind to others. Although 
some information about one’s thoughts 
and beliefs may be gleaned from observa-
tion, such inferences are typically coarse-
grained at best and cannot track the de-
tail and nuance of the inner life of the 
observed. Communication of the con-
tents of one’s mind primarily through lin-
guistic means, but also through pictorial, 
or even musical representation, uniquely 
furthers the interest in being known by 
others. It thereby also makes possible 
complex forms of social life. 15 Further, 
it helps to develop some of the capaci-
14.  I do not mean what individuates one as 
a creature. In that respect, physical features in-
cluding one’s genetic composition and perhaps 
other physical, non-mental facts may be impor-
tant.
15.  This consideration ﬁ   gured large among 
the motivations behind Kant’s views about 
truthfulness and lying. See Immanuel Kant, Of 
Ethical Duties Towards Others, and Especially 
Truthfulness, in LECTURES  ON E THICS 200–209 
(Peter Heath & J.B. Schneewind eds., trans. Pe-
ter Heath, 1997). Of course, individuals may not 
fully know themselves and, further, may be self-
deceived. Hence, they may not be fully equipped 
to share all of the contents of their minds with 
others and to enable others fully to know them-
selves directly through testimony. This does 
not diminish my point. Even when people are 
self-deceived, what they take to be their beliefs, 
emotions and other mental contents is an im-
portant aspect of who they are; further, shar-
ing these contents with others and confronting 
the reactions of others and their observations of 
one’s contrary behavior is often crucial to re-
solving and eliminating self-ignorance and self-
deception.
is and having others treat her morally 
well.
This list may not be exhaustive, but I 
believe it identiﬁ   es some of the more 
foundational and central interests that 
agents have, independent of their spe-
ciﬁ   c projects, interests, and desires, 
but just in virtue of their capacities for 
thought, broadly understood to include 
autonomous deliberation and reactions, 
practical judgment, and moral relations. 
Brieﬂ  y summarized, these are interests 
in self-development, self-knowledge, 
knowledge of others, others’ knowledge 
of and respect for oneself, knowledge 
of the environments in which they in-
teract, opportunities for the exercise of 
one’s intellectual capacities including 
the imagination, and the intellectual 
prerequisites of moral relations.  13
Speech, and free speech in particular, are 
necessary conditions of the realization 
of these interests. First, given the opac-
ity of our minds to one another, speech 
and expression are the only precise av-
enues by which one can be known as 
13.   In other work, I have argued that it is a 
mandatory, central (and fully liberal) aim of law 
to accommodate and facilitate individuals’ abil-
ity to engage in moral agency. See Seana Valen-
tine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On 
the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1214, 1222–29 (2010); Seana Valentine Shif-
frin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 713–19 (2007). Although 
I have mainly focused on other legal contexts 
of moral accommodation and facilitation, free 
speech protections may represent the most im-
portant legal context for the legal support of 
agents’ moral capacities. See also Seana Valen-
tine Shiffrin, Compelled Association, Morality, 
and Market Dynamics, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 
324–26 (2007).
contents on the basis of reasons, percep-
tions, and reactions through processes 
that, in the main and over the long term, 
are independent of distortive inﬂ  uences. 
So too they have an interest in reveal-
ing and sharing these mental contents at 
their discretion, i.e. at the time at which 
those contents seem to them correct, apt, 
or representative of themselves as well to 
those to whom (and at that time) such 
revelations and the relationship they 
forge seem appropriate or desirable. This 
is the intellectual aspect of being an au-
tonomous agent. In saying these process-
es are independent of distortive inﬂ  uenc-
es, I mean they do not follow a trajectory 
fully or largely scripted by forces external 
to the person that are distinct from the 
reasons and other features of the world 
to which she is responding.
g. Living among others.
Each rational, human agent has an inter-
est in living among other social, autono-
mous agents who have the opportunities 
to develop their capacities in like ways. 
Satisfaction of this interest does not 
merely serve natural desires for compan-
ionship but crucially enables other inter-
ests qua thinker to be achieved, includ-
ing the development and recognition of a 
distinctive self and character, the acquisi-
tion and conﬁ  rmation of knowledge, and 
the development and exercise of moral 
agency.
h. Appropriate recognition 
and treatment.
Each agent has an interst in being recog-
nized by other agents for the person she 
exercise of the philosophical capacities 
and the other parts of the imagination.  12
d. Becoming a distinctive individual.
Each agent has an interest in developing 
a personality and engaging more broadly 
in a mental life that, while responsive 
to reasons and facts, is distinguished 
from others’ personalities by individuat-
ing features, emotions, reactions, traits, 
thoughts, and experiences that contrib-
ute to a distinctive perspective that em-
bodies and represents each individual’s 
separateness as a person.
e. Moral agency.
Each agent has an interest in acquiring 
the relevant knowledge base and char-
acter traits as well as forming the rel-
evant thoughts and intentions to com-
ply with the requirements of morality. 
(This interest, of course, may already be 
contained in the previously articulated 
interests in developing the capacity for 
practical and theoretical thought, ap-
prehending the true, and exercising the 
imagination (a-c)).
f. Responding authentically.
Each agent has an interest in pursuing (a-
e) through processes that represent free 
and authentic forms of internal creation 
and recognition. By this, I mean rough-
ly that rational agents have an interest 
in forming thoughts, beliefs, practical 
judgments, intentions and other mental 
12.  See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagi-
nation: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE 
L.J. 1, 38–39 (2002). 72 73
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Of course, prisoners in solitary conﬁ  ne-
ment endure more than just the lack of 
conversation and the absence of inter-
locutors; they lack fundamental forms of 
control over their lives, other sorts of in-
teractions with persons, and other forms 
of perceptual access to reality. But, most 
other prisoners lack this sort of control 
and lack broader forms of access to the 
world and yet do not suffer the degree 
of devastation to mental function that 
prisoners in solitary conﬁ  nement  do.21 
“Whether in Walpole or Beirut or Hanoi, 
all human beings experience isolation 
as torture.”22 What seems to push them 
over the edge is the absence of regular, 
bilateral, communication. My worry is 
that to forbid or substantially to restrict 
free expression is not tantamount to soli-
tary incarceration but lies on a spectrum 
with it: it is to institute a sort of solitary 
conﬁ  nement outside of prison but within 
one’s mind.
So, in short, the view I am attracted to 
is that it is essential to the appropriate 
development and regulation of the self, 
and of one’s relation to others, that one 
have wide-ranging access to the opportu-
nity to externalize one’s mental contents, 
to have the opportunity to make one’s 
mental contents known to others in an 
unscripted and authentic way, and that 
one has protection from unchosen inter-
ference with one’s mental contents from 
processes that would disrupt or disable 
the operation of these processes. That 
21.  See id. at 125.
22.  Atul Gawande, Hellhole, THE NEW YORKER, 
Mar. 30, 2009, at 36 (emphasis added). 
ers need access to other thinkers under 
conditions in which their mental con-
tents may be known with some degree 
of precision, explicitly recognized as 
such, and reacted to, is partially but poi-
gnantly conﬁ  rmed by the evidence of the 
disastrous effects of involuntary solitary 
conﬁ   nement. Prisoners in solitary con-
ﬁ  nement deteriorate mentally and emo-
tionally. They progressively lose their grip 
on reality, suffering hallucinations and 
paranoia, and many become psychotic.  18 
“Human beings rely on social contact 
with others to test and validate their per-
ceptions of the environment. Ultimately, 
a complete lack of social contact makes it 
difﬁ  cult to distinguish what is real from 
what is not or what is external from what 
is internal.”19 Prisoners subject to solitary 
conﬁ   nement suffer terrible depression, 
despair and anxiety; moreover, their 
emotional control and stability wanes 
and their abilities to interact with others 
atrophies.20
18.  See, e.g., Bruce A. Arrigo & Jennifer Les-
lie Bullock, The Psychological Effects of Solitary 
Conﬁ  nement on Prisoners in Supermax Units: 
Reviewing What We Know and Recommend-
ing What Should Change, 52 INT’L J. OF OFFENDER 
THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 622, 627 (2008); 
Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-
T e r m  S o l i t a r y  a n d  “ S u p e r m a x ”  C o n ﬁ  nement, 
49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 130–32 (2003).
19.   Arrigo & Bullock, supra note 18, at 7 (cit-
ing the work of Haney, supra note 18). Similar 
evidence presents itself about the effects of un-
corrected hearing loss. Stig Arlinger, Negative 
Consequences of Uncorrected Hearing Loss: A 
Review, 42 INT’L J. OF AUDIOLOGY 2S17, 2S17–20 
(2003) (reporting the hearing loss may reduce 
intellectual and cultural stimulation, give rise to 
changes in the central nervous system, and may 
affect the development of dementia).
20.  See Haney, supra note 18.
ternalize what the thoughts are through 
verbal or written speech or through other 
forms of symbolic representation to iden-
tify them completely (and sometimes to 
form them at all), a prerequisite to evalu-
ating their contents. Other thoughts and 
methods of tracking one’s environment 
over time require some form of external 
representation because of the frailties of 
the human memory; to form the complex 
thought, one needs the device of external 
representation to keep track of portions 
of it over time.16 The ability and opportu-
nity to generate external representations 
may both make public what has already 
fully formed in the mind and may ren-
der possible the formation of new sorts 
of thoughts that cannot take full form in 
our limited mental space.17
Of course, it is not merely the develop-
ment and identiﬁ  cation of one’s thoughts 
that requires the use of representation 
and external articulation. To pursue our 
interest in forming true beliefs about 
ourselves and our environment, we need 
the help of others’ insights and beliefs, 
as well as their reactions and evaluative 
responses to our beliefs. Others can only 
have the basis for responding, and the 
means to respond with the sort of preci-
sion necessary to be helpful, if they are 
able to use speech.
My argument that rational human think-
16.  Tyler Burge, Computer Proof, Apriori 
Knowledge, and Other Minds: The Sixth Philo-
sophical Perspectives Lecture, 32 NOÛS SUPPL.12 
1, 10–13, 19–22, 27–28 (1998); Tyler Burge, 
Memory and Persons, 112 PHIL. REV. 289, 300–
03, 314–21 (2003).
17. See  also  MACKLEM, supra note 1, at 1–32.
ties prerequisite to moral agency because 
successful communication demands hav-
ing a sense of what others are in a posi-
tion to know and understand. Practicing 
communication initiates the process of 
taking others’ perspective to understand 
what others know and are in a position 
to grasp.
Being known by others as the distinct in-
dividual one is is important in itself. It is 
also essential for one to be fully respected 
by others. Further, having access to the 
contents of others’ minds (at their discre-
tion) is essential for being able to respect 
them, at least insofar as some forms of 
respect and other moral duties involve 
understanding and respecting individu-
als as separate persons and in light of 
features of their individuality, including 
their reasons, aims, and needs. Moreover, 
other forms of moral activity, as well as 
appreciation of the moral activity of oth-
ers, require some recognition of agents’ 
motives.
Furthermore, I suspect that one cannot 
fully develop a complex mental world, 
identify its contents, evaluate them, and 
distinguish between those that are merely 
given and those one endorses, unless one 
has the ability to externalize bits of one’s 
mind, formally distance those bits from 
one’s mind, identify them as particulars, 
and then evaluate them to either endorse, 
reject, or modify them. For many people, 
some thoughts may only be fully identi-
ﬁ  ed and known to themselves if made 
linguistically or representationally ex-
plicit. Many ﬁ  nd that difﬁ  cult to do using 
merely mental language, especially with 
sufﬁ  ciently complex ideas; one has to ex- 74 75
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  rate-to-corporate as well as corporate-
to-individual speech often bear only an 
indirect relation to the revelation and 
development of the thinker or the in-
tellectual, emotional, or moral relations 
between thinkers. Of course, thinkers 
may have an interest in access to corpo-
rate speech because corporate and com-
mercial speech may report information 
about one’s given environment, but, in 
other circumstances, the point of corpo-
rate speech, as well as other commercial 
speech, is to alter the environment, e.g. 
to manufacture desire, not to report it.
To be sure, however, altering the en-
vironment is also the aim of advocacy 
speech by individuals as well. That aim 
in no way diminishes the protection that 
should be afforded to it. Advocacy speech 
represents a form of exercise of think-
ers’ interests in developing their moral 
agency and in treating one another well 
by attempting to discern and to persuade 
others of what each of us or what we to-
gether should think and do. By contrast, 
non-press, business corporate and com-
mercial speech, by design, issue from an 
environment whose structure does not 
facilitate and, indeed, tends to discourage 
vidual points of view); C. Edwin Baker, The First 
Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. 
L.J. 981, 987–89 (2009) (stressing that commer-
cial corporations are limited forms of entities 
created for instrumental reasons and that the 
people who operate within them do not act fully 
autonomously); Steven H. Shiffrin, The First 
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away 
from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 
78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1246 (1983) (discussing 
the structure of the corporation and the distance 
between its speech and the views of its share-
holders).
human self than thoughts about one’s 
mortality or one’s friends; in so far as a 
central function of free speech is to allow 
for the development, exercise, and recog-
nition of the self, there is no reason to 
relegate the representation of thoughts 
about personal relations or self-reﬂ  ection 
to a lesser or secondary category. Picto-
rial representations and music (and not 
merely discourse about them) should 
also gain foundational protection because 
they also represent the externalization of 
mental contents, contents that may not 
be accurately or well-captured through 
linguistic means; after all, not all thoughts 
are discursive or may be fully captured 
through discursive description.25
On the other hand, this approach can 
render sensible the notion that non-
press, business corporate and commer-
cial speech may be different and that 
their protection may assume a weaker 
form and may rest upon separate, more 
context-dependent and instrumental, 
foundations.26 First, business corporate 
speech does not involve in any direct or 
straightforward fashion the revelation of 
individuals’ mental contents.27 Corpo-
25.  See Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal Qua-
lia, 32 PHIL. Q. 127, 128–30, 133–36 (1982); 
Frank Jackson, What Mary Didn’t Know, 83 THE 
J. OF PHIL. 291 (1986). 
26.  For one example of its context-depen-
dence on other features of the economic climate 
and our system of economic regulation, see 
Shiffrin, Compelled Association, Morality, and 
Market Dynamics, supra note 13, at 324, 327.
27.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the differences between 
corporations and human beings and the dis-
tance between corporate speech and any indi-
one’s sensory perceptions, the sense or 
lack thereof of the existence of a God, or 
one’s political beliefs. All of these com-
munications serve the fundamental func-
tion of allowing an agent to transmit (or 
attempt to transmit so far as possible) the 
contents of her mind to others and to ex-
ternalize her mental contents in order to 
attempt to identify, evaluate, and endorse 
or react given contents as authentically 
one’s own; further, they allow others to 
be granted access to the information nec-
essary to appreciate the thinker, on vol-
untary terms, and to forge a full human 
relation with her. One’s thoughts about 
political affairs are intrinsically and ex 
ante no more and no less central to the 
charges of internet defamation after she sent an 
email to friends complaining about a wrongful 
diagnosis at a local hospital. After an interna-
tional campaign in her defense, she was acquit-
ted but the government is appealing her acquit-
tal and seeking a 6 month prison sentence. See 
Norimitsu Onishi, Trapped Inside a Broken Ju-
dicial System after Hitting Send, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
5, 2009, at A6; Turning Critics Into Criminals: 
The Human Rights Consequences of Criminal 
Defamation Law in Indonesia, HUMAN R IGHTS 
WATCH, 5, 26–28 (May 2010) available at http://
www.hrw.org/node/90023 (discussing other 
criminal defamation cases for other consumer 
complaints).
Indonesia imposes criminal penalties for defa-
mation, enhancing them if the communication 
is sent over the internet. Truth, on its own, is 
not a standard defense. Whether it is permitted 
at all seems to be a matter of the judge’s discreti-
on. Further, defendants seeking to use the truth 
defense in cases not involving public ofﬁ  cials 
must bear the burden of proof and must show 
that the defamatory statement was offered from 
necessity or ‘in the general interest.’ Pursuing 
an unsuccessful truth defense may subject the 
defendant to an even harsher sentence of up to 
four years in prison. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra 
at 16–17.
is to say, free speech is essential to the 
development and proper functioning of 
thinkers. 
Further, because moral agency involves 
the ability to take the perspective of other 
people and to respond to their distinctive 
features as individuals, including some of 
their mental contents, then free speech 
also plays a foundational and necessary 
(though not sufﬁ  cient) role in ensuring 
citizens develop the capacity for moral 
agency and have the opportunities and 
information necessary to discharge their 
moral duties. Politically, these arguments 
should resonate with us, yielding an ar-
gument for constitutional protection for 
freedom of speech, both from respect for 
the fundamental moral rights of the per-
son and also because, as I have argued 
elsewhere, a well-functioning system of 
social cooperation and justice presuppos-
es that the citizenry, by and large, have 
active, well-developed moral personali-
ties.23 The successful operation of a demo-
cratic polity, as well as its meaningfulness, 
would also seem to depend upon citizens’ 
generally having strong and independent 
capacities for thought and judThis view 
makes no important distinction, at the 
foundations, between communication 
about aesthetics, one’s medical condition 
and treatment,24 one’s regard for another, 
23.   Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On 
the Occasional Virtues of Fog, supra note 13, 
at 1231–32. See also JOHN STUART MILL, CONSID-
ERATIONS  ON R EPRESENTATIVE G OVERNMENT 24–25 
(Currin Shields ed., 1958); RAWLS supra note 4, 
at 395–587. 
24.  Respect for this right is far from a given. 
Prita Mulyasari was recently incarcerated in In-
donesia for three weeks of pre-trial detention on  76 77
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over our actions that the broader ideal 
of self-authorship and self-governance 
involves. We may have all the interests 
I identify (along with their capacities to 
pursue them) even if we lack the abil-
ity or authority to implement our deci-
sions. Rightfully detained prisoners will 
lack both these features but, in my view 
(if not the Court’s), enjoy the relevant 
moral right of freedom of speech.35 Skep-
ticism about the broader ideal therefore 
should not impugn the more narrowly 
tailored, thinker-centered case for free 
speech protections.36 Further, a thinker-
based approach is better positioned to 
undergird a more expansive free speech 
protection, or at least to do so in a more 
35.  Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530–33 
(2006) (plurality opinion) (upholding ban on 
access to newspapers, magazines, and personal 
photographs by prisoners in the most restric-
tive level of incarceration); Turner v. Saﬂ  ey, 482 
U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (“[W]hen a prison regulation 
impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the 
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests.”); Bell v. Wolf-
i s h ,  4 4 1  U . S .  5 2 0 ,  5 4 8– 5 2  ( 1 9 7 9 )  ( u p h o l d i n g  
ban on pretrial detainees receiving hardback 
books by mail unless sent directly by the pub-
lisher or a bookstore); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ 
Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129–33 (1977) 
(upholding ban on bulk mailing and inmate-
to-inmate solicitation to join prisoner’s union); 
Pell v . Procunier, 41 7 U.S. 81 7 , 822–28 (1974) 
(upholding ban on prisoners initiating inter-
views with the press). For critical commentary 
on the low protection afforded to prisoners’ ﬁ  rst 
amendment rights see James E. Robertson, The 
Rehnquist Court and the “Turnerization” of 
Prisoners’ Rights, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 97 (2006); 
The Supreme Court, 2005 Term--Leading Cases, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 263 (2006).
36.  Further, arguing just from the founda-
tional interests of the thinker as such does not 
elicit the same worries regarding why speech in 
particular merits special, strong protection.
while neglecting other manifestations 
that are no less important. Although the 
ability to externalize one’s mental con-
tents through speech is of prime impor-
tance on this account, it would make no 
sense to give it pride of place over en-
suring that others could listen or take in 
these transmissions or over the protec-
tion of one’s rational processes from in-
terference or disruption.
Because this account derives the basic 
free speech protection from the founda-
tional interests of the autonomous agent 
qua thinker, it therefore, rests on sparer 
assumptions than other autonomy ac-
counts, such as Ed Baker’s, that revolve 
around the autonomous agent qua self-
governor.33  Whether in its substantive 
form (the agent as a person with the ca-
pacity “to pursue successfully the life she 
endorses”) or its formal conception (the 
agent with “the authority to make deci-
sions about her own meaningful actions 
[and resources]”), Baker’s ideal invokes 
an attractive model towards which to as-
pire, but utilizes unnecessarily controver-
sial assumptions.34
For instance, I do not believe that the au-
tonomy case for protecting free speech 
hinges upon whether we have (or 
should have or should value) the full 
panoply of executive skills and control 
33.  See Edwin Baker, Autonomy, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. (forthcoming 2011). See also BAKER, 
HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 
29, at 47–69; Baker, The First Amendment and 
Commercial Speech, supra note 27, at 990 (iden-
tifying autonomy in terms of embodying values 
in action).
34.  See C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy, supra 
note 33.
ences render more precarious the claims 
that strong presumptions against speech 
regulation in this domain reliably serve 
the interests of the thinker-qua-speaker 
or the thinker-qua-listener as the recipi-
ent of such communications. Together, 
these considerations provide reason to 
treat non-press, business corporate and 
commercial speech as non-standard cases 
within a free speech domain and justiﬁ  -
ably, depending on context and content, 
often to treat such speech as permissible 
targets of a more comprehensive scheme 
of economic regulation.32
Comparing A Thinker-Based Approach 
To Other Autonomy Approaches
This approach, one that showcases free-
dom of thought and the needs of think-
ers as such as the central theme of a free 
speech perspective, is compatible with 
many of the traditional insights associat-
ed with speaker-based and listener-based 
theories (and with democracy and truth 
theories for that matter). All of these ap-
proaches, however, work from an overly 
narrow foundation or they start by valo-
rizing one manifestation of free thought, 
32.  See also Baker, The First Amendment 
and Commercial Speech, supra note 27, at 994. 
I have assumed throughout this part of the dis-
cussion that the government’s motives in regu-
lating commercial or business corporate speech 
would be permissible ones, that is to say that 
they were not driven by a rationale that is incon-
sistent with valuing the autonomous operation 
of the mind. The requirement that the govern-
ment’s rationale must be a permissible one, as I 
specify above, is not suspended in this domain 
(or any other).
the authentic expression of individuals’ 
judgment. As Ed Baker has argued, the 
competitive structure of the economic 
market and the narrowly deﬁ  ned aims of 
the corporate or commercial entity place 
substantial pressures on the content of 
corporate and commercial speech. So 
too may the internal structural design of 
the corporation.28 In Baker’s view, their 
content has a ‘forced proﬁ  t orientation,’ 
and does not represent a ‘manifestation 
of individual freedom or choice’;29 in my   
somewhat weaker terms, external envi-
ronmental pressures render more tenu-
ous any charitable presupposition that 
such speech is sincere, authentic, or the 
product of autonomous processes. As I 
have argued elsewhere, Baker’s starkly-
put position may involve a degree of 
over-generalization given market im-
perfections, market actors who are true 
believers, and market actors using the 
market and speech within it to further 
external and sincere moral goals.30 None-
theless, I concur with him that the mar-
ket’s structure tends “very strongly [to] 
determine [corporate and commercial] 
speech content.”31 These distortive inﬂ  u-
28.  See Shiffrin, The First Amendment and 
Economic Regulation: Away from a General 
Theory of the First Amendment, supra note 27. 
29.  See C. EDWIN B AKER, HUMAN L IBERTY  AND 
FREEDOM  OF S PEECH 1 96,  204  ( 1 9 8 9);  C.  Ed win  
Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Free-
dom: The Commercial Speech Quandary in 
Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2004); 
Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial 
Speech, supra note 27, at 985–987.
30.  See Shiffrin, Compelled Association, Mo-
rality, and Market Dynamics, supra note 13, at 
320.
31. Id. 78 79
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acts of expression, nonetheless can-
not be taken as part of a justiﬁ  cation 
for legal restrictions . . . (a) harms to 
certain individuals which consist in 
their coming to have false beliefs as 
a result of those acts of expression; 
(b) harmful consequences of acts 
performed as a result of those acts 
of expression, where the connec-
tion between [them] consists merely 
in the . . . expression le[a]d[ing] the 
agents to believe . . . these acts to be 
worth performing.38
Although the insulation of the agent’s 
opportunity to form beliefs and opinions 
of her own is central to the thinker-based 
perspective, Scanlon’s Millian principle – 
as stated – has its limitations as a form 
of protection of the thinker. From a free-
dom of thought perspective, such a prin-
ciple is under-inclusive in an important 
respect.39 It is unclear why we should 
38.  Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expres-
sion, supra note 37, at 213.
39.  The Millian principle may be overinclu-
sive in the following respect: the principle as 
stated does not provide a clear line to distinguish 
between false beliefs that result from fraud or 
intentional misrepresentation and false beliefs 
that result from sincere communication (but 
poor judgment, understanding or perception 
on the part of the speaker or the listener). The 
former may reasonably count as harms, I sub-
mit, on the grounds that a thinker-based view 
of freedom of speech provides no foundational 
protection for speech that aims to distort and 
control the thinker’s rational processes of track-
ing and understanding her environment. Again, 
I doubt Scanlon would be hostile to this distinc-
tion, as suggested by his apparent friendliness to 
at least some sorts of defamation actions, id. at 
12, and his later criticism in Freedom of Expres-
sion and Categories of Expression of the Millian 
principle for failing to allow laws on deceptive 
direct and obvious fashion, because our 
imagination and thoughts range more 
widely than our capacity for self-gover-
nance and self-authorship (at least if the 
latter is construed to involve self-regard-
ing action and conduct). We are able to 
think and consider topics and subjects 
that have no speciﬁ  c and direct relation 
to ourselves and our pursuit of a life we 
endorse.
Explicitly making the thinker the central 
ﬁ  gure of free speech (as compared to fo-
cusing on the listener, the speaker, the 
self-governor or the functioning of the 
polity) may make a difference as far as 
what dangers and threats to free speech 
present themselves as salient. So, for ex-
ample, although I ﬁ  nd Tim Scanlon’s em-
phasis on sovereignty of deliberation in 
the Millian principle at the center of his 
early listener-based theory highly conge-
nial, its focus on the listener may distract 
us from equally signiﬁ  cant forms of regu-
lation that tamper with the sovereignty 
of deliberation but that are not directly 
targeted at interfering with a speaker-
listener relation.37 Scanl  on’s Millian prin-
ciple states:
[C]ertain harms which, although 
they would not occur but for certain 
37.  See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Free-
dom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972) 
reprinted in T. M. SCANLON, THE DIFFICULTY OF TOL-
ERANCE 6, 14–15 (2003). Scanlon subsequently 
criticized the Millian principle on other grounds 
than I explore here and embraced a modiﬁ  ed, 
but broader, theory of freedom of speech that, 
inter alia, offers primary recognition to speaker 
and audience interests. T. M. Scanlon, Jr., Free-
dom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 
40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519 (1979), reprinted in THE 
DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE, supra at 84.
protect only autonomous or authentic 
processes from efforts to interfere with 
belief and conclusion formation. Should 
we not also ensure that regulations are 
not propounded on the grounds that 
speech will yield emotional reactions of 
one sort or another or that speech will in-
duce sensory reactions of one sort or an-
other? Aren’t these processes also central 
to human thought at least?
Moreover, Scanlon’s principle only 
reaches and condemns regulation aimed 
at preventing the formation of false be-
liefs and practical judgments as conse-
quences of expression. It does not directly 
speak to the wrongfulness of regulations 
or government activity aimed at instill-
ing beliefs, attitudes, or reasons through 
compulsion, subliminal manipulation, or 
other efforts to circumvent rational delib-
eration.
Finally, it doesn’t directly recognize the 
signiﬁ   cance that assuming the role of 
speaker may have to an agent’s own ra-
tional development and cognition. Ex-
panding the theory to correct these forms 
of under-inclusion would not be, I take 
it, antithetical to the spirit of Scanlon’s 
original approach.40 Nonetheless, an ex-
plicitly thinker-oriented approach more 
naturally yields a comprehensive expla-
advertising. Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression, supra note 37, at 215. As originally 
stated, though, the Millian principle does not 
clearly make room for defamation liability.
40.    See, e.g., Thomas Scanlon, Freedom of 
Expression and Categories of Expression, supra 
note 37, at 91–2 (observing the audience’s inter-
est “in having a good environment for the for-
mation of one’s beliefs and desires” and offering 
criticisms of subliminal speech).
nation of what is troubling about thought 
control, efforts at thought control, as well 
as other sorts of efforts to disrupt the 
free operation of the mind, whether or 
not such efforts also happen to operate 
through a mode of interfering interper-
sonal communication.
For example, as Vince Blasi and I argued 
at greater length elsewhere,41 focusing 
on freedom of thought as such may yield 
a more straightforward account of the 
protection in West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette.42 It is not clear 
that the compelled pledge, so long as its 
origins are transparent, restricts listener 
opportunities, nor does its motivation 
violate strictures on respecting listeners 
and their deliberative capacities. Further, 
although it seems clear that the com-
pelled pledge violates the free speech 
rights of the party who must speak the 
pledge, it is less clear that the standard 
themes that have occupied speaker-ori-
ented theories are squarely engaged here. 
So long as it is clear the pledge is com-
pelled and so long as the speaker may 
disavow the pledge, the speaker’s ability 
to express herself faithfully is arguably 
not seriously abridged.43 The speaker will 
41.   See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 1. 
42.  319 U.S. 624 (1943).
43.  Of course, the necessity of correcting a 
false impression conveyed to an audience that 
does not understand the signiﬁ   cance of the 
speech being compelled may impinge upon 
the speaker’s interest in remaining silent with 
respect to the pledge and the sentiments and 
commitments expressed therein; necessarily, 
the interests in self-expression must include the 
ability to gather one’s thoughts and engage in 
self-creation at one’s own pace. There is some-
thing to this point but I am not sure that it car- 80 81
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effect, is to interfere with the autono-
mous thought processes of the compelled 
speaker. Signiﬁ   cantly, the compelled 
speaker is also a compelled listener and is 
compelled to adopt postures that typical-
ly connote identiﬁ  cation with her mes-
sage. The aim, and I believe the potential 
effect, is to try to inﬂ  uence the speaker 
to associate herself with the message and 
implicitly to accept it, but through means 
that bypass the deliberative faculties of 
the agent. Compelled speech of this kind 
threatens (or at least aims) to interfere 
with free thinking processes of the speak-
er/listener and to inﬂ  uence mental con-
tent in ways and through methods that 
are illicit: nontransparent, via repetition, 
and through coercive manipulation of a 
character virtue, namely that of sincerity, 
that itself is closely connected to commit-
ments of freedom of speech.
Another advantage of a thinker-centered 
approach is that it yields a distinctive 
approach to freedom of association that 
both explains its centrality and depicts the 
relation between ‘intimate’ and ‘expres-
sive’ as continuous. Again, the approach 
is not antithetical to other theories of 
freedom of speech, e.g. speaker-based or 
listener-based theories. But, occupying a 
thinker-based perspective may orient one 
more immediately to the centrality of as-
sociation than other theories which may 
lead one to value association through a 
more circuitous route. Even once one 
adopts a capacious view of the content 
covered by a free speech norm, speaker-
oriented theories have tended to think 
of the point of associations as bundles of 
speakers who come together to amplify 
not be misunderstood by reasonable ob-
servers. Although reciting others’ speech 
may not be a part of one’s project of self-
creation, so long as others’ uptake isn’t 
disrupted and so long as the compelled 
speech is not especially time consuming, 
focusing on the speaker—as such—seems 
strained. A more straightforward expla-
nation would not focus predominantly 
on either side of the speaker-audience 
relationship.
What seems most troubling about the 
compelled pledge is that the motive be-
hind the regulation, and the possible 
ries enough signiﬁ  cance to bear the full weight 
of the Barnette protection. Correcting a misim-
pression only requires explaining the signiﬁ  -
cance or fact of compulsion; it does not require 
the speaker to make up her mind or reveal any-
thing substantive about the pledge. This point, 
however, may be less persuasive in contexts in 
which any sort of correction or explanation may 
implicitly reveal some reservations about the 
pledge and such revelations would be socially 
or politically dangerous. Still, I assume the 
Barnette protection holds even for compelled 
speech that is less fraught or that is compelled in 
less charged contexts. See, e.g., Wooley v. May-
nard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
In any case, it is unclear how much of the subs-
tance, whether the positive protection or the ne-
gative limits, of the First Amendment protection 
should revolve around how unreasonable peo-
ple might interpret the signiﬁ  cance of a speech 
performance. For example, the fact that unre-
asonable people might take my friend’s speech 
to represent my own views and that their mi-
sunderstanding might prompt me to speak on a 
topic about which I’d prefer to remain silent does 
not begin to ground an argument that I have a 
right that my friend not speak in a way that may 
mislead the unreasonable interpreters. The re-
publishing libel doctrine also wanders a little 
too close for my comfort to the view that the li-
mits of the First Amendment may be dictated by 
the unreasonable reactions of readers. See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977).
their speech—to render it louder or to 
garner more attention for their positions. 
The model has been to think of speak-
ers as having a prior message that brings 
them together and that the associations 
facilitate more effective, clearer commu-
nication of these ideas, formed prior to 
association. The association is a conduit 
or a pass through: it enhances the effec-
tiveness of the message but plays little 
formative role with respect to the actual 
speech.
A thinker-based view of the sort I have 
been sketching identiﬁ  es, at least more 
immediately, the role of associations in a 
free speech theory. If, as a general matter, 
our intellectual development and, indeed, 
our basic sanity depends upon our com-
municative interaction with others, and, 
if we conceive of the function of speech 
as critical to this development, we are 
more likely to be attuned to the ways that 
associations serve as sites of idea forma-
tion and development, and to recognize 
the ways in which the development (and 
not merely the broadcasting) of content 
occurs through mutual collaboration and 
mutual inﬂ  uence in explicit and implicit 
ways. Such an approach would not focus 
predominantly on whether regulations 
affect the message of an association but 
on whether regulations interfere with 
the ability of associations to function as 
sites for mutual cognitive inﬂ  uence.44
44.  I develop an argument of this kind in 
greater detail in Shiffrin, What is Really Wrong 
with Compelled Association?, supra note 1.
What makes speech special?
I observed earlier that it seems to me to 
be a positive feature, rather than an em-
barrassment, of a speech theory that it 
can show the compatibility of and even 
the continuity between different core 
protections of individual autonomy. At 
the same time, it does seem as though 
speech is special in some way. An attrac-
tive free speech theory should draw some 
normative distinction between speech 
as an exercise of autonomy and at least 
some other behaviors that are exercises 
of autonomy; although some forms of 
autonomous action should perhaps gain 
the same high level of legal protection as 
free speech, not all autonomous action 
should. An attractive free speech theory 
will help to make some sense of the di-
vide.
With respect to the ﬁ  rst desideratum of 
making sense of the continuity, it strikes 
me as a strength of the thinker-based 
approach that it renders the penumbra 
theory of Griswold45 and Roe46 sensible. 
First, certain substantive due process pro-
tections provide the preconditions for a 
meaningful free speech protection. If we 
accept the First Amendment and its justi-
ﬁ  cations and we accept that our form of 
rational agency requires social connec-
tions to develop and ﬂ  ourish, then we 
must provide for safe havens for thought, 
communication, and mutual inﬂ  uence: 
the relevant forms of safety come both 
45.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965).
46.   Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 82 83
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be inferred from it, the kiss is not typi-
cally deployed merely to convey the fact 
of its existence. It can be used that way 
but its communicative use is parasitic 
upon the connotations of its expressive 
function.
This, of course, is a fraught distinction48 
pressives’ (and its cognate verb) to refer to 
speech acts that do more than convey content 
but also manifest it in a more active, direct way. 
See, e.g., John R. Searle, A Taxonomy of Illocu-
tionary Acts, in LANGUAGE, MIND, AND KNOWLEDGE 
344 (Keith Gunderson ed., 1975), reprinted in 
JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES 
IN THE THEORIES OF SPEECH ACTS 1, 15 (1979); John 
R. Searle, What is Language? Some Preliminary 
Remarks, 11 ETHICS & POL. 173, 181 (2009). Oth-
er speech acts may do even more, as with com-
missives, performatives, and declarations. See 
J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 32–33, 
151–57 (1962); KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, 
AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 57–63 (1989). By ‘com-
municate’ and its cognates, I mean to capture 
both the transmission of content as well as the 
transmission of one’s (presumed and often im-
plicit) agreement or belief in that content. Still, 
despite the familiarity of this use of ‘express’ in 
the philosophical literature, I couldn’t be more 
aware that my use of ‘express’ is not a salutary 
term in a context in which ‘freedom of expres-
sion’ is right at hand and sometimes is used in-
terchangeably with “freedom of speech.” As the 
better term occurs, so will the substitution.
48.    I will not go into detail here about the 
various fault-lines and strengths of different ac-
co unts  of  this  distin ction.  Rubenf eld’ s  g en eral  
discussion of the distinction is basically sen-
sible.  See  Rubenf eld,  supra  note  12  a t  42–44.  
Articulating the distinction from the perspec-
tive of sorting regulations sensitive and insen-
sitive to it, he asks whether the relevant harm 
that a regulation targets is caused by the com-
municative aspect of the expressive act or by 
some other element of it. I defended something 
like this approach in Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 
Speech, Death, and Double Effect, supra note 8. 
I disagree with him in thinking, however, that 
governmental intent to punish or restrict com-
munication as such is a necessary condition of 
in numbers (i.e. having associates with 
whom one may share thoughts and who 
may witness what happens to one) and 
in the ability to select with whom and 
in what ways one will share fundamen-
tal forms of intimacy. If the state could 
prevent intimate associations or if it 
could require them to occur (rendering 
the connection forced and inauthentic), 
it would obstruct individuals’ ability to 
forge the sort of authentic social connec-
tions essential for the development and 
maintenance of the personality and the 
free intellect.
Second, the central substantive due pro-
cess protections are extensions of the 
values protected by freedom of speech. 
Sexual intimacy, e.g., expresses and may 
reveal any of a variety of mental states 
towards another: in the good cases, feel-
ings of love, affection or at least lusty at-
traction.
But although (free) sexual intimacy and 
speech are both exercises of autonomy, 
both are not standard forms of communi-
cation or transmission of mental content; 
hence my remark that many substantive 
due process protections are extensions 
of the values protected by a free speech 
principle, rather than instantiations of 
it. A kiss typically expresses a happy re-
action, attraction, or a warm attitude, 
where here I mean to invoke the sense 
of ‘express’ that is not synonymous with 
‘communicate’ but rather that means to 
display and to manifest, rather than just 
to transmit the fact of or to communi-
cate.47 Although the mental attitude may 
47.    Philosophers of language often use ‘ex-
but it is one that I think has a point that 
connects to two of the reasons why 
speech is special. I have argued that 
speech facilitates some of the core inter-
ests of autonomous agents by rendering 
their mental contents available to others 
and vice versa, thereby enabling them to 
know one another, to cooperate with one 
another, to investigate the world, and to 
enhance one’s understanding of our en-
vironment and our circumstances, and 
thereby enabling (though not ensuring) 
moral agency.
The external representation of mental 
content and its communication plays an 
especially foundational role in furthering 
these ends in large part because, in gen-
eral, it is so much more precise and infor-
mative than many of its non-essentially 
communicative, expressive counterparts. 
I mean something here as mundane as 
that an explanation of the reasons why 
one disapproves of another’s conduct and 
a description of the emotional reactions 
that conduct gives rise to conveys more 
content than a wordless punch in the 
nose. Some content conveyed by commu-
nication cannot reliably and accurately 
be conveyed through other means. With 
respect to the interest in being recognized 
and known as the person one is and in 
providing an outlet from the isolation of 
each mind, curtailments on speech rep-
resent a severe incursion on this interest 
because speech provides unique modes 
running afoul of First Amendment protections; 
we agree that it may be a sufﬁ  cient condition. 
See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s 
Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 775–78, 793–94 
(2001). 
of access to the contents of other minds. 
I do not mean to include only discursive 
communication here: a melody or paint-
ing of the image in my mind – a external 
representation of my internal visual im-
agery – may convey more of my mental 
contents – including but not limited to 
my mood – than approving or disapprov-
ing behavior; it necessarily conveys more 
about my private mental contents than 
silence and its visual analog.
As a general matter, regulations on the 
non-essentially communicative expres-
sion, manifestation or implementation 
of mental contents as such do not pre-
clude the communication or transmis-
sion of the mental contents they express. 
Restrictions on my ability to express my 
anger through violence do not preclude 
my transmitting my anger through com-
municative means: saying I’m angry, de-
tailing my complaints, and depicting my 
emotional maelstrom through words, im-
ages, or sounds. A restriction on the emo-
tion’s non-essentially communicative ex-
pression does not threaten to isolate me 
in my mind; a restriction on communi-
cation doeI hasten to add that this gen-
eral point is perfectly compatible with the 
recognition that some forms of expres-
sion convey more than words, images, 
or sounds could on certain occasions. It 
may well be that, on some occasions, the 
depth of my anger can only be conveyed 
through violent aggression. I am neither 
arguing that agents have absolute rights 
to ensure that (any and all) others fully 
understand their mental contents on all 
occasions nor that externalized repre-
sentations of thoughts always convey  84 85
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ther words.50 Whereas, I cannot revise or 
retract my intentional punch by follow-
ing it immediately with more violence, 
cringing, or even with regretful words. A 
further stream of punches may clarify my 
assault was intentional but beyond that 
rudimentary clariﬁ  cation, further light – 
why I threw the punch – will typically 
require words.
The capacity of speech to be tentative and 
exploratory – to allow us in a non-com-
mittal way to try on an idea, whether to 
formulate it at all or to assess its plausibil-
ity or ﬁ  t with oneself – is closely related 
to and helps to underpin a more famil-
iar idea about the specialness of speech, 
namely that we must protect the ability 
to discuss and conceive of even those ac-
tions we may reasonably outlaw, because 
protecting our speech and conception of 
them permits us to revisit and justify our 
regulation; thereby, we may retain the 
ability to assess the aptness and legitimacy 
of our regulation and to preserve the abil-
ity to change course if we are mistaken.
Not all speech stops short of action and I 
am not arguing there is an especially clear 
speech/action divide, but there are some 
special features that hold generally of 
speech that render it distinct from other 
50.  Although sometimes the further speech 
wi l l  h a v e  t o  f o l l o w  o n  i mm e di a t e l y  t o  b e  e f -
fective as a retraction as opposed to a later re-
thinking, our linguistic practice allows us to 
use speech to formulate and even generate our 
thoughts without the ﬁ  rst stab at articulation 
rigidly gelling immediately into a ﬁ  nal draft: 
we can try on an idea by articulating it with-
out it immediately sticking to us or representing 
us. Such tentativeness is less possible with most 
actions (putting aside the special case of speech 
acts).
more than behavior that acts upon those 
thoughts in ways different than merely 
externalizing a representation. But, by 
and large, speech is special because it is 
a uniquely speciﬁ   c mechanism for the 
transmission of mental contents and their 
discussion, evaluation, development and 
reﬁ  nement, independent from and prior 
to their implementation.
Of course, I do not deny that the trans-
mission of mental contents sometimes 
immediately effects or implements them: 
directed at the relevant person, the desire 
to insult or, in certain contexts, to hu-
miliate or to subordinate can be imple-
mented merely by being communicated. 
But as a general matter, communicative 
methods of transmitting mental contents 
generate the possibility of an intermedi-
ate workshop-like space in which one 
may experiment with, advance tentative-
ly, or try on, revise or reject a potential 
aspect or element of the self or of one’s 
potential history before directly afﬁ  rming 
it through endorsement or implementa-
tion.49 One cannot preface one’s thrown 
punch with ‘maybe’ or ‘consider the pos-
sibility’ and thereby, make the assault 
less of a punch in the way that prefatory 
remarks will qualify a proposition subse-
quently articulated so that it becomes less 
than a full-blown assertion. We ﬁ  nd both 
intelligible and signiﬁ  cant our abilities ef-
fectively to revise, clarify, or even retract 
what one has begun to say just using fur-
49.  Nevertheless, on occasion, even purely 
exploratory communication of thoughts and 
ideas may have moral signiﬁ  cance and may be 
inappropriate to convey to some people, how-
ever explicitly inchoate they are in form. 86 87
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SPECIAL LECTURE
The Existence of Human Rights 
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Robert Alexy, 
Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 20.00 h – 22.00 h
Location HZ 1/2
Abstract:
Human rights are considered, worldwide, 
as the basis of the normative order of so-
ciety. This broad agreement is found not 
only in philosophy but also in politics and 
law. Numerous human rights covenants 
can be read as an expression of a trium-
phant march of human rights in the pe-
riod after the Second World War. Their 
existence seems to be beyond question.
 Nevertheless, there are doubts about 
whether the belief in the existence of 
human rights is anything more than a 
collective error or illusion. Fundamen-
tal criticism, directed to the assumption 
that human rights exist, is to be found 
not only in the dark regions of political, 
ideological, and religious extremism but 
also in highly respectable philosophi-
cal writings. Alasdair MacIntyre’s claim 
that ‘there are no such rights, and belief 
in them is one with belief in witches and 
unicorns’ is an example. This along with 
the fact, often corroborated in the history 
of ideas, that widespread consensus is by 
no means a guarantee of truth, is reason 
enough to raise the question of the exist-
ence of human rights, in short, the exist-
ence question.
It makes no sense to talk about the ex-
istence of something without explaining 
what it is that is claimed to exist. For this 
reason, a deﬁ  nition of human rights has 
to be elaborated. According to this deﬁ  ni-
tion human rights are, ﬁ  rst, moral, sec-
ond, universal, third, fundamental, and, 
fourth, abstract rights that, ﬁ  fth, take pri-
ority over all other norms. For the ques-
tion of the existence of human rights, the 
ﬁ  rst deﬁ  ning element is of special impor-
tance. According to it, human rights are 
moral rights. Rights exst if they are valid. 
Positive rights are valid if they are duly 
issued and socially efﬁ  cacious. In contrast 
to this, moral rights are valid if and only 
if they are justiﬁ   able. For this reason, 
the existence of human rights qua moral 
rights depends on their justiﬁ  ability, and 
on that alone.
 The question of whether human rights 
are justiﬁ   able has far-reaching conse-
quences for legal philosophy, for the 
theory of constitutional rights, and for 
politics. In legal philosophy, the answer 
to the question of what law is, that is, the 
question of the concept and the nature 
of law, essentially depends on whether 
human rights exist. If it should prove to 
be the case that human rights do not ex-
ist, then non-positivism would not be an 
acceptable alternative to positivism. The 
consequences for the theory of consti-
tutional rights concern the basic char- 88 89
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ism. Non-scepticism may well include 
one or more of these sceptical elements, 
but it insists that there be a possibility of 
giving reasons for human rights, reasons 
that lay claim to objectivity, correctness, 
or truth.
 In order to defend non-scepticism, eight 
non-sceptical approaches may be con-
sidered. This list comprises, ﬁ  rst, the re-
ligious, second, the intuitionistic, third, 
the consensual, forth, the biological, ﬁ  fth, 
the instrumental, sixth, the cultural, sev-
enth, the explicative, and, eighth, the ex-
istential approach. The ﬁ  rst six approach-
es have more defects than strengths. For 
this reason, the justiﬁ   cation of human 
rights is based on the seventh and the 
eighth approaches, that is, on explicative 
and existential arguments.
A justiﬁ  cation of human rights is explica-
tive if it consists in making explicit what 
is necessarily implicit in human practice. 
If the practice is the practice of asserting, 
asking, and arguing, the justiﬁ  cation ob-
tains a discourse-theoretic character. The 
practice of asserting, asking, and arguing 
presupposes rules of discourse that ex-
press the ideas of freedom and equality. 
The ideas of freedom and equality, how-
ever, are the basis of human rights. To 
recognize another individual as free and 
equal is to recognize him as autonomous. 
To recognize him as autonomous is to 
recognize him as a person. To recognize 
him as a person is to attribute dignity to 
him. Attributing dignity to someone is, 
however, to recognize his human rights.
The explicative argument provides, in-
deed, a necessary part of the justiﬁ  cation 
of human rights, but it is, by itself, not 
acter of constitutional rights. If human 
rights do not exist, constitutional rights 
would be nothing more than what has 
been written down in the constitution. 
They would have an exclusively posi-
tive character. If, however, it should be 
proven that they exist, the picture would 
change fundamentally. Constitutional 
rights would be understood as attempts 
to positivize human rights. This would 
imply that catalogues of constitutional 
rights can be assessed as more or less suc-
cessful efforts to positivize human rights, 
and that the ideal character of human 
rights has to remain present in the inter-
pretation of human rights. With respect 
to politics, ﬁ  nally, the main consequence 
concerns the problem of cultural relativ-
ism. The non-existence of human rights 
would count as a strong argument for 
cultural relativism, whereas the existence 
of human rights would be a good reason 
against cultural relativism. All of this 
shows that the question of the existence 
of human rights is of very real theoretical 
and practical signiﬁ  cance.
The theories about the justiﬁ  ability of hu-
man rights, as well as the theories about 
the justiﬁ  ability of moral norms in gen-
eral, can be classiﬁ  ed in many different 
ways. The most fundamental distinction 
is that between approaches that generally 
deny the possibility of any justiﬁ  cation 
of human rights and approaches claim-
ing that some sort of justiﬁ  cation is pos-
sible. The ﬁ  rst approach may be termed 
‘scepticism’, the second ‘non-scepticism’. 
Scepticism will have its roots in forms 
of emotivism, decisionism, subjectivism, 
relativism, naturalism, or deconstructiv-
sufﬁ  cient. Two problems are easily iden-
tiﬁ  ed. The ﬁ  rst concerns the necessity of 
the discourse rules. It is possible to cir-
cumvent this necessity by avoiding any 
participation in the practice of asserting, 
asking, and arguing. The price one pays 
for this, would, however, be high. Never 
to assert anything, never to ask any ques-
tion, never to give any reason would be 
to forbear from participating in what es-
sentially belongs to the form of life of 
human beings qua discursive creatures. 
The second problem stems from the dif-
ference between discourse and action on 
the one hand and capabilities and inter-
ests on the other. Having discursive capa-
bilities does not imply an interest in mak-
ing use of them. This might be called the 
‘interest problem’. The interest in mak-
ing use of discursive capabilities solely in 
the sphere of argument might be called 
a ‘weak interest in correctness’. By con-
trast, the interest in making use of dis-
cursive capacities not only in the sphere 
of argument but also in the realm of ac-
tion can be characterized as a ‘strong in-
terest in correctness’. The strong interest 
in correctness comprises taking seriously 
the implications of the discursive capa-
bilities in real life, that is to say, in taking 
seriously human rights. In this way, the 
interest in correctness makes it possible 
for us to arrive at the object of our jus-
tiﬁ  cation.
It might be objected that this is no justi-
ﬁ  cation at all. It has lost its character as a 
justiﬁ  cation, so the objection runs, once 
the premise concerning the interest is 
introduced. Indeed, this objection is not 
without merit. The objection must, how-
ever, be qualiﬁ  ed. As with any interest, 
the interest in correctness is connected 
with decisions. This decision concerns 
the fundamental question of whether we 
accept our discursive capabilities or pos-
sibilities. It is the question of whether 
we want to see ourselves as discursive or 
reasonable creatures. This is a decision 
about who we are. It might be called ‘ex-
istential’. Still, to talk about justiﬁ  cation 
or substantiation seems to be warranted, 
for this decision is not based on ground-
less or arbitrary preferences, drawn, so to 
speak, from nowhere. Rather, the deci-
sion has the character of an endorsement 
of something that has been proven, by 
means of explication, to be a capability 
necessarily connected with human be-
ings or, in other words, a necessary pos-
sibility. As an endorsement of a necessary 
possibility the existential argument is in-
trinsically connected with the explicative 
argument. One might call this connection 
the ‘explicative-existential justiﬁ  cation’.
The explicative-existential justiﬁ  cation 
connects objective with subjective ele-
ments. Objectivity connected with sub-
jectivity is, to be sure, less than pure 
objectivity, but it is also more than pure 
subjectivity. If one adds to this the as-
sumption that a purely objective justiﬁ  ca-
tion of human rights is not possible, one 
has good reasons to qualify the explica-
tive-existential argument qua objective-
subjective argument as a justiﬁ  cation of 
human rights. This justiﬁ  cation sufﬁ  ces 
to establish the validity of human rights 
as moral rights, which is to say that hu-
man rights exist. 90 91
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PLENARY LECTURE
The Morality of Legality: 
A Hobbesian Account (Draft) 
Prof. Dr. David Dyzenhaus, 
University of Toronto / Canada
Date WED 17 Aug 2011
Time 9.30 h – 10.15 h
Location HZ 1/2
Abstract1:
Introduction
A central debate in contemporary phi-
losophy of law concerns the authority of 
law. Whilst there is general agreement 
that in order to understand law one must 
understand how it might be said to be 
authoritative over those subject to it, phi-
losophers divide over the nature of law’s 
authority. On the one hand, legal posi-
tivists who follow HLA Hart say that the 
law’s claim to authority has to be under-
stood in terms of the non-moral condi-
tions that make a legal system into a de 
facto authority, one which while capable 
1  Professor of Law and Philosophy, Univer-
sity of Toronto. This paper started as one about 
the Engagement Controversy and Hobbes on au-
thority for a symposium organized by Thomas 
Poole (LSE). Comments on that paper, especial-
ly from Jeffrey Collins, Dennis Klimchuk, Lars 
Vinx, and an anonymous reviewer for Cam-
bridge University Press led me to contemplate 
radical revisions. Further comments on a diffe-
rent paper given to the Berkeley Jurisprudence 
workshop helped me to see the appropriate way 
to proceed, and here I thank in particular An-
drew Brighten, Richard Flathman, and Kinch 
Hoekstra. 
About the author:
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ologico-historical class of the Academy of 
Sciences in Göttingen. In 1984, he quali-
ﬁ  ed as university lecturer in the faculty 
of law at the University of Göttingen. 
His thesis, submitted as his Habilitations-
schrift, was entitled “A Theory of Con-
stitutional Rights”. Since 1986, he has 
been Professor of Public Law and Legal 
Philosophy at the Christian-Albrechts-
University in Kiel. From 1994 to 1998, 
he was president of the German section 
of the IVR. Since 2002, he has been a 
member of the Academy of Sciences in 
Göttingen. In 2008, he was awarded a 
honorary doctorate, honoris causa, by 
the University of Alicante, the University 
of Buenos Aires, and by the University of 
Tucumán, in 2009, by the University of 
Antwerp, in 2010 in Lima (Universidad 
Nacional Mayor de San Marcos and Uni-
versidad Ricardo Palma). In 2010 he was 
awarded the First-Class Distinguished 
Service Cross of the Order of Merit of the 
Federal Republic of Germany.
of exercising authority might not be de 
jure or legitimate. On the other hand, 
critics of legal positivism argue that law 
has certain intrinsic qualities that make it 
always at least to some extent moral, and 
thus endow it with a claim to legitimacy. 
This claim might be outweighed by oth-
er considerations, but that goes to show 
that de facto legal authority is always pre-
sumptively de jure. 
This division is linked to another. Legal 
positivists like to think of themselves as 
engaged in a kind of social scientiﬁ  c or 
value neutral exploration of the nature 
of law.2 On this view, legal philosophy 
shows that law has to be understood as 
normative, as an obligation-creating sys-
tem in which at least some of the par-
ticipants understand themselves as acting 
out of a sense of duty that is not reduc-
ible to motivation by fear of punishment. 
But the question whether the obligations 
created by the law of a particular system 
are moral is answered by standards ex-
ternal to law, the standards set by moral 
philosophy. In contrast, at least some of 
the critics of legal positivism argue that 
philosophical inquiry into law’s author-
ity cannot be compartmentalized in this 
way. Philosophy of law is a branch of 
political philosophy, because it seeks to 
answer a question that is fundamentally 
one of political morality: How is the au-
thority of law legitimate? Indeed, for rea-
sons that will become clearer below, this 
question can and should be formulated 
2  By ‘legal positivists’, I refer only to HLA 
Hart and his followers. Kelsen is, in my view, 
quite close to Hobbes on the issue of authority. 
more succinctly as ‘How is law authorita-
tive?’ That is, the law of any particular 
legal order purports to change the nor-
mative situation of those subject to it by 
obliging them to act in accordance with 
the law. That the law claims this norma-
tive power or authority over its subjects 
can be unpacked by saying that the law 
necessarily claims legitimate authority. 
But ‘legitimate’ serves only to emphasize 
that what is being claimed is authority – 
the ability to create obligations.
Thomas Hobbes’s account of the author-
ity of law might seem to straddle at least 
the ﬁ  rst division, as he is commonly tak-
en to argue that de facto legal authority 
begets de jure legal authority. Hobbes is 
taken, that is, to have argued that the 
possession in fact of the kind of central-
ized power that makes it possible for a 
regime to rule effectively the popula-
tion within its territory sufﬁ  ces for that 
regime to be considered legitimate. He 
is also commonly taken to have argued 
that this central commander is not sub-
ject to any legal limits and that his laws 
are no more than his commands to which 
sanctions are attached that make obedi-
ence less painful than disobedience. He 
thus seems responsible for the command 
theory of law, taken over in large part by 
Jeremy Bentham and then John Austin. 
Those who understand Hobbes this way 
notice that when he provided his deﬁ  ni-
tion of law he said more than that law 
is the commands of an uncommanded 
commander to which sanctions attach. 
He also said that the sovereign, the ‘per-
son Commanding’, addresses his com-
mands to ‘one formerly obliged to obey  92 93
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subject to their power. It is no surprise, 
then, that Hobbes in chapter 26 deﬁ  nes 
‘Law in generall as ‘not Counsell, but 
Command’,6 referring to his elaboration 
of the distinction in the previous chap-
ter.7 Hart, it is worth noting, thought that 
Hobbes had with this distinction made a 
signal contribution to the understanding 
of law in that it illuminated the idea of 
command as well as the ‘similarities and 
differences between commands and cov-
enants as sources of obligation and as ob-
ligation-creating acts’. And Hart took his 
most distinguished student, Joseph Raz’s 
work on authority and the kinds of rea-
sons that law gives us as an elaboration 
of Hobbes’s contribution.8 If Hart were 
right, it would follow that the commands 
had at least the following two qualities to 
them.
First, the commands come with an im-
plicit claim to authority, that is, to right-
fully or legitimately demand compliance 
from those subject to the commands. 
Here Hart is correct since Hobbes contin-
ues his deﬁ  nition of law as command in 
chapter 26 by saying that law is a com-
mand not to any individual since it must 
be ‘addressed to one formerly obliged to 
obey him’.9 Indeed, Hobbes might be said 
to subscribe to what Raz calls the Nor-
mal Justiﬁ   cation Thesis, that ‘a person 
should be acknowledged to have author-
ity over another person … [when] the 
6 Leviathan,  183.
7 Ibid,  176.
8  HLA Hart, Essays on Bentham: Jurispru-
dence and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1982), 244.
9 Leviathan,  183.
him’.3 However, the idea that besides the 
sanctions that motivate obedience, there 
is a prior moral commitment of the legal 
subject to obey seems to make Hobbes’s 
account of legal authority highly autho-
ritarian. It amounts to the argument that 
any political order is superior to the chaos 
of the state of nature, hence legal subjects 
must obey the sovereign’s commands, 
whatever their content. This argument 
puts Hobbes on the methodological side 
of the critics of legal positivism, since it 
subordinates his account of law to its uti-
lity in securing political order.4 
In sum, Hobbes is from one perspective 
an early legal positivist, from another, a 
critic of the kind of methodology adopted 
by contemporary legal positivism. One 
solution to this conundrum is in Norberto 
Bobbio’s suggestion that we should think 
of Hobbes as an ‘ideological positivist’, a 
philosopher whose positivist theory of 
law is constructed to serve certain politi-
cal values.5 
Indeed, Hobbes seems to hold the view 
that de facto political power is by deﬁ  ni-
tion legitimate political authority. The
task of law in such a theory is simply 
to transmit as effectively as possible 
the judgments of the powerful to those 
3  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997, Richard 
Tuck, ed.), 183. Hereafter Leviathan.
4  This claim is consistent with, though not 
committed to, the view that Hobbes’s wishes to 
ground his political theory in science.
5  Norberto Bobbio, ‘Sur Le Positivisme Ju-
ridique’ in Bobbio, Essais de Théorie Du Droit, 
trans. by Michel Guéret with the assistance of 
Christophe Agostini (Buylant: Paris, 1998) 23, 
27-29.
alleged subject is likely better to comply 
with reasons which apply to him … if he 
accepts the directives of the alleged au-
thority as authoritatively binding, and 
tries to follow them, than if he tries to 
follow the reasons which apply to him 
directly’.10 Though, of course, the differ-
ence would be that Hart and Raz think 
that it is very rarely the case that the law 
of any particular legal order will satisfy 
this requirement, while Hobbes supposes 
that the requirement is satisﬁ  ed by the 
existence of de facto legal authority, that 
is, the existence of an organized, stable 
political power that is capable of govern-
ing through law. 
Second, Hobbes might be thought to 
subscribe also to the idea that the com-
mands must have a determinate content 
to them. This idea was put rather mis-
leadingly by Hart as the idea of ‘content-
independence’:11 that the subject obeys 
not because of his or her agreement with 
the content of the command, but because 
of the reason that makes him or her re-
gard the commander as an authority. It 
is misleading because legal positivists 
suppose that in order to have this qual-
ity, the command has to have a certain 
kind of content, one that is determinable 
without going into the questions that the 
judgment of the commander was sup-
posed to settle through issuing the com-
mand. As Raz has summarized this idea, 
the law ‘consists only of authoritative 
10  Joseph Raz, ‘Authority, Law, and Morali-
ty’ in Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays 
in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1994) 194, at 198.
11  Hart, Essays on Bentham, 254-55.
positivist considerations’, and the lat-
ter are considerations ‘the existence of 
which can be ascertained without resort 
to moral argument’.12 
In sum, a command’s success as a con-
tent-independent reason for action de-
pends on its having a determinate con-
tent. Again, Hobbes might seem to agree 
with Raz on this point, as he says, early 
in Leviathan, that the parties to a dispute 
who agree to have the dispute settled by 
arbitration also agree to take the content 
of the arbitrator’s decision as represent-
ing ‘right reason’ and that it would be 
irrational for them to contest his deci-
sion by invoking the considerations that 
brought them to arbitration.13 
I will argue that Bobbio’s views, and in-
deed the view just sketched of Hobbes’s 
account of the authority of law, are mis-
taken. We can start by noticing that these 
views are inconsistent with the aim that 
Hobbes himself stated for Leviathan: to 
show how one could pass ‘unwounded’ 
between those ‘who contend, on one side 
for too great Liberty, and on the other 
side for too much Authority’.14 We need, 
12  Joseph Raz, ‘The Problem about the Na-
ture of Law’ in Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, 
179, at 189-90. Notice that there is an ambiguity 
here between ‘the existence of which can be de-
termined’ and the content of which can be de-
termined’. In my view, Raz means both. 
13  For an illuminating account of Hobbes 
in these terms, one which attempts to save his 
argument from several important difﬁ  culties, 
see Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance: 
Defying the Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), chapter 3, ‘Limited ob-
edience to an unlimited sovereign’. 
14  See Hobbes’s dedication to Francis Godol-
phin-Leviathan 3.  94 95
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not then strictly one in which a theory of 
law is subordinated to a political philoso-
phy. Rather, political philosophy does the 
work of explaining why it is that law has 
authority, more elaborately, why it is that 
legal authority is always de jure or legiti-
mate political authority.16
The Limits of Legal Authority
Despite Hobbes’s general argument that 
there is no such thing as unjust law or 
command, he was clearly troubled by 
what to say about a sovereign who is-
sues a command that is shameful for the 
subject to obey or inhuman or both, and 
by one particular example of such a com-
mand: a son who is commanded to kill 
his father; for he discussed it in De Cive 
(1642) and returned to it in Behemoth 
or the Long Parliament (1679),17 a reﬂ  ec-
tion on the civil war some 17 years after 
Leviathan. 
In De Cive, Hobbes says that a son so 
commanded would not be obliged by the 
command because he would ‘rather die, 
than live infamous, and hated of all the 
world’.18 He also says others could do the 
16   My argument is thus, as I indicate in the 
text, primarily methodological or about the phi-
losophical structure of Hobbes’s position. Mo-
reover, it is primarily about that position as it is 
elaborated in Leviathan, though I will refer to 
other works. I leave to another occasion the task 
of showing how Hobbes’s views on such matters 
changed and developed across his entire corpus.
17  (London: Frank Cass, 1969, Ferdinand 
Tönnies, ed.)
18  Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (On the Citizen) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 
Richard Tuck ed.), 6.13.
in other words, to avoid both the position 
of those who think that when authority 
clashes with their view of right there is no 
authority and the position of those who 
think that the commands of the powerful 
are always right. 
Hobbes, on my account, goes a long way 
to meeting just that aim through an argu-
ment that we cannot distinguish between 
de facto and de jure legal authority, since 
it is in the nature of legal authority that 
it exercises its power rightfully, that is, in 
accordance with the fundamental laws 
of political morality he calls the laws of 
nature, laws that amount to principles 
of legality that discipline government ac-
cording to law.15 Hobbes reveals to us, in 
other words, the commitments of politi-
cal morality that are involved in a society 
in which political power inheres in an ar-
tiﬁ  cial person – a state that exercises its 
power through law because it is legally 
constituted. Hobbes’s methodology is 
15  Hobbes’s account of the operation of these 
laws is hardly every analysed, rather a reason 
is found for bypassing them which ﬁ  ts with the 
orthodox interpretation. For example, Bobbio 
argues that the ‘true function’ of Hobbes’s ex-
tensive account of the laws of nature ‘and the 
only one that cannot be eliminated, is to provide 
the most absolute ground to the norm according 
to which there is no other valid law than posi-
tive law’; Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural 
Law Tradition, trans. Daniela Gobetti (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1993), ‘Natural Law and 
Civil Law in the Political Philosophy of Thomas 
Hobbes’, 114, 148. More recently, SA Lloyd, Mo-
rality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes: Ca-
ses in the Law of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) argues that the laws of 
n a t u r e  a r e  ‘ s e l f - e f f a c i n g ’ .  T h e y  p l a y  a  r o l e  i n  
grounding obedience but once civil society has 
been established, they go missing in action. See 
chapter 6. 
job in place of the son and generalises the 
point by saying: ‘There are many other 
cases, in which, since the Commands are 
shamefull to be done by some, and not 
by others, Obedience may, by Right, be 
perform’d by these, and refus’d by those; 
and this, without breach of that abso-
lute Right which was given to the Chief 
Ruler’.19 
One might well suppose that Hobbes is 
saying here that there is no way in which 
the sovereign’s power is threatened be-
cause of the fact that someone else can 
easily be found to kill the father.20 Thus 
Susanne Sreedhar concludes that these 
are cases in which it is the case both 
that obedience cannot be ‘systematically 
expected’ because the ‘threat of pun-
ishment is likely to be ineffective’ and 
that the ‘sovereign can systematically 
permit’.21 
Sreedhar thus plausibly supposes that 
this example helps to support her argu-
ment that ‘Hobbes’s sovereign is abso-
lute (and absolutely authorized) in that 
he can command with impunity … But 
unlike many absolutists Hobbes does not 
think that absolute sovereignty requires 
absolute obedience’.22 In order to solve 
the puzzle Hobbes creates of the subject 
being entitled to consider himself not 
bound in this and other situations, she 
relies on Raz’s theory of authority. In 
particular, she ﬁ   nds helpful Raz’s idea 
that an authoritative reason excludes re-
19 Ibid.
20  As Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance, says 
at 125.
21 Ibid,  130.
22 129.
liance by the subject of an authoritative 
directive on the reasons excluded within 
a certain scope. She thus argues that for 
Hobbes there is a determinate set of rea-
sons that are non-excludable—reasons 
that preclude killing oneself, bringing 
dishonour on oneself, etc. Hobbes has to 
concede that there is such a set because 
the premise of the whole argument for 
subjection to the sovereign is ensuring 
self-preservation. And he can make that 
concession without undermining the ar-
gument because the concession does not 
threaten the absolute nature of sover-
eignty.23 
But Sreedhar’s Razian solution to this 
puzzle does not work as well when 
Hobbes returns to this example in Behe-
moth, a book in the form of a dialogue 
where B is the young Hobbes and A the 
mature Hobbes. 
B: Must tyrants also be obeyed in ev-
erything actively? Or is there nothing 
wherein a lawful King’s command 
may be disobeyed? What if he should 
command me with my own hands to 
execute my father, in case he should 
be condemned to die by the law?
A: This is a case that need not be put. 
We have never read nor heard of any 
King so inhuman as to command it. If 
any did, we are to consider whether 
that command were one of his laws. 
For by disobeying Kings, we mean the 
disobeying of his laws, those his laws 
that were made before they were ap-
plied to any particular person; for 
23   Ibid, 108-22. 96 97
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doubt is evidence of his optimism that 
sovereigns will not produce patholo-
gies—situations that undermine legal 
subjects’ basis for obedience or continu-
ing consent to sovereign rule. But Hobbes 
nevertheless thinks it is important openly 
to confront the pathology. 
His ﬁ  rst point is that we have to be care-
ful about what counts as a law. There is 
a difference between, on the one hand, 
the commands of a father to his children 
or to his servants and, on the other, the 
commands of the same individual who 
happens to be king when he wishes to 
fulﬁ  ll his political role as sovereign, as the 
artiﬁ  cial person who has ultimate legal 
authority in the legal order. In the latter 
case, his commands have to be issued as 
laws, with the result that no command 
has any effect until it is in proper form. 
Hobbes’s second point is that proper form 
requires not only that the law precede any 
ofﬁ  cial act, but also that it be couched in 
general terms, and only then applied to 
particular circumstances. A law that com-
manded me to execute my father if my 
father were found guilty of a particular 
offence would not count as a law. Hobbes 
does, however, suggest that the sovereign 
could ‘contrive’ to put such a command 
into general form. Such a law would have 
to set out a crime punishable by the death 
penalty and stipulate that if the convicted 
criminal happened to have a son of a cer-
tain age in the country, the son must take 
on the ofﬁ  ce of executioner. If the sov-
ereign succeeded in doing this, I would 
be bound to obey, Hobbes says, unless I 
managed to get out of the country before 
the condemnation of my father. So while 
the King, though as a father of chil-
dren, and a master of domestic ser-
vants command many things which 
bind those children and servants yet 
he commands the people in general 
never but by a precedent law, and as 
a politic, not a natural person. And 
if such a command as you speak of 
were contrived into a general law 
(which never was, nor never will 
be), you were bound to obey it, un-
less you depart the kingdom after the 
publication of the law, and before the 
condemnation of your father.24
The passage is intriguing, ﬁ  rst, because 
while B does not mention explicitly the 
distinction between a tyrant and a law-
ful king on which A relies, neither does 
B explicitly reject it, whereas Hobbes in 
Leviathan and other earlier works was 
adamant that such a distinction is both 
politically pernicious and conceptually 
confused.25 It is intriguing, second, be-
cause B’s remarks about why the case 
‘need not be put’, especially when these 
are read in the light of the legal theory 
elaborated in Leviathan, reveal an ac-
count of law’s authority that is very dif-
ferent from those usually attributed to 
Hobbes, including Sreedhar’s Razian ver-
sion. 
In this passage, Hobbes expresses doubt 
that any sovereign would enact the law 
proposed in the question to him. This 
24  Hobbes, Behemoth, 51.
25  For discussion of Hobbes’s changing views 
on this distinction, see Kinch Hoekstra, ‘Tyran-
nus Rex VS. Leviathan’ (2001) 82 Paciﬁ  c Philo-
sophical Quarterly 420.
it would be difﬁ  cult to wrestle legal form 
into a shape that would allow a law that 
Hobbes clearly regards as inhumane to be 
brought into existence, he admits that it 
could be done. 
Notice that while Hobbes is bothered by 
the sheer inhumanity or immorality of 
the law, his analysis in Behemoth does 
not focus on that fact. Rather, his point is 
that there are certain kinds of inhumani-
ty that legal form resists. His earlier texts, 
in particular Leviathan, make it clear that 
the basis for the resistance is the laws of 
nature, which are not only laws that are 
derivable from the right of nature but 
also principles internal to legal order.26 
Once we set the passage from Behemoth 
in the context of that and other discus-
sions in Leviathan, matters become even 
more complex. 
First, in order to take advantage of the 
gap between publication of the law and 
the condemnation of my father, I would 
have to be pretty sure that he would be 
26  As Michael Oakeshott put it, for Hobbes 
the laws of nature make up the content of ius: 
But they should not be seen as independent 
principles which, if followed by legislators, 
would endow their laws with a quality of ‘jus-
tice’; they are no more than an analytic break 
down of the intrinsic character of law, … the 
jus inherent in genuine law which distinguishes 
it from a command addressed to an assignable 
agent or a managerial instruction concerned 
with the promotion of interests.
Oakeshott, ‘The Rule of Law’ in Oakeshott, On 
History and Other Essays (Indianopolis: Liber-
ty Fund, 1999) 129, 173. For my own attempts 
to elaborate this idea, see David Dyzenhaus, 
‘Hobbes’s Constitutional Theory’ in Ian Shapi-
ro, ed., Leviathan (New Haven: Yale Universi-
ty Press, 2010), 453 and ‘How Hobbes met the 
‘ H o b b e s  C h a l l e n g e ” ’  ( 2 0 0 9 )  7 2  M o d e r n  L a w  
Review 488.
convicted despite the fact that he would 
have to be tried and found guilty by a 
judge. For only after such a ﬁ  nding had 
been made, could the judge issue the 
particular command that I execute my 
father. This factor complicates matters 
because Hobbes has a rich understanding 
of the judicial role. 
Hobbes argues that in arbitration in the 
state of nature, and in a dispute before a 
judge in civil society, the parties must on 
pain of irrationality accept the decision as 
representing right reason, and hence that 
they are not permitted to return to the 
original conﬂ  ict of reasons between them 
to contest the judgment. They must take, 
in other words, the decision as settling 
the dispute. Hence, a standard interpre-
tation of Hobbes is that it matters more in 
a conﬂ  ict that the conﬂ  ict is resolved or 
settled by a deﬁ  nitive decision than how 
it is resolved. The principle of settlement 
is then what makes it altogether rational 
to submit to arbitration, and thus by par-
ity of reasoning to the decisions of an all-
powerful political sovereign, whatever 
the content of the decision of the arbitra-
tor or the decisions of the sovereign.27 
If this interpretation captured the whole 
of Hobbes’s argument, his solution to the 
problem of the state of nature would be 
wholly procedural. Further, his concepti-
on of an arbitrator in the state of nature 
and of the arbitrator’s equivalent in civil 
society, the sovereign and his subordi-
nate judges, would amount to no more 
than the person with authority to decide 
27  See Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Concept and the 
Rule of Law’ (2008) 43 Georgia Law Review 1. 98 99
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ver, when the parties submit a dispute to 
an arbitrator, they do so not only in the 
expectation that he will give a decision 
which provides a deﬁ  nitive resolution to 
the dispute, and so permits them to avoid 
ﬁ  ghting it out by whatever means they 
choose, but also in the expectation that 
the decision will accord with the laws of 
nature which set out the moral discipline 
of the arbitrator’s role. The authority of 
the arbitrator comes, then, not only from 
the consent of the parties to abide by his 
decision, but also from the kind of deci-
sion that they are entitled to expect. A 
complaint by one of the parties that the 
decision is ﬂ   awed because the arbitra-
tor failed to act in accordance with these 
constraints of role is different in kind 
from the complaint that Hobbes rules 
out – that the party simply does not like 
the way the arbitrator settled the dispute 
over right reason.33 
Notice that the principles that condition 
the substance of the decision are princi-
ples that will ﬁ  gure on most, perhaps all 
lists of principles of legality or the rule of 
law. So if we move from the situation of 
an arbitrator in a state of nature to the 
situation of a judge in a civil society, we 
can put the point just made as follows. 
In Hobbes, the speciﬁ  c authority of law 
comes from not only from the fact that 
law provides an institutionally conclusive 
way of settling a dispute since it provides 
determinate conclusions about the obli-
gations of legal subjects. Such authority 
also comes from the fact that conclusions 
33  Raz almost gets to the point of seeing this 
in ‘Authority, Law, and Morality’, 196.
a dispute, however that person wanted to 
decide it. Indeed, there would be no need 
for Law 16 of the laws of nature, which 
makes it a duty on conﬂ  icting parties to 
submit to arbitration by a third party if 
they ﬁ  nd themselves in conﬂ  ict,28 since it 
would be far more efﬁ  cient for the con-
ﬂ  icting parties simply to agree to the re-
sult of a coin toss. 
As Hobbes makes clear, there is much 
more to arbitration than the principle of 
settlement. Once the conﬂ  icting parties’ 
consent constitutes an arbitrator, that 
person is not simply a natural individual. 
Rather, he is an artiﬁ  cial person in that 
he takes on a role in which at least four of 
the other laws of nature are implicated. 
Law 11 is the law of equity, that ‘if a man 
be trusted to judge between man and 
man, it is a precept of the Law of Nature, 
that he deal Equally between them’.29 
And because, says Hobbes, ‘every man is 
presumed to do all things in order to his 
own beneﬁ  t, no man is a ﬁ  t arbitrator in 
his own cause’, which gives us law 17.30 
For the same reason, law 18 holds that 
no man is to be judge who ‘has in him 
a natural cause of partiality’.31 Law 19 
is that in controversies of fact, the judge 
must give credit to the witnesses.32 
These last four laws are both procedural 
and substantive in that they affect, with-
out determining, the content of any de-
cision by an arbitrator who is faithful to 
the moral discipline of his role. Moreo-
28 Leviathan,  108-9.
29 Ibid,  108.
30 Ibid,  109.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
about what the law requires will be based 
on sound reasons, reasons that include 
the principles of legality.34 In play here 
is not the principle of settlement, but the 
principle of justiﬁ  cation.
Of course, Hobbes does see differences 
between the situation of the arbitrator in 
the state of nature and the judge in a civil 
society since the legal order of civil soci-
ety has to be staffed by subordinate judg-
es because all laws require interpreta-
tion.35 Hobbes tells us that a good judge is 
one who, in interpreting the written law, 
relies on his understanding of the un-
written law, the laws of nature.36 More-
over, one should not think that there is 
anything illegitimate in judges interpret-
ing the positive law through the lens of 
the laws of nature, because it would be a 
great insult if subordinate judges were to 
attribute to the ultimate judge, the sov-
ereign, an intention to ﬂ  out the laws of 
nature.37 
As a result, the sovereign as ultimate 
judge is constrained by the laws of nature, 
not because he owes duties to his subjects, 
but because of the duties owed by judges 
to them. Their duty to the sovereign is ex-
hausted by their obligation of ‘ﬁ  delity’ to 
law,38 including the laws of nature. This 
34  I adapt here the illuminating argument in 
Kenneth Winston, ‘Introduction’, to Winston, 
ed., The Principles of Social Order: Selected Es-
says of Lon L. Fuller (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 
2001), 25, at 36-7.
35 Leviathan,  190-1.
36 Ibid,  95-6.
37 Ibid,  194.
38  To use Lon L. Fuller’s term, ‘Positivism 
and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart’ 
(1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 632.
duty, it must be emphasized, ﬂ  ows not to 
a natural individual, even if the sovereign 
happens to be one natural individual. As 
the quote from Behemoth makes clear, 
from the judicial perspective the sover-
eign is the body that makes the written 
laws that judges must interpret. That is, 
the sovereign is a legally constituted sov-
ereign: the person or body that has the au-
thority to make laws provided that it com-
plies with the public criteria recognized for 
certifying that a law is valid. 
I will call this the ‘validity proviso’. But 
there is, following my account so far, an-
other ‘legality proviso’—the laws the sov-
ereign makes have to be interpreted, and 
so must be interpretable, in light of the 
laws of nature.
The validity proviso tells us that Hobbes 
was well aware of the existence of some-
thing like Hart’s ‘rule of recognition’, the 
ultimate rule of legal order that provides 
criteria for certifying the validity of par-
ticular laws. Hart and Hartians after him 
have taken for granted Hart’s claim that 
the rule of recognition corrected the mis-
take of his positivist predecessors Ben-
tham and Austin in supposing that the 
sovereign is legally unlimited, a supposi-
tion that Hobbes is even more famous for 
making. But Hart did not perhaps have 
the best understanding of his tradition 
on this score.39 The better interpretation 
is that Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin 
did not mean by ‘legally unlimited’ that 
the sovereign could make law without 
39  The legality proviso was, however, ex-
pressly rejected by Bentham and Austin after 
him. Legal positivists today are still struggling 
with the question of how to cope with it.  100 101
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This last fact gives rise to the question 
of what happens when the two provisos 
clash, for example, when the sovereign, 
in full compliance with the public crite-
ria, enacts a law that is difﬁ  cult to square 
with one or more laws of nature. I point-
ed out that, in the example from Behe-
moth, Hobbes’s analysis of the inhumane 
law focuses on the legally problematic as-
pects of the law rather than on its sheer 
inhumanity. That is, Hobbes focuses on 
the difﬁ  culties attendant on getting to the 
point where it is true that ‘legally speak-
ing, it is the case that you must execute 
your father’. 
But we need to recall that he does not 
rule out the possibility that the point can 
be reached. My excursus into Hobbes’s 
understanding of the role of a judge 
shows that the statement would have 
to follow not only the successful enact-
ment of the general law, but also a full 
trial. That entails, on Hobbes’s legal the-
ory that from law’s own perspective the 
judge would have to take into account 
any argument that sought to show that 
a law of nature required him to interpret 
the law in a particular way, perhaps one 
that goes against what seemed at ﬁ  rst 
the self-evident meaning of the law. For 
Hobbes is clear that judges must take the 
meaning of any particular law to be the 
one that complies best with the laws of 
nature, even when another interpreta-
tion would seem the more obvious one 
ture of La w’ in Raz, Ethics in the Public Do-
main, 179, at 189-90. Notice that there is an 
ambiguity here between ‘the existence of which 
can be determined’ and the content of which 
can be determined’. Raz means both. 
complying with public criteria for law-
making. Rather, they had in mind a legal 
order in which the sovereign may at will 
change any law as long as he complies 
with the criteria by enacting a law.40 
The legality proviso tells us that it is not 
sufﬁ  cient for an enacted law to comply 
with the public criteria. The content of 
the law must also be one that judges can 
interpret in such a way that it complies 
with the laws of nature, that is, at least 
does not violate them, at best, displays an 
attempt to meet the highest aspirations 
set by these laws. Hence, Hobbes is not 
a legal positivist at least in so far as does 
not subscribe to the thesis that the law 
‘consists only of authoritative positiv-
ist considerations’, with the latter being 
considerations ‘the existence of which 
can be ascertained without resort to mor-
al argument’.41 
40  For Hobbes’s account of the rule of rec-
ognition, see ibid, 189. Those who think that 
Hobbes regarded the sovereign as legally un-
limited rely on Hobbes’s insistence that the sov-
ereign is ‘not Subject to the Civill Lawes’, ibid, 
184:
For having power to make, and repeale Lawes, 
he may when he pleaseth, free himselfe from 
that subjection, by repealing those Lawes that 
trouble him, and making of new; and conse-
quently he was free before. For he is free, that 
can be free when he will: Nor is it possible for 
any person to be bound to himselfe; because he 
that can bind, can release; and therefore he that 
is bound to himselfe only, is not bound.
Compare the similar passage at 224. But they 
fail to see that for an artiﬁ  cial person to be free 
‘when he will’ he has to will publicly, that is, 
to express himself in a way that is publicly ac-
cessible and recognizable to his subjects as an 
expression of will. They also fail to notice that in 
the passage at 224 Hobbes emphasizes that the 
sovereign is subject to the laws of nature. 
41  Joseph Raz, ‘The Problem about the Na-
outside of the interpretive context pro-
vided by natural law. 
Note that in the Behemoth situation, 
there is one law of nature that should 
give the judge pause. Law 7 forbids the 
inﬂ  iction of punishment ‘with any other 
designe, than for correction of the of-
fender, or direction of others’.42 Hobbes 
must suppose that the death penalty may 
be inﬂ  icted when this would help to di-
rect others by deterring them from cer-
tain crimes, even though it cannot ‘cor-
rect’ the offender.43 Thus, a judge might 
conclude, though the conclusion will be 
somewhat strained, that my knowing 
that my own son will have to execute me 
should I be found guilty of committing a 
particular crime could be regarded as a 
plausible interpretation of this law of na-
ture because the very inhumanity of the 
law might have a great deterrent effect. 
But while the judge might think he can 
makes sense of his role in ordering that 
I execute my father, can he make sense 
of the claim that I am under a duty to do 
as he commands? Recall that in De Cive, 
Hobbes supposes there is no duty at all. In 
contrast, in the passage from Behemoth 
he says that that I will be ‘bound’ unless 
I escape the country before my father’s 
actual condemnation. His vacillations 
create the kinds of puzzles that Sreedhar 
invokes Raz to solve. For example, while 
42 Ibid,  106. 
43  Though Mario A. Cattaneo suggests that 
the logical conclusion of Hobbes’s argument is 
that the death penalty should be outlawed be-
cause of its deep irrationality; ‘Hobbes’s Theory 
of Punishment’ in K.C. Brown, ed., Hobbes Stu-
dies (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965) 275.
I am permitted to agree in the covenant 
that sovereign is entitled to execute me 
for disobedience to his laws, an agree-
ment not to resist the sovereign when the 
actual punishment is imminent is void. 
And it is void because the punishment 
undermines the end of self-preservation 
for which I transferred to the sovereign 
my right to judge how best to preserve 
myself.44 In Leviathan, Hobbes calls this 
the ‘true liberty’ of the subject, and says 
that the words of the covenant that give 
the sovereign a complete authorization 
to govern cannot ‘by themselves’ bind a 
man ‘either to kill himselfe, or any other 
man’:
And consequently, that the Obliga-
tion a man may sometimes have, 
upon the Command of the Sovereign 
to execute any dangerous or dishon-
ourable Ofﬁ  ce, dependeth not on the 
Words of our Submission; but on the 
Intention; which is to be understood 
by the End thereof. When therefore 
our refusal to obey, frustrates the 
End for which the Soveraignty was 
ordained; then there is no Liberty to 
refuse: otherwise there is.45 
De Cive makes explicit that the ‘ofﬁ  ce’ in 
the example, i.e. taking the ofﬁ  cial role 
of being one’s father’s executioner, is 
dishonourable. Leviathan sets our more 
elaborately than De Cive the legalist 
morality of the ofﬁ   cial role. Behemoth 
sets the example in the context of that 
44 Leviathan,  98.
45 Ibid,  151. 102 103
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made by a lawgiver whose authority rests 
on the fact that his subject have autho-
rized him so to act, and who has no in-
terest in making law other than the pro-
vision of such security. In addition, the 
legal subject knows that in cases where 
the law seems unreasonable because it 
does not accord with the laws of nature 
derivable from that interest, he may ask a 
judge for an authoritative interpretation 
of the law, which the judge will strive 
to ensure complies with the liberty-and 
equality-serving laws of nature.48 
For Hobbes the paradigmatic way for this 
authorization to come about is through 
sovereignty by institution, an agreement 
between free and equal individuals in 
the state of nature.49 Once the sovereign 
is instituted, the equality of the state of 
nature is preserved in law 11, the law 
of equity that requires that those who 
are ‘trusted to judge between man and 
man’ deal equally between them,50 and 
in law 10, the law against arrogance, 
that ‘at the entrance into conditions of 
Peace, no man require to himselfe any 
Right, which he is not content should be 
reserved to every one of the rest’.51 Law 
10, says Hobbes, secures for men the lib-
48  The third way in which the quality of the 
space of civic liberty differs from mere negati-
ve liberty is that individuals are enabled both 
to create juridical relations for themselves and, 
more generally , to act as just men; Leviathan, 
103-4. 
49  I will not here go into why I think that 
sovereignty by institution, in contrast to the al-
ternative method of acquiring sovereignty de-
scribed by Hobbes--sovereignty by acquisition, 
is paradigmatic.
50  Leviathan, 108, emphasis removed.
51  Ibid, 107, emphasis removed.
morality and sketches how the ofﬁ  ce is 
problematic not only because it is dishon-
ourable but also because it is inherently 
problematic as an ofﬁ  cial, that, is a law-
constituted role. 
Put differently, the command’s inhuma-
nity is legally problematic since it under-
mines the basis for law’s claim to autho-
rity over me. This basis is not reducible, 
as is commonly supposed, to my interest 
in security – a trade of protection for obe-
dience – though even on those terms one 
might argue that the law undermines 
security. For Hobbes is clear that a civil 
society is not merely one in which the-
re is centralized power, since what ma-
kes it civil is in large part that the power 
is exercised through law. To clamour for 
freedom from the law, he argues, is ab-
surd because that it is to demand a return 
to the state of nature.46 This argument is 
rightly taken to be an attempt to debunk 
the claim that people may legitimately 
rise up against their leaders in the name 
of liberty.47 But it is not only that, for it 
is also an argument about the quality 
of civic liberty, a kind of liberty we can 
have only when a system of civil law is 
in place. 
The basis for the law’s claim to authority 
is that it serves our interest in civic liberty. 
This is the liberty one has when one en-
joys the security of a stable order of laws, 
46 Ibid.,  147.
47  See, for example, Quentin Skinner, Li-
berty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998) and Hobbes and Repu-
blican Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2008), and Philip Pettit, ‘Liberty and 
Leviathan’, (2005) 4 Politics, Philosophy, & Eco-
nomics 131.
erty to do those things without which ‘a 
man cannot live, or not live well’ and it 
thus amounts to an ‘acknowledgment of 
naturall equalitie’.52 In addition, liberty 
is preserved both through the institution 
of civic liberty and through the residual 
right to question whether ‘the End for 
which the Soveraignty was ordained’ is 
frustrated.
Now, both liberty (other than the residu-
al right of liberty) and equality are trans-
formed in the transition from the state of 
nature to civil society through the way in 
which the conditions for both are deter-
mined through enacted law. But, as we 
have seen, just because it is the task of 
sovereignty to decide how to effect that 
transformation, subordinate judges are 
under a duty to try to ensure that the 
enacted law lives up to the principles it 
seeks to effect. Indeed, while it is crucial 
for Hobbes that when subordinate judges 
perform this task they do so in an impar-
tial fashion, that is, that they make an 
independent judgment about what the 
law (both enacted and natural) requires, 
they should not be seen as checking sov-
ereignty. Rather they are completing the 
sovereign act of law-making as part of the 
artiﬁ   cial person of sovereignty. Judges 
are, as Hobbes tells us in ‘The Introduc-
tion’ the ‘artiﬁ  call Joynts’ of the ‘Artiﬁ  -
ciall Soul’ of sovereignty.53
In sum, liberty and equality are not 
smuggled into the laws of nature. Rather, 
they are built in, since one cannot make 
sense of the project of erecting the ‘ﬁ  rme 
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid,  9.
and lasting ediﬁ  ce’54 of a civil society—
one in which subjects enjoy civic liberty-- 
in the absence of a legal order, which is to 
say an order of positive law that complies 
with the principles of natural law. The 
principles are thus formal or structural 
in nature. They are the principles with 
which there has to be conformity in or-
der to have a society in which the exer-
cise of power through law has a plausible 
claim to the obedience of the individuals 
subject to the law, such that they may be 
said to have authorized it. Hence, the task 
of ensuring that the positive law is inter-
preted in the light of these principles is 
inseparable from an inquiry about how 
the law serves both liberty and equality. 
Recall that for Hobbes the sovereign is the 
supreme judge. However, unlike subor-
dinate judges, he not only declares what 
the law is, but also has the authority to 
enact new laws. But, as I have already in-
dicated, his freedom from the law is not 
a freedom for the artiﬁ   cial person and 
its agents to act outside of the law, but 
a freedom to enact new laws that over-
ride old laws. Hobbes here makes a great 
contribution to modern legal theory in 
beginning to set out an account of how a 
centralized political power is able to make 
judgments about the common good, that 
is, judgments that all legal subjects might 
reasonably be taken to have authorized 
as their own. In other words, he begins 
an account of the conditions for deliber-
ate and legitimate legislative reform. 
However, it is within this account that 
the validity proviso applies. That is, to 
54 Ibid,  221. 104 105
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contrary to the end for which every 
Common-wealth is instituted.56
Such a grant, Hobbes says, is ‘void’,57 and 
he must mean void even if it is the case 
that the grant is explicit and contained in 
a command that fully complies with the 
validity proviso. 
So here we have an example where sub-
ordinate judges would not only be en-
titled to disregard a perfectly valid com-
mand, but under a duty so to do. If they 
did not, as Hobbes tell us in the quota-
tion, the end of Commonwealth – the 
preservation of civic peace and security 
– is subverted. Moreover, they would be 
under such a duty even if the sovereign 
included in the law a provision that pro-
hibited subordinate judges from exercis-
ing such a review power, the equivalent 
of the legislative provision called either a 
privative or ouster clause in the twenti-
eth century. 
But recall that for Hobbes it is not order as 
such – the mere absence of conﬂ  ict-- that 
is in issue when it comes to Judicature. 
Rather, it is the kind of order that makes 
possible a certain kind of interaction be-
tween subjects, one that, as I have ar-
gued, requires a stable system of law that 
makes it possible for individual subjects 
to live together as equal members of the 
civic community. This point establishes 
one end—the ‘duty end’--of what we can 
think of as a continuum of legality where 
judges are under a duty to strike down a 
law, even though that law complies with 
56 Ibid,  125.
57 Ibid,  127.
state an obvious but important point, the 
validity proviso applies only to statutes 
and to the authority delegated to public 
ofﬁ   cials by statutes. It is thus a neces-
sary condition for an important class of 
legal statements to be true. But it is not a 
necessary condition for other statements 
of what is legally speaking the case to be 
true. It is, as we have seen, not true about 
judgments about what the law requires 
that depend on the subordinate judge ar-
riving at a conclusion about what is war-
ranted by the best interpretation of the 
laws of nature, or of enacted law inter-
preted in the light of the laws of nature.55 
Moreover, Hobbes remarks in Leviathan 
that there are certain essential rights of 
sovereignty that the sovereign cannot 
grant away however explicit the grant, 
including the right to make law and the 
right of ‘Judicature’. The latter is the right
of hearing and deciding all contro-
versies, which may arise concerning 
Law, either Civill, or Naturall, or con-
cerning Fact. For without the decision 
of Controversies, there is no protec-
tion of one Subject, against the inju-
ries of another; the Lawes concerning 
Meum and Tuum are in vaine; and to 
every man remaineth, from the natu-
rall and necessary appetite of his own 
conservation, the right of protect-
ing himselfe by his private strength, 
which is the condition of Warre; and 
5 5   I n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  H o b b e s  d i f f e r s  f r o m  t h e  
common law tradition in general and from Ro-
nald Dworkin’s ‘interpretive’ account of how 
judges should reason mainly because he is op-
posed to any doctrine of precedent; ibid, 101-2. 
the validity proviso, and even though 
they are not given any explicit authority 
by any other kind of enacted law to do so. 
The other end – the ‘aspiration end’ – is 
established by Hobbes’s claim in chapter 
30 of Leviathan that the sovereign must 
make ‘Good Lawes’. Hobbes does not 
mean by ‘good’ ‘just’ since his view is 
that all the sovereign’s laws are by deﬁ  ni-
tion just. Rather, a good law is that which 
is ‘Needfull, for the Good of the People, 
and withall Perspicuous’.58 He goes on to 
say that the use of laws is ‘not to bind the 
People from all Voluntary actions; but to 
direct and keep them in such a motion, 
as not to hurt themselves by their own 
impetuous desires, rashnesse, or indiscre-
tion; as Hedges are set, not to stop Trav-
ellers, but to keep them in the way’.59 
Further, while one might think that the 
true end of a law is the beneﬁ  t of the sov-
ereign this is not the case, for ‘the good 
of the Soveraign and People, cannot be 
separated’.60 Finally, perspicuity consists 
not so much in the words of the law, but 
in a ‘Declaration of the Causes, and Mo-
tives, for which it was made’.61 And it 
seems clear that for Hobbes law should 
have all of these features in order that it 
might be ‘the publique Conscience, by 
which [the subject] … hath already un-
dertaken to be guided’.62 
As one moves away from the duty end, 
matters become complex because when 
a statute is not clearly void but seems to 
58 Ibid,  239.
59 Ibid,  239-40.
60 Ibid,  240.
61 Ibid.
62  Ibid, chap. 29, 223.
undermine one or other principle of le-
gality, the judge is under a duty to try to 
ﬁ  nd an interpretation of the statute that 
will make it less problematic from the 
perspective of legality. In seeing this we 
can dispel a possible confusion about the 
distinction between what we can think 
of as the morality of duty and the moral-
ity of aspiration.63 The distinction is not 
one that pertains directly to the judicial 
role, though it has clear implications for 
judges; rather, it pertains directly to the 
role of the lawmaker. 
The duty end of the continuum of legality 
is the end at which the lawmaker has to 
conform in very particular ways with le-
gality in order for its acts to be recognized 
as legislative acts. Correspondingly, when 
the lawmaker fails so to conform, judges 
are under a duty to declare that the act 
fails to be law. As one moves away from 
this end, answers to the question of what 
legality requires will not be so clear; nev-
ertheless, the judges remain under a duty 
to interpret the law so as to make it as 
consistent as possible with the aspirations 
of legality. There is, in short, a judicial 
duty to enforce strictly the requirements 
of legality at the duty end. But as one 
moves away from that end, there is also 
a judicial duty to make the law live up to 
the aspirations of legality, one that is de-
rived from the legislative duty to comply 
with these aspirations.64 
63  Here I follow the distinction in Lon L. Ful-
ler, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1969, revised edition), 5 ff. 
64  Kinch Hoekstra notes in his manuscript, 
‘Thomas Hobbes and the Creation of Order’, that 
‘valid’ in Hobbes’s day meant strong as well as  106 107
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legal order, because they are conﬂ  icts in-
ternal to the exercise of legal authority. 
Moreover, addressing such conﬂ  icts  is 
part of the judicial role even when judges 
are conﬁ  ned, as Hobbes would prefer, to 
‘weak form judicial review’ and so ﬁ  nd 
on occasion when they are on points of 
the continuum towards the aspirational 
end that they are unable to decide a con-
ﬂ  ict between the two provisos in favour 
of the legality proviso.
The difference between these two forms 
of judicial review is in this context is only 
about whether there is s judicial remedy 
available in the limit case – when the 
validity proviso clashes with the legality 
proviso in such a way that the individ-
ual’s interests in liberty and equality are 
threatened. Sreedhar’s Razian argument 
is one way of responding to the limit case 
through a claim about non-excludable 
reasons, in essence inalienable rights 
against the sovereign.65 
My account is different. The authority of 
the sovereign is not a matter of his being 
able to decide as he pleases with each in-
dividual subject obliged to obey him un-
less the decision has a negative impact on 
the non-excludable reasons of that indi-
vidual. Rather the limit case reveals the 
fundamental norms of the moral com-
munity of which all legal subjects are 
members and that make it possible for 
the artiﬁ  cial person of the sovereign to 
have and to exercise authority, by which 
I mean de jure or legitimate authority . 
65  See Yves Charles Zarka, ‘The Political 
Subject’, in Tom Sorell and Luc Foisneau, eds, 
Leviathan After 350 Years (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 167). 
It follows that any of the following ex-
amples would be legally speaking prob-
lematic from Hobbes’s perspective on 
law: a statute that ﬂ  atly contradicted the 
content of one of the laws of nature; a 
statute that precluded judges from rely-
ing on a particular law of nature in inter-
preting the law; or, even more radically, 
a statute that prohibited judges from 
ever relying on the laws of nature. The 
morality of aspiration requires judges to 
try to do something in all these cases to 
preserve the laws of nature even if one 
thinks they are not under a duty to de-
clare the statute void. And that sufﬁ  ces 
to show that Hobbes has a rich and com-
plex legal account of law’s authority, one 
in which the complexities are generated 
from within. 
Put differently, the issue is not about 
whether judges are entitled to exer-
cise (in our terms) ‘strong form judicial 
review’, striking down statutes when 
these conﬂ   icts with fundamental legal 
principles, for example, those contained 
in an entrenched bill of rights. Rather, 
Hobbes helps us to understand that the 
kinds of conﬂ  icts that such review might 
be thought institutionally appropriate to 
resolve are conﬂ  icts that will arise in any 
valid in the sense of ‘not void’. Hence, when 
Hobbes means to use valid at important points 
in the former sense, he must intend that validi-
ty comes in degrees of strength. On this view, 
a statute can be more or less valid depending 
on its ability to meet the legality proviso. For a 
relevant argument in a very different context, 
see David Dyzenhaus, ‘The Juristic force of Inju-
stice’ in Dyzenhaus and Mayo Moran, eds, Cal-
ling Power to Account: Law, Reparations, and 
the Chinese Head Tax Case (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2005) 256.
Indeed, on this account adding either of 
these adjectives merely makes explicit 
what is necessarily implicit, since legal 
authority is always de jure. Here it is 
helpful to return to Hobbes’s distinction 
between advice and command because, 
as he says in De Cive, we ‘must fetch the 
distinction between counsel and law, 
from the difference between counsel 
and command.’66 
The Background Conditions 
of Authority
In one of the most innovative works in 
ethics in the last sixty or so years,67 Ste-
phen Darwall argues that the idea of au-
thority presupposes certain background 
conditions—the existence of a moral 
community, whose members have equal 
standing to hold each other to account 
for violations of moral norms. Darwall 
takes Hobbes’s distinction between com-
mand and advice as central to his own 
theory of morality as ‘second personal’, 
and comments that failure to observe this 
distinction ‘infects Joseph Raz’s account 
of authority’.68 As Darwall has explained, 
Raz’s Normal Justiﬁ  cation Thesis can ex-
66  Hobbes, De Cive, 14.1.
67  See Gary Watson, ‘Morality as Equal Ac-
countability: Comments on Stephen Darwall’s 
The Second-Person Standpoint’ (2007) 118 Eth-
ics 37, at 37-8.
68  Stephen Darwall, . See also Darwall, ‘Au-
thority and Reasons: Exclusionary and Second 
Personal’ (2010) 120 Ethics 257 and ‘Authori-
ty and Second Personal Reasons for Acting’, in 
David Sobel and Steven Wall, eds., Reasons for 
Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009) 135.
plain when we should treat someone as 
a great source of advice, but not why we 
should treat that person as an authority. 
Raz has responded that his explanation 
of authority is not an ‘account of [moral] 
rights and duties in general’ but, rather, 
‘an attempt to explain authority of the 
kind that governments claim over their 
subjects, parents over their children, and 
so on’.69 
However, on my argument so far 
Hobbes’s account of governmental au-
thority is precisely the kind that Darwall 
describes, and this is so despite the fact 
that Hobbes elaborates the distinction be-
tween command and advice in Leviathan 
in what might seem initially an incon-
sistent fashion. It follows, Hobbes says, 
‘manifestly’ from the distinction that ‘he 
that Commandeth, pretendeth thereby 
his own Beneﬁ  t. For the reason of his 
Command is his own Will onely, and the 
proper object of every mans Will, is some 
Good to himselfe’.70 It may seem, that is, 
that Hobbes if offering something like a 
beneﬁ  t theory of authority: you obey my 
command because of the beneﬁ  t to me.
However, Hobbes’s point about beneﬁ  t 
merely emphasizes a feature of author-
ity that an authoritative directive is not 
one that I follow because its content is 
one I inspect and decide offers the best 
69  Joseph Raz, ‘On Respect, Authority, and 
Neutrality: A Response’ (2010) 120 Ethics 279, 
290.
70  Leviathan, 176. Note that Darwall quotes 
almost the full passage from De Cive but not the 
two lines towards the end where Hobbes makes 
the same point; The Second-Person Standpoint: 
Morality, Respect, and Accountability, note 25 
at 12-13. 108 109
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ger appropriate since the beneﬁ  t is to the 
public at large or the Commonwealth. 
Raz’s account of scope is helpful here.74 
But scope is not a property of exclusion-
ary reasons. Rather scope is a property 
of authority that is set by reasons, in 
legal contexts the idea of jurisdiction or 
bounded authority. Moreover, there is 
a hard to resist danger in trying to un-
derstand the scope of reasons in spatial 
terms.75 Rather, scope has to be under-
stood in terms of what is reasonable to 
infer, given the background conditions of 
authority. And this requires an interpre-
tation of the reasons in the directive in 
the light of the reasons for treating the 
body or person issuing the directive as an 
authority. 
Another way of seeing the problem in 
the Razian account is in terms of the 
positivist idea of content-independent 
reasons. One aspect of this idea is rela-
tively harmless, since it seeks to capture 
simply the same point Hobbes makes 
with the idea of beneﬁ  t to self-- that one 
does not ‘obey’ when one’s reason is that 
the content seems right. But the other 
aspect is where the theory of authority 
goes wrong – that the content consists of 
positivist considerations, ‘the existence of 
which can be ascertained without resort 
to moral argument’. 
74  This is perhaps the only idea that Sreed-
har means to take from Raz. 
75  See Murray Hunt, ‘Sovereignty’s Blight: 
Why Contemporary Public Law Needs the Con-
c e p t  o f  D u e  D e f e r e n c e ’  i n  N i c h o l a s  B a m f o r t h  
and Peter Leyland, eds, Public Law in a Multi-
Layered Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2003) 337.
course of action to me. Rather, I obey it 
because of my reason for regarding you 
as an authority. Thus, the remark is en-
tirely consistent with Darwall’s favourite 
example of my authority to demand that 
you take your foot off mine thus ceasing 
to cause me pain.71 The beneﬁ  t is to me 
not to you. But that I’m entitled to de-
mand that you take your foot off mine is 
not explained by the fact that I beneﬁ  t, 
but by our standing vis à vis each other as 
members of the same moral community. 
When one moves from the private con-
text to the public one, from the interper-
sonal relationship to the relationship of 
legal subject to public authority, however, 
the concept of beneﬁ  t has to be ‘fetched’ 
from the interpersonal context and de-
ployed in the public context. Recall that 
the sovereign is an artiﬁ  cial person and 
that Hobbes says that it is wrong to sup-
pose that the true end of a law is the ben-
eﬁ  t of the sovereign but not the people, 
because ‘the good of the Soveraign and 
People, cannot be separated’.72 The idea 
survives from the interpersonal context 
that the legal subject makes a mistake 
if he decides whether or not a directive 
is authoritative on the basis whether he 
thinks it also serves his beneﬁ  t.73 But the 
idea of one individual making a demand 
of another that the other is obliged to 
obey to the demander’s beneﬁ  t is no lon-
71 Ibid,  5-10.
72 Leviathan,  240.
73  Raz’s theory of authority seems to make 
that mistak e writ large, in supposing that so-
meone who is a constant source of good advice, 
that his, his advice always conduces to my bene-
ﬁ  t, is an authority because he meets the criteria 
of the Normal Justiﬁ  cation thesis. 
As we have seen, not only is the case that 
the laws of nature condition the content 
of the law, but they do so through their 
relationship to the reason for obedience. 
That is, the way in which the laws of na-
ture interact in civil society with enacted 
law makes the content of enacted law in 
part dependent on its compliance with 
the laws of nature. Hence, because the 
laws of nature are derived from our inter-
est in liberty and equality that leads us in 
the ﬁ  rst place to authorize the sovereign, 
the content of the enacted law will reﬂ  ect 
those interests. And the content should 
achieve this in a way that is intelligible or 
‘perspicuous’ to the legal subject. 
When intelligibility in this sense is not 
achievable, it will also be the case that 
the validity and the legality provisos 
are in conﬂ  ict. I will not, a I have indi-
cated, attempt here to try to provide an 
account of how Hobbes or any other le-
gal theorist envisages the resolution of 
such conﬂ  icts. For it sufﬁ  ces to see that 
the conﬂ   icts arise within Hobbes’s ac-
count of the role of law in sustaining a 
civil society to establish the contours of a 
very different account of authority both 
from that elaborated by contemporary 
legal positivists and from that commonly 
attributed to Hobbes. In that account, 
what is problematic about such conﬂ  icts 
is precisely that they bring into question 
the most fundamental presuppositions of 
the well-functioning political community 
that Hobbes calls a civil society.
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Abstract:
Legal positivism has been discussed, for 
the most part, in a vacuum. Still, there is 
a standing presumption, however rarely 
articulated, that there are ties between le-
gal positivism and positivism writ large in 
the greater philosophical tradition, that is 
to say, between legal positivism and nat-
uralism. What sorts of ties? In the present 
paper, I offer an answer in two parts. In 
Part One, I draw on John Austin’s legal 
philosophy, establishing that a positivist 
legal philosophy ﬁ  ts into the greater ru-
bric, positivism writ large, or – my sub-
stitution – naturalism. And, in Part Two 
of the paper, I address the substitution of 
naturalism for positivism writ large.
In Part One, two theses are of special 
interest, with the second thesis follow-
ing from the ﬁ  rst. My ﬁ  rst thesis: Aus-
tin’s naturalism – his “reduction”, at 
two junctures, of ostensibly juridico-
normative concepts to matters of fact 
(namely, to fear and to habit) – is, as he 
contends, sufﬁ  cient to make out his case 
on the nature of law. My second thesis, 
following from the ﬁ  rst: If Austin’s move 
is sufﬁ  cient, then no thesis respecting a 
1977 B.A., University of the Witwa-
tersrand 
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non-contingent link between morality 
and the law can be necessary to the ex-
plication of the nature of law. These two 
theses, taken together, make a point of 
genuine signiﬁ  cance. That is, if these two 
theses are indeed correct and if Austin’s 
legal philosophy is representative of legal 
positivism, then the celebrated “sepa-
ration principle” is not doing the lion’s 
share of the work in legal positivist circles 
after all. Rather, the separation principle 
is but a corollary of naturalism, the over-
riding view.
Parenthetically, I might add a note on 
Hans Kelsen. Just as Austin is representa-
tive of legal positivism, Kelsen is utterly 
unrepresentative – and is known to be 
unrepresentative. In particular, the idea 
that the separation principle is but a cor-
ollary of naturalism can scarcely be at-
tributed to him. Of course Kelsen defends 
the separation principle, but his position 
represents, inter alia, a wholesale rejec-
tion of naturalism.
In Part Two of the paper, I return to the 
question posed by my substitution of 
naturalism for positivism writ large. Is 
the substitution defensible? This ques-
tion takes us to the history of ideas and 
the history of philosophy. A preliminary 
point is as important as it is obvious: 
These “ism”-labels in philosophy – “posi-
tivism”, “naturalism”, “empiricism”, and 
the like – are, without exception, very 
general, and it would be a mistake to 
contend that this or that deﬁ  nition of an 
“ism”-label counts as the characteriza-
tion of the view so labeled. I illustrate the 
point by turning to Willard Van Orman 
Quine, the “father of contemporary nat-
uralism”. Quine understands naturalism 
as the appeal to the sciences, contending 
that naturalism assimilates epistemology 
to “empirical psychology”. “[T]he episte-
mological question”, Quine writes, is “a 
question within science”, the question 
of “how we human animals can have 
managed to arrive at science from such 
limited information. Our scientiﬁ  c episte-
mologist pursues this inquiry … Evolu-
tion and natural selection will doubtless 
ﬁ  gure in this account, and he will feel 
free to apply physics if he sees a way.” 
(Quine, “Five Milestones of Empiricism” 
[ﬁ   rst publ. 1975], in Quine, Theories 
and Things, Cambridge, Mass. 1981, pp. 
67-72, at 72). Austin, however, has no 
concern whatever with the empirical sci-
ences. My point here is that if one were 
to conﬁ  ne naturalism to Quine’s view of 
it, the idea of bringing Austin within the 
rubric of naturalism would be well nigh 
absurd.
To repeat, Quine’s naturalism counts 
against ﬁ  tting Austin’s legal philosophy 
into a naturalistic framework. Natural-
ism, however, is greater than Quine, 
thanks not least of all to the extraor-
dinary role he played in begetting it. 
Quine’s own view counts today as one 
prominent characterization of natural-
ism, and David Hume’s view, now widely 
characterized as naturalism but clearly 
not to be understood as an appeal to the 
empirical sciences, represents a different 
species of naturalism. Barry Stroud, in his 
well-known book on Hume, makes out 
the case for treating Hume as a naturalist. 
“Of all the ingredients of lasting signiﬁ  -
cance in Hume’s philosophy I think [his]  112 113
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tract with the Oxford University Press for 
a new translation of the second edition 
of Kelsen’s Reine Rechtslehre (1960). In 
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naturalistic attitude is of the greatest im-
portance and interest … He was interest-
ed in human nature, and his interest took 
the form of seeking extremely general 
truths about how and why human beings 
think, feel and act in the ways they do 
… These questions were to be answered 
in the only way possible – by observation 
and inference from what is observed.” 
(Stroud, Hume, London 1977, at p. 222)
Austin, too, rests his case on observation 
and inference. And his ties to the tradi-
tion in English philosophy – Jeremy Ben-
tham and John Stuart Mill, to name only 
the most prominent ﬁ   gures – are well 
known. And if, beyond the tradition in 
English philosophy, Austin is also rep-
resentative of legal positivism generally, 
then his naturalism reaches to legal posi-
tivists generally. At this point, a host of 
ﬁ  gures on the European continent come 
into play. My favorite example is Georg 
Jellinek.
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Abstract:
1. Introduction
In the Preface to the second edition of 
his Main Problems in the Theory of Pub-
lic Law, Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) writes 
that Pure Theory of Law is “the communal 
work of a constantly expanding circle of 
men with a congenial theoretical orienta-
tion.” One person who joined this circle 
was Leonid Pitamic (1885-1971), who ac-
knowledged the value of its contributions 
to the project of deﬁ  ning the basic norm 
as a condition of juridical knowledge. In 
the Preface to the ﬁ  rst edition, Kelsen also 
speaks of an intimate circle of men striv-
ing for univocal aims. The characteristics 
of his “School”, according to him, is that 
“here, everyone tries to learn from others, 
without giving up on their own position”. 
In the case of Kelsen and Pitamic, these 
questions concentrate on the purity of the 
method of law and of its content.
It would be false to say that Pitamic was 
not impressed or impassioned by the 
Pure Theory of Law. As for questions ad-
dressing the notion of law as a normative 
system, Kelsen’s normative purism had a 
visible inﬂ  uence on him. Kelsen’s point 
of departure, his statement that a norm 
can only arise from norms, not from re-
ality, may have inspired Pitamic’s claim 
that normative properties of law can be 
deduced only from properties of law. 
“The cardinal question is the relation be-
tween the group of norms determined by 
formal signs of positive law and superor-
dinate or subordinate groups of positive 
law, a relation which, in fact, is identical 
to the legal force of the norm.”
Pitamic extended the normative ap-
proach to studies of the state, of govern-
ment bodies and of the relations between 
them. He already observed in his ﬁ  rst 
paper, Plato, Aristotle and the Pure The-
ory of Law (1921) that Plato, and most 
notably Aristotle, had “followed a strict 
normative model in their exploration 
of the notions of the state, the citizen, 
and the law”, and had managed to avoid 
methodological syncretism. Drawing on 
the example of Aristotle’s Politics, he il-
lustrates how “the idea of the state as an 
order, as a constitutional or legal order” 
is fundamental to the notion of the state. 
For any association, what is relevant is 
“the idea, the system, the nature of the 
connection, and not what is connected”. 
In the footprint of this pursuit, Pitamic 
perceives a parallel between the ancient  114 115
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In 1917, Pitamic published a paper on the 
economy of thinking as a precondition of 
jurisprudence, which played a key role 
in this quest. Pitamic was particularly 
interested in the question whether and 
how Kelsen’s purity could be justiﬁ  ed. He 
advocated the scientiﬁ  c principle that an 
investigation of the process of normative 
deduction must take into account the de-
velopment of events as it occurs accord-
ing to another (causal) method. As he 
says himself, 
“facing this choice, an economical 
principle must be observed both with 
respect to past and to current law; 
this principle completely disregards 
subjective political beliefs and is ex-
hausted in the objective statement of 
the material conditions determining 
the construction of such legal rules, 
which are to agree as closely as pos-
sible with prevailing conceptions of 
the ought, i.e. with such conceptions 
that actually motivate people in the 
domain and at the time for which the 
law is to be determined.”
Regarding the nature of this principle, 
he quotes the philosopher and physicist 
Ernst Mach:
“This tendency of obtaining a survey 
of a given province with the least ex-
penditure of thought, and of repre-
senting its facts by some one single 
mental process, may be justly termed 
an economical use.”
Pitamic proposed methodological clarity 
in legal theory, without altogether re-
ducing Law as a priori to its normativity, 
and without completely divesting the a 
priori concept of all its non-normative el-
Greek conception, which was “free from 
the constructivist auxiliaries of modern 
jurisprudence” and the Pure Theory of 
Law, which “dissolves this momentum, 
materialization and hypostasis of this de-
vice and recognizes it merely as an aux-
iliary for the conceptual economy of ju-
ridical thinking.”
In the following, I will ﬁ  rst brieﬂ  y touch 
on one of the starting points of the Pure 
Theory of Law: the economy of thinking. 
It was certainly the question of the basic 
norm which divided Kelsen and Pitamic 
most incisively. Pitamic transcended the 
Pure Theory of Law and set out to ﬁ  nd 
a common denominator between the 
contents of positive and natural law. He 
sought this common denominator in 
the nature of law. However, the conclu-
sion from this is not that Kelsen’s and 
Pitamic’s conceptions are irreconcilable. 
Their views certainly differ, but they can 
complement each other if linked in an 
appropriate way. The core contribution 
of the Pure Theory of Law is that it erects 
a frame of formal law, while allowing for 
creativity within it.
2. The quest for a juridical basic norm 
(starting point of the Pure Theory of 
Law)
2.1. “Economy of thinking as a precon-
dition of jurisprudence”
Law understood as a system of norms 
would be utopian without some founda-
tion. Kelsen and his circle were searching 
for this foundation.
ements. Pitamic sharply distinguishes be-
tween the deductive-normative and the 
inductive-causal method. The ﬁ  rst only 
provides a way of thinking which enables 
us “to identify without contradiction the 
norms of a given material of law in their 
relations to one other, as well as to apply 
them in the face of actual events.” The 
centerpiece of this method is the proce-
dure of normative imputation, which is 
nothing but “the conjunction of one fact 
of the case with another fact of the case 
on grounds of a norm.” In particular, it is 
characteristic that a defender of the de-
ductive-normative method would always 
presuppose the starting point of his en-
quiry, while the starting point itself (i.e. 
the legal material as the subject matter 
of the enquiry) can only be deﬁ  ned by 
using the inductive-causal method. The 
latter investigates the concrete point of 
departure, i.e. a legal order which is to 
be found “in its concrete, temporally and 
spatially contingent contents.”
This methodological dualism, which ju-
risprudence is unable to avoid, is illus-
trated by Pitamic in a metaphorical way:
“When Kelsen presupposes a given 
standpoint – a complex of norms – 
and, from this formal precondition 
unconcerned with content, derives 
the consequences in a purely deduc-
tive way, he is so to speak on the 
peak of some mountain, from which 
he descends by carving a normative 
way, without asking himself the ques-
tion how the summit is reached. The 
‘others’ ﬁ  rst investigate the material 
preconditions in order to ﬁ  nd a start-
ing point for the norms; they start by 
looking for the peak of a particular 
mountain; they carve a way upwards, 
which is only possible by using the 
inductive, causally operating method, 
as it requires (…) stating the psycho-
logical effects of conceptions of the 
ought which fall into the epistemic 
realm of being.”
Pitamic explains that facing a series of 
ideas arranged by a certain method, one 
can never escape this inﬁ  nite series with-
out introducing conceptions arranged by 
another method. As Pitamic says, we are 
here dealing with “a leap (emphasis add-
ed) across an abyss, which, in its inﬁ  nite 
depth, separates the world of the is from 
the world of the ought.” In short: we 
are here concerned with an unresolved, 
maybe even unsolvable philosophical, 
epistemological problem, which may be 
bridged by a human leap of value [Wert-
sprung],  but which leaves normatively 
operating deduction “cut off from any 
fact of being” (emphasis added).
2.2. The object and the 
method of enquiry
The central question revolves around 
the relation between the object and the 
method, or between the method and the 
object of enquiry. For Pitamic, Kelsen’s 
standpoint that “a speciﬁ  c method deter-
mines a speciﬁ  c object” is unacceptable, 
and he dismisses it with the moderated 
counter-statement that a speciﬁ  c object 
also shapes the speciﬁ  c method which is 
to be used in its exploration. In a way, 
the investigated object thus presents itself  116 117
ABSTRACTS
Plenary Lectures
P
l
e
n
a
r
y
 
L
e
c
t
u
r
e
s
 
–
 
A
b
s
t
r
a
c
t
s
retical solution. By the time of the pub-
lication of Pitamic’s Economy of Think-
ing as a Precondition of Jurisprudence 
(1971), Kelsen had not been successful 
in deﬁ  ning such a solution which would 
remain within the boundaries of the Pure 
Theory of Law. Kelsen had addressed the 
problem of the basic norm. In his paper 
Imperial Law and State Law according to 
the Austrian Constitution (from 1914), 
he explicitly states that any juridical con-
struction must “presuppose certain norms 
as valid legal rules”. It is typical for Kelsen 
that the choice of this starting point is un-
derstood not as a juridical, but as a politi-
cal question, and therefore “must always 
seem arbitrary from the perspective of ju-
ridical understanding.” 
Pitamic is convinced that Kelsen has bor-
rowed his thoughts on the effectiveness 
of law, simply expressing them in a mod-
iﬁ  ed, more normative form, ﬁ  rst in the 
shape of the norm of international law, 
then as the content of the basic norm. 
According to Pitamic, Kelsen has “com-
pleted the mentioned idea by introducing 
as a norm of international law what I had 
only suggested as a principle of enquiry 
for concrete national laws.”
Kelsen’s epistemological principle be-
came “the content of a legal norm” and 
is therefore supposed to function as a ju-
ridical principle. 
“By becoming the content of a norm”, 
Kelsen writes, “the factual undergoes a 
very peculiar change of meaning, it is in 
a way denaturized, it makes a volte-face 
and becomes normative itself.” Pitamic is 
not satisﬁ  ed with this solution, because 
it only “puts the fundamental epistemo-
to the investigator, rather than him being 
the one who shapes this object.
For Pitamic, the use of the inductive-
causal method is justiﬁ  ed and completely 
“legitimate”. Kelsen and Weyr were of 
a different opinion and objected to Pi-
tamic that the use of the inductive-causal 
method implies a “complete denaturation 
of juridical understanding”. Pitamic’s re-
search illustrates that the inductive-caus-
al method is generally necessary when 
the “normative World of the Law” (i.e. 
law as an ought) depends on equivalent 
facts of being and is founded on them.
In this sense, the dispute over the meth-
od is an “entirely sterile dispute” (em-
phasis added), already because it fails to 
distinguish between the starting points 
of the enquiry and the normative juridi-
cal enquiry itself. The key question is not 
whether the additional application of the 
inductive-causal method is “allowed”, 
but whether the two methods are “con-
founded”. The goal is methodological 
clarity and purity, not a purity of the 
object, which could only be attained by 
using the deductive-normative method. 
Banishing the inductive-causal method 
would be to ignore, at least to a certain 
extent, the whole of temporally and spa-
tially given law.
2.3. Kelsen’s reaction
Kelsen partly took Pitamic’s criticism into 
account. After all, he took for granted that 
we can only speak of positive law when its 
norms are, at least on average, effective in 
society, and tried to ﬁ  nd an adapted theo-
logical problem back one level, while it 
must resurface in international law.“
He expresses the same concerns with re-
gard to the basic norm as it is formulated 
by Kelsen in the ﬁ  rst edition of his Pure 
Theory of Law (1934). 
The development of Kelsen’s theoretical 
standpoint justiﬁ  es Pitamic’s opinion that 
Kelsen had (to a certain extent) incor-
porated his critical remarks on the task 
of founding the effectiveness of law in a 
way which would make it acceptable and 
which would reconcile it with the Pure 
Theory of Law.
Regardless of the scope of this inﬂ  uence, 
it is a matter of fact that Kelsen did not 
develop it in all places where the norma-
tive and the factual, the factual and the 
normative overlap, but absorbed and 
canalized it in a way which left the start-
ing points of the Pure Theory of Law un-
touched.
3. Back to the Nature of Law
Pitamic gradually committed himself 
more and more to the conclusion that 
law is not and cannot be merely a social 
technique, because its technique has to 
be social in order to be legal. He was not 
interested in law merely as a ﬂ  eshed-out 
and ﬁ  ne-tuned normative technique, but 
saw in it a socially effective legal order, 
which assumes the character of law when 
it protects human external behaviour in 
general and human rights in particular 
(humaneness as a measure of legality). 
However, the “preconditions” of positive 
law are not only situated outside of it, but 
are also a “different, heterogeneous (em-
phasis added) system” reaching into the 
legal system, vitalizing it, and supporting 
its interpretations of legal norms. The de-
pendence of law on this “different, het-
erogeneous system” is most delicate and 
also most obvious in the exegesis of the 
constitution, which is situated at the top 
of the pyramid of national law. 
His exploration of law and its nature 
teaches him that its principal elements 
are order and human behaviour. Order 
is “so essential for law that it ceases to 
be law when it is not ‘order’ anymore”. 
When the norms of a legal order are 
no more constantly implemented, they 
cease to serve the ‘order’ in the society 
they are designed for; those societies are 
then ruled by ‘disorder’, a lawless state; 
or another legal order has become effec-
tive.” The order which is of such seminal 
importance for law is not an order with-
out content, but an order which regulates 
human conduct and action. This regula-
tion must 
“take account of its object, at least 
insofar as not to strip it of its charac-
ter. Thus, in order to remain law, law 
may only prescribe or allow external 
human behaviour, not its contrary, 
‘inhumane behaviour’; otherwise it 
loses its legal quality.” 
The order ensured by the law loses its le-
gal nature when its inhumaneness trans-
gresses the boundaries beyond which in-
dividuals and social communities cannot 
exist. This is the minimal content of law, 
in its most general formulation, accept-
able for everyone who recognizes hu-
maneness as a value. 118 119
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condition for positive law to function is 
the legitimacy of its respective content. 
Hart, for example, is moving in this di-
rection by admitting that positive law has 
to include at least a minimal content of 
natural law.
4.2. Creative force of normative purism
Pitamic’s assumption was that the meth-
od used in exploring law is not indepen-
dent from the object of the enquiry. The 
object (i.e. the nature of this object, and 
thus the nature of law) affects the choice 
of the method(s) by which jurisprudence 
understands law. The paper O ideji prava 
(Of the Idea of Law) includes this inter-
esting passage:
“As a model should in general be 
shaped after the object it is made to 
represent, law as a form must equally, 
at least in general, be shaped after its 
object. If a model considerably dam-
ages the object rather than harmoniz-
ing with it, then it is not a model of 
this object.”
Pitamic’s language is symbolical. The 
model referred to is obviously Kelsen’s 
method which aims at purity of the le-
gal content. Pitamic objects that the ideal 
of methodological purity overlooks the 
structure of the legal content, which 
lends itself to scientiﬁ  c enquiry. This ob-
jection does not imply that a partial un-
derstanding of law has no creative force. 
The strength of a partial approach can 
lie in a clearer image of the points of 
view which are highlighted with equal 
strength, for example, by the integrative 
4. Methodological clarity instead of 
purity of the content of law
4.1. Freedom of scientiﬁ  c enquiry and 
arbitrariness of the content of law
The choice of the method and the nature 
of the investigation are also a matter of 
the freedom of scientiﬁ  c research. It lies 
in the nature of freedom of research to 
seek and to open up new aspects and 
nuances which are not available yet 
and which will contribute to legal un-
derstanding. Kelsen’s purely normative 
understanding of law (cf. normativity 
thesis) is a creative example of this sci-
entiﬁ  c quest. The quest is creative as long 
as it is in keeping with law and its nature. 
Kelsen’s understanding of law is puriﬁ  ed 
to such an extent that it is left with noth-
ing but the formal structure of law as a 
social reality. Law is a pattern of norms 
embracing humanity (i.e. society) in a 
web shaped like a pyramid, and display-
ing their possibilities of action. Kelsen’s 
approach depends on support in the form 
of facts (i.e. social relations) or values, 
which are the touchstone for the creation 
as well as for the understanding of legal 
contents. The objection which charges 
Kelsen with consenting to any content, 
returns like a boomerang. The question is 
not whether a grosso modo effective legal 
system could have an arbitrary content 
according to the Pure Theory of Law. The 
question is whether a system of norms 
whose content is arbitrary can actually 
be law. A system of norms which relies 
only on authority and tramples human 
rights under foot cannot be law. The very 
or integral (synthetic) interpretation of 
law. On the other hand, however, we also 
face the substantial danger that a partial 
approach might exaggerate one aspect of 
the law, or even distort it in comparison 
with other aspects. Kelsen’s normative 
purism has a creative effect wherever it 
unveils a problem area which deserves 
attention. Kelsen reveals the problem, 
but his theory does not provide the 
means required for genuinely tackling it. 
Especially distinctive revelations of this 
kind in Kelsen’s work can be found in his 
comparison of natural law with juridi-
cal law, in his discussion of the subject of 
law, of legal loopholes, and of the nature 
of international law, in his interpretation 
of legal acts (combined with the hier-
archy model of the legal order), and in 
other places. Due to time constraints we 
can here only address the questions of 
the legal loophole and of the interpreta-
tion of laws.
A legal loophole is not a gap in the law 
but a “typical ideological formula”; think-
ing about it, we realize that in the case of 
such so-called loopholes, the application 
of the law in force is not impossible, but 
‘only’ ideologically inappropriate for the 
defender of the loophole. Kelsen is inex-
orable: “Any legal dispute consists in one 
party raising a claim against another one; 
and whether the decision is favourable or 
dismissive depends on whether the law, 
i.e. a valid norm applicable in the con-
crete case, states the alleged legal duty or 
not.” We ﬁ  nd ourselves in an area which 
is highly susceptible to human freedom; 
we have to be aware that the so-called 
legal loophole is thus “nothing but the 
difference between positive law and an 
order deemed better, fairer, and more 
correct”.
Next: The interpretation of the law is 
equally not supposed to determine which 
meaning of a law is its true meaning. By 
scientiﬁ  c means, it is not possible to de-
velop a method “which allows to com-
plete the established framework”. Kelsen 
explicitly underlines that the norm only 
constitutes “a framework, which allows 
several possibilities of execution.” If ad-
ditionally we combine these ﬁ  ndings 
with the suggested hierarchy of the legal 
order, we discover that both interpret-
ing and applying legal acts (e.g. laws) are 
very creative acts; science cannot answer 
the question which direction we have 
to take, but it can expose the uncritical 
ideology upholding that we are merely 
dealing with a mechanical application of 
laws.
The productivity I am speaking of is only 
possible insofar as the form of the law 
complies with its content. A case in point 
of a divergence between form and con-
tent is Kelsen’s conception of the legal 
norm. The social-teleological purpose of 
legal norms is to strengthen and to guide 
the external behaviour and conduct of 
the legal subjects. Their primary aim is 
the implementation of permissions, pre-
scriptions and interdictions; the sanc-
tion as their secondary aim only comes 
in when a breach of the law occurs. As 
already expressed by Modestinus, “The 
capacity of law is thus: to command, to 
prohibit, to allow, to punish” (Legis vir-
tus haec est: imperare, vetare, permittere, 
punire” – Modestinus, D. 1,3,7). Kelsen  120 121
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science depends on the method and its 
scientiﬁ  c orientation (see paragraphs 2.1, 
2.2). Pitamic, from the very beginning, 
struck a new path: he was convinced 
that law could not be understood and 
explored by a single method aiming at 
a pure object of enquiry. He argued that 
it is necessary to employ other methods 
besides the normative method (espe-
cially the sociological and the axiological 
method), which, however, should not be 
confounded. Methodological syncretism 
can be avoided by distinguishing clearly 
between different aspects of law and by 
allowing the methods to support each 
other. Step by step, these results prompt-
ed Pitamic to combine the positive-law 
and the natural-law-conception of the 
nature of law. For Pitamic, to sum it up 
again, the essential elements of law are 
order and human behaviour. These ele-
ments are interdependent. The order is 
associated with legal norms regulating 
external human behaviour. It is so es-
sential that law ceases to be law when its 
norms cease to be at least grosso modo ef-
fective. However, not any order can func-
tion as an element of law; the condition 
is that it be an order, which prescribes 
“only external human behaviour”, and 
does not prescribe or allow “its contrary, 
‘inhumane behaviour’; otherwise it loses 
its legal quality.”
However, the legal norm “ceases to be 
law when its content seriously threatens 
the existence and social interaction of the 
people subjected to it.” For this, it is not 
sufﬁ  cient that there be some kind of in-
humaneness in the content of the legal 
norm (e.g. unjust taxes); there has to be 
has departed from this simple truth. 
What he treated as primary legal norms 
in the Pure Theory of Law are norms of 
sanctioning which are particularly char-
acteristic of criminal law and in general of 
norms immediately relating to breaches 
of the law. Norms of conduct stating what 
we are entitled to do, what is prescribed, 
and what is prohibited, were only sec-
ondary legal norms. For Kelsen, they 
were norms specifying how people had to 
behave in order to “avoid the forced act 
they are threatened with”. In the posthu-
mously published work General Theory 
of Norms, he amended his view and re-
turned to the point from which he should 
have started. The main capacities of legal 
norms are their possibilities to command, 
prohibit, allow, authorize – i.e. authorize 
an implementation or application of the 
norms -, derogate already existing norms, 
and replace them by new ones. At last, 
these possibilities of action again become 
the content of primary norms, while the 
norms dictating sanctions are referred to 
as secondary norms.
4.3. Kelsen, Pitamic and Radbruch
The question of normative justiﬁ  cation 
is the thread which links Kelsen and Pi-
tamic, even if their points of view were 
different. To repeat it brieﬂ  y, Kelsen sup-
ported the methodologically pure ap-
proach which generates a pure object of 
enquiry. Its methodological purity is so 
pronounced that the object of enquiry 
does not inﬂ  uence the method. The con-
trary applies: the object interrogated by 
“a conspicuous, obvious, severe case of 
inhumaneness” (such as mass slaughter 
of helpless people). It has to be a “crude 
disturbance” (for instance the extermina-
tion of members of another race), which 
interferes so intensely with law that its 
nature is negated.
Ulfrid Neumann convincingly observes 
that Pitamic “does not invoke ethical 
criteria beyond law, but appeals to ele-
ments of the legal concept itself.” This 
form of justiﬁ   cation complies to some 
extent with Radbruch and his formula. 
The similarities between Radbruch and 
Pitamic consist predominantly in the fact 
that their projects both aim at justiﬁ  ca-
tion of the legal concept, and that they 
are both, in a similar way, exploring the 
boundary which may not be transgressed 
by a conﬂ  ict between single elements of 
law. The Rubicon is crossed once the or-
der is “blatantly inhumane”. We are here 
facing an obvious parallel to Radbruch’s 
“formula of intolerability”. 
It does not arise from Pitamic’s oeuvre 
that he drew on Radbruch’s theories. In 
the already quoted work At the Edges of 
the Pure Theory of Law, Radbruch’s name 
is only mentioned once and in associa-
tion with heteronomous obligations. In 
Pitamic’s central book Drzava (The State, 
1927), Radbruch is not quoted at all. The 
majority of reasons for their afﬁ  nity lie in 
the fact that Radbruch and Pitamic have 
undergone a similar development, which 
ultimately led to similar results. Rad-
bruch as a Neo-Kantian endorsed value-
theoretical relativism and held the view 
that legal values cannot be “known” but 
only “professed”. Given the fact that the 
supreme value of law cannot be known, 
it is necessary, for the sake of legal securi-
ty, that this content be deﬁ  ned by the au-
thority. The experiences with Nazism in-
cited Radbruch to make his points of view 
complete, and partly also to complement 
them in the light of the condition of legal 
values after the Second World War. The 
deﬁ  nitive deduction states that when the 
contrast between positive law and justice 
reaches an “intolerable degree”, “the law 
as an ‘untrue law’ has to give way to jus-
tice” (formula of intolerability). Besides 
this formula, there is also the formula of 
deniability; this formula applies when the 
law consciously denies equality. In this 
case, the law is not only ‘untrue law’, but 
lacks legal character altogether.
Pitamic’s development was similar. He 
ﬁ  rst made acquaintance with theory and 
philosophy of law as Kelsen’s disciple and 
was impassioned by normative purism as 
a form. He was not very deeply affected 
by the sharp distinction between the is 
and the ought, as he also contemplated 
law sociologically and axiologically. From 
the very beginning, he was perturbed by 
the self-sufﬁ  ciency of law as a normative 
system. In the face of the assertion that 
an ought can only be derived from an 
ought, he advanced the thesis, inspired 
by Aristotle, that man is by his very na-
ture implanted into normative relations. 
The experiences with the barbarism of 
the 20th century certainly had their in-
ﬂ  uence on Pitamic who, just like Rad-
bruch, placed law in relation to values. 
Radbruch argues that law is striving for 
justice, while Pitamic seeks the solution 
in a concept of law which also has to be  122 123
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moralists. Radical positivists accept any 
imaginable content of law, while radical 
moralists grant only a law which con-
forms to their moral ideal. The Pure 
Theory of Law is not an example of radi-
cal positivism; it only assumes arbitrari-
ness of content in order to authorize an 
analysis of law irrespective of its content. 
Kelsen’s thesis of normativity is dialogical 
for all those interested in the content of 
a normative legal structure. Kelsen’s the-
ory (and especially the hierarchy theory 
of the legal order) reveals (even provok-
ingly, in its own way) where the ques-
tions about the legal content are situated.
Kelsen, at least in a certain sense, refused 
to accept this dialogue, because law was 
for him only a closed system of legal 
norms. Kelsen’s thesis was that a relation 
is only possible “between elements of one 
and the same system”. The one-sidedness 
of Kelsen’s approach is illustrated very 
aptly by the already mentioned moun-
tain allegory.
Pitamic contributed to the development 
of the contents of the Pure Theory of 
Law. The key argument is that the meth-
ods used in investigating and under-
standing law have to comply with the 
nature of law. The understanding of the 
nature of law is a peculiar prior knowl-
edge guiding the scholar in his choice of 
the method with which he approaches 
his ﬁ  eld of study. By following this guide-
line, and by arguing according to a clear 
method, we can also open up space for 
dialogue and for the juxtaposition of con-
trasting points of view. “Then”, according 
to Pitamic, “we will see the advent of the 
object which we have to strive for with 
humane. Radbruch’s formula is articulat-
ed more thoroughly than Pitamic’s legal 
concept. Yet, Pitamic can also be under-
stood as saying that conscious disavowal 
of equality is inhumane, and that an in-
equality which is intolerably inhumane is 
lacking legal character.
An in-depth comparison of Radbruch 
and Pitamic is not the object of this en-
quiry. Yet a comparison was necessary 
because it highlighted a parallel with 
Kelsen’s normativity thesis. Kelsen stuck 
to this thesis until the very end and thus, 
from the point of view of his theory, he 
was indifferent to the content of posi-
tive law. This content simply was not an 
object of his formal, normative analysis 
of law. Radbruch and Pitamic included 
the content into their arguments and, 
in their respective way, made it a yard-
stick for their concepts of law. This en-
abled them to position their investigative 
methods outside of natural law and legal 
positivism. More precisely, in the words 
of Robert Alexy, their investigative meth-
od can be described as dual. This means 
that, again both in their own way, they 
combine the factual and the ideal side in 
their investigation. The factual side en-
compasses the positive legal order and 
the effectiveness of this order, while the 
ideal side addresses the (moral) adequacy 
of its content. Their common denomina-
tor is that law only remains law as long 
as its content is not extremely unjust or 
extremely inhumane.
The discovery that the nature of law is 
dual also opens up the possibility of a 
dialogue – cf. Peter Koller – between all 
those who are not radical positivists or 
all – nota bene, with all – our capacities: 
knowledge.”
Pitamic’s enquiries have illustrated that 
even the purest theory of law cannot 
conﬁ   ne itself to the subject of law as 
a normative construction. If we want 
this construction to be active and le-
gally effectual, it has to rely on facts of 
being, and it also has to make possible, 
in compliance with its content, the exis-
tence of the individual as well as social 
interaction. This is naturally a very loose 
framework to be imposed on law, but it is 
nevertheless a framework which clearly 
pronounces itself about the direction law 
is to assume. This direction is embraced 
by all those who are interested in law as 
a living phenomenon.
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by contrast, is engaged by jurists includ-
ing legal philosophers. It aims at master-
ing economic way of thinking and mak-
ing use of it to understand, interpret, and 
propose law. It could be called juristic 
‘Law and Economics.’
I shall argue that the latter type is unnec-
essary or may be harmful, although eco-
nomics is very useful for legal science. To 
support this assertion, I shall take Coase’s 
theory as one of the best achievements 
of economic ‘Law and Economics’, and 
make clear how it has been misunder-
stood by all jurists of ‘Law and Econom-
ics’ as well as almost all economists. 
2. Why Juristic ‘Law and Economics’ 
Is Not Necessary
If jurists’ object in referring to economic 
theory is to improve law by way of un-
derstanding some of the functions of law 
from an economic point of view, it is ob-
viously better to learn economics from 
genuine economists than from jurists of 
‘Law and Economics.’
Some jurists of ‘Law and Economics’ 
might insist that it be a division of law 
which pick out those part of law that 
connect inseparably with economy and 
apply economic theory to answer legal 
problems. This view, however, would 
make us lose sight of the fact that every 
legal phenomenon can be analyzed from 
an economic point of view. 
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Abstract:
1. Two Types of ‘Law and Economics’
Economic policy involves a choice among 
alternative social institutions, and these 
are created by the law or are dependent 
on it. The majority of economists do not 
see the problem in this way. They paint 
a picture of an ideal economic system, 
and then, comparing it with what they 
observe (or think they observe), they 
prescribe what is necessary to reach this 
ideal state without much consideration 
for how this could be done. The analysis 
is carried out with great ingenuity but it 
ﬂ  oats in the air. It is, as I have phrased 
it, “blackboard economics.”(R. H. Coase)1
I think ‘Law and Economics’ as an aca-
demic subject can take two forms. The 
ﬁ  rst is the Coasian type, which studies 
how legal system inﬂ  uences the work-
ing of economic system. It belongs to 
economics, and could be called economic 
‘Law and Economics.’ The second type, 
1  R. H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and 
the Law, the University of Chicago Press, Chica-
go and London, 1988, p. 28.
3. Why Juristic ‘Law and Economics’ 
Is Sometimes Harmful
Economics as a science is neutral to any 
ideology. It argues neither for nor against 
so-called market economy. In fact both 
economists who supported socialist 
planned economy and those who sup-
ported free enterprise system believed in 
the same micro-economic theory. There 
are no top-class economists such as Mil-
ton Friedman and F. A. Hayek who use 
Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efﬁ  ciency in order 
to vindicate free market system.
Nevertheless some jurists such as Rich-
ard Posner of ‘Law and Economics’ have 
contributed to making widely known the 
falsehood that micro-economics endorses 
market economy. It is said market equi-
librium is efﬁ  cient, because it maximizes 
consumer’s and/or producer’s surplus. 
But the well-known graph of demand 
and supply curves seen in every standard 
textbook is no more than a model for be-
ginners in learning economics. It cannot 
be an object of vindication. There is no 
market or market economy as an institu-
tion or system in such a graph.
4. Transaction Cost and Law
It is Coase who called on economists to 
pay attention to the signiﬁ  cance of mar-
ket as an institution. He says “Markets 
are institutions that exist to facilitate 
exchange, that is, they exist in order to 
reduce the cost of carrying out exchange
transaction.”2
Any exchange transaction always entails 
some positive cost, though standard eco-
nomics assumes transaction cost is zero. 
Coase says the following.
[F]or their operation, markets … require 
the establishments of legal rules govern-
ing the rights and duties of those carry-
ing out transactions … Such legal rules 
may be made by those who organize the 
markets, as it is the case with commodity 
exchanges … Agreement [of the rules] is 
facilitated in the case of commodity ex-
changes because the members meet in 
the same premises and deal in a restricted 
range of commodities; and enforcements 
of the rules is possible because the oppor-
tunity to trade on the exchange is itself 
of great value and withholding of permis-
sion to trade is a sanction sufﬁ  ciently se-
vere to induce most traders to observe the 
rules… When the physical facilities are 
scattered and owned by a vast number of 
people with very different interests, as is 
the case with retailing and wholesaling, 
the establishment and administration of 
private legal system would be very dif-
ﬁ  cult. Those operating in these markets 
have to depend, therefore, on the legal 
system of the State.3
Markets in this description have con-
crete forms and substance, and are not 
abstract concepts as in the explanation of 
price mechanism. Here it is explained in 
view of transaction costs why there are 
many kinds of markets and why forms of 
markets are so different. More interest-
2  Ibid., p. 7.
3  Ibid., p. 10. 126 127
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ing those who would not buy them. The 
shop owner takes such a behavior seeing 
that it is more proﬁ  table than alternative 
behaviors. To explain her behavior we do 
not need such a concept of externality.
Too often as it is ignored, Coase rejects the 
concept of externality and uses the words 
“harmful effects”5 instead of negative 
externalities in such a case of pollution. 
He makes a point of reciprocal character 
of the problem. People including econo-
mists would suppose a factory owner is 
liable for the damages, if the smoke from 
it has harmful effects on neighbors. But if 
this legal policy were adopted, the neigh-
bors in turn would damage the factory 
owner. Coase says the following.
To avoid the harm to B would be to in-
ﬂ  ict harm on A. The real question that 
has to be decided is, Should A allowed to 
harm B or should B be allowed to harm 
A? The problem is to avoid the more seri-
ous harm.6
It matters not only whether the factory 
owner in production does not consider 
the costs for neighbors but also whether 
the neighbors do not consider the costs 
for the factory when they continue to 
live there.
Coase objects to so-called Pigovian taxes 
for the same reason. The basic idea of Pig-
ovian tax is the following. When a facto-
ry harms the neighbors through smoke, 
for example, if they do not have rights 
to the same amount as the damages suf-
fered in effect, the production would be 
too much because it would continue to 
5  Ibid., p. 95 et passim.
6  Ibid., p. 96.
ing for legal philosophers, it makes clear 
why private legal systems are sometimes 
established and administrated by private 
people for all that legal systems are a kind 
of public goods. If the cost of self-regu-
lation of the market, a kind of transac-
tion cost, is lower than the gain from the 
working of the market, the market would 
be regulated by the practitioners them-
selves of the market. If, on the contrary, 
the former is higher than the latter, state 
law would be necessary to maintain and 
promote market exchange for the public 
good.
5. Externality and Reciprocity
Coase’s theory of transaction cost should 
be treated in the context of exchange in 
market. But in fact it is discussed in that 
of externality. An externality is “the ef-
fect of one person’s decision on someone 
who is not a party to that decision.”4
I think externality is a strange idea, be-
cause economists study how economic 
actions of independent agents such as 
ﬁ  rms and consumers inﬂ  uence indirectly, 
as it were, those of other independent 
agents. If we understood externality in 
the sense of the deﬁ  nition above, exter-
nalities would emerge in almost all eco-
nomic behaviors. When a person out of 
work is seeking a job, she would give 
other job seekers negative externalities. 
When a shop shows prices of its com-
modities, it would give positive externali-
ties to the potential purchasers includ-
4  Ibid., p. 24.
produce without regard for the costs ac-
cruing to the neighbors. To prevent such 
a state of affairs government should lay 
on the factory a tax amount to the dam-
ages suffered by the neighbors.
But this way may not be optimal accord-
ing to Coase. When such taxes are im-
posed, the factory will try to decrease the 
harms through the smoke-preventing 
system, for example, to avoid taxes in 
as much as the costs for it is lower than 
the amount of the tax. If the number of 
neighbors increases, the factory will be 
willing to pay more cost to prevent smoke 
for the same reason. The neighbors, how-
ever, would not consider the cost borne 
by the factory. As a result the population 
of neighbors would be too much. Coase 
contends that it is better to tax not only 
the factory but also neighbors, if the for-
mer shall be taxed.7
Many economists as well as jurists of Law 
and Economics are thinking like a lawyer 
, the polluter is always liable, when they 
see the case of negative externalities such 
as pollutions. It is strange for me.
5. Coase Theorem
As far as zero transaction costs are as-
sumed, the value of production is maxi-
mized, whoever has the rights which 
matter.8 This is Coase theorem well-
7  Ibid., pp.151-152. and 181.
8   I b i d . ,  p .  1 5 8 .  A n  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  p e r f e c t  
competition is not necessary, because under the 
zero- transaction- cost assumption any seller 
can ﬁ  nd without costs the buyer who is willing 
to pay the highest price. 
known among even jurists who are not 
interested in Law and Economics. It im-
plies that the distribution of rights does 
not inﬂ  uence the allocation of resources 
at all under the zero-transaction-cost as-
sumption. But many economists who 
perhaps do not have read Coase’s essays 
add that the distribution of rights inﬂ  u-
ence the distribution of incomes. Almost 
all jurists of Law and Economics follow 
them. Coase objects to such an interpre-
tation.9
Let us suppose ﬁ  rst that a rancher pro-
duces something with cattle and a neigh-
boring farmer produce crops, and that 
some crops would be destroyed by the 
roaming of the cattle. Suppose second 
that among the factors employed for the 
rancher’s production only the ranch ac-
crues to the rents, and among the factors 
employed for the farmer’s production 
only the farm accrues to the rents. The 
term “rent” means the difference be-
tween what a factor of production earns 
in the activity under discussion and what 
it could otherwise earn.10 Suppose at last 
that the lands of ranch and farm are rent-
ed from the same owner.
When the damage the cattle bring to 
corps is smaller than either the rents of 
the ranch or those of the farm, both the 
rancher and the farmer would continue 
to operate, whether the rancher is liable 
for the damage or not. When the rancher 
is liable, the sum he is willing to pay for 
renting the land would decrease by an 
amount of the value of the damage. If the 
9  See ibid., pp. 163-170 for the following.
10  Ibid., p. 163. 128 129
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Nothing could be further from the truth. 
It is the world of modern economic the-
ory, one which I was hoping to persuade 
economists to leave.11
A theoretical economist as he is, Coase 
recommends economists to investigate 
transaction costs in reality. The idea of 
transaction cost will help them study 
real costs. We cannot say anything de-
terminative about which legal rule is bet-
ter than the alternatives until we know 
how much it costs to adopt it. It does not 
mean jurists have to examine the costs by 
themselves, but they can use the achieve-
ments of positive economists. Many ju-
rists of Law and Economics, however, 
seem to be discussing what the best rule 
is from an economic point of view with-
out even the rough data. It is true that 
we can use and need some assumptions 
to construct models for analyzing reality, 
but we need minimal data at least in or-
der to make some proposal about law, if 
we should talk about law in action rather 
than law in books or law on blackboards.
About the author:
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rancher is not liable, the sum the farmer 
willing to pay for renting the land would 
decrease by an amount of the value of 
the damage. The wealth of each producer 
(and also the land owner) is, therefore, 
the same regardless of liability rules. This 
is the case when the relative sizes of those 
rents and the value of damage are other-
wise. The rentals so adjust themselves to 
the liability rules as to keep the wealth of 
each party the same.
The conclusion that wealth is constant 
whoever has the rights is correct even 
if the liability rule would be changed in 
the future. For zero transaction costs im-
ply that parties could contract without 
costs in any further detail for the future 
change of rules.
6. Coasian World
Coase theorem can be derived from com-
mon sense in standard economics. Zero 
transaction costs imply every seller of her 
own rights to some resources can always 
and immediately ﬁ  nd the purchaser who 
is willing to pay the higher sum than any 
other purchasers. As a result the value 
of production is maximized. As to the 
right to pollute or stop pollution, this is 
also the case, for it is a kind of right to 
resources, not different in essence from 
the other kinds of rights to goods.
Coase’s contribution to economics con-
sists rather in laying stress on positive 
transaction costs in reality and no appli-
cation of Coase theorem.
The world of zero transaction costs has 
often been described as a Coasian world. 
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PLENARY LECTURE
How Should We Legal Philosophers 
Make Use of Economics? 
Prof. Dr. Carl Wellman, Washington 
University in St. Louis / USA
Date FRI 19 Aug. 2011
Time 10.15 h – 11.00 h
Location HZ 1/2
Abstract:
The founders of the IVR believed that 
progress in the philosophy of law and so-
cial philosophy required the cooperation 
of scholars from many nations. Hence in 
1907 they created an international jour-
nal to be a central organ for the consid-
eration of scientiﬁ  c investigation of the 
entire civilized world concerning those 
disciplines. And two years later they es-
tablished an international association for 
the care and furthering of philosophy of 
law and social philosophy in all civilized 
countries. Although all three of the origi-
nal presidents were German, indeed all 
Berliners, the membership list of 1909 
features a committee of ﬁ  fteen represen-
tatives of countries outside of Germany, 
including the United States, Argentina, 
Brazil and India. Clearly their intention 
was to create a world-wide scholarly or-
ganization.
However, the process of building a global 
association began slowly and is still un-
ﬁ  nished. The IVR held its ﬁ  rst congress 
in Berlin in May of 1910. The academic 
program consisted of fewer than a dozen 
presentations followed by discussions  130 131
ABSTRACTS
Plenary Lectures
P
l
e
n
a
r
y
 
L
e
c
t
u
r
e
s
 
–
 
A
b
s
t
r
a
c
t
s
diately national sections were founded 
in Finland and Germany. By 1964, there 
were national sections in Australia, Aus-
tria, Brazil, Finland, Germany, Mexico, 
The Netherlands, Spain, Turkey and the 
United States. These sections contributed 
to the internationalization of the IVR in 
two important ways. First, they distrib-
uted the activities of the IVR more widely 
in the world by organizing their own 
conferences and publishing collections of 
papers presented. Second, they recruited 
members from a variety of nations into 
the International Association. Thus, by 
1978 the number of national sections had 
doubled to twenty and the membership 
of the IVR had grown to more than 700. 
Although the majority of these members 
were European, the Japanese section had 
78 members and the North American 
section 150. Today the number of nation-
al sections has more than doubled again 
so that there are now over forty, includ-
ing 16 outside Europe. Thus, the IVR has 
national sections on every continent ex-
cept Antarctica.
Some of these national sections have 
introduced a new dimension of interna-
tionalization by organizing regional con-
ferences. For example, members of the 
Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swed-
ish sections have met together to hold 
Nordic conferences. For several years the 
Austrian and Hungarian sections held 
joint meetings and published the papers 
presented and discussed. And in 2000 the 
Chinese national section hosted members 
of the Japanese and Korean sections in 
the Third Asian Symposium in Jurispru-
dence.
from the ﬂ   oor. Of the 76 participants, 
only thirteen were from outside Germa-
ny and none from outside Europe. 
The ﬁ  rst IVR World Congress was held 
in October 1957 in Saarbrücken. Its size 
and format were essentially the same as 
the previous congresses. The academic 
program consisted of a small number of 
presentations followed by discussion, and 
there were about 100 participants in all.
The 1975 Saint Louis World Congress, or-
ganized by Gray Dorsey, introduced a rad-
ically new kind of international congress. 
In addition to a somewhat larger num-
ber of lectures followed by discussions 
in plenary sessions, it included working 
groups in which a rapporteur summa-
rized a set of papers on a general theme 
to set the stage for more extensive discus-
sion. Thus, more than 120 papers were 
presented and subsequently published. 
There were more than 275 participants 
representing at least 48 countries. The 
Saint Louis congress served as a pattern 
for the world congresses that followed in 
a way that has greatly increased the in-
ternationalization of the IVR. About 550 
members participated in the 2003 Lund 
World Congress and over 600 in the 2005 
Granada World Congress. With this in-
crease in numbers of participants came a 
greater diversity of nations with a voice 
in IVR congresses. 
Although during the ﬁ  rst  half-century 
of its existence several groups of Ger-
man members of the IVR became sub-
ordinate sections of the International 
Association, there was no provision for 
the formation of national sections until 
the Constitution of 1959. Almost imme-
The internationalization of the IVR has 
been reﬂ  ected in its organizational struc-
ture. Before the introduction of national 
sections, the administration of the IVR 
was carried out by its three presidents. Al-
though there was an advisory committee 
that would normally represent a number 
of nations, it had no control over the ad-
ministrative actions of the Presidents. The 
constitution of 1959 introduced a new 
administrative body, an Executive Com-
mittee consisting of a President, two Vice-
Presidents and six additional members. 
It speciﬁ  ed that the membership of this 
Committee must be international, and in 
practice this has meant that only under 
special circumstances could more than one 
of its members be from the same country. 
The constitution of 1979 recognized the 
increased number of national sections by 
enlarging the Executive Committee to in-
clude the President, four Vice-Presidents 
and twenty additional members. But be-
cause its membership remained relatively 
ﬁ  xed, an increasing number of national 
sections felt excluded from any signiﬁ  cant 
voice in the administration of the Interna-
tional Association. Therefore, the consti-
tution of 1987 introduced a Nomination 
Committee consisting of the members 
of the outgoing Executive Committee, a 
member from each national section that 
has no member on the Executive Com-
mittee and one member to represent the 
members of the IVR who do not belong to 
any national section. Thus, although not 
all national sections can have a member 
on the Executive Committee, they can all 
take part in selecting those who will serve 
in this capacity.
Creating and maintaining an effective in-
ternational association requires solutions 
to a number of serious practical problems. 
One problem that has confronted the IVR 
is the limited competence of its members 
and administrators in foreign languages. 
For over three decades, almost all of the 
articles published in its journal were writ-
ten in German. Only in volume 38 were 
articles in French and English as well as 
German regularly accepted for publica-
tion. Although these are the only consti-
tutionally established languages, articles 
in Spanish have been published since 
1991. Obviously, this excludes the native 
languages of a great many members, but 
it has proven impractical to increase the 
number of languages beyond these four.
The problem of limited competence in 
foreign languages is much more serious 
in conducting congresses. Reading a pa-
per in a foreign language is one thing; lis-
tening to a lecture in a foreign language 
another. One can read at one’s own pace, 
perhaps consulting a dictionary from 
time to time, but the ﬂ   ow of spoken 
words moves forward irresistibly, often 
too rapidly to be comprehended by many 
members of the audience. Participating in 
the give and take of discussion requires 
an even higher level of linguistic compe-
tence. At least by the 1971 Brussels World 
Congress, there was simultaneous trans-
lation of the main lectures into the three 
ofﬁ   cial languages of the IVR—German, 
French and English. Occasionally there 
was also translation into the language of 
the host country, for example Japanese in 
the 1987 Kobe World Congress. However, 
simultaneous translation has never been  132 133
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past conferences and other activities were 
published in this journal. However, this 
method of communication was not very 
effective. Not many members of the IVR 
subscribed to its journal and because it 
was very expensive only a minority of 
academic libraries did either. Moreover, 
there was a considerable time-lag be-
tween the preparation of copy for pub-
lication and the arrival of the journal in 
any library. Hence, published information 
was often out-of-date by the time mem-
bers of the IVR had access to it.
Therefore, the IVR introduced a Newslet-
ter in 1976. Originally it was printed by 
the Secretary General four times each 
year, mailed in batches to the national 
sections and sent by them to its mem-
bers. The general policy was that ofﬁ  cial 
documents and information that ought 
to be on record would be published in 
the Archiv and information of more im-
mediate but perhaps less lasting interest 
would be circulated more rapidly in the 
Newsletter. Although this improved com-
munication with the members of the IVR, 
international postal service was not al-
ways prompt and some national sections 
failed to forward copies of the Newslet-
ter to their members. Today Newsletters 
are posted on the ofﬁ  cial IVR website so 
that they are immediately available to 
all members who own or have access to 
computers.
Unfortunately, this does not completely 
solve the problem of communication 
within the IVR. Editors of the Archiv and 
the Newsletter can publish only as much 
information as they receive. Some na-
tional sections never send information 
available in the many working group dis-
cussions where it is most needed. More 
recently organizers of world congresses 
have found themselves unable to raise 
funds sufﬁ  cient to pay the very high cost 
of professional translators and the neces-
sary equipment. Therefore, world con-
gresses are now conducted almost en-
tirely in English. Fortunately, English is 
increasingly becoming something like a 
global language.
When he was President of the IVR, 
Chaim Perelman decided that the busi-
ness of the Executive Committee should 
be conducted entirely in English. I have 
always been grateful that this decision 
was made before the administration of 
the IVR moved to the United States, for 
the only languages in which I am com-
petent are English and American. How-
ever, this is the only practical policy, for 
English is the only language which all the 
members of an international group, like 
the Executive Committee, can speak and 
understand easily.
A second practical problem that arose 
in the internationalization of the IVR is 
maintaining effective communications. It 
is obviously essential to keep the mem-
bers of any international association in-
formed of its activities. From the ﬁ  rst, 
future congresses were announced in the 
Archiv and members invited to attend. 
Soon other information for members was 
added, especially reports on past con-
gresses, reports on the election of ofﬁ  cers 
of the IVR and occasionally membership 
lists. Subsequently announcements of 
forthcoming conferences organized by 
sections of the IVR and reports of their 
about their ofﬁ  cers and activities to either 
publication, and others do so infrequent-
ly. Even the Secretary General sometimes 
neglects to forward important informa-
tion about the IVR to the editors of its 
journal or its Newsletter.
One especially important sort of informa-
tion concerns invitations to future world 
congresses. This includes the location and 
dates of the congress, the topics for sub-
mitted papers, when and how to register 
for participation, and information about 
available accommodation. Originally, 
members of the IVR had to ask the or-
ganizing committee about these matters 
by mail or, more often, telephone. Today 
each organizing committee establishes its 
own website, linked to the ofﬁ  cial IVR 
website, that contains this information 
and often enables members to register for 
the congress and reserve accommodation 
on-line. Although this is a vast improve-
ment in communication, it, together with 
the posting of Newsletters on the IVR 
website, does pose the problem of ﬁ  nding 
persons with the technical competence to 
create and update websites.
A central part of the problem of commu-
nication within the IVR is that of main-
taining effective interchange between 
the International Association, in prac-
tice its Executive Committee, and its na-
tional sections. Originally this took place 
primarily by international mail and, if 
speed mattered, by telephone. The new 
technologies of e-mail and the world-
wide web have transformed international 
communication for the better. However, 
any medium of communication is only as 
effective as those who employ it. Twice 
in the history of the IVR communication 
almost completely broke down because of 
the lack of an active and responsible Sec-
retary General. And even the most con-
scientious Secretary General cannot keep 
in touch with national sections that do 
not have either a President or Secretary 
that sends and responds to communica-
tions. Here and elsewhere the adminis-
tration of any international association 
depends upon ﬁ  nding and enlisting able 
administrators.
A third practical problem created by the 
internationalization of the IVR is the in-
creasing complexity of its administration. 
According to the constitution of 1909, its 
three Presidents together governed all of 
its activities. This arrangement seems to 
have worked well, for it was retained in 
the two following constitutions. How-
ever, the constitution of 1959 introduced 
a new administrative body, an Executive 
Committee. It authorized the Executive 
Committee to appoint a Secretary Gen-
eral to manage the affairs of the IVR. 
Because the Executive Committee meets 
only once a year, in practice it is the Pres-
ident and Secretary General who carry 
most of the administrative burden. From 
1975-1979 when I was Secretary Gener-
al, I sent and received almost all the cor-
respondence, wrote ofﬁ  cial  documents 
such as reports on the meetings of the 
Executive Committee and General As-
sembly, requested and received the dues, 
paid the bills, and wrote, printed and 
mailed the newsletters. Subsequent expe-
rience demonstrated that the IVR could 
not rely upon a single Secretary Gener-
al to perform all of these administrative  134 135
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quently update a website to convey infor-
mation about the forthcoming congress 
to prospective participants and to enable 
them to register in advance, know when 
and how to submit their papers, and to 
enable them to reserve accommodation. 
All of this must be done in co-ordination 
with the IVR Executive Committee.
A fourth and eminently practical problem 
arising from the internationalization of 
the IVR is the rapidly increasing costs of 
carrying out its activities. When the IVR 
was a small association with the major-
ity of its members in or near Germany, 
its expenses were modest. Normally the 
university or universities with which its 
president or presidents were afﬁ  liated 
could be expected to provide postal and 
telephone service and occasional secre-
tarial assistance for correspondence. The 
ﬁ  rst few congresses of the IVR had only 
a few main speakers and relatively few 
participants. Facilities for the academic 
program and any receptions were avail-
able on the campus of the host institution 
and provided at little or no expense. And 
since most of the participants were Euro-
pean, they could afford to pay their own 
train or other travel fares.
After the 1975 Saint Louis World Con-
gress, the costs imposed upon the orga-
nizing committees have grown exponen-
tially. Much larger and more complex 
facilities, usually with sound systems and 
other technical equipment, are required 
for plenary sessions with an audience of 
several hundred and a large number of 
conference rooms for working groups 
and, more recently, workshops. The orga-
nizing committee is expected to pay the 
functions. Therefore, Aulis Aarnio cre-
ated an administrative team consisting of 
a Secretary General, a Treasurer and the 
Editor of the Newsletter. This is a much 
more satisfactory arrangement provided 
that the President can ﬁ  nd persons will-
ing and able to serve efﬁ  ciently in each of 
these capacities.
Probably the most arduous task in the 
administration of the IVR is organizing 
its congresses. In the early days when 
these were relatively small, this was eas-
ily managed. The organizer or organizers 
needed only to select a few main speakers 
and ﬁ  nd places to carry out the academic 
program together with a few receptions. 
These were typically readily available at 
some host university, and accommodation 
for the participants was near at hand. Par-
ticipants could register upon arrival and 
local logistics were minimal. But after the 
1975 Saint Louis World Congress intro-
duced a new paradigm for congresses, the 
demands upon the organizing committee, 
especially its chairperson, became much 
more pressing. An auditorium to hold 
plenary sessions attended by hundreds 
of people and a considerable number of 
smaller rooms for discussions of working 
group and workshop papers were usu-
ally to be had only in some large hotel 
or conference center. Also the organizers 
had to negotiate special rates with hotels 
in several price ranges to accommodate 
the various needs of the participants. Ar-
rangements had to be made to receive 
and circulate hundreds of papers. And, 
of course, there was the invitation of and 
providing for the needs of the main speak-
ers. Today it is necessary to set up and fre-
travel expenses, often from distant lands, 
and provide accommodation for the main 
speakers and to provide for the accom-
modation of the members of the Execu-
tive Committee as well. It must set up and 
frequently update a congress web-site. It 
must deal with a mass of correspondence 
through its web-site, by e-mail and even 
snail-mail. And, of course, the social pro-
gram including receptions for hundreds 
of participants and accompanying per-
sons are not inexpensive. Over the years 
the task of raising the funds necessary to 
host an IVR world congress has become 
formidable indeed.
The IVR Executive Committee meets 
even in years when there is no world 
congress. Since 1978, it has been custom-
ary for one of the national sections to 
host these business meetings in conjunc-
tion with an associated academic confer-
ence. Although the expenses incurred in 
this way are much less than those of or-
ganizing a world congress, they are not 
negligible. Accommodation and most of 
the meals for any invited speakers and 
the members of the Executive Committee 
must be provided. And facilities for the 
meetings of the EC and for the sessions 
of the conference may be costly. Fortu-
nately, the national section hosting these 
interim meetings of the Executive Com-
mittee are not expected to pay the travel 
expenses of the participants.
However, the expenses of travel from 
one’s home university to events spon-
sored by the IVR have increased dramati-
cally with the internationalization of the 
International Association. When the ma-
jority of the members of the IVR were 
German and most of the others Europe-
an, its members were able to travel very 
short distances at very little cost to partic-
ipate in its activities. But as its member-
ship grew in countries far from Europe, 
it became much more costly for non-Eu-
ropean members to travel to world con-
gresses or other conferences held on the 
Continent. Conversely, after world con-
gresses became common on other con-
tinents, it was much more expensive for 
European members to take part in them. 
Many members of the IVR, especially its 
younger members, now ﬁ  nd they cannot 
afford to participate in its activities.
Is internationalization worth so much ex-
pense and effort? Is the ideal of a global 
association leading us astray? There have 
long been those who have challenged the 
wisdom of pursuing this goal. In 1976, 
the German national section urged the 
Executive Committee to cancel the Aus-
tralian World Congress, but it refused. 
In 1977, the Swiss organizing committee 
presented its plans for the 1979 World 
Congress. It rejected the Saint Louis mod-
el and insisted on holding a much smaller 
congress with only a few plenary lectures. 
At this point, the Executive Committee 
withdrew authorization from the original 
Swiss committee and Professor Trappe 
organized the 1979 Basel World Con-
gress with many more invited lectures 
and a large number of working groups. 
Although the Executive Committee thus 
persisted in the further internationaliza-
tion of the IVR, not all of its members 
thought this wise. Professors Cotta and 
Raphael, in particular, argued that this 
was a mistake. 136 137
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problems with which I am struggling. 
The principle that no philosophical ori-
entation is excluded from the IVR proved 
most valuable during the cold war when 
members from both sides of the iron cur-
tain could meet in world congresses and 
discuss their very different philosophies 
of law and social philosophies frankly and 
in a spirit of collegiality. 
No doubt openness to diverse philosophi-
cal and cultural perspectives is of value, 
but there are limits to our mutual under-
standing. A second reason for resisting 
the ideal of a global IVR is the diminish-
ing philosophical utility of expanding 
one’s intellectual horizons. Some mem-
bers of the Executive Committee argued 
that any full understanding of a lecture 
or worthwhile discussion with a col-
league required a familiarity with his or 
her presuppositions and a sympathy with 
the approach taken that are lacking when 
the participants have radically differ-
ent philosophical orientations, especially 
when these reﬂ  ect deep cultural differ-
ences. Therefore, they favored restrict-
ing the IVR to a Euro-centric association 
with a few colonies in countries such as 
the United States or Argentina with close 
cultural ties to Europe.
I feel the force of this objection to the in-
ternationalization of the IVR also. Among 
my most valued colleagues are members 
of the IVR that I meet regularly at its 
world congresses and with whom I have 
penetrating discussions of philosophi-
cal issues. At the same time I often ﬁ  nd 
myself frustrated when I attempt to dis-
cuss theoretical problems with members 
whose perspectives are radically differ-
What reasons might one have for resist-
ing the ideal of a truly global IVR? One is 
that this is incompatible with maintaining 
the quality of its intellectual intercourse 
and its publications. Some argued that 
membership in the IVR and participa-
tion in its congresses ought to be limited 
to those with demonstrated competence 
in philosophy of law or social philosophy. 
Even more insisted that only genuinely 
important papers ought to be published 
under its auspices. Although I favored 
open membership in the IVR and the pol-
icy that any paper submitted by a mem-
ber for discussion in a congress work-
ing group would be accepted, I did side 
with those who wished to publish only 
the best papers. To my mind the ﬂ  ood 
of mediocre publications was distracting 
serious thinkers from the relatively few 
original and important books and jour-
nal articles. However, Professor Klenner 
disagreed with me. He argued that there 
are no truly objective standards of philo-
sophical quality so that in practice selec-
tive publication would reﬂ  ect the philo-
sophical prejudices of the most inﬂ  uential 
members of the Executive Committee 
and thus be incompatible with the consti-
tutional principle that in the IVR no phil-
osophical orientation is excluded. As usu-
al, Hermann was wiser than I. I ﬁ  nd that 
I learn very little when I read the publi-
cations by or discuss philosophical issues 
with those whose opinions are similar to 
mine. It is those with whom I disagree, 
often radically, that force me to rethink 
my theses and reexamine my arguments 
and who suggest new and more illumi-
nating approaches to the philosophical 
ent from any of those with which I am 
familiar. It is not that we disagree and 
are unable to reach agreement. It is that 
I cannot understand their reasoning or 
why they would accept assumptions that 
seem wildly implausible to me. In fact, I 
sometimes wonder if we are both talking 
about the same subject. Nevertheless, I 
persist in attempting to comprehend di-
verse perspectives because I ﬁ  nd success, 
even when partial, well worth the effort.
But does this really imply that the inter-
nationalization of the IVR is valuable to us 
as philosophers of law and social philoso-
phers? If so, how? For one thing, our goal 
is to develop and defend theories of law 
and other social institutions. This requires 
generalization. To explain any social phe-
nomenon, one must subsume it under 
some general principle; and to evaluate 
any law, legal system or other institution, 
one must apply general norms. However, 
generalization on the basis of a limited 
sample of one’s subject matter is unreli-
able at best and often highly misleading. 
This is not to say that one ought to try to 
obtain an unlimited number of instances. 
Much more important is the diversity of 
examples, for increasing the number of 
very similar instances seldom disconﬁ  rms 
a mistaken generalization. And ﬁ  nding 
a wide variety of kinds of social institu-
tions, legal or non-legal, is best achieved 
by learning about societies with very dif-
ferent cultures and that have developed 
institutions appropriate to very different 
conditions on the six inhabited conti-
nents. Unless one has the time and en-
ergy to devote many years to ﬁ  eld work 
throughout the world, the easiest way to 
accomplish this is to learn from colleagues 
from many countries. The international-
ization of the IVR enables each of us to 
meet with and learn from those who are 
willing and able to provide information 
about diverse legal and social institutions 
with which we are unfamiliar.
Secondly, philosophy is, or at least ought 
to be, a critical enterprise. Although we 
need not emulate Socrates by drinking 
hemlock, we are committing philosophi-
cal suicide if we do not question the be-
liefs commonly accepted in our societies. 
And as philosophers of law and social 
philosophers, we should challenge the 
presuppositions of the relevant sciences, 
such as sociology, anthropology, political 
science and legal theory. Above all, we 
need to question our own assumptions 
and methodologies. This is especially dif-
ﬁ  cult for these tend to be shared by most 
of our colleagues. Only by frank and in-
cisive discussion with philosophers with 
radically different systems of beliefs and 
ways of thinking, typically from distant 
lands, will we be forced to rethink our 
own views. The world congresses of the 
IVR enable us to do this by its interna-
tionalization and its principle that no 
philosophical orientation is excluded.
A third reason we need the internation-
alization of the IVR is that our subject 
matter is itself increasingly internation-
alized. We are engaged in applied phi-
losophy, philosophy of legal and other 
social institutions. Centuries ago the le-
gal systems, economies, family structures 
and other social institutions of each na-
tion were largely independent of those 
in other countries, but that is a bygone  138 139
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our fellow citizens and even all human-
ity. As philosophers seeking to general-
ize about diverse legal systems and social 
institutions, we should be able to suggest 
alternative legal or social institutions that 
might be more beneﬁ  cial than the exist-
ing ones. As critical thinkers who ques-
tion the generally accepted norms and 
propose new normative legal and social 
theories, we are in a position to evaluate 
social institutions, both national and in-
ternational, more adequately than politi-
cians answerable to their constituents.
I do not believe, as Plato did, that phi-
losophers are necessarily best qualiﬁ  ed to 
rule. But I am suggesting that as philoso-
phers of law and social philosophers, we 
have a responsibility to address the practi-
cal problems that the rulers of our nation 
states and the ofﬁ  cials in the internation-
al organizations that inﬂ  uence our lives 
must solve. In our time these include the 
collapse of our interdependent ﬁ  nancial 
institutions with resulting massive un-
employment, international terrorism and 
the military intervention it engenders, 
the protection of international human 
rights and preventing the destruction of 
our global environment. To address such 
issues in our increasingly global world, 
we need the assistance of colleagues in 
a fully international IVR. So let us be 
grateful that the internationalization of 
the IVR could enable us to fulﬁ  ll its con-
stitutional purpose, the cultivation and 
promotion of legal and social philosophy 
on a national and international level, in a 
way that is of value to others not merely 
proﬁ  table to ourselves.
era. Today international treaties greatly 
modify our national legal systems, our 
economies depend upon importing and 
exporting goods and services, and many 
persons not only travel to distant lands 
but reside in more than one country. In-
ternational corporations deeply inﬂ  uence 
our lives as do other international organi-
zations such as NATO or the World Bank. 
The United Nations and its many agen-
cies today have a global reach. It is one 
thing to read about these international 
institutions, but much more is required to 
understand their inﬂ  uences globally and 
in various nation states and to evaluate 
them. If we are to develop philosophies of 
law and social philosophies that realisti-
cally reﬂ  ect our subject matter, we need 
colleagues from around the world to in-
form us of how these institutions inter-
penetrate their diverse social systems and 
to correct the biases of the media in our 
own countries. If my reasoning is valid, 
we ought to welcome and move forward 
with the internationalization of the IVR.
But before we congratulate ourselves for 
being members of an international, al-
most a global, association, let us ask an 
awkward question. Why should anyone 
pay us for doing what we love? What 
value, if any, do our disciplines, philoso-
phy of law and social philosophy, have 
for our respective societies and for our 
world? Far too often none at all, for typi-
cally we choose to think and write about 
esoteric subjects with no discernible prac-
tical relevance and of interest only to a 
few colleagues in our narrow specializa-
tions. Nevertheless our disciplines do 
have the potential to improve the lives of 
About the author:
Prof. Carl Wellman; born in 1926.
Academic career: Lawrence University, 
1953-1968, Washington University, 
1968-1999, emeritus 1999-present
Major publications: Welfare Rights, 1982; 
Theory of Rights, 1985; Real Rights, 
1995; Approach to Rights, 1997; The Pro-
liferation of Rights, 1999; Medical Law 
and Moral Rights, 2009; Moral Dimen-
sions of Human Rights, 2011.
IVR PRIZE LECTURE
Cost-Beneﬁ  t-Analysis and the Quest 
for Wealth Maximization: How to Em-
brace Complexity and Uncertainty
Dr. Adrian Künzler, 
Yale Law School / USA
Date FRI 19 Aug. 2011
Time 12.15 h – 13.00 h
Location HZ 1/2
Abstract:
The application of cost-beneﬁ  t analysis to 
regulation is widely believed to provide 
for a disciplined method of rationally as-
sessing the consequences of proposed 
courses of action. This paper exposes a 
critical ﬂ   aw in the neoclassical welfare 
economic paradigm of cost-beneﬁ  t  as-
sessment and argues that it is insufﬁ  cient 
to apply a single value framework to re-
ality. Taking account of the complexity 
and uncertainty of certain aspects of real-
world phenomena, the paper describes 
the way some common understanding of 
an underlying concept of ‘reality-based’ 
regulatory economics can be reached. 
The paper thereby indicates how related 
behavioral sciences can deepen our un-
derstanding of regulatory law.”
About the author:
Adrian Kuenzler grew up in Lucerne and 
Zurich (Switzerland) and studied law at 
Zurich University School of Law. He was 
Assistant Lecturer in Private Law and Le-
gal Theory at the Faculty of Law of the 
University of Zurich where he also wrote 
his Ph.D. dissertation, entitled “Efﬁ  ciency 
or Freedom to Compete? On the Goals 
of the Law against Private Restraints on 
Competition” (2008). From 2008 to 2009 
he served as a Law Clerk at the District 
Court of Zurich, and subsequently became 
a Robert Schuman Centre Research Fel-
low at the European University Institute 
in Florence (Italy). From 2010 to 2011 
Adrian Kuenzler completed his LL.M. 
studies at Yale Law School (USA), where 
he was Senior Editor of the Yale Journal 
on Regulation and Information Society 
Project Fellow. Since 2011, Adrian Kuen-
zler has been a J.S.D. scholar at Yale Law 
School and Branco Weiss Fellow of Society 
in Science at the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology Zurich (ETH). His research 
interests are Behavioral and Institutional 
Law and Economics, Legal Theory and 
Philosophy, Intellectual Property, Com-
petition and Financial Market Regulation.141
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SW 1 ‘Dialogue’ in public decision-making
SW 2 Human Rights and Human Nature
SW 3 Law, morality and democracy. The legacy of Carlos S. Nino
SW 4 Theology and the Political: a new debate on community, politics, and law
SW 5 Junge Rechtsphilosophie
SW 6 The Theory of Legal Scholarship
SW 7 Gustav Radbruch’s Concept of Law – A ‘Conversion’ from Positivism to 
Natural Law?
SW 8 AICOL – Artiﬁ  cial Intelligence Approaches to the Complexity of 
Legal Systems
SW 9 Regulierung von Technisierung – die Rolle des Rechts am Beispiel der 
Biomedizin im Spannungsfeld von Recht und Ethik
SW 10 Gegenwärtige Juristische Hermeneutik zwischen Vergangenheit und 
Zukunft
SW 11 Aristotle and the Philosophy of Law – Theory, Practice and Justice
SW 12 The Natural Law Tradition
SW 13 Cancelled.
SW 14 Theoretical and Methodological Foundations of Law and Economics
SW 15 Legal Argumentation
SW 16 Legal Fictions
SW 17 Criminalization
SW 18 Coexisting Normative Orders: Natural and Positive Law, from the 
Classical Tradition to Modern Global Law
SW 19 Sustainability, Intergenerational Justice, and Global Justice
SW 20 The Role of Lawyers in Interaction: Inﬂ  uences of ADR practice on 
Legal Thinking and Legal Education
SW 21 H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law Reconsidered
SW 22 New Developments in Technology: challenges for the law and ethics 
of privacy and conﬁ  dentiality
SW 23 Normative and epistemological implications of data science, proﬁ  ling 
and smart environments ‘Code as Law’ meets ‘Law as Code and 
Law as Literature’
SW 24 Law as Literature: memory and oblivion
Overview
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SW 25 The Latin American Legal Thinking in front of the challenges of Globalization
SW 26 Between interpretation and intuition: cognitive sciences and the model 
of decision making process in law
SW 27 Exemplary Narratives: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
SW 28 Human Rights, Global Justice, and Democracy: Issues at their 
Intersection
SW 29 Legal Philosophy of Nikolai Alekseev and European scientiﬁ  c tradition
SW 30 Legitimacy 2.0. E-democracy and  Public Opinion in the Digital Age
SW 31 Recht am technisierten Körper / Recht an verkörperter Technik
SW 32 Methodology of Jurisprudence and the impact of new technologies
SW 33 Person, Verantwortung, Grenzen des Rechts – alte Debatten im neuen 
Kontext „Robotik und Künstliche Intelligenz“
SW 34 Menschenwürde – Menschenbild – Verantwortung: 
Analyse von Leitbegriffen der bioethischen Debatten
SW 35 Epistemische Unsicherheiten und das Recht
SW 36 Orthos logos, Recta ratio, or Right Reason in the Philosophy of Law 
from Aristotle to Dworkin
SW 37 Cultural Turn and Philosophy of Law and State
SW 38 Cancelled.
SW 39 Constitutional Reasoning: Theoretical Perspectives
SW 40 The Language of Law: Classical Perspectives
SW 41 Disciplinary Perspectives and Legal Truth
SW 42 Sterbehilfe aus ethischer und rechtlicher Sicht / Die Religion im 
öffentlichen Bereich
SW 43 Wirtschaftsethik und Rechtsquellenlehre (Cooperating Special Workshop)
SW 44 Business Ethics and Law
SW 45 Public Legal Reason
SW 46 Law and Economics – Foundations and Applications
SW 47 When is the exercise of an interest a human right? Secular and religious 
responses to the legitimacy question
SW 48 The Philosophy of Home Schooling and Its Legal Implications Today
SW 49 Producing Justice: social responsibility of the legal profession in the 
age of globalization
SW 50 The Fusion of law and Information Technology
SW 51 Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Conceptualizing 
the conﬂ  ict(s)
SW 52 Roles of Citizen/ Civil Society and Responsibility of State
SW 53 Rethinking the foundational concepts of constitutional and legal theory 
from ‚the semi-periphery’
SW 54 The Relevance Of African Legal Theory To Contemporary Problems
SW 55 Hart and Kelsen
SW 56 Meaning, Truth and the Concept of Law
SW 57 Cancelled.
SW 58 Workshop on Biopolitics
SW 59 Objectivity in Legal Discourse. The Comparative Perspective
SW 60 Net Neutrality or Not Neutrality? Law, Politics & Internet
SW 61 Legal Normativity and the philosophy of practical reason 
SW 62 Philosophy of science and legal philosophy – a blending or a clash?
SW 63 The Scope of Liberalism in Bioethics; the limit of concenting will
SW 64 Analogical and Exemplary Reasoning in Legal Discourse
SW 65 Recht, Wissenschaft und Technik: phänomenologisch-
hermeneutischer Ansatz
SW 66 Dynamics of Law and Society: The Promise of Interactionism and 
Pragmatism
SW 67 The Fact/Value Separation and its Relevance for Interdisciplinary 
Research in Law
SW 68 Political Obligation
SW 69 Genetically Modiﬁ  ed Organism and Different Legislations
SW 70 Legal Discourse and Human Rights
SW 71 Involving the Experts – A Critical Analysis of the Role of Expert 
Committees in Legal Decision Making concerning Complex 
Technological Issues with a Strong Moral Impact
SW 72 Legal Theory and Education: The Way Ahead
SW 73 Transitional justice in Legal Philosophical Perspective
SW 74 Private Law Theory (PLT) – Politics of Private Law in a Technological Age
SW 75 Legisprudence – Rethinking Legislation and Regulation in the Light of 
Legal Theory
SW 76 Legal recognition of minority groups in light of social sciences 144 145
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SW 77 Cancelled.
SW 78 Constitutionalism After Communism: Author meets her critics
SW 79 Neo-Communitarian approach on the human rights in the East Asia
Disclaimer: This abstract book has been 
produced using texts submitted by au-
thors until June 2011. No responsibility 
is assumed for the content of abstracts.
 
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 1 
‘Dialogue’ in public decision-making
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h 
Location HOF 3.45 / Sydney
Organizers Prof. Dr. Maurice Adams, 
Tilburg University, Law 
School / The Netherlands
About the workshop:
Traditional constitutional legal scholar-
ship has hit a dead end. There is increas-
ing acknowledgement for the impor-
tance of informal processes in shaping 
and controlling public power, but so 
far we have not managed to get a grip 
on these processes that will allow us to 
appraise their implications and signiﬁ  -
cance.
One emerging topic in the periphery of 
legal scholarship is ‘dialogue’. This is a 
phenomenon that has been extensively 
studied in other disciplines, but which is 
still relatively new to legal researchers. 
Legal scholarship is still unsure what 
qualiﬁ  es as a ‘dialogue’ and what impli-
cations to attach to this qualiﬁ  cation.
The potential of ‘dialogue’ as a mode of 
public decision-making has been dis-
cussed tentatively in various scholarly 
areas that are concerned with legitima-
cy, accountability and quality of regula-
tion. When classical methods fail, calls 
for ‘dialogue’ tend to follow rapidly. But 
what constitutes a ‘dialogue’? What are 
the risks and opportunities of employ-
ing a non-legal term in situations where 
the legal system is clearly in trouble? Do 
other – less deliberative – modes of deci-
sion-making hide behind the metaphor? 
Or would ‘networks’, ‘consultations’ and 
other processes related to public decision-
making beneﬁ  t from being cast more in 
terms of ‘dialogue’, possibly because this 
mode of communication comes with its 
own inherent ‘rules of the game’?
In this special workshop we:
• bring together researchers using the
  device of ‘dialogue’ in their research,
  in order to come closer to an under-
  standing of the concept that is not tied
   to a particular discipline;
•  trigger a multidisciplinary debate bet-
  ween researchers from different di-
  sciplines and even interdisciplinary as
   far as the efforts to deﬁ  ne ‘dialogue’ go;
• establish the relevance of ‘dialogue’
   as a key concept for constitutional le-
  gal scholarship (without necessarily
   juridifying the concept).
List of Lectures:
1. Sven Braspenning (Antwerp Univer-
sity / Belgium)
The normative force of dialogue in 
contexts of moral standoff
2. Gökçe Çataloluk and Barkin Asal 
(Faculty of Law, Istanbul Bilgi Univer-
sity / Turkey)
Constitutional amendment process in 
Turkey in context of “dialogue” and 
consensus in a highly polarized society 146 147
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SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 2 
Human Rights and Human Nature
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location IG 454
Organizers Prof. Dr. Marion Albers, 
University of Hamburg, 
Faculty of Law / Germany 
Dr. Thomas Hoffmann, 
University of Magdeburg, 
Faculty of Philosophy / 
Germany 
Dr. Jörn Reinhardt, 
University of Hamburg, 
Faculty of Law / Germany
About the workshop:
Natural sciences have not only changed 
our understandig of what the human be-
ing is. They have also made it possible to 
change the very nature of the human. 
Medical and biotechnical interferences 
as well as the developments in the life 
and neuro-sciences are questioning cen-
tral legal concepts and categories. This 
applies especially to the human rights 
discourse. It is obvious that the recourse 
to human nature as a line of argument 
becomes problematic if human nature 
itself is the subject of continual transfor-
mation and transgression. The vanishing 
line between the natural and the artiﬁ  -
cial, challenges common (metaphysical) 
explanations of human rights as natural 
rights. Nevertheless, “human nature” is 
still an attractive argument in contem-
porary human rights theory. The special 
3. Petra Gümplova (Justus-Liebig-Uni-
versity, Gießen / Germany)
Deliberation and the Politics of the Ex-
traordinary: The Constitution Making 
in Czech Republic, 1992
4. Elaine Mak (Erasmus University 
Rotterdam / The Netherlands)
Dialogue in Judicial Decision-Making
5. Maurice Adams (Tilburg University / 
The Netherlands)
Judicial transnational dialogue: a tale 
of two democratic stories
6. Karlijn van Blom (Tilburg University 
/ The Netherlands)
The use of foreign sources of law, an 
historical approach
7. Ólafur Ísberg Hannesson (European 
University Institute/Italy)
Legal Pluralism in the EEA legal 
order: The role of the EFTA Court and 
the Icelandic national courts in the 
European Judicial Dialogue
8. Bartosz Greczner (Wroclaw Univer-
sity / Poland)
The inﬂ  uence of judges’ responsibil-
ity for the dialog  and judicial inde-
pendence on providing  justice to the 
society in the European Union
workshop will address the role that hu-
man nature plays (and can possibly play) 
for the foundation and exempliﬁ  cation 
of human rights positions. We will con-
sider not only naturalistic positions in 
the strict sense, but also anthropological 
and quasi-anthropological lines of argu-
ment as well as the recourses to “second 
nature”. How do the transformations of 
the human affect the idea of a human 
right? How do they change our under-
standing of particular basic and human 
rights?
List of Lectures:
1. Marion Albers (University of Ham-
burg / Germany)
Fundamental Rights and Values in the 
Discussions about Genetic Engineer-
ing and Enhancement
2. Frederik von Harbou (University of 
Zurich / Switzerland)
Bridging the Moral Gap: Cosmopoli-
tan Empathy and Human Rights
3. Thomas Hoffmann (University of 
Magdeburg / Germany)
Human Dignity and Human Nature
4. Jörn Reinhardt (University of Ham-
burg / Germany)
From Naturalism to Political Anthro-
pology.The Role of Nature in Kant’s 
Theory of Rights 
5. Tetsu Sakurai (Kobe University / 
Japan)
Should Society Guarantee Individuals 
a Right to Keep ‘Normal Function-
ing’? Liberal Eugenics Is Confronted 
With the Challenge of Global Justice
6. Mateusz Stepien (Jagiellonian Uni-
versity Krakow / Poland)
The Relation between Human Nature 
and Human Rights. The Confucian 
example
7. Harun Tepe (Hacettepe University 
Ankara / Turkey)
A New concept of Human Nature as a 
Basis for Human Rights
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 3 
Law, morality and democracy. 
The legacy of Carlos S. Nino
Date THU 18 Aug 2011 + 
FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time THU 14.30 h – 18.30 h + 
FRI 15.30 h – 18.00 h
Location RUW 3.102
Organizers Lucas Arrimada, Univer-
sity of Buenos Aires / 
Argentina 
Gustavo Beade, Christian-
Albrecht-Universität zu 
Kiel / Germany
About the workshop:
Carlos S. Nino (Buenos Aires, Argentina 
1943 – La Paz, Bolivia 1993) was one of 
the most inﬂ  uential legal philosophers  148 149
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Laura C. Roth (Universidad Pompeu 
Fabra / Spain) 
Towards a deliberative criminal process
Fabio Enrique Pulido Ortiz (Universi-
dad Católica de Colombia / Fundación 
Derecho Justo, Colombia) + Juan Carlos 
Lancheros Gámez (Universidad de La 
Sabana /Fundación Derecho Justo, 
Colombia) 
The construction of democracy in Co-
lombia: synthesis and evaluation of the 
Constitutional Court activity regarding 
legislative processes (1992 to 2010)
Matías Parmigiani (UNC/Conicet / 
Argentina) 
The Consensual Theory of Punish-
ment: A Justiﬁ  catory Theory or an 
Interpretative Scheme?
Pedro Caminos (Universidad de Buenos 
Aires / Argentina)
The status quo paradox of Deliberative 
Democracy
Roberto Carlés (Universidad de Bue-
nos Aires, Argentina – Università degli 
Studi di Ferrara / Italy) 
The crisis of the legitimating function 
of the legal good (Rechtsgut) concept 
and its consequences for the Criminal 
Law theory
Thomas Obel Hansen (United States 
International University / Kenya)  
Revisiting Nino’s Justiﬁ  cations for 
Punishing State-Sponsored Violence
Eduardo Rivera López (Universidad Tor-
cuato Di Tella – CONICET / Argentina) 
Subjective and objective moral duties. 
Further thoughts Carlos Nino’s Quatri-
lemma of Consequentialism
Walter Carnota (Universidad de Buenos 
Aires / Argentina) 
Nino: (Talking Social) Rights Seri-
ously
Abraham Peréz Daza (Universidad Na-
cional Autónoma de México / México) 
Justiﬁ  cation of the moral discourse in 
Carlos Nino. On purpose of the liber-
alism’s fundamentation
Miguel Godoy (Universidade Federal do 
Paraná / Brazil)
Constitutionalism and deliberative 
democracy in Nino
Federico Thea (Universidad de Buenos 
Aires / Argentina)
A deliberative conception of authority
Sebastian Pagano (Universidad Nacional 
de La Plata / Argentina) 
Interpretation, truth and the impera-
tive need to live with each other
José Arthur Castillo de Macedo (Uni-
brasil / Brazil)
Deliberative democracy and hiperpres-
identialism in Brazil
this same year the 18th. Anniversary of 
his tragic lost. Following the most classic 
academic traditions in Germany – coun-
try that holds the Conference – we seek 
to review his career and start preparing 
a Festschrift, the usual gift that every 
inﬂ  uential Legal Scholar receives in his 
70th birthday, which would be at the be-
ginning of 2013.
That is our main purpose.
List of Lectures:
Lucas Arrimada  (Universidad de Bue-
nos Aires – CONICET / Argentina)
Nino on theory and practice: A legacy 
review
Gustavo A. Beade (Christian-Albrechts-
Universität zu Kiel / Germany)
Nino on Subjetivism, retribution and 
perfectionism
Stanley Paulson (Washington Univer-
sity in St. Louis / USA) 
Nino on ‘Justiﬁ  ed Normativity’ and a 
Reply
Miroslav Imbrisevic (Heythrop College, 
University of London / UK)   
Hart and Nino on Punishment
Rinat Kitai Sangero (The Academic 
Center of Law and Business / Israel) 
Does and should the State forgive per-
petrators of heinous crimes via statutes 
of limitations?
and public intellectuals in the past cen-
tury. His ideas are worldwide recognise 
and his work is continuously translated 
into different languages, such as Italian, 
Portuguese and Chinese.
Throughout his short but intensive aca-
demic life, he published several books 
and articles related to legal education, 
legal theory, criminal law, political phi-
losophy, constitutional law and moral 
philosophy. Above everything, he wrote 
some classic pieces of constitutional in-
terpretation, presidentialist government, 
transitional justice, human rights and 
deliberative democracy.
His sudden death left many young re-
searchers without the opportunity of 
meeting him. But this was not an excuse 
to move him from the scene of studies; 
his inﬂ  uence, through his books, papers, 
conferences, disciples or academic histo-
ries, is still part of the present. That is the 
reason why we would like to assemble 
all kind of researchers – seniors and jun-
iors – in any ﬁ  eld, that are related and 
interested – or simply curious – in some 
aspect of his vast literature. Our purpose 
is to show the relevancy (relevance) of 
Nino’ s thoughts today . In addition, the 
huge ﬁ  elds of law and morality in which 
Nino has extensively worked, prevent 
us from being restrictive in the possible 
topics of the workshop. 
We would be delighted to discuss in depth 
every aspect of Nino’s legacy, making a 
public and an academic tribute to an in-
tellectual who also attended, as a former 
participant, to the IVR Congresses. 
It’s interesting to know that in 2011 
Nino should have the age of 68, being  150 151
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SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 5 
Junge Rechtsphilosophie
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011; 
THU 18 Aug 2011; 
FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time TUE 14.30 h – 18.30 h; 
THU 14.30 h – 18.30 h; 
FRI 15.30 h – 18.00 h
Location HZ 10
Organizers Dr. Carsten Bäcker, 
Kiel / Germany
Dr. Sascha Ziemann, 
Frankfurt am Main / 
Germany
About the workshop:
Der Special Workshop Junge Rechtsphilos-
ophie (SW) ist konzeptuell angelehnt an 
das Junge Forum Rechtsphilosophie (JFR) 
in der IVR, welches sich die Förderung des 
rechtsphilosophischen Nachwuchses in 
eigener Organisation zur Aufgabe gesetzt 
hat.
Der SW präsentiert originäre Ideen des 
deutschsprachigen rechtsphilosophischen 
Nachwuchses. Der Titel lässt erkennen, 
dass die Referate in deutscher Sprache 
gehalten werden sollen. Diese Beschrän-
kung entspricht dem Grundsatz des JFR, 
sich als Nachwuchsorganisation deutsch-
sprachiger Rechtsphilosophie zu verste-
hen. Dahinter steht das Ziel, Deutsch als 
klassische Sprache der Rechtsphilosophie 
nicht weiter aufzugeben, sondern wieder 
zu stärken. Daraus resultiert freilich eine 
Beschränkung des SW auf deutschspra-
as a new way of approaching subjectiv-
ity beyond the well-known binary debate 
between the community of identity (Sit-
tlichkeit) versus neo-Kantian universal-
ism. The core is to open up a new debate 
on the notion of subjetivity based on a sin-
gularity without inward concepts, without 
properties. The last section leads the dis-
cussion towards the implications between 
politics and law. The effect of historical 
rupture rises up a nomos´ internal tension 
between the stability of the Constitution 
and the extraordinarity of the political ac-
tion (the constituent power). The tension 
between law and politics through the no-
tions of nomos pisteos and Agora (the po-
litical). It will be thought-out the crucial 
discussion on transcendental legitimacy of 
violence within/without the scope of law, 
as well as, the debate on decision, sover-
eignty and political action and the connec-
tion to distinct accountings on exception 
and natality
List of Lectures:
1. Rafael Rodriguez Pietro (University of 
Pablo de Olavide de Sevilla / Spain)
Toward a Complex Approach to Sub-
jectivity. The Common, Constituent 
Power and Human Needs
2. Willis Santiago (Pontiﬁ  cal Catholic 
University of São Paulo / Brazil)
Antigone or the Poetical Dissolution of 
Politics
3. Petra Gumplova (Liebig University 
Gießen / Germany)
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 4 
Theology and the Political: 
a New Debate on Community, Politics, 
and Law
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location IG 0.251
Organizers Ass.Prof. Bethania Assy, 
Pontiﬁ  cal Catholic Uni-
versity of Rio de Janeiro 
/ Brazil 
Ass.Prof. Florian 
Hoffmann, University 
Erfurt / Germany
About the workshop:
The panel gives particular attention to 
three main branches on the linkage be-
tween theology and politics. Firstly, it 
deals with a general discussion on the no-
tions of time and history, mainly consid-
ered by the central European Jewish intel-
lectuals from the 1920´s. It is particularly 
interesting the role Messianic idea plays 
in order to articulate a (post-)modern 
new political community. The key-point 
i s  t o  a p p r o a c h  a n  a n t i - e v o l u t i o n i s t  i d e a  
of politics. The unpredictability of Mes-
sianism, the extra-historical Irruption 
in the immanent history, is precisely the 
meaning of messianic history, namely, the 
break with the historical linearity of the 
events. The second branch relies on the 
intersection on the notions of community, 
singularity, and freedom. The suggestion 
is to think over the notion of singularity 
Carl Schmitt: Democracy and Sover-
eign Constitutional Politics
4. Kinga Marulewska (Academic Insti-
tution: Nicolaus Copernicus University 
/ Poland)
Delegate or Trustee? Carl Schmitt and 
Eric Voegelin’s Theories of Representa-
tion
5. Leticia Dyniewicz (Academic In-
stitution: Federal University of Santa 
Catarina / Brazil)
Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin: 
the Rescue of Non-rational Ideas for a 
Disruption
6. Bethania Assy (Pontiﬁ  cal Catholic 
University of Rio de Janeiro / Brazil) 
and Florian Hoffmann (Universität 
Erfurt / Germany)
Another Time for Justice: Singular 
Event, Deviation of Law, and Judg-
ment of the Defeated
7. Luís Pedro Pereira Coutinho 
(Lisbon University / Portugal)
Theology and the foundational: 
the American foundation in Hannah 
Arendt 152 153
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scholars (like Alexy) are doing better in 
this respect?
The workshop would also address issues 
concerning the very character of legal 
scholarship. It is often noted that legal 
doctrinal scholarship has never been 
properly integrated into the social sci-
ences. Some have argued (like Tushnet) 
that legal scholarship is isolated from the 
intellectual tendencies of the social sci-
ences by its strong functional ties to legal 
education and its ideological commit-
ment to the ideal of the rule of law. The 
uncertainties about the methodological 
proﬁ  le of legal scholarship and its epis-
temological worth raise a challenge for 
legal theory: that of clarifying the char-
acter of the doctrinal knowledge legal 
scholarship represents. The workshop 
would seek to face up to that challenge.
List of Lectures:
1. Dr. Mátyás Bódig (University of 
Aberdeen / United Kingdom)
Doctrinal Knowledge, Legal Doctrines 
and Legal Doctrinal Scholarship
2. Dr. Thomas Bustamante 
(Federal University of Minas Gerais, 
Belo Horizonte / Brazil)
Comment on Mátyás Bódig’s Paper
3. Dr Mátyás Bencze (University of 
Debrecen / Hungary)
The Use of Doctrinal and Conceptual 
Theoretical Knowledge in Legal Rea-
soning
5. Prof. Dr. Klaus Mathis 
(Luzern / Switzerland)
Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts
6. Sabine Müller-Mall 
(Berlin / Germany)
Performative Rechtserzeugung
7. Christian Nierhauve 
(Hagen / Germany)
Zur Rechtsklugheit
8. Dr. phil. Jörn Reinhardt 
(Hamburg / Germany)
Transformationen der Demokratie
9. Ralf Seinecke, M.A. 
(Frankfurt am Main / Germany)
Recht und Rechtspluralismus – 
Perspektiven von Rechtsphilosophie 
und Rechtswissenschaft?
10. Dr. iur. Nils Teifke (Kiel / Germany)
Menschenwürde als Prinzip
11. Dr. iur. Friederike Wapler 
(Göttingen / Germany)
Pluralismus und Toleranz in liberalen 
politischen Gemeinschaften
12. Mônica Danielle de Castro Weitzel, 
LL.M. (Bremen / Germany)
Agrobusiness vs. kleinbäuerliche 
Landwirtschaft: Zum Schutze alter-
nativer Lebensformen jenseits des 
liberalen Regierens
13. Tim Wihl (Berlin / Germany)
Menschenwürde als praktische 
Wahrheit
chige Teilnehmer. Der SW hat kein Gene-
ralthema. Stattdessen stellen die Referen-
ten ihre Rechtsphilosophie, in den meisten 
Fällen gegründet auf die Dissertation, vor.
Ziel des SW ist es, auf dem Frankfurter 
Weltkongreß ein Forum zu bieten, in dem 
über gegenwärtige Entwicklungen in der 
jungen deutschsprachigen Rechtsphiloso-
phie informiert und diskutiert wird.
List of Lectures:
1. Dr. iur. Tilmann Altwicker, LL.M. 
(Zürich / Switzerland and Budapest / 
Hungary)
Rechtsethik als Common Law-Phi-
losophie – Die Methode der rechts-
ethischen Rekonstruktion von Men-
schenrechten
2. Dr. iur. Carsten Bäcker 
(Kiel / Germany)
Rationalität ohne Idealität. Eine rela-
tivistische Diskurstheorie des Rechts
3. Daniel Gruschke, M.A. 
(Aachen / Germany)
Zur vagheitstheoretischen Model-
lierung unbestimmter Rechtsbegriffe
4. Dr. phil. Bernhard Jakl, M.A. 
(Münster / Germany)
„Rechtsentwicklung“ in Rechtstheorie 
und Rechtsphilosophie. Ein Vergleich 
am Beispiel der Transnationalisierung 
des Rechts
14. Magdalena Zietek, M.A. 
(Aachen / Germany)
Über die technokratischen Grundlagen 
des modernen Rechtsverständnisses
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 6 
The Theory of Legal Scholarship
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HZ 15
Organizers Senior Lecturer, 
Dr. Habil. Mátyás Bódig, 
University of Aberdeen, 
School of Law / UK
About the workshop:
The special workshop sets out to explore 
the functional ties between legal theo-
ry and legal scholarship (and doctrinal 
scholarship in particular), as well as the 
ability of contemporary legal theory to 
address the methodological concerns of 
legal scholarship.
There are recurrent complaints that 
mainstream Anglo-American legal the-
ory has turned away from the substan-
tive and methodological concerns of le-
gal scholarship. The primary purpose of 
the workshop is to offer a forum to dis-
cuss whether it is really the case. Does 
contemporary legal theory have the the-
oretical resources to shape the agenda 
of scholarship? And if Anglo-American 
legal theory is losing touch with legal 
scholarship, can we say that Continental  154 155
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10. Prof. Dr. Joachim Renzikowski 
(Universität Halle)
Die Hart-Radbruch-Kontroverse – nur 
eine Frage der Kompetenz?
11. Prof. Dr. Hubert Rottleuthner 
(Institut für Rechtssoziologie und 
Rechtstatsachenforschung, Freie Uni-
versität Berlin/Germany)
Gustav Radbruch und der ‚Unrech-
tsstaat’
12. Prof. Dr. Torben Spaak (Uppsala 
University)
Robert Alexy, the Radbruch Formula, 
and the Separation Thesis
13. Prof. Dr. Alexandre Travessoni (Uni-
versidade Presidente Antônio Carlos)
Gustav Radbruch’s (Supposed) Turn 
against Positivism: a Matter of 
Balancing?
tation’.On closer inspection, however, it 
is less than clear that the orthodox read-
ing, giving rise to the ‘conversion thesis’, 
is convincing. To be sure, there can be 
little doubt that Radbruch’s concept of 
law, in so far as it can be characterised 
by his ‘formula’, is nonpositivistic. What 
is more, Radbruch himself later explic-
itly classiﬁ   ed his own position before 
the war as positivistic. This is, however, 
hard to reconcile with the for the most 
part unkn o wn fa ct tha t Ra db ru ch ha d 
repeatedly criticized ‘positivism’ in his 
earlier writings. What is more, Radbruch 
argued from the outset that law is ‘the 
reality whose meaning it is to serve the 
legal value.’ The legal value is none other 
than ‘justice’, Radbruch’s contribution to 
Neo-Kantian value theory. Such a con-
cept of law certainly transcends tradi-
tional legal positivism, characterized by 
the separability thesis. This raises ques-
tions about the classiﬁ   cation of Rad-
bruch’s pre-War position as positivistic 
and about the ‘conversion thesis’ gener-
ally.The special workshop is devoted to a 
comprehensive enquiry into Radbruch’s 
concept of law. Even though the ‘con-
version thesis’ will inevitably play an 
important role in this enquiry, contribu-
tions to any other aspect of the debate 
on Radbruch’s concept of law are most 
welcome.
List of Lectures:
1. Prof. Dr. Michael Anderheiden (Uni-
versität Heidelberg)
Why We Should (Largely) Forget Rad-
bruch’s Formula
4. Krisztina Ficsor and Ágnes Kovács 
(University of Debrecen / Hungary)
The Limits of Legal Doctrinal Knowl-
edge
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 7 
Gustav Radbruch’s Concept of Law – 
A ‘Conversion’ from Positivism to 
Natural Law?
Date THU 18 Aug 2011 + 
FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time THU 14.30 h – 18.30 h + 
FRI 15.30 h –18.00 h
Location HZ 9
Organizers Priv.-Doz. Dr. Martin 
Borowski , Birmingham 
Law School, University 
of Birmingham / 
Great Britain
About the workshop:
Gustav Radbruch was Germany’s most 
famous legal philosopher in the twen-
tieth century. According to the ortho-
dox reading, he supported a positivistic 
position in his pre-War writings, most 
notably in section 10 of his treatise ‘Re-
chtsphilosophie’ (1932). Against this 
backdrop, the well-known nonpositivis-
tic ‘Radbruch formula’ introduced in one 
of his post-W ar essays suggests that he 
underwent a conversion from positivism 
to natural law. In alluding to Radbruch’s 
‘ c o n v e r s i o n ’ ,  H . L . A .  H a r t  s p e a k s  o f  i t  
having the ‘special poignancy of a recan-
2. PD Dr. Martin Borowski (Birming-
ham Law School, University of Bir-
mingham)
On the Conversion Thesis
3. Daniel Deba (Universität Kiel)
Gustav Radbruchs gerechtigkeitsorien-
tierter Rechtspositivismus
4. Prof. Dr. Ralf Dreier (Universität 
Göttingen)
Kontinuitäten und Diskontinuitäten in 
der Rechtsphilosophie Radbruchs
5. PD Dr. Andreas Funke (Universität 
Köln)
Radbruchs Rechtsbegriff und Rad-
bruchs Methode zur Bestimmung des 
Rechtsbegriffs
6. Prof. Dr. Hidehiko Adachi (Univer-
sität Kanazawa)
Die Freiheitslehre von Gustav Rad-
bruch
7. Prof. Dr. Stephan Kirste (Andrássy 
Universität und Universität Heidelberg)
Radbruch’s Idea of Law and the 
Elements of Justice
8. Prof. Dr. Thomas Mertens (Univer-
sität Nijmegen)
Betrayal and Continuity in Radbruch’s 
Formula
9. Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Stanley L. 
Paulson (Washington University in St. 
Louis, MO)
Zur nichtpositivistischen Kontinui-
tätsthese bei Gustav Radbruch 156 157
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About the workshop:
Kaum ein anderes Gebiet der Medizin 
entwickelte sich in den vergangenen 
Jahren derart rasant wie die Biomedi-
zin. Zu denken ist etwa an Innovationen 
in der Fortpﬂ  anzungstechnologie,  an 
Gendiagnostik und Gen-Therapie oder 
an die Stammzellenmedizin. Im Grenz-
bereich zwischen Biologie und Medizin 
bedient sich die Biomedizin modernster 
Technik, um Krankheiten erkennen 
und zu heilen. Die Biomedizin ist so-
mit ein paradigmatisches Beispiel für 
das Zusammentreffen von Technik und 
Wissenschaft. Durch die Voraussetzun-
gen und die Folgen der Biomedizin se-
hen sich Recht und Ethik immer wie-
der von neuem herausgefordert. Nicht 
nur, dass sich der Regelungsgegenstand 
selbst in stetem Wandel beﬁ  ndet, auch 
vermeintliche Grenzen der Biomedizin 
werden immer weiter gezogen. Wel-
che Rolle kommt dabei dem Recht zu? 
Welches sind die speziﬁ  schen  Aufga-
ben des Rechts und der Rechtsethik in 
der Regulierung der Biomedizin? Wie 
kann das Recht im Feld der Biomedizin 
seine Steuerungsfunktion wahrneh-
men? Woran orientiert sich das Recht, 
wenn es im Bereich der Regulierung 
der Biomedizin Wertungen vornimmt? 
Wie wirkt sich die Technisierung der 
Medizin auf Menschenbilder aus? Wie 
können im Gebiet der Biomedizin ver-
bindliche rechtliche Normen geschaf-
fen werden? Welche Rolle kommt dabei 
dem Soft Law zu? Können aus dem Zu-
gang des Rechts zur Technisierung der 
Medizin allgemeine Schlüsse auf das 
jing, Sept. 15-20, 2009, China), and the 
successful second edition in Rotterdam 
(JURIX-09, Rotterdam, Nov. 16-18, The 
Netherlands)3/4 is thus to support for ex-
change of knowledge and methodologies 
approaches between scholars from dif-
ferent scientiﬁ  c ﬁ  elds, by both highlight-
ing their similarities and differences and 
preparing the scientiﬁ  c community to a 
common ground beyond the state of the 
art of any individual discipline.
Besides providing advanced computer 
applications for the legal domain such 
as knowledge based systems and intel-
ligent information retrieval, research 
on AI and law has developed innovative 
interdisciplinary models for understand-
ing legal systems and legal reasoning, 
which are highly signiﬁ  cant for philoso-
phy of law and legal theory. Among such 
models, we can mention logical frame-
works for defeasible legal reasoning and 
dialectical argumentation, logics of nor-
mative positions, theories of case-based 
r e a s o n i n g ,  a n d  c o m p u t a b l e  m o d e l s  o f  
legal concepts. Other topics involved in 
this process of integration are ‘multia-
gent systems’, multilingual ontologies, 
complexity theory, graph theory, game 
theory, cognitive science and any other 
contribution from those disciplines that 
could help to formalize the dynamics of 
legal systems and to capture the rela-
tionships between norms.
List of Lectures:
1. AI Approaches to the Complexity of 
Legal Systems
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 8
AICOL – Artiﬁ  cial Intelligence 
Approaches to the Complexity of 
Legal Systems
Date MON 15 Aug 2011 + 
TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time MON 14.30 h – 18.30 h + 
TUE 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HZ 8
Organizers Prof. Danièle Bourcier, 
CERSA-CNRS, Paris / 
France
Prof. Pompeu Casano-
vas, UAB Institute of 
Law and Technology, 
Barcelona / Spain
Prof. Ugo Pagallo, Uni-
versity of Turin / Italy
Prof. Monica Palmirani, 
CIRSFID - University of 
Bologna / Italy
Prof. Giovanni Sartor, 
European University 
Institute and University 
of Bologna / Italy
About the workshop:
Today there is a strong need not only to 
integrate research in AI and law within 
legal theory, but also to encompass the 
different branches of research in AI and 
law. In fact research in AI and Law is de-
veloping so quickly, that there is a risk 
of missing the opportunities to exchange 
knowledge and methodologies.
The aim of the workshop 3/4 after a ﬁ  rst 
experience in Beijing (IVR XXIV, Bei-
Casanovas, P.; Pagallo, U.; Sartor, G.; 
Ajani, G. (Eds.), International Work-
shops AICOL-I/IVR-XXIV, Beijing, 
China, September 19, 2009 and AICOL-
II/JURIX 2009, Rotterdam, The Neth-
erlands, December 16, 2009 Revised Se-
lected Papers. Springer Series: Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 6237 
Subseries: Lecture Notes in Artiﬁ  cial 
Intelligence, 1st Edition., 2010, X, 243 
p., ISBN 978-3-642-16523-8
2. Approaches to Legal Ontologies
Sartor G., Casanovas P.,  Biasiotti M., 
Fernandez-Barrera M.(Eds.), Springer, 
Theories, Domains, Methodologies, Se-
ries: Law, Governance and Technology 
Series, Vol. 1, 1st Edition., 2011, XIII, 
279 p. 15 illus.
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 9 
Regulierung von Technisierung – die 
Rolle des Rechts am Beispiel der 
Biomedizin im Spannungsfeld von 
Recht und Ethik
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 1.102
Organizers Prof. Dr. Michael 
Anderheiden, Ruprecht-
Karls-Universität 
Heidelberg / Germany
lic.iur. LL.M. Peter Bürkli, 
Juristische Fakultät der 
Universität Basel / 
Switzerland 158 159
ABSTRACTS
Special Workshops
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
 
W
o
r
k
s
h
o
p
s
 
–
 
A
b
s
t
r
a
c
t
s
Western philosophy. Many well known 
works in Ethics, Political and Legal Phi-
losophy may be read as maintaining a 
dialogue with him. The relation between 
theory, practice and justice is one of the 
fundamental issues of Aristotle and links 
this workshop to the conference theme 
(i.e. Law, Science and Technology). The 
workshop intends to motivate studies 
about the way Aristotle may still inspire 
contemporary discourse in this respect.
Selection of presentations
The language is English. A Program 
Committee will select papers for pres-
entation. The committee consists of 
the coordinators and invited members, 
scholars specialized in Aristotelian Phi-
losophy and/or Political Science and 
Ethics: Marcel Becker, Radboud Uni-
versity (Netherlands), António de Cas-
tro Caeiro, Nova University of Lisbon 
(Portugal); Oliver Lembcke, University 
of Jena (Germany); Carlo Natali, Uni-
versity Ca’Foscari Venezia (Italy); Di-
ego Poole, University Rey Juan Carlos II 
(Spain); Jonathan Soeharno, University 
of Utrecht (Netherlands); Marco Zinga-
no, University of São Paulo (Brazil).
Community of researchers
This will be the third edition of the 
workshop, the ﬁ  rst meetings being held 
at Cracow (2007) and (Beijing (2009). A 
community of researchers interested in 
Aristotle and the Philosophy of Law is 
emerging; a reunion of the participants 
took place in Brazil, in August 2010, 
with the support from the Brazilian IVR 
Section.
2. Gaetano Carlizzi (Università Suor 
Orsola Benincasa di Napoli / Italy)
Historische und theoretische Haupt-
fragen der gegenwärtigen juristischen 
Hermeneutik
3. Stephan Meder (Leibniz Universität 
Hannover / Germany)
Francis Lieber (1800-1872) und die 
Begründung der modernen Herme-
neutik
4. José Antonio Seoane (Universidad de 
A Coruña / Spain)
Hermeneutik und Typus
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 11 
Aristotle and the Philosophy of Law – 
Theory, Practice and Justice
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 1.301
Organizers Prof. Dr. Nuno Coelho, 
University of São Paulo 
(USP) / Brazil
Dr. Liesbeth Huppes-
Cluysenaer, University 
of Amsterdam / 
The Netherlands
About the workshop:
This workshop aims to join researchers 
interested in the contribution of Aris-
totle to developments in Philosophy of 
Law. Aristotle has attracted the attention 
of philosophers in very different ways in 
werden, ein Rechtsurteil zu rechtfertigen. 
Im Hintergrund steht oft die Annahme, 
dass ein strenges theorein nur das unter-
suchen kann, was „sichtbar“ ist. 
Damit kann auch die derzeitige margi-
nale Position der „gegenwärtigen juristi-
schen Hermeneutik“ (g.j.H.) als eine The-
orie der rechtlichen Urteils-herstellung 
erklärt werden. Es bleibt jedoch festzu-
stellen, ob diese marginale Position auch 
wohlverdient ist. Denn die g.j.H. (z.B. 
mit Kaufmann, Hassemer, Hruschka und 
E s s e r )  h a t  z u e r s t  g e z e i g t ,  d a s s  d i e  H e r -
stellungsphase eines Rechtsurteils nicht 
nur gleich bedeutend wie seine Rechtfer-
tigungsphase ist, sondern auch die not-
wendigen Bedingungen des echten se-
cundum ius Urteilens impliziert. Da diese 
Bedingungen als solche weder psycho-
logisch noch normativ sind, können sie 
prinzipiell und auf andere Weise, als die 
der Theorie der juristischen Argumenta-
tion theoretisiert werden.
Schließlich sollte der Special Workshop 
ein Gespräch über diese Fragen und so-
mit die eigentümliche Funktion der g.j.H. 
fördern, indem er versucht, einerseits ihre 
Ursprünge hervorzuheben, anderseits 
ihre Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft und 
-praxis herauszuarbeiten.
List of Lectures:
1. Martin Avenarius (Universität zu 
Köln / Germany)
Universelle Hermeneutik und rech-
tshistorisches Verstehen: die Ent-
wicklung der Kontroverse zwischen 
Gadamer und Wieacker
Verhältnis von Recht, Wissenschaften 
und Technik gezogen werden?
List of Lectures:
1. Dr. iur. HSG Julia Hänni 
(Oberassistentin am Institut für Eu-
roparecht der Universitäten Bern, 
Neuenburg und Fribourg / Schweiz)
Recht, Biomedizin, Technik und die 
autonome Leiblichkeit des Menschen
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 10 
Die Gegenwärtige Juristische 
Hermeneutik zwischen Vergangenheit 
und Zukunft
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF 3.36 / Chicago
Organizers Dr. Gaetano Carlizzi, 
Università Suor Orsola 
Benincasa di Napoli / 
Italy
About the workshop:
Das Rechtsurteil ist ein zentrales Thema 
der Rechtstheorie und kann unter vielen 
Gesichtspunkten erforscht werden.
Viele Rechtstheoretiker haben sich auf 
den Aspekt der juristischen Argumenta-
tion konzentriert. Unter „juristischer Ar-
gumentation“ kann man u.a. Folgendes 
verstehen: die Explikation der Gesamt-
heit der Gründe, die für geeignet gehalten  160 161
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the natural rules that had to govern hu-
man relations. In this sense, the sentence 
of Cambacérès, when he presented the 
second project of Civil Code for France, 
is emblematic: “Our laws will not be but 
the code of Nature, sanctioned by rea-
son and guaranteed by freedom”. This 
rationalist iusnaturalism is the principal 
form of iusnaturalism that has stood in 
opposition to the later positivism of the 
19th and 20th centuries, presenting, it 
as it were, classical iusnaturalism by an-
tonomasia. 
This image, represented by rationalist iu-
snaturalism, is not the object of the pro-
posed Workshop, but rather the classical 
iusnaturalism that is presently identiﬁ  ed 
as the Aristotelian-Thomistic Natural 
Law Tradition. This Aristotelian-Thom-
ist jurisprudence developed from a reha-
bilitation of the study of practical reason-
ing, in dialogue with the contemporary 
philosophy. On this perspective, natural 
law is not reduced to its mere historical 
formulations. If there is a natural law, it 
exists independently of the theories that 
we could develop about it. Neverthe-
less, when we talk about natural law we 
necessarily refer to a speciﬁ  c doctrine, a 
theory formulated under the philosophi-
cal debate surrounding the foundations 
of the moral order. Although the ancient 
antecedents of this doctrine are found 
in Stoicism, its more classic formulation 
is owed to Aquinas. It is to this version 
of the natural law that the contempo-
rary efforts at rehabilitating the study of 
practical reasoning are referred.
mon in the 19th century, when, under 
the inﬂ  uence of positivism, the convic-
tion prevailed that natural law theory 
lacks the capacity to clarify the concept 
of law, and still less, to project itself onto 
the concrete practice of law.
The 19th century critique of iusnatural-
ism traces its roots to the rationalism 
of the 18th century. During the 18th 
century, a view of natural law as a ra-
tional code arose. This code was to be 
accurately formulated by the study of 
human nature. But this study of human 
nature took the form of an individualis-
tic analysis of man from the perspective 
of modern rationalism. This perspective 
(rationalist iusnaturalism) supplanted 
what might be called a ‘classical’ per-
spective (classical iusnaturalism), which 
took man’s ﬁ  nality as the fundamental 
explanatory criterion, by instead pri-
oritizing material and formal causality 
as the principal explanatory criteria.In 
other words, the rationalist perspec-
tive is characterized by the conviction 
that reality is better understood by un-
raveling the internal composition of its 
elements and analyzing the relation be-
tween them, rather than by investigat-
ing the end or purpose of its existence. 
An investigation into the ‘why’ of real-
ity (the classical perspective) was virtu-
ally replaced by an investigation into the 
‘how’ of reality (the rationalist perspec-
tive). As a result, reﬂ  ection on natural 
law lost touch with teleology. Rational-
ist iusnaturalism became, in turn, le-
gal positivism: the ﬁ  rst European legal 
codes appeared as compendiums of all 
Synallagma as a paradigm of ex-
change: from Aristotelian to Game 
Theoretic Categorisation in Contract 
Law
9. Ekow N.Yankah (Cardozo School of 
Law New York / USA)
Legal Vices and Civic Virtues
10. António de Castro Caeiro (Universi-
dade Nova de Lisboa / Spain)
The concept of value in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 12 
The Natural Law Tradition
Date THU 18 Aug 2011 + 
FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time THU 14.30 h – 18.30 h + 
FRI 15.30 h – 18.00 h
Location HOF 2.45 / Boston
Organizers Dr. Francisco José 
Contreras, University of 
Seville / Spain
About the workshop:
The expression ius naturale evokes, in 
its apparent simplicity, the existence 
of a relation between Law and Nature. 
This relationship between the normative 
and the natural—despite being afﬁ  rmed 
in diverse and sometimes incompatible 
ways—was, for centuries, a relatively 
paciﬁ  c question. Criticism of natural law 
theory , or iusnaturalism, became com-
List of Lectures:
1. Clifford Angell Bates (Uniwersytet 
Warzawski / Poland)
Law and the rule of law and its place 
relative to politeia in Aristotle’s Poli-
tics
2. Eric Engle (Pericles-Able Moskow / 
Russia)
Aristotle and Post-Positivism
3. Iris van Domselaar (University of 
Amsterdam / The Netherlands)
Destabilizing Adjudication: where 
deconstructivism and neo-Aristoteli-
anism meet 
4. Jesús Vega ( University of Oviedo / 
Spain)
Aristotle vs. Schauer on Rules as Gen-
eralizations 
5. Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer (Univer-
sity of Amsterdam / The Netherlands)
Reasoning against a deterministic/
mechanistic conception of the world
6. Samuli Hurri (Helsinki / Finland)
Justice kata nomos and justice as 
epieikés (legality and equity)
7. Nuno M.M.S. Coelho (USP, UNISEB-
COC, UNIPAC / Brazil)
Psyche as Agora: the rhetorical struc-
ture of phronesis
8. Mariusz Jerzy Golecki (University of 
Lodz / Poland) 162 163
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still others discuss the relevance of an 
economic approach to comparative law 
and various doctrinal legal areas.
The workshop is a follow-up of the First 
MetaLawEcon workshop (Tilburg, No-
vember 2010).
List of Lectures:
1. Helen Eenmaa (Yale / USA)
Normative differences among forms of 
liability and the limits of the economic 
analysis of law
2. Carsten Gerner-Beuerle (London 
School of Economics / UK)
Comparative Corporate Governance for 
the 21st century
3. Mariusz Golecki (University of Lódz 
/ Poland)
Foundationalism vs. Antifoundationa-
lis: some remarks on law and econom-
ics as jurisprudential theory
4. Alon Harel (Hebrew University 
Jerusalem / Israel)
Commensurability and Agency: Two 
Yet-To-Be-Met Challenges for Law and 
Economics
5. Szabolcs Hegyi (University of Miskolc 
/ Hungary)
The scope and limits of consequen-
citalist reasoning: a philosophical 
approach
6. Régis Lanneau (Université Paris X / 
France)
Hans Kelsen and the Tradition of 
Natural Law: Why Kelsen’s Objec-
tions to the Natural Law Doctrine Do 
Not Apply Against Aquinas’ Theory of 
Natural Law
8. María Elósegui, Universidad de 
Zaragoza / Spain)
The Thought of Legaz Lacambra and 
the Natural Law Tradition
9. Marta Albert (Universidad Rey Juan 
Carlos / Spain)
Natural Law and the Phenomenologi-
cal Given
10. Paloma Durán (Universidad Com-
plutense / Spain)
Universality of Human Rights, Natural 
Law, and Human Condition
11. Rafael Ramis (Universidad de las 
Islas Baleares / Spain)
Alasdair Macintyre: “Legal Philoso-
phy and Natural Law Tradition”
List of Lectures:
1. Anna Taitslin (University of Canberra 
/ Australia)
The competing sources of Aquinas’ 
Natural Law: Aristotle, Roman Law 
and early Christian Fathers, and the 
vitality of Suarez’ critique
2. Caridad Velarde (Universidad de 
Navarra / Spain)
Borders, Political Community, and 
Natural Law Tradition
3. Diego Poole (Universidad Rey Juan 
Carlos / Spain)
Democracy and Moral Relativism: 
A Reply to Hans Kelsen
4. Fernando Llano (Universidad de 
Sevilla / Spain)
Cicero and Natural Law
5. Francisco José Contreras, Universidad 
de Sevilla / Spain)
The Finnis-Veatch Controversy on the 
„Naturalistic Fallacy“
6. Ignacio Sánchez Cámara (Universi-
dad de La Coruña / Spain)
Perspectivism and Natural Law
7. Julio Oliveira (Pontiﬁ  cia Universidade 
Catolica de Minas Gerais / Brazil) and 
Barbara Lessa (Pontiﬁ  cia Universidade 
Catolica de Minas Gerais / Brazil)
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 13 
(cancelled)
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 14 
Theoretical and Methodological 
Foundations of Law and Economics 
(Second MetaLawEcon Workshop)
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HZ 11
Organizers Dr. Péter Cserne, 
Tilburg University / 
The Netherlands
 
About the workshop:
While law and economics seems to have 
become the lingua franca of US legal 
scholarship and is increasingly popular 
in Europe and elsewhere in the world, 
there are still signiﬁ  cant misunderstand-
ings surrounding its theoretical status, 
methodology and normative commit-
ments. This calls for a renewed focus on 
foundational issues of the discipline. 
The workshop addresses meta-theoreti-
cal and epistemological questions of law 
and economics scholarship; some con-
tributors elaborate on various aspects of 
the contrast between philosophical and 
economic approach to law; others enter 
normative debates (related to efﬁ  ciency, 
welfare, justice, and consequentialism),  164 165
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SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 16 
Legal Fictions
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location IG 457
Organizers Dr. Maksymilian Del Mar, 
Queen Mary, University 
of London / UK
About the workshop:
In his unduly neglected series of ar-
ticles on ‘Legal Fictions’ (Illinois Law 
Review, 1930-1), Lon Fuller noted that 
‘the ﬁ  ction has generally been regarded 
as something of which the law ought 
to be ashamed, and yet with which the 
law cannot, as yet, dispense’ (1930, 
364). The role of ‘ﬁ  ctions’ in the law is 
a topic of direct relevance to this year’s 
IVR Congress theme, ‘Law, Science and 
Technology.’ The workshop will ask the 
following questions: are Fuller’s argu-
ments relevant today? Can we still, in 
this era of enthusiasm for naturalism, 
speak of legal ﬁ  ctions? And if we can 
speak of legal ﬁ  ctions, then what does 
this show us about the limits of science, 
or the aims of law? Are legal concepts 
tests in wholly different ways to scientif-
ic hypotheses? Is legal reasoning, partly 
as a result of the employment of legal ﬁ  c-
tions, a world apart from scientiﬁ  c rea-
soning? If they are worlds apart, can law 
and science ever learn from each other, 
and if so how exactly? What do legal ﬁ  c-
tions tell us about the increasing reliance 
About the workshop:
Topics include balancing, argumentation 
fallacies, coherence, dialogue in the law, 
strategic maneuvering and the distinc-
tion between context of discovery and 
context of justiﬁ  cation.
List of Lectures:
1. Jan Sieckmann (Bamberg / 
Germany)
Is Balancing a Method of Rational 
Justiﬁ  cation?
2. Christian Dahlman / David Reidhav / 
Lena Wahlberg (Lund / Sweden)
Fallacies in ad Hominem Arguments
3. Antonino Rotolo / Corrado Roversi 
(Bologna / Italy)
Constitutive Rules and Coherence in 
Legal Argumentation
4. Thomas Bustamante (Aberdeen / UK)
On the Argumentum ad Absurdum in 
Statutory Interpretation
5. Harm Kloosterhuis (Rotterdam / 
The Netherlands)
The Pragma-Dialectic Perspective on 
Legal Argumentation and the Rule of 
Law
6. Eveline Feteris (Amsterdam / 
The Netherlands)
Strategic Maneuvering with Argu-
mentation in the Case of the Unworthy 
Spouse
What is ‘law’ from the law and eco-
nomics point of view?
7. Diego Moreno-Cruz (University of 
Genoa / Italy)
Three Explanatory and Predictive Re-
alistic Strategies Confronted
8. Aurélien Portuese (Université Paris II 
/ France)
The case for a principled approach to 
law and economics: efﬁ  ciency analysis 
and general principles of EU law
9. Endre Stavang (University of Oslo / 
Norway)
Some experience-based thoughts on 
the relevance of economic analysis of 
law
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 15
Legal Argumentation
Date THU 18 Aug 2011; 
FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time THU 
14.30 h – 18.30 h; 
FRI 15.30 h – 16.30 h;
17 h – 18 h
Location HZ 15
Organizers Prof. Dr. Christian 
Dahlman, Lund 
University / Sweden
Dr. Eveline Feteris, Uni-
versity of Amsterdam / 
The Netherlands
7. Jaap Hage (Maastricht / The Nether-
lands)
Legal Constructivism and the Institu-
tional Theory of Law
8. Flavia Carbonell (Univ. Alberto Hur-
tado / Chile)
Reasoning by Consequences
9. Bruce Anderson (Saint Mary’s Univ. 
/ Canada)
Balancing in the Discovery Process
10. Bruce Chapman (Toronto / Canada)
Pluralism, Proportionality and Process
11. Stanley L. Paulson (St. Louis / USA)
Is Kelsen Caught between Discovery 
and Justiﬁ  cation?
12. Marko Novak (Nova Gorica / Slo-
wenia)
The (Ir)rationality of Judicial Deci-
sion-Making
13. Virgilio Afonso da Silva (São Paulo 
/ Brazil)
Dialogue and Deliberation in Constitu-
tional Courts
14. Giovanni Tuzet (Bocconi / Italy)
Truth on Trial – Inquiry or Advocacy 
in Legal Argumentation? 166 167
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2. Professor Antony Duff (University of 
Stirling / UK and University of Minne-
sota / USA)
Towards a modest legal moralism
3. Professor Kimberly Ferzan (Rutgers 
University / USA)
Inchoate offenses at the prevention/
punishment divide
Thursday 18 August
4. Dr Ignace Haaz (University of 
Fribourg / Switzerland)
Eduard von Hartmann and criminali-
zation
5. Dr Claes Lernestedt (University of 
Örebro / Sweden)
Victim, offender, and society: sharing 
wrongs, but how, and in which roles?
6. Professor Andreas von Hirsch (Uni-
versity of Frankfurt / Germany and 
University of Cambridge / UK)
The roles of harmfulness and wrong-
fulness in crimalisation theory
Fictional Fraud: Reliance and the 
Myth of Efﬁ  cient Markets
7. Nancy Knauer (Temple University / 
USA)
Legal Fictions and the Constitutive 
Power of Law: Slavery and the Doc-
trine of Discovery
8. Karen Petroski (Saint Louis Univer-
sity / USA)
Legal Fictions, Legal Facts, and the 
Limits of Legal Communication
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 17 
Criminalization
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011 + THU 
18 Aug 2011
Time TUE 14.30 h – 18.30 h + 
THU 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF E.22 / Commerzbank
Organizers Prof. Andreas von Hirsch, 
University of Frankfurt / 
Germany and University 
of Cambridge / UK
Prof. Antony Duff, 
University of Stirling / 
UK and University of 
Minnesota / USA
About the workshop:
It is often said that contemporary socie-
ties face a crisis of over-criminalization: 
too much conduct is criminalized, too 
hastily, without adequate thought about 
placed, in some domains of the law, on 
expert scientiﬁ  c witnesses? Are legal ﬁ  c-
tions the last bastion of defence against 
the inroads of science in law, e.g. of the 
uses made of neuroscience in the crimi-
nal law? Or does talk of ‘inroads’ smack 
only of traditionalism and conservatism, 
or, worse, unseemly protection of legal 
professional interests?
List of Lectures:
1. William Twining (University College 
London / UK and Miami / USA)
Fuller’s Legal Fictions: Introductory 
Remarks
2. Michael Quinn (University College 
London / UK)
Fuller on Legal Fictions: A Benthamic 
Perspective
3. Burkhard Schafer (University of Ed-
inburgh / UK)
Bentham and Zalta on Reasoning with 
Fiction
4. Kristen Rundle (London School of 
Economics / UK)
Pathology as Teacher: Fuller’s Distinc-
tive Starting Point
5. Maksymilian Del Mar (Queen Mary, 
University of London / UK)
Fuller on Legal Fictions
6. Randy Gordon (Gardere Wynne 
Sewell LLP / Southern Methodist Uni-
versity / USA)
the principles that should guide crimi-
nalization or the aims it should serve; the 
result is a disorganized, unprincipled, 
over-expansive criminal law, which 
subjects too many people to the threat 
o f  p u n i s h m e n t .  ( O n e  q u e s t i o n  i s  h o w  
widespread this problem is: does it, e.g., 
affect chieﬂ  y certain western democra-
cies, such as the United States and Brit-
ain; or does it reach further than that?) 
But normative criminal law theorists, 
who have made advances in systematic 
work on such issues as punishment and 
criminal responsibility, have made com-
paratively little systematic progress on 
this central problem of criminalization.
Some recent work, especially in Ger-
many, Britain and the US, has begun 
to remedy that lack; this workshop pro-
vides an opportunity to advance the 
international debate. It will involve six 
papers, each addressing a central aspect 
of this large question. The papers will be 
available in advance, and the sessions 
will proceed on the assumption that all 
participants have read the papers. Each 
session will begin with a brief comment 
on the paper by a respondent, followed 
by a very brief response from the author, 
leaving ample time for open discussion.
List of Lectures:
Tuesday 16 August
1. Dr Antje du Bois-Pedain (University 
of Cambridge / UK)
The wrongfulness constraint in crimi-
nalisation 168 169
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ported by plane, etc., it wouldn’t work. 
The global climate and the natural re-
sources probably would just collapse – at 
least they will, if we don’t optimise our 
energy and resource efﬁ  ciency standards 
radically. This poses big challenges, es-
pecially in consideration of the fact that 
some kind of measures of global justice 
( e . g .  a c c e l e r a t i n g  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  t o  
combat misery in the developing coun-
tries) can affect intergenerational jus-
tice – and vice versa. The intention of 
the concept of sustainability, which has 
increasingly been gaining popularity as 
an overarching political aim since the 
1990s, is exactly to ﬁ   ght this “global-
intergenerational” dilemma.
List of Lectures:
1. Prof. Dr. Felix Ekardt LL.M., M.A. 
(University of Rostock / Germany)
Freedom and sustainability
2. Dr. Herwig Unnerstall M.A. (Evange-
lische Akademie Hofgeismar / Ger-
many)
Legal and philosophical problems of 
intergenerational justice
3. Prof. Dr. Klaus Mathis (University of 
Lucerne / Switzerland)
Sustainability, efﬁ  ciency, and the law
a b e r  s e l b s t  in  E ur o p a  ni e m als ,  un d  di e  
immer deutlichere Präsenz von Rechts-
pluralismus und der Überlagerung nor-
mativer Ordnungen in der Gegenwart 
sensibilisiert auch für deren Bedeutung 
in der Geschichte. Dies wiederum bietet 
Reﬂ  exionschancen für heute: denn wenn 
in Bezug auf die zukünftige normative 
Ordnung in einer globalen Welt irgend-
etwas sicher ist – dann wohl, dass es sich 
um eine Welt unabgestimmter Geltungs-
ansprüche und konkurrierender norma-
tiver Systeme handeln wird. 
Der workshop nimmt diese Situati-
on als Ausgangspunkt, um in Ausein-
andersetzung mit einigen Thesen von 
John Finnis – der seine Teilnahme an 
dem workshop bereits zugesagt hat und 
eine einleitende Stellungnahme abgibt 
– nach verschiedenen historischen Ar-
tikulationen dieser Überlagerungen in 
unterschiedlichen Regionen zu fragen.
List of Lectures:
1. John Finnis (Notre Dame / USA and 
Oxford / UK)
2. Roberto Hofmeister-Pich (Porto 
Alegre / Brazil)
3. Santiago Legarre (Buenos Aires / 
Argentinia)
4. Mathias Lutz-Bachmann (Frankfurt 
/ Germany)
5. Merio Scattola (Padua / Italy)
6. Paul Yowell (Oxford / UK)
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 18 
Coexisting Normative Orders: Natural 
and Positive Law, from the Classical 
Tradition to Modern Global Law
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HZ 14
Organizers Prof. Dr. Thomas Duve, 
Max Planck Institut for 
European Legal History / 
Germany
About the workshop:
Die Überlagerung verschiedener norma-
tiver Ordnungen ist eine Grundkonstan-
te der Geschichte der Gerechtigkeit und 
des Rechts. Hatten in europäischer An-
tike und Mittelalter stets verschiedene 
normative Sphären nebeneinander exis-
tiert, so wurden im frühmodernen Staat 
„Staat“ und „Recht“ immer enger aufein-
ander bezogen. Das „Gesetz“ begann vie-
le andere Rechtsquellen zu absorbieren. 
Der Wille des Gesetzgebers wurde zum 
wichtigsten Geltungsgrund, man beob-
achtet in der Geschichte der Rechtsquel-
lenlehre zu Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts 
einen Aufstieg des sog. voluntaristischen 
Gesetzesbegriffs, die Transformation ei-
ner Rechtsquellenvielfalt zu einem Du-
alismus von „positivem“ und „natürlich-
vernünftigem“ Recht. Doch das ist nur 
ein Bild auf die Geschichte – ein überdies 
von einem Kerneuropa aus in den Wes-
ten hineingeschriebenes. Nicht-rechtli-
che normative Sphären verschwanden 
SPECIAL WORKSHOP    
SW 19
Sustainability, Intergenerational 
Justice, and Global Justice
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HZ 10
Organizers Prof. Dr. Felix Ekardt, 
LL.M., M.A., University 
of Rostock / Germany
Dr. Herwig Unnerstall, 
M.A., Evangelische 
Akademie Hofgeismar / 
Germany
About the workshop:
The liberal framework of western socie-
ties has resulted in most inhabitants of 
modern-day western states being able 
to enjoy an extent of liberty and wealth 
which would have been inconceivable 
for human beings in former times. But 
i t  is  s till  a  ma tt e r  o f  f a ct  tha t  th e  l a w  
as well as the philosophy of justice are 
more or less restrained to the resolution 
of conﬂ  icts between contemporaries and 
between people living in the same coun-
try. This is a crucial problem since the 
western way of life and its technologi-
cal basis can probably not be continued 
(a) in a long-term perspective and (b) on 
a global level. If countries like China or 
India succeeded in copying our model of 
wealth and 2.3 billion Indian and Chi-
nese people were one day to own 1.2 
billion cars, fridges, air conditioners, 
washing machines, and have food im- 170 171
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SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 21
H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law 
Reconsidered
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011 + 
THU 18 Aug 2011
Time TUE 14.30 h – 18.30 h + 
THU 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HZ 12
Organizers Professor Dr. Imer 
Flores, Instituto de 
Investigaciones Jurídi-
cas (Legal Research 
Institute) & Facultad de 
Derecho (Law School) / 
Mexico
About the workshop:
Reconsider the inﬂ  uence of H.L.A. Hart’s 
The Concept of Law in its golden an-
niversary, in particular, and the legacy 
of his work, in general, is the main aim 
for this special workshop. Actually, Hart 
is among the jurists that did contribute 
more to the subject of jurisprudence in 
the second half of the Twentieth Cen-
tury, by restoring legal philosophy to a 
central place in the study of both law 
and general philosophy. Certainly, The 
Concept of Law was quintessential for 
that purpose and has been highly inﬂ  u-
ential ever since its publication in 1961. 
It contains an authoritative critique of a 
simple model of a legal system construct-
ed along the lines of John Austin’s com-
mand theory and an equally powerful 
analysis of the concept of law and of a 
3. Samuel Dahan (Paris / France)
The Governance of Social Policy: 
From Open Coordination to Financial 
Stabilisation
4. Diederik Vandendriessche (Brussele / 
Belgium)
Tax havens, ADR and legal theory
5. Romina Amicolo (Napoli / Italy)
The Italian Law on the mediation 
in civil and commercial matters: the 
problems of its italian unconstitution-
ality and its European accordance. 
The philosophical implication of a 
possible conﬂ  ict
6. Ewa Kurlanda (London / UK)
ADR clauses – The effects of changing 
relationships between parties”
7. Peter Kamminga (Stanford / USA)
Toward a new kind of highly interac-
tive lawyer: The promise of collabora-
tive Lawyering?
8. Paola Cecchi Dimeglio (Stanford / 
USA)
The Role of lawyers in Designing 
Conﬂ  ict Management
fectors, i.e. anything that may affect the 
parties’ conﬂ  ict positions. Through in-
teraction, an æffective concept of truth 
and certainty can be generated, surpass-
ing individual convictions because of its 
affective effect on the parties at hand. 
For that reason, such concept of truth 
and certainty is highly effective, as it 
wields its indispensable effect, while at 
the same time upholding an interactive 
and dynamic stance. Or, as Deleuze puts 
it: “il n’y a que des mots inexacts pour 
désigner des choses exactement.” Only 
in and through interaction between par-
ties will lawyers succeed in directing the 
dynamics of conﬂ  ict affectors in order to 
generate legal meaning, truth and even 
certainty. As such, nor legal meaning 
nor legal certainty even remotely refer 
to the rationalized constructs of classic 
legal thought. Hence, legal education 
opens the way to a new deﬁ  nition of 
meaningful legal analysis as a reﬂ  ection 
of human interaction.
List of Lectures:
1. Frank Fleerackers (Brussels / 
Belgium)
Legal Education, Negotiation and 
Conﬂ  ict Analysis
2. Stefan Häußler (Göttingen / 
Germany)
Early 20th Century Theories of 
Legal Education: Psychology and 
“Civilpolitik”
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 20
Legal Theory, Negotiation and 
Interaction: Inﬂ  uences of ADR on 
Legal Thinking and Legal Education
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time 15.30 h – 18.00 h
Location HZ 11
Organizers Prof. Dr. Frank 
Fleerackers, Ph.D, 
B.Phil, L.Iur, LL.M 
(Harvard), KU Brussels 
University / Belgium
About the workshop:
ADR practices in legal negotiation and 
mediation may serve as paradigms for 
a new way of legal thinking. If differ-
ence and conﬂ  ict are indeed irreducible, 
then legal thinking may only be effec-
tive if the dynamics of interaction are 
fully endorsed. Through interaction, 
mankind appears to be able to generate 
a concept of meaning that lives up to a 
dynamic, yet defendable notion of truth. 
Surely, the classic archeological notion 
of truth is far gone and its postmodern 
successor could not prevail. Yet human 
interaction allows us to engender in-
stances of truth and certainty, by way of 
juxtaposition and concurrence. Such is 
the scope of interaction as conﬂ  ict reso-
lution, at the heart of critical legal think-
ing, conducted by lawyers as directors of 
conﬂ  ict. Lawyers direct the interaction 
of conﬂ  icting parties by æffectively ana-
lyzing the effects of dynamic conﬂ  ict af- 172 173
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5. Anita Ho (University of British 
Columbia / Canada), Anita Silvers 
(San Francisco State University / USA), 
and Tim Stainton (University of British 
Columbia / Canada)
Continuous Surveillance of Persons 
with Disabilities: Conﬂ  icts and Com-
patibilities of Personal and Public 
Goods
6. Alan Rubel (University of Wisconsin 
/ USA)
Information Access, Privacy, and Posi-
tive Intellectual Freedom
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 23
Normative and epistemological 
implications of data science, proﬁ  ling 
and smart environments. ‘Code as 
Law’ meets ‘Law as Code and Law as 
Literature’
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HZ 15
Organizers Prof. Jeanne Gaakeer, 
Erasmus University 
Rotterdam / Nether-
lands
Prof. Mireille Hilde-
brandt, Erasmus Uni-
versity Rotterdam and 
Radboud University 
Nijmegen / Netherlands
creasing pressures on the desire to keep 
information conﬁ  dential. Moreover, the
beneﬁ  ts of assembling information are
also impressive: beneﬁ  ts to public health,
 to education, to environmental under-
standing, and much more. The EU and 
the US have taken very different legal 
approaches to the difﬁ  cult problems of 
protecting privacy and conﬁ  dentiality 
in light of these concerns. This special 
workshop brings together a experts from 
a variety of disciplines and countries to 
address issues in protecting privacy and 
conﬁ  dentiality raised by these new tech-
n o l o gi e s.  W o r ks h o p  p a pe rs  will  b e  th e  
basis for a special issue of the Journal 
of Social Philosophy to be published in 
2012.
List of Lectures:
1. Melike Akkaraca (Istanbul Kultur 
University / Turkey)
Judicial Balancing Between Civil 
Rights and National Security in 
Turkey
2. Angus Dawson (Keele University / 
UK)
Trust, Privacy and Public Health: In 
Defence of Biobanking
3. Martijn Blaauw & Jeroen van den 
Hoven (Delft University of Technology/ 
Netherlands
Privacy and Knowing Who
4. Leslie Francis and John Francis 
(University of Utah / USA)
Surveillance without borders
fusionist Map of (Mis)Readings of his 
Work
5. Margaret Martin (Western Ontario 
University / Canada)
Hart’s The Concept of Law: Between 
Fact and Value
6. Roger A. Shiner (University of British 
Columbia Okanagan and Okanagan 
College / Canada)
Hart and the Senses of Discretion
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 22
New Developments in Technology: 
Challenges for the law and ethics of 
privacy and conﬁ  dentiality
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 1.302
Organizers Prof. Leslie Francis, 
University of Utah / 
USA
About the workshop:
Many new technological developments   
– from surveillance cameras, to search 
engine techniques, to cloud storage, and 
beyond – raise signiﬁ  cant challenges for 
privacy and conﬁ  dentiality. These tech-
nologies make it far simpler to locate, 
gather, store, and analyze information 
about individuals. At the same time, 
risks from the global transmission of 
pandemic disease to terrorism place in-
complex legal system through a discus-
sion of the way in which rules of human 
conduct are used as social practices or 
standards of behavior. Hence, the idea is 
to encourage the revision not only of dis-
tinctions between “being obliged” and 
“having an obligation”, “primary and 
secondary rules”, “external and internal 
points of view”, but also of his original 
contributions regarding the “rule of rec-
ognition”, the idea of a “critical reﬂ  ective 
attitude” and his main theses, includ-
ing “law as the union of primary and 
secondary rules”, “the open texture of 
language” and “the indeterminacy of 
law”, “the separation of law and morals”, 
among others.
List of Lectures:
1. Tom Campbell (Charles Sturt Univer-
sity / Australia)
Hart’s Normative Concept of Law
2. Pierluigi Chiassoni (Universitá degli 
studi di Genova / Italy)
The Simplest and Sweet Virtues of 
Analysis. A Plea for Hart’s Philosophy 
of Jurisprudence”
3. Imer B. Flores (Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México / Mexico)
H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law: 
Between the Nightmare and the Noble 
Dream
4. Diego López-Medina (Universidad de 
los Andes / Colombia)
Hart in Latin America: Toward a Dif- 174 175
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represent the memory of a nation? And 
to which extent the establishing power 
of Law can break with Past and relegate 
it to oblivion? Can Law be understood as 
the narrative of one people, of one cul-
ture?
List of Lectures:
1. Martin Škop (Czech Republic)
Milan Kundera and Franz Kafka – 
How not to Forget the Everydayness
2. Andityas Soares de Moura Costa 
Matos (Universidade Federal de Minas 
Gerais – FEAD / Brazil)
From Literature to Cinema, from 
Cinema to Reality. Law and Dystopia 
in Contemporary World
3. Marcelo Campos Galuppo (Universi-
dade Federal de Minas Gerais – 
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de 
Minas Gerais / Brazil)
The Judge as Storyteller
4. Anthony Amatrudo (United King-
dom) and Fritz Wefelmeyer (United 
Kingdom)
Nazi Law: the Censuring of Modern-
ist Culture and the Elimination of 
Memory Formation
5. Monica Lopes Lerna (Finland)
From Amnesty to Memory
6. Jorge Douglas Price (Universidad de 
Comahue / Argentina)
Law and Literature
Aiming for evidence-based legal 
theory (with an application to legal 
domestication of a multi-phenomenon, 
co-emerging with data storing, -min-
ing and – processing capabilities)
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 24
Law as Literature: memory 
and oblivion
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 3.101
Organizers Prof. Dr. Marcelo Cam-
pos Galuppo, Pontifícia 
Universidade Católica 
de Minas Gerais / Brazil
About the workshop:
Since its dawn, the studies in Law and 
Literature have offered a deeper com-
prehension of Law and Jurisprudence, 
through the analysis of Law in Litera-
ture as well as through the analysis of 
Law as Literature. In many countries, 
such as United States, Brazil, Portugal, 
Belgium and Netherlands, these studies 
has reached a so developed stage that 
graduation courses on Law have offered 
disciplines which deal with this kind of 
subject. 
A speciﬁ  c research on Law as Literature 
can be found on Narratology and inves-
tigate the relation between memory and 
oblivion in novels, as well as in Law. To 
which extent rules and judicial decisions 
Where Law is an Invisible Maker – 
Blade Runner as a Legal Dystopia
2. Maria Aristodemou (Birkbeck 
College, London / UK)
Bare Law between Two Lives: José 
Saramago and Cornelia Vismann on 
Naming, Filing and Cancelling
3. and 4. Niels van Dijk and Katja de 
Vries (Free University Brussels / 
Belgium)
The Hydra of Legal Practice
5. Jeanne Gaakeer (Erasmus School of 
Law / Netherlands)
Control, Alt and/or Delete? Some 
observations on new technologies and 
the human
6. Mireille Hildebrandt (Erasmus School 
of Law and Radboud University 
Nijmegen / Netherlands
From Galathea 2.2 to Watson – and 
back?
7. and 8. Ronald Leenes and Bibi van 
den Berg (Tilburg University / Nether-
lands)
Abort, Retry, or Fail: Scoping techno-
regulation and other techno-effects
9. Arild Linneberg (University of Bergen 
/ Norway)
The Rhetoric of the Data Retention 
Directive; Hermeneutic and Epistemo-
logical Implications
10. Aernout Schmidt (Leyden Univer-
sity / Netherlands)
About the workshop:
Data science, proﬁ   ling and/or smart 
environments help (re)shape our cur-
rent ideas of knowledge and challenge 
traditional forms of legal concepts and 
thought. They affect our perception of 
the world and the manner in which hu-
man behavior can be regulated. In the 
case of smart environments we witness 
an extension of our visual and auditory 
perception via Internet and mobile com-
munication technologies and a blurring 
of the borders between the public, the 
private and the social. Established bal-
ances between societal actors are chal-
lenged.The normative implications of 
these developments seem paramount.
This raises questions as to the theoretical 
assumptions underlying both scientiﬁ  c 
and legal practice.
This special workshop brings togeth-
er two different angles from which to 
shed light on the subject, the one start-
ing from a theoretical reﬂ  ection on the 
normative impact of these technologies 
and the other building on contempo-
rary legal theory in the ﬁ  eld of Law and 
Literature, or, more generally, Law and 
the Humanities. The focus will be on the 
hermeneutic and epistemological im-
plications of data science, proﬁ  ling and 
smart environments for democracy and 
the Rule of Law.
List of Lectures:
1. Shulamith Almog (University of 
Haifa / Israel) 176 177
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8. Marco Amaral Mendonça (Brazil)
On the Direito Achado na Rua
9. María Guadalupe Trujillo (México)
Critic to the Human Rights concept in 
a Globalised Right
10. Ramiro Contreras Acevedo (México)
The Right in a new Globalization
11. Ronaldo Porto Macedo (Univer-
sidade de São Paulo and Fundação 
Getúlio Vargas / Brazil)
Overcoming orientalizing views of 
Latin American Law. New Approaches 
to the new Legal Experiences in Bra-
zilian Law
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 26 
Between Interpretation And Intuition: 
Cognitive Sciences And The Model 
Of Decision Making Process In Law
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30h  – 18.30h
Location HOF E.21 / Paris
Organizers Dr. Mariusz Golecki, 
University of Lodz, 
Faculty of Law and 
Administration / 
Poland
About the workshop:
Until recently descriptive models of hu-
man decision making process did not 
play an important role in jurisprudential 
body. The politisation of the justice. 
The Brazilian experience
3. Paulo César Corrêa Borges (Universi-
dade Estadual Paulista / Brazil)
The Brazilian ecletism on criminal law 
against sexual crimes
4. Carlos Alberto Rohrmann (Faculdade 
de Direito Milton Campos / Brazil)
On line Privacy Protection under a Bra-
zilian Court Perspective: A Case Study
5. Julio Aguiar de Oliveira (Pontifícia 
Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais 
and Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto 
/ Brazil) and Rodolpho Barreto Sampaio 
Júnior (Pontifícia Universidade Católica 
de Minas Gerais and Faculdade de 
Direito Milton Campos / Brazil)
Good fences make good neighbors: an 
investigation on the place of law and 
its limits in the context of the Brazil-
ian private law movement Escola do 
Direito Civil-Constitucional
6. Graziela Bacchi Hora (Universidade 
Federal de Pernambuco / Brazil)
Fragmentation and Eristic in the 
Escola do Recife: A Rethorical Reading 
of Tobias Barreto’s Philosophy
7. José Renato Gazziero Cella (Bra-
zil) and Paola Bianchi Wojciechowski 
(Brazil)
The Dispute Between Universalism 
and Relativism: Is it Possible a Cosmo-
politan Project of Human Rights?
tion of a lifestyle and of a worldview typ-
ically Eurocentric. In the twentieth cen-
tury, thinkers like Enrique Dussel and 
Eduardo Galiano have even called into 
question the universalizing pretensions 
of this kind of thought, leading authors 
such as Apel and Vattimo to redesign 
their systems to include philosophical 
c o n c e p t s  s u c h  a s  g l o b a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
and liberation.
Since the claim of universality of Euro-
pean thought is a phenomenon parallel 
to globalization, these authors are very 
critical of the assumptions, methods and 
results of globalization operated from 
the North perspective.
This workshop intends to recover such 
criticism, particularly in its implications 
for contemporary legal theory
List of Lectures:
1. Aloísio Krohling (Faculdade de 
Direito de Vitória / Brazil) e Ricardo 
Maurício Freire Soares (Universidade 
Federal da Bahia / Brazil)
Dussel’s ethics of liberation as rhi-
zomatic matrix and original source 
of human fundamental rights as root 
principles of postpositivistic philoso-
phy of law
2. Monica Hermann (Universidade de 
São Paulo / Brazil) and Rubens Beçak 
(Universidade de São Paulo / Brazil)
The XXIth Century Juridical Lit-
erature. A new command for the 
establishment of public policies. The 
emergence of a new decision maker 
7. James Gray (United Kingdom)
The presence of the past: Law, Litera-
ture and Cynthia Ozick
8. José Garcez Ghirardi (Brazil) and 
Juliana Neuenschwander Magalhães 
(Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 
/ Brazil)
Your Husband, your Sovereign: the 
Violent Prince in the Taming of Shrew
9. João Pinheiro Faro (Brazil) and Dau-
ry César Fabris (Faculdade de Direito de 
Vitória/Brasil)
How to do Thing with the Constitution
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 25
The Latin American Legal Thinking 
in front of the challenges of 
Globalization
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 3.201
Organizers Prof. Dr. Marcelo Cam-
pos Galuppo, Pontifícia 
Universidade Católica 
de Minas Gerais / Brazil
Jorge Douglas Price / 
Argentina
About the workshop:
Since its constitution in the XVII centu-
ry, the Latin American thought has re-
sisted the cultural domination imposed 
by the North to the South and the adop- 178 179
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factors that explain the shape of the de-
cisions, norms and practices of Hominis 
Iuridici are supposed to be a main ﬁ  eld 
of interest.
List of Lectures:
1. Dr Matyas Bencze (University of De-
brecen / Hungary)
Burden of reasoning. Some psychologi-
cal obstacles to coherent interpretation
2. Ms. Anna Ronkainen (University of 
Helsinki, Department of Modern Lan-
guages / Finland)
Dual-process cognition and legal rea-
soning
3. Ms. Magdalena Małecka (Polish 
Academy of Science, Graduate School 
for Social Research / Poland)
Towards neuro-law and economics? 
Neuroscience and its application to law 
and economics
4. Ms. Loisima Miranda Schiess (Brasil-
ianischer Richterverband / Brazil) and 
Mr. Lossian Miranda (Bundesinstitut 
für Eziehung, Wissenschaft und Tech-
nologie Piauí / Brazil)
Physikalische und Matematische 
Verbindungen von Justiz Division
5. Mr. Marcin Romanowicz (University 
of Warsaw / Poland)
Psycholinguistic perspective and the 
positivist idea of legal interpretation“
agenda. Commonly accepted models of 
decision making process were normative 
rather than descriptive.
A very peculiar case for this process con-
cerns some models of legal interpreta-
tion. Legal interpretation as such seems 
to be modelled by some legal and ext -
ralegal directives, shaping the practices 
of actors and institutions such as courts 
and administrative bodies.
Some of those models rest upon the as-
sumption about practically unlimited 
access to knowledge and unrestricted 
rationality of decision makers. These 
conditions can hardly be satisﬁ  ed in a 
real world, where human cognitive ca-
pacities are restricted and particularly 
structured by neuropsychological char-
acteristics of human body.
Under these assumptions, the descrip-
tive model of human decision making 
process plays an increasingly signiﬁ  cant 
role in legal theory and legal sciences. 
Accordingly there has been considerable 
interest recently in empirical approaches 
to legal interpretation and application of 
law.
Many authors presented research agen-
da pertaining to the investigation of 
adjudication in cognitive legal studies 
(G. Lekoff, L. M. Solan, S. Winter) and 
psychology of legal process based behav-
i o u r a l  d e c i s i o n  t h e o r y  ( A .  T v e r s k y ,  D .  
Kanheman, C. S. Sunstein, R. Korobkin, 
J. Rachlinski).
This special workshop will focus on cur-
rent research into these approaches and 
their relevance to a legal theory and phi-
losophy of law. The questions about the 
biological, cultural and psychological 
6. Mr. Paweł Soluch (University of 
Warsaw / Poland)
The perspectives of eyetracking re-
search in legal sciences
7. Dr. Mariusz Golecki (University of 
Lodz, Faculty of Law and Administra-
tion / Poland)
Homo Oeconomicus vs. Homo Iu-
ridicus. Towards a General Theory of 
Linguistic Categorisation Within the 
Law and Economics Scholarship
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 27
Exemplary Narratives: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location IG 251
Organizers Dr. Randy Gordon, 
Gardere Wynne Sewell 
LLP, Southern Methodist 
University / USA
Dr. Maksymilian Del Mar, 
Queen Mary, Univer-
sity of London / United 
Kingdom
About the workshop:
This workshop – in the tradition of nar-
rative-based legal epistemology – wel-
comes contributions from a variety of 
disciplines, including legal theory, lit-
erary theory, history and theology, to 
explore the notion of ‘exemplary narra-
tives’. ‘Exemplary’ is here understood in 
two senses: ﬁ  rst, the sense in which cer-
tain narratives take on a paradigmatic, 
leading or model status and function; 
and second, the sense in which narra-
tives can, and arguably often do, have a 
normative content, inviting or inciting, 
and thereafter guiding, persons to cer-
tain beliefs, attitudes and actions.
The ﬁ  rst sense of exemplary may be ex-
plored in a variety of ways, including: 
the way in which certain cases, under-
stood as narrative fact-complexes, con-
stitute the epicentre of certain areas of 
the law (e.g. see Simpson, Leading Cases 
in the Common Law, 1995); the way in 
which the authoritative content of lead-
ing cases changes as a result of encoun-
ters with new facts; the history of nar-
rative revolutions, or the way in which 
previously-exemplary narratives are 
replaced by new ones; and the way in 
which certain narrative fact-complexes 
are more memorable than others, and 
thus may offer a particularly effective 
mode of transmission of certain content, 
e.g. rules or principles.
The second sense of exemplary offers an 
equally rich opportunity, enabling, for 
instance, research into: the varying de-
grees of prescriptivity in different liter-
ary forms or genres, e.g. compare fables 
and parables, where the former tend to 
be more moralistic and the latter more 
normatively ambiguous; the ways in 
which certain narratives are drawn on 
as sources for analogical extension, fea-
turing as part of the discourse of justi-
ﬁ   cation in conﬂ  ict resolution; and the 
ways in which certain narratives may  180 181
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Narrating Legal Change: An Exempla-
ry Story from Rabbinic Historiography
8. Ralph Grunewald (University of 
Wisconsin-Madison / USA)
The Narrative of Innocence, or: Lost 
Stories
9. Nahel AsFour (University of Vienna / 
Austria)
Sanctity, Propriété and Greed: One 
Case, Three Stories. The Wrongful En-
richment Case in Ottoman, Continen-
tal and American Legal Traditions
10. Diana Young (Carleton University / 
Canada)
Law, Film and the Abject: Represent-
ing the Unknowable
come to structure the cognitive atten-
tion of decision-makers, guiding them to 
notice and classify as important or sig-
niﬁ  cant certain kinds of fact-complexes. 
List of Lectures:
1. Maksymilian Del Mar (Queen Mary, 
University of London / UK)
Introducing Exemplary Narratives
2. Randy Gordon (Gardere Wynne 
Sewell LLP and Southern Methodist 
University / USA)
Institutionalizing Exemplary Narra-
tives: A Kansas Case
3. Zenon Bankowski (University of Ed-
inburgh / UK)
On Parables and Law
4. Scott Veitch (University of Hong 
Kong/ China)
Binding and Loosing: Exemplary Nar-
ratives and the ‘Vinculum Iuris’ 
5. Audun Kjus (The Norwegian Mu-
seum of Cultural History / Norway)
Lucifer and Adam: A Royal Example
6. Moshe Shoshan (The Rothberg 
School, Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
/ Israel)
Between Structure and Subversion: 
The Two Faces of Legal Exemplary 
Anecdotes
7. Lena Salaymeh (University of Berke-
ley / USA)
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 28 
Human Rights, Global Justice, and 
Democracy: Issues at their Intersection
Date MON 15 Aug 2011 + 
TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time MON 14.30 h – 18.30 h + 
TUE 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 2.102
Organizers Prof. Dr. Carol Gould, 
City University of 
New York / USA
Prof. Dr. Alistair 
Macleod, Queen’s 
University / Canada
About the workshop:
This workshop focuses on a set of inter-
related normative conceptions that are 
highly relevant to contemporary philos-
ophy of law and its global import. In par-
ticular, the distinguished participants in 
this workshop have a shared interest in 
three clusters of questions, concerning: 
a) the normative basis of the doctrine of 
human rights (as legal and moral rights); 
b) the content and scope of principles of 
distributive justice (particularly in the 
context of increasing global responsibili-
ties); and c) the contours of the demo-
cratic ideal and the conditions for its ef-
fective implementation. While careful 
speciﬁ  cation of these issues is crucial to 
progress towards their resolution, there 
can often be disagreement both about 
how this should be done and about how 
the favored formulations relate to broad-
er normative concerns. The primary aim 
of the workshop is to provide a forum for 
critical exchanges on papers that reﬂ  ect 
p a r t i c u l a r  w a y s  o f  f o c u s i n g  n o r m a t i v e  
inquiry in these areas. A secondary goal 
is to enab le parti cipan ts to dev elop an 
enhanced sense of whether – and if so, of 
the ways in which – there are instructive 
overlaps and interconnections between 
questions about human rights, justice, 
and democracy.
List of Lectures:
1. Andreas Follesdal (University of Oslo 
/ Norway)
The Principle of Subsidiarity as a 
strategy for legitimate international 
problem-solving, for and against: 
The case of human rights treaties
2. Carol C. Gould (City University of 
New York / USA)
Is there a Human Right to Democracy?
3. Thomas Christiano (University of 
Arizona / USA)
State Consent and the Legitimacy of 
International Institutions
4. Andrew Lister (Queen’s University / 
Canada)
Reciprocity, Relationships, and Global 
Justice
5. Rainer Forst (University of Frankfurt 
/ Germany)
Transnational Justice, Democracy and 
Human Rights 182 183
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About the workshop:
The Workshop’s activity will be focused 
on the ideas of the Russian legal phi-
losopher of the XXth century Nikolai 
Alekseev This theorist’s work is as origi-
nal and important as the constructions 
of the other “Russian Europeans” – 
Georges Gurvitch, Leon Petrazycki, Pit-
irim Sorokin. Alekseev’s world outlook 
expressed in his multiple works can be 
considered as an attempt to draw up the 
preliminary results of the controversies 
between Slavophiles and Occidental-
ists, between the liberal democrats and 
the “Eurasians”. The participants will 
discuss the different applications of Ale-
kseev’s theory to the contemporary legal 
problems. Vladimir Grafsky deliberates 
on the axiological image of law, stress-
ing actuality of Alekseev’s ideas for the 
philosophy of law. Mikhail Antonov in-
tervenes with an allocution on impact of 
Alekseev’s conception of law for develop-
ment of the sociology of law. Irina Bor-
sch focuses her attention on correlation 
between the image of a human being 
and the image of law, and investigates 
methodological quest in social and legal 
philosophy of Alekseev. Aleksei Stovba 
suggests discovering some elements of 
the phenomenological philosophy of law 
in the ideas of this philosopher. Mikhail 
Milkin-Skopets discusses the relation 
between methods of law and of math-
ematics using Alekseev’s legal theory as 
a starting point for his reﬂ  ections. Sergei 
Maksimov takes on importance of Ale-
6. Alistair Macleod (Queen’s University 
/ Canada)
Human Rights, Equality of Opportu-
nity, and Justice
7. Darrel Moellendorf (San Diego State 
University / USA)
Rights and Climate Change
8. Omar Dahbour (City University of 
New York / USA)
Radical Approaches to Global Justice: 
Is There a New Paradigm?
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 29
Legal Philosophy of Nikolai Alekseev 
and European scientiﬁ  c tradition
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 4.101
Organizers Prof. Dr. Vladimir 
Grafsky, Institute for 
State and Law, The 
Russian Academy of 
Science / Russia
Associate Professor 
Dr. Mikhail Antonov, The 
Higher School of Eco-
nomics, St.-Petersburg / 
Russia
kseev’s conception for the actual discus-
sions about the methodological perspec-
tives of the legal philosophy.
List of Lectures:
1. Vladimir Grafsky (professor, senior 
research fellow, Institute of State and 
Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
Moscow / Russia)
Axiological image of law: Nikolai Ale-
kseev’s contribution
2. Mikhail Antonov (associate profes-
sor, research fellow, Higher School of 
Economics, Saint-Petersburg / Russia)
Impact of legal conception of Nikolai 
Alekseev for development of sociology 
of law in the XXth century
3. Irina Borsch (research fellow, Urba-
niana University / Italy)
The image of a human being and the 
image of law: a methodological quest 
in legal philosophy of Nikolai Ale-
kseev
4. Aleksei Stovba (associate profes-
sor of Kharkov’s National University / 
Ukraine)
N.N. Alekseev: special way in the phe-
nomenology of law
5. Mikhail Milkin-Skopets (lecturer, 
Yaroslavl State University / Russia)
Law and Mathematics. On the relation 
of their methods
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 30 
Legitimacy 2.0 
E-democracy and Public Opinion 
in the Digital Age
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 4.201
Organizers Ass. Prof. Andrea 
Greppi, Law School, 
University Carlos III, 
Madrid / Spain
Ass. Prof. Patricia 
Mindus, Philosophy 
Faculty, University of 
Uppsala / Sweden
About the workshop:
E-democracy has been cutting the edge 
in ﬁ  elds connected to legal, political and 
social theory over the last two decades 
but cross-fertilization and transdiscipli-
nary approaches are still scarce: stock-
t a k i n g  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  I V R  m e e t i n g s  
show no record of work on e-democracy, 
notwithstanding the increasing interest 
for ICTs’ impact on law and IA in the 
digital society. 
The starting point is that the impact of 
digital technology in political and gov-
ernance processes seem elusive to be 
framed into the traditional theoretical 
settings based on legitimacy, normative 
authority, enforcement, nature of norms 
etc.
The aim of the workshop is to integrate 
the current state of the art with the  184 185
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SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 31 
Recht am technisierten Körper / 
Recht an verkörperter Technik
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HZ 11
Organizers Dr. Malte Gruber, Univer-
sität Frankfurt / Germany
Ass.-Prof. Dr. Vagias 
Karavas, Universität 
Luzern / Switzerland
About the workshop:
Technik und Wissenschaft erzeugen 
ständig neue Rechtsgegenstände, die als 
eigentumsfähige Sachen oder Immate-
rialgüter wirtschaftlich verwertbar sind. 
Gegenwärtig richten sie ihre Produk-
tivkraft allerdings nicht mehr nur auf 
das Material einer außermenschlichen 
Natur, sondern auch auf den Menschen 
selbst, auf seinen lebendigen Körper und 
seinen Geist. Bio-, Neuro- und Infor-
mationstechnologien machen Körper-
teile, genetische Information oder auch 
neuronale Daten isoliert verfügbar und 
konfrontieren das Recht mit der Frage, 
was von alledem als verkehrsfähige Sa-
che und vermögenswertes Gut anzuer-
kennen oder aber als „ideeller“ Teil der 
Persönlichkeit zu schützen sei. Mitunter 
betrachten sie Menschen und Maschinen 
sogar als informationstheoretisch ver-
gleichbar. Künstliches Leben und künst-
liche Intelligenz erscheinen demnach als 
technisch machbar, menschliches Leben 
The Virtual Reality of Voting Advice 
Applications
9. Javier Lorenzo (Universidad Carlos 
III, Madrid / Spain)
ICT and Voting Abroad. An Analysis 
of 30 Countries
10. Giovanni Allegretti (CES, Coimbra / 
Portugal)
ICT Technologies within the Grammar 
of Participatory Budgeting: Tensions 
and Challenges of a Mainly “Subordi-
nate Clause” Approach
11. Juan Pablo Serra (University 
Francisco de Vitoria, Madrid / Spain)
Epistemic Justiﬁ  cation of Democracy: 
A Hidden Epistemocracy or Just An-
other Legitimization of Democracy?
12. Mateusz Klinowski (Jagiellonian 
University Krakow / Poland)
Title t.b.a.
13. Gloria Origgi (CNRS Paris / France)
Title t.b.a.
2. Andrea Greppi 
(Universidad Carlos III Madrid / Spain)
Ignorance and Representation in the 
Net
3. Massimo Durante 
(University of Torino / Italy)
E-Democracy as a Frame of Networked 
Public Discourse
4. Massimo Cuono 
(University of Sassari / Italy)
Election and Electioneering in the 
Digital Era. Relation between Repre-
sentative and Electronic Democracy
5. Nazanin Ghanavizi, Arash Falasiri 
(University of Sidney / Australia)
From E-citizenship to E-democracy?  
Case study of Internet Use in Iran
6. Marco Goldoni (University of 
Antwerp / Netherlands)
Code as Undemocratic Law? An 
Assessment from a Legal Theory Per-
spective
6. Judith Simon (Institut Jean Nicod, 
ENS Paris / France)
E-democracy and Values in Informa-
tion Systems Design
7. Pedro Salazar (UNAM / Mexico)
Democracy, Transparency, and Public 
Opinion in the “Latin American 
Triangle”
8. Thomas Fossen (Utrecht University / 
Netherlands)
toolkit of the analytical and normative 
perspectives of legal and political theory. 
E-democracy aims for broader and more 
active Internet-enhanced citizenship in-
volvement but can there be any “democ-
racy” after representative democracy? 
Should we understand it in terms of de-
liberative and/or participative democra-
cy? How is e-government impacting on 
transparency and accountability? What 
role does mediation play in communica-
tion technologies? Should it be institu-
tionalized? How is the repertoire of civil 
disobedience changing (ECD)? What 
kind of e-governance processes enhance 
legitimacy in complex legal systems en-
tangled at the supranational level? How 
should we scientiﬁ  cally frame complex-
ity in information society?
The purpose is to go beyond the polari-
zation between the apologists that hold 
the web to overcome the one-to-many 
architecture of opinion-building in tra-
ditional democratic legitimacy, and the 
critics that warn cyberoptimism entails 
authoritarian technocracy.
The workshop offers a meeting point for 
scholars eager to share their ﬁ  ndings in 
the ﬁ  eld, enhancing comprehension be-
tween different approaches to law.
List of Lectures:
1. Patricia Mindus 
(Uppsala Universitet / Sweden)
Updating Democracy Studies: Outline 
of a Research Program 186 187
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SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 32
Methodology of Jurisprudence and 
the impact of new technologies
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011 + 
THU 18 Aug 2011
Time TUE 14.30 h – 18.30 h + 
THU 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF E.01 / 
Deutsche Bank
Organizers Prof. Dr. Miracy Gustin, 
Federal University of 
Minas Gerais / Brazil
Prof. Dr. Mônica Sette 
Lopes, Federal Univer-
sity of Minas Gerais / 
Brazil
About the workshop:
In Contemporary times, the study of the 
relations among ethics, law and technol-
ogy assumes methodological tools for 
the apprehension of reality in order to 
deﬁ  ne their objects of study and theo-
retical support of knowledge. Jurispru-
dence did not sufﬁ  ciently face the prob-
lem of science as “ideology” proposed 
since the last century until now. A ra-
tional Science of Law could become a 
system of domination and legitimation 
by demanding for itself the claims of an 
exact and complete reliable modern sci-
ence. This Special Workshop will discuss 
the most relevant theoretical and meth-
odological contributions to make the Ju-
risprudence capable to understand the 
new changes that science and technol-
ogy have caused whereas seeking to un-
als technisch manipulierbar. Damit ver-
ändert sich auch der Begriff des leben-
digen, natürlichen Körpers. Dessen Bild 
einer organischen Einheit weicht dem 
einer in eine Vielzahl natürlicher und 
artiﬁ   zieller Bestandteile fragmentier-
ten, technischen Assemblage. Die Mög-
lichkeiten und Grenzen dieser „Techni-
sierung“ sind nicht bloß eine Frage der 
Angewandten Ethik, sondern auch des 
Rechts. Alte anthropologische Gewiss-
heiten vermögen hier kaum weiterzuhel-
fen. Vielmehr muss das Recht im Zusam-
mentreffen von „technisierten Körpern“ 
und „verkörperter Technik“ versuchen 
mit der Auﬂ  ösung der tradierten Dicho-
tomien umzugehen. Der W orkshop soll 
der Reﬂ  ektion und Diskussion über die 
genaue Form eines solchen Rechts am 
technisierten Körper / eines Rechts an 
verkörperter Technik dienen.
List of Lectures:
1. Dr. Susanne Beck (Universität Würz-
burg / Germany)
Title t.b.a.
2. Prof. Dr. Jochen Bung (Universität 
Passau / Germany)
Title t.b.a.
3. Prof. Dr. Dr. Eric Hilgendorf (Univer-
sität Würzburg / Germany)
Title t.b.a.
4. Dr. Hyo Yoon Kang (Universität 
Luzern / Switzerland)
Title t.b.a.
derstand the role of law in contemporary 
societies. It will debate as well the con-
sequences of legal research for the politi-
cization of societies, emancipator move-
ments and their refusal to accept social 
and state domination. Some questions 
tha t  ha v e  alr e a d y  b e e n  rais e d  b y  l e g al  
theory in different historical moments, 
are still being debated in the scientiﬁ  c 
sphere , such as: 
1) the question about the scientiﬁ  c status 
of Law; 2) the approximation regarding 
the methods and techniques of research 
toward other sciences; 3) a theoreti-
cal construction that combines critical 
theory and methodology of Law, 4) the 
possibility of developing legal methodol-
ogies for the production of knowledge on 
equal terms with other scientiﬁ  c ﬁ  elds 5) 
the inter/transdisciplinarity as mecha-
nisms of reshaping Jurisprudence as a 
human knowledge of great axiological 
and factual value, 6) the science of law 
as ideology that adds value to the knowl-
edge of contemporary times.
List of Lectures:
1. Prof. Dr. Mônica Sette Lopes (UFMG 
/ Brazil)
Jurisprudence under the perspective 
of the new media and its effect on the 
communication of Law
2. Prof. Dr. Miracy Barbosa de Sousa 
Gustin (UFMG / Brazil)
The Science of Law as ideology: the 
consequences of legal research for the 
politicization of excluded social group
3. Prof. Dr. Josefa Dolores Ruiz-Resa 
(University of Granada / Spain)
Jurisprudence and the society of 
knowledge (how to adapt a dogmatic 
knowledge to the demands of the col-
lective intelligence)
4. Prof. Dr. Andityas Soares de Moura 
Costa (UFMG / Brazil)
For a legal ideology criticism: State 
and Law as a theological and conserva-
tive concept
5. Prof. Dr. Mariá Brochado (UFMG / 
Brazil)
A redeﬁ  nition of law ethics as a break 
out with the positivist and neo positiv-
ist ideas and ideologies
6. Prof. Dr. Clodomiro José Bannwart 
Júnior e Carlos Frederico Oléa (UEL, 
Universidade Estadual De Londrina / 
Brazil)
Duality of reading in relation to ju-
dicialization and the reﬂ  exes of new 
technologies
7. MSc Gustavo Silveira Siqueira and 
MSc João Andrade Neto (UFMG / 
Brazil)
The revolution will be tweeted: how 
the Internet can stimulate the public 
exercise of freedoms
8. Mila Batista Leite Corrêa da Costa 
(UFMG / Brazil)
Science of law and anthropology: 
methodology of otherness 188 189
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the role of dialogue about the sources 
of law in the framework of information 
society
16. Prof. Dr. Gregório Assagra de Al-
meida (University of Itaúna / Brazil)
The new Summa Divisio of the Brazil-
ian Law: individual and collective 
laws
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 33
Person, Verantwortung, Grenzen des 
Rechts – alte Debatten im neuen 
Kontext „Robotik und Künstliche 
Intelligenz“
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF 3.36 / Chicago
Organizers Prof. Dr. Dr. Eric 
Hilgendorf, Universität 
Würzburg / Germany
Dr. Susanne Beck, 
Universität Würzburg / 
Germany
About the workshop:
Die Entwicklung im Bereich „Robotik 
und Künstliche Intelligenz“ führt schon 
jetzt zu praktischen rechtlichen Schwie-
rigkeiten und theoretischen Fragen. 
So ist zu klären, wie weit die Verantwor-
tung für eine Maschine, die innerhalb 
eines vorgegebenen Rahmens eigen-
ständige Entscheidungen trifft, reicht. 
Verträge werden von elektronischen 
9. Aline Pereira (UFMG / Brazil)
Law, language and science
10. Rafael Soares (UFMG / Brazil)
The law and ethical act of judging as 
a guideline for harmonious relations 
between the values: a phenomenologi-
cal view
11. Prof. Dr. Maria Tereza Fonseca 
Dias (Federal University of Ouro Preto, 
UFOP / Brazil)
How researches are done in the ﬁ  eld 
of Law? Reﬂ  ections from the study 
of monographs of the undergraduate 
course.
12. Prof. Dr. Maria Teresinha Pereira e 
Silva (PUC, Rio de Janeiro / Brazil)
The evolution of Supreme Federal 
Court (STF) of Brazilian system of 
justice concerning social rights and the 
philosophical and social approach
13. Prof. Dr. Maria Fernanda Salcedo 
Repolês (UFMG / Brazil)
Law in theory and law in practice with 
the recognition of new social actors
14. MSc Aparecida de Carvalho Liz 
(UFMG / Brazil)
Deployment of Electronic Process in 
Brazilian Labor Court
15. Prof. Dr. Fabiana de Menezes Soares 
(UFMG / Brazil)
The production of law, legisprudence 
and the circulation of juridical models: 
Agenten geschlossen, ohne dass geklärt 
ist, wie mit diesen möglicherweise teil-
rechtsfähigen Akteuren umzugehen ist. 
Dies schließt die Frage an, ob es Bereiche 
gibt in denen eine Übertragung der Ent-
scheidung auf Maschinen unvertretbar 
scheint. 
Auch die Entwicklung von Robotern, 
die menschenähnlich aussehen und sich 
menschlich verhalten, ist in greifbare 
Nähe gerückt. Gleichzeitig nimmt die 
Maschinisierung der Menschen durch 
Prothesen, künstliche (Sinnes-)Organe, 
etc. zu. Das Recht muss sich der Einord-
nung und Kategorisierung derartiger 
Phänomene stellen. 
Einige der elektronischen Agenten haben 
bereits jetzt eine Teilrechtssubjektivität 
inne, die jedoch in ihren Voraussetzun-
gen und Konsequenzen noch ungeklärt 
ist. Doch nicht nur mit bestehenden, 
auch mit künftigen Entwicklungen 
wird sich der workshop beschäftigen. So 
stellt sich die Frage, wie sich derzeit das 
menschliche Verhalten von dem Verhal-
ten der Roboter unterscheidet und wie 
sich diese Unterschiede in Zukunft ver-
ändern könnten. Diese Änderung macht 
es auch erforderlich, Roboter und Cy-
borgs im Licht der Grundrechtsordnung 
zu betrachten. Schließlich wird zu ana-
lysieren sein, wie weit die menschliche 
Autonomie beim Vorantreiben dieser 
Entwicklungen reicht oder ob ihr recht-
liche Grenzen zu setzen sind.
List of Lectures:
1. Dr. Malte Gruber (Universität 
Frankfurt / Germany)
Teilrechtssubjekte des elektronischen 
Geschäftsverkehrs
2. Dr. Jan Schuhr (Universität Erlangen 
/ Germany)
Willensfreiheit, Roboter und Auswahl-
axiom
3. PD Dr. Tade Spranger (IWE Bonn / 
Germany)
Roboter und Cyborg in der Grun-
drechtsordnung
4. Dr. Beatrice Brunhöber (HU Berlin / 
Germany)
Autonomie und Biomacht am Beispiel 
von Mensch-Maschine-Systemen 190 191
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ganzen Organen; die Möglichkeiten 
der Nanobiotechnologie im Bereich der 
medizinischen Diagnose und Therapie; 
die Erzeugung und Verwendung von 
Mensch-Maschine-Schnittstellen, nicht 
nur im Rahmen des (zeitweiligen) Or-
ganersatzes, sondern auch zur dauerhaf-
ten Funktionsergänzung und -verbes-
serung insbesondere der Sinnesorgane; 
Eingriffe in das Gehirn (etwa sog. Ge-
hirnschrittmacher); die ständige Ver-
besserung von Organtransplantationen; 
die Möglichkeiten und Gefahren der Xe-
notransplantation; die Entwicklungen 
der sog. synthetischen Biologie.
Ziel des Workshops ist es, auf der Ba-
sis der überkommenen Konzepte von 
Menschenbild, Menschenwürde und 
Verantwortung zu untersuchen, ob die-
se überhaupt auf die moderne medi-
zintechnische Entwicklung anwendbar 
und noch geeignet sind, unsere Ant-
worten auf die damit zusammenhängen 
ethischen Fragen zu steuern.
List of Lectures:
1. Dr. Daniel C. Henrich (IZEW, Univer-
sität Tübingen / Germany)
Bioethik und Selektion. Die Heraus-
forderung der ‚neuen‘ Eugenik
2. Dr. Dr. Altan Heper (Universität 
Würzburg / Germany)
Brauchen wir einen Menschenwürde-
begriff in einer pluralistischen 
Gesellschaft?
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 34
Menschenwürde – Menschenbild –  
Verantwortung: Analyse von Leit-
begriffen der bioethischen Debatten
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF 1.27 / Dubai
Organizers Prof. Dr. Jan C. Joerden, 
Universität Frankfurt/
Oder, Deutschland
About the workshop:
Mit der rasanten Entwicklung des me-
dizintechnischen Fortschritts vermögen 
die überkommenen Vorstellungen von 
Menschenwürde und Menschenbild und 
der damit verbundenen Verantwortung 
kaum noch Schritt zu halten. Denn heu-
te muss ernsthaft über früher völlig uto-
pisch erscheinende medizintechnische 
Handlungsoptionen nachgedacht wer-
den, z.B. über die Veränderung des Erb-
gutes zum Zwecke der „Verbesserung“ 
des „menschlichen Programms“ (sog. 
Enhancement); das Klonen von Men-
schen; die Vorhersage von Krankheiten 
anhand einer Genanalyse; die Möglich-
keiten der Präimplantationsdiagnostik; 
die Bildung von Chimären und Hybri-
den zu Zwecken der Forschung und zur 
Behandlung von Krankheiten; die Her-
stellung von embryonalen Stammzellen 
durch Klonprozesse und von Stammzel-
len durch „Reprogrammierung“ adulter 
Zellen; die Züchtung von menschlichen 
Zellen und Gewebestrukturen, ja von 
3. Prof. Dr. Jan C. Joerden (Universität 
Frankfurt/Oder / Germany)
Könnten dereinst auch Maschinen 
Würde haben?
4. Prof. Dr. Andrzej M. Kaniowski 
(Universität Lodz / Poland)
Kants Konzept der Menschenwürde 
und die Zuständigkeit des Staates in 
bioethischen Fragen
5. Prof. Dr. Peter Schaber (Universität 
Zürich / Switzerland)
Würde und Lebensschutz
6. Dr. Dr. Paul Tiedemann (Verwal-
tungsgericht Frankfurt/Main / 
Germany)
Gibt es ein Menschenrecht auf Leben?
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 35
Epistemische Unsicherheiten 
und das Recht
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF 1.27 / Dubai
Organizers Prof. Dr. Dr. Rafaela 
Hillerbrand, Human Tech-
nology Centre (HumTec), 
RWTH Aachen / Germany
M.A. Magdalena Zietek, 
Human Technology 
Centre (HumTec), RWTH 
Aachen / Germany
About the workshop:
Unsicherheit hinsichtlich des (künfti-
gen) Verhaltens technischer und ökolo-
gischer Systeme sowie die Unbestimmt-
heit von Begriffen in Rechtsnormen, die 
der Regulierung dieser Systeme dienen, 
stellen das Technik- und Umweltrecht 
vor zwei aufeinander bezogene Prob-
lemkomplexe: Zum einen stellt sich für 
den Gesetzgeber die Frage, wie unter 
Bedingungen unvollständigen Wissens 
– etwa über die Auswirkungen mensch-
licher Eingriffe in Ökosysteme oder 
über das Verhalten neuer, bislang nicht 
zum Einsatz gekommener Technologi-
en – eine rechtliche Regelung erfolgen 
kann, die sich erstens auf dem Stand 
von Wissenschaft und Technik beﬁ  ndet, 
zweitens Risiken minimiert und drittens 
mit rechtsstaatlichen Erfordernissen wie 
dem der Normenklarheit, der Rechtssi- 192 193
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senschaftstheoretisches Problem. Die in 
diesem Workshop geführte Debatte wird 
daher die aktuelle Forschung innerhalb 
der Wissenschafts- und Erkenntnistheo-
rie zum Umgang mit epistemischen Un-
sicherheiten in wissenschaftlichen Prog-
nosen berücksichtigen.
List of Lectures:
1. Liv Jaeckel (Universität Leipzig / 
Germany)
Neutralisiert das Recht das Risiko – 
eine Reise ins Ungewisse?
2. Susanna Much (Universität Bremen / 
Germany)
Der Umgang mit den Risiken der CCS-
Technologie in der Gesetzgebung
3. Eva Lohse (Friedrich-Alexander-Uni-
versität Erlangen-Nürnberg / Germany)
Gesetzgeberische Pﬂ  ichten für den 
verantwortlichen Umgang mit (noch) 
ungewissen Risiken am Beispiel der 
Regelungsoptionen für die Nanotech-
nologien
4. Guoqiong Sun, Alessandro Ianniello 
Saliceti (EC, European Union, Brüssel / 
Belgium)
Precautionary principle, uncertainty 
and the principle of legal certainty in 
EU Law and in China
5. Rafaela Hillerbrand (RWTH Aachen / 
Germany)
Risiko, Unsicherheit und Ungewissheit 
in der Technikfolgenforschung
cherheit und der Einzelfallgerechtigkeit 
vereinbar ist. Zum anderen sehen sich 
die mit der Rechtsanwendung befassten 
Behörden sowie die mit der Überprüfung 
des behördlichen Handelns befassten 
Verwaltungsgerichte vor die Schwierig-
keit gestellt, die oftmals vagen Vorgaben 
des Gesetzgebers in konkrete Maßnah-
men umzusetzen bzw. zu entscheiden, 
ob eine Maßnahme im Sinne der Vorga-
ben des Gesetzgebers erfolgt ist.
Aus rechtsdogmatischer Sicht sind hier 
die Begriffe der Gefahr und des Risikos 
zentral, deren juristische Abgrenzung 
bislang noch nicht befriedigend gelun-
gen ist. Eine konzeptuelle Schärfung 
der Begriffe Risiko, Unsicherheit und 
Ungewissheit fand in den vergangen 
Jahrzehnten allerdings im Rahmen der 
Technikfolgenforschung statt. Im Rah-
men dieser Sektion soll erörtert werden, 
inwieweit die rechtsdogmatische und 
rechtsphilosophische Debatte um Un-
sicherheit und Risiko von den neueren 
Erkenntnissen in der Technikfolgenfor-
schung proﬁ   tieren kann. Konkret gilt 
es zu eruieren, ob und inwieweit die-
se Unterscheidungen zwischen Risiko, 
Unsicherheit und Ungewissheit für die 
Rechtswissenschaft, insbesondere im 
Umweltrecht, fruchtbar gemacht wer-
den können. Da auch die besten wis-
senschaftlichen Prognosen hochgradig 
unsicher sind, wenn es darum geht, die 
Entwicklung realweltlicher Systeme wie 
speziﬁ   scher Ökosysteme oder des Kli-
masystems als Ganzem zu prognosti-
zieren, so betrifft eine Abgrenzung von 
potenziellem Schaden und Gefahr dabei 
im Kern ein epistemisches oder wis-
6. Magdalena Zietek (RWTH Aachen / 
Germany)
Über den verantwortlicher Umgang der 
politischen und juristischen Entschei-
dungsträger mit den Ergebnissen der 
Natur- und Ingenieurwissenschaften
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 36
Orthos logos, Recta ratio, or Right 
Reason in the Philosophy of Law from 
Aristotle to Dworkin
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 3.201
Organizers Ass. Prof. Ki-Won Hong, 
City University of Seoul / 
South Korea
About the workshop:
Our special workshop aims to study the 
theories of “right reason” in the his-
tory of the philosophy of law. Although 
the topic of “right reason” is a familiar 
subject for legal philosophers, it has not 
been fully discussed as an IVR program. 
The term “right reason” has been used 
to refer to the foundation of natural law. 
Our speciﬁ  c focus will be on the right 
reason as practical reason in various 
natural law theories. For jusnaturalists 
like Thomas Hobbes, for instance, right 
reason dictates what we ought to do and 
thus establishes a set of rules which are 
identiﬁ  ed with natural laws. A century 
later, Adam Smith, in his Theory of Mor-
al Sentiments, developed a discussion 
on right reason, based on the Greek au-
thorities. He said that “Virtue, according 
to Aristotle, consists in the habit of me-
diocrity according to right reason.” For 
Smith, right reason helps form the vir-
tue of mediocrity by conforming one’s 
acts to the very virtue.
Papers in our special workshop are ex-
pected to contribute to a comprehensive 
new understanding of the history of 
right reason theories, ranging from Ar-
istotle to Ronald Dworkin. Some topics 
suggested are as below:
•  recta ratio and arbitrium boni viri in  
 Roman  Law
•  Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica,  
 I,  QQ.44-49
•  William of Ockham, Sent., passim,  
  Reportatio, III, q. 11-12
•  Jean Gerson, De vita sprituali anime
• Erasmus,  Enchiridion
• More,  Utopia
•  Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis  
  libri III, passim
•  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, I, 5 
  (“Of Reason and Science”), De cive
•  Milton, De doctrina Christiana, 
  passim, Paradise Lost, V, 42
•  William Blackstone, Commentaries 
  of the Laws of England, passim
•  Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral  
  Sentiments, VII, ii, 1, 12
•  Right Reason in the Creation of the  
 American  Republic 194 195
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SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 37 
Cultural Turn and Philosophy of 
Law and State
Date TUE 16 AUG 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location IG 0.457
Organizers Prof. José Luiz Horta, 
Federal University of 
Minas Gerais / Brazil
About the workshop:
The cultural turn is one wide movement 
which takes places on the Humanities 
from the 1980’ years; it seems a critic 
to the naturalization (materialist and 
e c o n o m i c i s t )  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  w o r l d ,  a n d  
also the rediscovery of the importance 
of an interdisciplinary approach. In the 
frames of a cultural turn, we all look for 
interconnections between our sciences, 
even in Law, where the most advanced 
investigations, the true border investi-
gations, are given in the intersection of 
Law and Humanities.
On the cultural turn, Law, so as social 
sciences, has to reinvent itself, incorpo-
r a t i n g  e l e m e n t s  o f  A n t h r o p o l o g y ,  P h i -
losophy, Sociology, Political Science, and 
building new paradigms for the Com-
pared Law, moved further away of the 
borders of the occidental culture.
Particularly, interests us to debate the 
challenges of the knowledge in the era 
of this Benighted Society, in which 
knowledge is exponentially bigger, but, 
in remarkable paradox, generates a pro-
List of Lectures:
1. Nuno M. M. S. Coelho (University of 
São Paulo / Brazil)
Orthos logos in Aristotelian Ethics: 
EN 1144b
2. Anna Taitslin (University of Can-
berra / Australia)
Right Reason in the Stoic thought from 
Zeno to Seneca
3. Ki-Won Hong (City University of 
Seoul / Korea)
Recta ratio in Ciceronian Philosophy 
of Law
4. Diego Poole (Universidad Rey Juan 
Carlos / Spain)
Recta ratio in Thomist Philosophy of 
Law
5. Richard Arnold (Alfaisal University / 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
Cause and Culpability in the “First 
Crime” of the Western Tradition
gressive absence of culture (kind of a 
post-modern alienation).
How can Philosophy of Law reinvent it-
self, away from the old debate natural-
ism-positivism? Is there really a third 
way, which can be called a culturalism? 
How and where the new approaches are 
been developed? Which impacts would 
it all represents for the main occidental 
philosophical movement — the German 
Idealism — and its greater project — the 
Rechtsstaat? Can we conﬁ  gure a juridi-
cal thought prepared for these modern 
times?
All these subjects, referred to the dia-
logue between Law and Humanities, 
so as between Law and Culture(s), can 
be carried to the debate, and ﬁ  nally se-
lected for a publication to be planned in 
Spanish, English and/or Portuguese.
List of Lectures:
t.b.a.
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 38 
(cancelled)
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 39
Constitutional Reasoning: 
Theoretical Perspectives
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 2.101
Organizers Dr. András Jakab, 
Catholic University
Pázmány Péter
Budapest / Hungary
Dr. Arthur Dyevre, Center 
for Political and Consti-
tutional Studies/ Spain
About the workshop:
The focus of this workshop is on how 
judges think and ought to think about 
constitutional issues. The discussion will 
concentrate on the methods rather than 
on the content of constitutional law: 
how judges go on to develop the consti-
tution and how they justify their results. 
We would expect paper proposals to re-
late to some of the following themes:
•  Methods of interpretation and choice  
  of interpretive regimes: original un- 
  derstanding vs. living constitution,  
  textual vs. teleological approaches etc.
•  Tests of constitutionality and basic  
  standards of constitutional adjudica-  196 197
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2. Mariusz Jerzy Golecki (Univ. of Łódź 
/ Poland)
The Supremacy Claim within Judicial 
Rulings of the National Constitutional 
and Supreme Courts in the EU
3. Maria Isabel Gonzalez Pascual (Univ. 
Pompeu Farba, Barcelona / Spain)
Interpretation of principles framed as 
competence conﬂ  icts (Spain, Germany 
and Italy)
4. Tamás Győrﬁ   (Univ. of Aberdeen / 
UK)
The moral reading of the constitution 
and its alternatives: methods of con-
stitutional interpretation or judicial 
strategies?
5. Leszek Leszczynski (Univ. of Lublin / 
Poland)
The Interpretational Role of Consti-
tutional Principles: Impact on the 
Process of Interpretation and Scale of 
Judicial Discretion
6. Lorenzo Maratea (Sapienza Roma / 
Italy)
New values and order in the examina-
tion of the questions before the judge. 
La «ragione più liquida» in Italian 
Constitutional Court jurisprudence
7. Fernando Muñoz L. (Universidad 
Austral de Chile / Chile)
Autonomy and responsiveness as com-
peting forms of constitutional reason-
ing and rhetoric
  tion: proportionality, strict scrutiny,  
 balancing  …
•  Coherence, in the application of con- 
  stitutional provisions and the observ- 
  ance of precedents.
•  Style(s) of constitutional writing, both  
  in scholarship and judicial opinions.
•  Implied moral and philosophical pre- 
  suppositions of judicial discourse: 
  adherence to natural rights or to doc- 
  trines claiming the pre-legal existence  
  of the state.
•  Choice of conceptualization and  
  choice of constitutional topoi: con- 
 stitutional  conﬂ  icts framed as human  
 rights  conﬂ  icts vs. constitutional con- 
 ﬂ  icts framed as competence conﬂ  icts,  
  use of general concepts such as the  
  rule of law vs. use of speciﬁ  c constitu- 
 tional  provisions.
Ideally, contributions of the above topics 
would discuss the nature of constitution-
al reasoning as well as the consequences 
of choosing certain methods over others 
for judicial activism, democracy and the 
rule of law. One of the workshop’s goals 
would be to bring the insights of linguis-
tics, meta-logic, and the cognitive scienc-
es to bear on common understandings of-
constitutional interpretation, inferential 
reasoning, and the rhetorical dimension 
of constitutional argumentation.
List of Lectures:
1. Mher Arshakyan (Univ. of Bern / 
Switzerland)
Common Law and American Constitu-
tional Interpretation
8. Raban Ofer (Univ. of Oregon / USA)
Capitalism, Liberalism, and the Con-
stitutional Right to Privacy
9. Cesare Pinelli (Sapienza Roma / Italy)
Constitutional reasoning and political 
deliberation
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 40 
The Language of Law: 
Classical Perspectives
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HZ 12
Organizers Miklós Könczöl, Durham 
University / United 
Kingdom, Pázmány Péter 
Catholic University, 
Budapest / Hungary
About the workshop:
While in recent scholarship there are 
some signs that 20th-century bounda-
ries between disciplines as Legal Theory, 
Classics, Legal History and Linguistics 
become penetrable, interdisciplinary 
discourse among exponents of these 
ﬁ  elds is at best sporadic. The aim of the 
workshop is to bring together scholars 
working on linguistic aspects of (ancient 
and contemporary) law from different 
backgrounds and to facilitate the ex-
change of ideas through the discussion 
of their research papers.
The rationale for exploring classical per-
spectives on the language of law is that 
encounters of this kind have proven to 
be mutually enriching: contemporary 
insights may help to make sense of an-
cient theories and indeed practices, 
while the analysis of ancient sources 
continues to provide useful frameworks 
for contemporary legal thought.
Papers accepted for the workshop ad-
dress topics ranging from Greek and Ro-
man legal and/or literary discourses to 
the different forms of the reception of 
classical antiquity.
List of Lectures:
1. Marcin Pieniążek (Andrzej Frycz 
Modrzewski University, Cracow / 
Poland)
Ricoeur on Sophocles and Aristotle
2. Lára Magnúsardóttir (University of 
Iceland / Iceland)
Roman legal terms in Mediaeval 
Iceland: The case of contumacia
3. Annalisa Triggiano (University of 
Salerno / Italy)
Evidentiary rules in Roman rhetoric 
and jurisprudence
4. Julen Etxabe (University of Helsinki 
/ Finland)
The originality of Antigone
5. Romina Amicolo (University of 
Naples Federico II / Italy)
Bellum iustum: War and justice in 
classical antiquity 198 199
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each with its distinctive epistemic goals 
and methodology designed to achieve 
those goals – such as history, economics, 
and philosophy? Or do those disciplines 
offer fundamentally different, and per-
haps incompatible perspectives? And if 
they do provide different or incompat-
ible perspectives, is there any way to 
assess which of them is more accurate 
without begging the question against 
the other disciplinary perspectives? Is 
any more accurate?
List of Lectures:
1. Prof. Scott Brewer (Harvard Law 
School / USA)
2. Prof. Dr. Bernhard Jussen (Goethe-
Universität Frankfurt am Main / Ger-
many)
3. Prof. Dr. Volker Caspari (Technische 
Universität Darmstadt / Germany)
4. Dr. Isabel Feichtner (Goethe-Univer-
sität Frankfurt am Main / Germany)
5. Prof. Dr. Katja Langenbucher 
(Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main 
/ Germany)
6. Dr. Maciej Pichlak (University of 
Wroclaw / Poland)
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 41
Disciplinary perspectives 
and legal truth
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF E.21 / Paris
Organizers Prof. Dr. Katja 
Langenbucher, Goethe-
Universität Frankfurt, 
House of Finance / 
Germany
Prof. Dr. Scott Brewer, 
Harvard Law School / 
USA
About the workshop:
One of the oldest questions in episte-
mology is whether there is one objective 
perspective from which factual or nor-
mative truths can be judged, or whether 
there are only different subjective (or 
perhaps intersubjective) perspectives. 
Kant gave this question a new and pow-
erful articulation, and the question has 
continued to surface – for example, in 
the “perspectivism” of Nietzsche and in 
the work of many who follow him in the 
self-styled “post-modern” tradition.
In this working group we will consider 
this debate with regard to a speciﬁ  c ob-
ject of explanation: legal rules and insti-
tutions. Is there one common or correct 
perspective that provides the best ex-
planation of legal rules and legal insti-
tutions, a perspective that is or could be 
or should be shared by such disciplines – 
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 42
Sterbehilfe aus ethischer und recht-
licher Sicht / Die Religion im öffent-
lichen Bereich
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 3.201
Organizers Prof. Dr. Shing-I Liu, 
National Taipei 
University / Taiwan
Prof. Dr. Kim Young-
Whan, Hanyang 
University / Korea
Prof. Dr. Enrique Zuleta, 
Universität Buenos Aires 
/ Argentinia
Prof. Dr. Andrés Ollero, 
Universität Rey Juan 
Carlos Madrid / Spain
About the workshop:
Durch die großen Fortschritte der mo-
dernen Medizin kann das menschliche 
Leben heutzutage durch Operationen 
b z w .  G e r ä t e  k ü n s t l i c h  v e r l ä n g e r t  w e r -
den, was die Diskussion um die Ster-
behilfe in den letzten Jahren entfacht. 
Zwar besteht die wichtige Aufgabe der 
Medizin in der menschenwürdigen Un-
terbringung wie der Schmerztherapie 
für ein zuendegehendes Lebens. Aber 
in Frage steht, ob und inwiefern künst-
liche Ernährung wie die Infusion von 
Flüssigkeiten in recht- und moralischer 
Hinsicht zugelassen wäre. Mit anderen 
Worten: Es geht hier um die Sterbehil-
fe in dem Sinne, dass unheilbar kranke 
Menschen mindestens dem menschen-
würdigen Tod zugeführt werden sollten.
Wie bekannt werden dazu folgende Ar-
gumente pro und kontra ins Feld geführt: 
Befürworter vertreten die Ansicht, dass 
es gerade auf die Menschenwürde ver-
stößt, wenn man ihn möglichst am Le-
ben hält, wie es medizinisch machbar 
ist. Stattdessen soll dem Betroffenen 
endlich die Möglichkeit zuerkannt wer-
d e n ,  s i c h  ü b e r  s e i n e n  S t e r b e z e i t p u n k t  
selbst zu entscheiden. Dagegen wird be-
hauptet, dass das Sterben ein natürliches 
Prozess ist, in den künstlich nicht ein-
gegriffen werden soll. Es sei anmaßend, 
den Sterbezeitpunkt selbst festzulegen, 
denn das Leben enthält einen intrinsi-
schen Wert. Außerdem wird das Beden-
ken geäußert, dass die Freigabe des Le-
bens einen Dammbruch für Willkür und 
Kostendruck darstellt.
Bei näherem Zusehen ist die Diskussion 
um die Sterbehilfe mindestens auf zwei 
theoretischen Ebenen angesiedelt. Auf 
der konkreten rechtlichen Ebene, wo es 
sich auf die strafrechtlichen Probleme 
ankommt, wird dieses Problem mittels 
der begrifﬂ  ichen Differenzierung in die 
indirekte oder passive Hilfe zu einer 
angemessenen Lösung geführt. Auf der 
abstrakten rechtsphilosophischen Ebe-
ne, wie es um die ethische Fage geht, 
steht das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen 
gesetzlichen Vorgaben und der Selbst-
bestimmung sowie das zwischen medi-
zinischen Möglichkeiten und der Men-
schenwürde im Vordergrund.
Da es an einem so grundsätzlichen The-
ma wie die Sterbehilfe kein Patenrezept 
gibt bzw. geben kann, soll sich jeder  200 201
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SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 43
Wirtschaftsethik und 
Rechtsquellenlehre
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011 + 
SAT 20 Aug 2011
Time FRI 15.30 h – 18.00 h + 
SAT 9.00 h – 14 h
Location HOF E.22 / Commerzbank
Organizers Prof. Dr. Klaus Lüderssen, 
Goethe-Universität 
Frankfurt am Main / 
Germany
About the workshop:
Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von 
“Law, Science and Technology“ betrifft 
auch das Verhältnis von Ökonomie 
und Recht. Gibt es beispielsweise eine 
Sachlogik der Finanzmärkte, die recht-
licher Regulierung feste Grenzen setzt, 
oder eröffnet umgekehrt die rechtliche 
Regulierung den Finanzmärkten erst 
ihr Tätigkeitsfeld? Viel spricht dafür, 
dass es sich hier um Interdependenzen 
handelt. Aber wie sie im einzelnen be-
schaffen sind, bedarf weiterer Klärung. 
Quelle des Rechts im demokratischen 
Zeitalter ist das Parlament, konkreti-
siert wird es durch Justiz und Verwal-
tung. Alle Instanzen stoßen dabei auf 
tatsächliche und normative Vorgaben 
des Wirtschaftslebens. Die Wirtschaft-
sethik stellt Forderungen an das Recht, 
sowohl aus der Perspektive einer imma-
nenten ökonomischen wie einer zusätz-
lichen externen Orientierung. Weil es 
letztlich entscheiden, was höher zu be-
werten wäre; das Selbstbestimmungs-
recht oder die Erhaltung des Lebens 
auch unter den sinnlosen Umständen. 
Aus dem Grund sei es sinnvoll, ein Fo-
rum „Überlegungen zur Sterbehilfe aus 
ethischer und rechtlicher Sicht anzubie-
ten, um vor allem den unsichtbaren Pro-
blemkomplex sichtbar zu machen.
List of Lectures:
1. Ken Takeshita (Kansai Universität, 
Osaka / Japan)
Der kulturelle ethische Hintergrund 
der Abschätzung des Selbstmords in 
Japan 
2. Shing-I Liu (Taipei University, Taipwi 
/ Taiwan)
Sterbehilfe aus strafrechtlicher und 
rechtsethischer Sicht
3. Young-Whan Kim (Hanyang Univ., 
School of Law / Rep. of Korea)
Yue-Dian Hsu (Department of Law,
National Cheng Kung University, 
Tainan / Taiwan)
Religiös-weltanschauliche Neutralität 
in öffentlichen Räumen
auch „Verantwortungsethik“ gibt, kann 
sich die Rechtsquellenlehre diesem Ap-
pell nicht unter Hinweis auf die auto-
nome Rolle des Rechts entziehen. Viel-
mehr ist „Folgenorientierung“ längst 
eines der gemeinsamen Segmente von 
Recht und Ethik. Was insoweit aus der 
„Natur der Sache“ folgen könnte, ist 
für die Gegenwart interessant, weil auf 
diese traditionsreiche Konzeption jetzt 
auch moderne betriebswirtschaftliche 
Forschungen zurückgreifen. Einen ver-
gleichsweise traditionellen Einstieg in 
die Ökonomie eröffnen die Äquivokati-
onen des Wettbewerbs. Aber auch hier 
gibt es erstaunliche Aktualisierungen. 
Die Geltung des Rechts könnte das Kri-
terium sein, mit dem alles entschieden 
wird. Wenn das, was sozial gewünscht 
wird, den Status der Rechtsgeltung er-
hält, wird auf den ersten Blick eine 
eindeutige Fixierung sichtbar; aber-
Rechtsgeltung ist im modernen Verfas-
sungsstaat nicht nur etwas Formales; 
vielmehr wächst die Relevanz der (psy-
chologisch-behaviouristisch aufzuhel-
lenden) Anerkennung des Rechts durch 
seine Adressaten. Dieser Modalität der 
Rechtserzeugung entsprechen auf öko-
nomische Efﬁ  zienz bezogene Kommu-
nikationen. Verhandelt wird dann zwi-
schen Juristen und Ökonomen nicht 
mehr über die „Stoffbestimmtheit der 
Rechtsidee“, sondern über „institutio-
nelle Tatsachen“, wobei in die Genesis 
des Institutionellen – durch „gesell-
schaftlich-staatliche Verbundsprojekte“ 
– Elemente direkter Demokratie einge-
hen.
List of Lectures:
Freitag, 19. August 2011
Moderation: Klaus Lüderssen (Goethe-
Universität Frankfurt am Main / Ger-
many)
1. Dietmar von der Pfordten (Universität 
Göttingen / Germany)
Die „Stoffbestimmtheit der Rechts-
idee“ und die „Natur der Sache 
– Ontologie, Konvention oder Kons-
truktion?
2. Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (Max-
Planck-Instituts für ausländisches und 
internationales Privatrecht, Hamburg / 
Germany)
Wettbewerbsfreiheit oder Wohlfahrt
Samstag, 20. August 2011
Moderation: Lorenz Schulz (Goethe-
Universität Frankfurt am Main / 
Germany)
3. Armin Engländer (Universität Passau 
/ Germany)
Funktion, Ausgestaltung und 
Kriterien der Rechtsgeltung
4. Frank Saliger (Bucerius Law School, 
Hamburg / Germany)
„Institutionelle Tatsachen“
5. Michael Baurmann (Sozialwissen-
schaftliches Institut, Universität 
Düsseldorf / Germany)
Die Integration normativer Bindungen 
in die Nutzenmaximierung 202 203
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ship or corporate social responsibility be 
un d e rst ood  bo th  in  l egal  as  w e ll  as  in  
ethical terms?
Third, this workshop also aims to discuss 
the relation between speciﬁ  c national le-
gal frameworks and cultural values.
List of Lectures:
1. Nick Lin-Hi (Universität Mannheim / 
Germany)
The Market and the Incompleteness of 
Contracts: Implications for CSR
2. Christoph Lütge (TU München / 
Germany)
Some Implications of Cultural Differ-
ences for Business Ethics
3. N.N. (Japan)
Liberal Business Ethics and Culture
6. Brigitte Haar (Goethe-Universität 
Frankfurt am Main / Germany)
Anerkennung und Economic 
Behaviour
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 44
Business Ethics and Law
Date MON 15 Aug 2011 + 
TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time MON 14.30 h – 18.30 h + 
TUE 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HZ 9
Organizers Prof. Dr. Christoph Lütge, 
Peter Löscher Chair of 
Business Ethics, TU 
München / Germany
About the workshop:
The relation between business ethics and 
the law can be viewed from different an-
gles. First, there are general questions: 
Are moral norms and conventions strict 
complements to the legal system or do 
they overlap in their functions? Which 
role do liberal principles play in this pic-
ture? Does a liberal society need certain 
taboos, as F.A. von Hayek found neces-
sary?
Second, there are more speciﬁ  c  ques-
tions regarding corporations: Many 
corporations, especially multi-national 
o n e s ,  d o  m u c h  m o r e  t h a n  i s  r e q u i r e d  
from them by law. More and more, they 
regard themselves as corporate citizens. 
How can concepts like corporate citizen-
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 45
Public Legal Reason
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 3.102
Organizers Ph.D. Jon Mahoney, 
Kansas State 
University / USA
Christopher McCammon, 
University of 
Nebraska / USA
About the workshop:
Papers in this workshop address in vari-
ous ways the question, “what is a public 
legal reason?” Participants defend differ-
ent views on this question as well as the 
general topic of legal authority. The pur-
pose of the workshop is to explore both 
theoretical and practical aspects of the 
idea of public reason as it applies to law. 
Papers in the workshop will cover topics 
such as pluralism, the treatment of resi-
dent workers, the inﬂ  uence of tradition 
on public reason, constitutional norms, 
Ronald Dworkin, anarchism and the 
moral basis for legitimate legal authority.
List of Lectures:
1. Matthew Binney (Eastern Washing-
ton University / USA)
Reason and the Tradition in Joseph-
François Laﬁ  tau’s Customs of Ameri-
can Indians
2. Denis de Castro Halis (Faculty of 
Law, The University of Macau, Macau 
SAR / China)
Public Justiﬁ  cation and Legal Reason-
ing in the “Las Vegas of the East”: The 
Cases of Non-Resident Workers in 
Macau, China
3. Szabolcs Hegyi (University of Miskolc 
/ Hungary)
The theoretical grounds of „constitu-
tional matters” and their role in public 
legal reasoning
4. Win-chiat Lee (Wake Forest Univer-
sity / USA)
Citizens as Appellate Judges: Dwor-
kin’s Protestantism about Law
5. Roderick T. Long (Auburn University 
/ USA)
Reasonable Pluralism, Public Reason, 
and Anarchist Legal Theory
6. Jon Mahoney (Kansas State Univer-
sity / USA
Democratic Equality and Public Legal 
Reason
7. Christopher McCammon (University 
of Nebraska / USA)
Republican Foundations for Public Le-
gal Reasoning
8. Elena Pribytkova (Ruhr-Universität 
Bochum / Germany)
Justice in a Pluralistic World: John 
Rawls’ Ideas of Public Reason and an 
Overlapping Consensus 204 205
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welfare economics) be analysed but also 
the methods behind empirical social 
research shall be critically reviewed. 
The ﬁ  ndings of behavioural economics, 
which have called into question the ba-
sic assumptions of economic theory – for 
example the rationality or the selﬁ  sh-
ness of the players – are also of great sig-
niﬁ  cance in this debate.
On the other hand, the question of why 
the economic analysis of law has devel-
oped differently and the diverse impact 
it has had on America in comparison 
to continental Europe will also be dis-
cussed. The lawfulness of consequence 
based reasoning in law application may 
have played an important role in this dis-
crepancy. Furthermore it shall be shown 
in which ﬁ  elds of law (Civil, Criminal, 
Public, Competition law etc.) economic 
based reasoning and methods have – ex-
plicitly or implicitly – found their way 
into continental European law.
Please note that this special workshop is 
coordinated with the partner workshop 
“Theoretical and Methodological Foun-
dations of Law and Economics (Second 
MetaLawEcon Workshop)” organized by 
Péter Cserne (Tilburg).
List of Lectures:
1. Klaus Mathis (Universität Luzern / 
Switzerland)
Law and Economics Today – 
Some Introductory Remarks
2. Tze-Shiou Chien 
(Academia Sinica / Taiwan)
9. Ofer Raban (University of Oregon 
School of Law / USA)
The Legal Principle of Public Reason-
ing
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 46
Law and Economics – 
Foundations and Applications
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF 1.28 / Shanghai
Organizers Prof. Dr. Klaus Mathis, 
Universität Luzern / 
Switzerland
About the workshop:
This w orkshop will deal with the eco-
nomic analysis of law, its methodical and 
philosophical foundations as well as the 
possible applications in both legislation 
and application of law. Fifty years after 
the famous essay “The Problem of Social 
Cost” (1960) by the Nobel laureate Ro-
nald Coase, Law and Economics seems 
to have become the lingua franca of 
American jurisprudence, and although 
its inﬂ  uence on European jurisprudence 
is only moderate by comparison, it has 
also gained popularity in Europe.
On the one hand this workshop intends 
to explore both the methodical and phil-
osophical foundations of the economic 
analysis of law. In doing so, not only 
will the theories of economics (mostly 
the principles of microeconomics and 
A Legal Interpretation of Coasean 
Economics
3. Szabolcs Hegyi 
(University of Miskolc / Hungary)
The Scope and Limits of Consequen-
tialist Reasoning – a Philosophical 
Approach
4. Felix Ekardt (Universität Rostock / 
Germany)
A Critical Review of “Efﬁ  ciency Eth-
ics”
5. Niels Petersen 
(MPI Bonn / Germany)
The Role of Law and Economics in 
Constitutional Adjudication
6. Kai P. Purnhagen (Ludwig-Maximil-
ians-Universität München / Germany)
Never the Twain Shall Meet – Cultural 
Limits Between Continental Dogma-
tism and Law and Economics Theory?
7. Aurélien Portuese (Université Paris II 
/ France)
The Case for a Principled Approach to 
Law and Economics: Efﬁ  ciency Analy-
sis and General Principles of EU Law
8. Kristoffel Grechenig (MPI Bonn / 
Germany)
Wrongful Sanctions
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 47
When is the exercise of an interest a 
human right?
Secular and religious responses to the 
legitimacy question.
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 1.303
Organizers Prof. Ph.D. Angus 
Menuge, Concordia Uni-
versity Wisconsin / USA
About the workshop:
A right is a just entitlement to the exer-
cise of an interest. A human right is a 
just entitlement one has simply because 
one is a human being. That is, a human 
right is not conditional on being a citi-
zen, on having a particular cultural or 
religious identity, or on whether special 
agreements or contracts have been en-
tered into. As the human rights move-
ment has progressed, however, the scope 
of alleged human rights has greatly in-
creased. This raises the concern that 
some widely supported claims of human 
rights may be unjustiﬁ  ed.
Underlying this concern is the funda-
mental question of legitimacy: “What 
makes the exercise of certain interests 
a fundamental human right?” Initial-
ly, thinking about human rights was 
strongly inﬂ  uenced by religious sources 
(e.g. inalienable rights were derived 
from the Judeo-Christian teaching of the 
imago dei). However, the Enlightenment  206 207
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Why is man the primary and function-
al way for the Church? The involve-
ment of Christian teaching in contem-
porary human rights discourse
3. Dr. Hendrik Kaptein (Leiden Univer-
sity /The Netherlands [http://www.law.
leiden.edu/organisation/metajuridica/
staff/scientiﬁ  c/kapteinhjr.html])
Retribution as a fundamental human 
right
4. Dr. Angus Menuge (Professor of 
Philosophy, Concordia University Wis-
consin / USA [http://www.cuw.edu/fs/
angusmenuge])
Why Human Rights Cannot be Natu-
ralized: the Contingency Problem
5. The Honourable Dallas Miller (http://
www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/ja-
nj/2006/doc_31982.html)
The New Mandate for Human Rights
6. Dr. John Warwick Montgomery (Pro-
fessor Emeritus of Law and Humanities, 
University of Bedfordshire / UK) and 
Christian Thought (Patrick Henry Col-
lege, Virginia / U.S.A. [http://www.phc.
edu/JWMontgomery.php])
Restrictions on Religious Freedom: 
When and How Justiﬁ  ed?
7. Professor Dr. Friedrich Toepel (http://
www.haarmann.com/en/lawyers/
associates/12-angestellte/19-ft.html)
Which function does the legitimation 
of a human right fulﬁ  ll?
proclaimed that the content of morality 
is discernible entirely apart from special 
revelation. And today, many people be-
lieve that human rights can be defended 
solely by appealing to the natural char-
acteristics of human beings. This raises 
several important questions: 
(1) Are religious rationales for human 
rights still proﬁ  table today, or have they 
been superseded by superior, secular ra-
tionales?
(2) More speciﬁ  cally, have popular Kan-
tian, neo-Kantian, or similar analyses of 
rational beings made these religious ra-
tionales redundant?
(3) Are religious rationales no longer ac-
ceptable, because they violate a principle 
of neutrality governing apt contributions 
to public discourse?
This workshop will address these and re-
lated questions, with the goal of assess-
ing the relative merits of secular and re-
ligious responses to the underlying issue 
of legitimacy.
List of Lectures:
1. John Calvert (JD, Intelligent Design 
Network; [http://www.intelligent-
designnetwork.org/], former Chairman 
of Lathrop & Gage Corporate Department)
Does the security of religious rights 
depend on state use of a function-
ally inclusive or neutral deﬁ  nition of 
religion?
2. Dr. Dobrochna Bach-Golecka (Uni-
versity of Warsaw [http://en.wpia.
uw.edu.pl/])
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 48
The Philosophy of Home Schooling 
and Its Legal Implications Today
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF E.01 / Deutsche Bank
Organizers Prof. Dr. Dr. Dr. John 
Warwick Montgomery, 
Patrick Henry College / 
USA
About the workshop:
The right to education and parental 
rights are guaranteed in a number of 
the international human rights conven-
tions, but their scope is disputed. One 
of the most controversial areas is that of 
home schooling: the right of the parent 
to carry out a child’s education under his 
or her own supervision. This right exists 
in France, in the United Kingdom, and 
in every American jurisdiction, but is 
not recognised (except under very lim-
ited circumstances) in Germany and in 
Sweden. This workshop brings together 
specialists in American, German, and 
European human rights law to raise the 
underlying questions as to the philo-
sophical and legal justiﬁ  cation (or non-
justiﬁ  cation) of home schooling in mod-
ern society.
List of Lectures:
1. Michael Donnelly (J.D., Director of 
International Relations, Home School 
Legal Defense Association, U.S.A.)
Education As Creature of the State? 
Home Schooling at the Intersection 
of Law, Human Rights and Parental 
Autonomy
2. Prof. Dr. phil. Dr.theol. Thomas 
Schirrmacher (State University of the 
West / Romania)
Compulsory Education—in Schools 
Only? Divergent Developments in 
Germany
3. Prof. Dr Dr Dr John Warwick Mont-
gomery (Patrick Henry College, Virginia 
/ U.S.A.)
The Justiﬁ  cation of Home Schooling 
vis-à-vis the European Human Rights 
System 208 209
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state? The validity of the main princi-
ples of lawyer’s and judge’s ethics will be 
tested using this theoretical framework 
describing the relationship between jus-
tice, power and law. To this end, judges, 
lawyers and academics from both the 
common law and civil law jurisdic-
tions will work together in formulating 
and discussing a hypothetical case. This 
should also prove be a test of the sound-
ness of the framework itself and the 
conceptions of law and justice on which 
the framework is built. Those interested 
in participating are very welcome and 
should email the organizer.
List of Lectures:
t.b.a.
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 50
The Fusion of Law and 
Information Technology
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011 + 
THU 18 Aug 2011
Time TUE 14.30 h – 18.30 h + 
THU 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 1.101
Organizers Prof. Kitahara Munenori, 
Hiroshima Shudo 
University / Japan
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 49
Producing Justice: social responsibil-
ity of the legal profession in the age of 
globalization
Date TUE 16 AUG 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF E.21 / Paris
Organizers Prof. Yasutomo 
Morigiwa, Nagoya Uni-
versity Graduate School 
of Law / Japan
About the workshop:
The professional responsibility of jurists 
(judges, prosecutors, lawyers and aca-
demics) should be explained and deter-
mined in terms of the political function 
the judiciary provides in a constitutional 
democracy. The branch of Staatsge-
walt called the “judiciary” should be in 
charge of providing the public good of 
justice to society. Justice, in this con-
text, should be deﬁ   ned, following the 
tradition of Roman Law, as constans et 
perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique trib-
unes; in more modern terms, as the con-
stant effort to uphold the rights of each. 
In the Rechtsstaat, the use of power to 
administer justice should be both jus-
tiﬁ  ed and limited by law. In the age of 
globalization, the jurisdiction of justice 
can no longer be identical with the na-
tional border. How are the core values of 
the professional ethics of the lawyer and 
the precepts of judicial comportment af-
fected by such evolution of the liberal 
About the workshop:
I would like to propose the fusion of law 
and information technology. The fusion 
can be a way how laws should collaborate 
with information technologies to recover 
the legal effectiveness.
The purpose will aim at getting the high-
er compliance with legal provisions as 
information. In the information society 
law, the breach of the laws has been per-
formed with information technologies. 
Then, we should oppose to the breaches 
using the same information technologies. 
The way can be called that like cures like.
The way will mean introducing the strict-
ness and certainty of the technology into 
laws. 
Here, I will suggest the examples.
The Electronic Signatures Act introduces 
a cryptgraphic technology. As a result, 
an y o n e  can  mak e  an  e asy  u s e  o f  stri ct  
certiﬁ  cation. The authenticity of any elec-
tromagnetic record can be legally veriﬁ  ed 
by public key cryptosystem.
The Minors Protection Act shall oblige 
ISPs to apply a ﬁ   ltering and blocking 
technology to the child pornography in-
formation on the Internet.
However, the laws shall provide the se-
curity and architecture standard of the 
technologies.
I would like the participants to present 
the legal examples and exchange opin-
ions of the fusion.
List of lectures:
t.b.a.
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 51
Freedom of Speech and Intellectual 
Property: Conceptualizing the 
conﬂ  ict(s)
Date TUE 16 AUG 2011
Time 14.30 – 18.30
Location HZ 11
Organizers Prof. Dr. Peter Niesen, 
TU Darmstadt / Germany
Prof. Dr. Alexander 
Peukert, Goethe-Univer-
sität Frankfurt am Main, 
Germany
About the workshop:
Obgleich kein Konsens darüber besteht, 
wie geistiges Eigentum philosophisch 
und rechtstheoretisch verstanden wer-
den soll, so liegt doch sein spannungs-
reiches Verhältnis zu kommunikativen 
Freiheitsrechten auf der Hand. Wenn 
die Verwendung von Immaterialgütern 
reguliert wird, kann man sich ihrer 
nicht in allen Kontexten zum Zweck der 
Äußerung oder Kommunikation bedie-
nen. Ein verbreitetes Verständnis kom-
munikativer Freiheiten, demzufolge ein 
subjektiver Anspruch darauf besteht, 
„Informationen und Ideen mit allen Ver-
ständigungsmitteln ohne Rücksicht auf 
Grenzen zu suchen, zu empfangen und 
zu verbreiten“ (Art. 19 AEMR), scheint 
mit exklusiven Verfügungsrechten über 
Informationen und Ideen strikt unver-
träglich. Dem Spannungsverhältnis soll 
auf rechtsdogmatischen wie philosophi- 210 211
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war was a turning point for also „Civ-
il Society“.  in Japan „NPO-law“ was 
made 1998. So Civil Society- discussion 
has already some history. In this sense, 
now is the time for legal philosophy, the 
possibility and implication of CS for its 
general problems. For example, validity 
of law has two sources: from its contents 
and from competence of law-maker. 
Normally, CSs have no formal compe-
tence of law-making. But they inﬂ  uence 
indirectly on it. It can be important, to 
settle these inﬂ  uences institutionally in 
law-making-system, in order to make 
law-contents better. Better means here 
that law responds adequately to more 
opinions in society. CSs can function as 
a bridge between legislator and (silent) 
citizens. This can apply to policy-making 
of administrative system (Mori). 
On the other hand, institutions for CSs 
provide preconditions for better CSs.: ac-
countability of CSs to their clients etc. 
Under the conditions of good CS there 
are not-legal one. Communications 
among citizens, families, CSs and state is 
one thing (Inoue). This is important for 
collective decision. In addition to this, 
independency of CS from state or „public 
sphere“ are important to keep diversity 
of opinions (Nasu). So CS has a role as 
a mediator in the process of public will 
making in its widest sense. Philosophical 
approach to communication in society 
gives a skill to analyze these aspects of 
CS (Sugawara).
As a background of this problems  one 
cannot forget the great impact of globali-
zation upon states, societies, and also lo-
cal communities. Internet communica-
schen und ideengeschichtlichem Gebiet 
nachgegangen werden. 
Die Ko-Veranstalter sind Principal In-
vestigators des Exzellenzclusters Her-
ausbildung normativer Ordnungen. Das 
Panel knüpft inhaltlich an den Plenar-
vortrag von Seana Shiffrin an und sollte 
daher, wenn möglich in unmittelbarem 
zeitlichen Zusammenhang stehen. Das 
Panel soll 150 Minuten dauern.
List of Lectures:
t.b.a.
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 52
Roles of Citizen/ Civil Society and 
Responsibility of State
Date TUE 16 AUG 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 1.301
Organizers Prof. Tatsuji Ohno, Hosei 
University / Japan
About the workshop:
The aim of this workshop is, to discuss 
the importance of activities of „Civil So-
ciety“, not only in their  political, social 
aspects, but also from a legal point of 
view.
The development of „Civil Societies“ in 
these days has given inﬂ  uences on the 
relationship between states, state and 
society or citizen. The end of the cold 
tions opened new networks for people. 
One can say, it makes a new type of CS. 
But in this „world“ there are many prob-
lems, which distruct rights, freedom of 
people.  Therefore, legal approach to this 
is also necessary (Machimura). We need 
the coercion of the state power to retain 
such communities. This paradox will be 
explained through the cases of regula-
tion/deregulation, comparing Japan-
U.S. (and Korea) case studies concerning 
land-use regulation (Taniguchi).
We provide reports about many aspects 
around CS, especially with examples 
from Japanese experiences. But we hope 
to discuss on comparison with experi-
ences in another countries.
List of Lectures:
1. Tatsuji Ohno (Hosei University/ 
Japan)
Introduction – The general theoretical 
and practical Situation about Civil So-
ciety and State, especially in Japanese 
Legal Institutions and Movements
2. Toru Mori (Kyoto University/ Japan)
Democratization of the Administration 
– from the top down and/ or from the 
bottom up
3. Kosuke Nasu (Setsunan University / 
Japan)
Civil Society and its Nonpolitical 
Foundation
4. Koichi Taniguchi (Tokyo Metropoli-
tan University / Japan)
Paradox of Solidarity and Coersion – 
global Impact on Communities
5. Masako  Inoue (Kanagawa University 
/ Japan)
Civil Society and Family – from Femi-
nism Point of View
6. Yasutaka Machimura (Hokkaido Uni-
versity / Japan)
Civil Society in the World of Internet 
Communications – its Legal Aspects 
7. Yasuhiro Sugawara (Hokkaigakuen 
University / Japan)
Meaning of the Communication in 
Civil Society and its philosophical 
Ground
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 53
Rethinking the foundational concepts 
of constitutional and legal theory from 
‚the semi-periphery’
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 3.101
Organizers Dr. Zoran Oklopcic, 
Carleton University, 
Ottawa / Canada
About the workshop:
Glance at the Field
The workshop proposal that follows is 
predicated upon the claim/intuition/
conclusion that contemporary constitu- 212 213
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described above. We provisionally un-
derstand the semi-periphery not as a 
precise geographical location, but rather 
as a political condition. That condition 
can be anything which departs from 
the normality of a relatively afﬂ  uent, 
theoretically inﬂ  uential,  contemporary 
liberal-democratic state. The semi-pe-
ripheral locales can be marked by their 
authoritarian past, semi-authoritarian 
present, political paralysis, or deep eth-
no-national cleavages. Crucially, the lo-
calities within semi-periphery bear an 
ambiguous relationship with the consti-
tutional and legal heritage of ‘Western’ 
liberal-democratic states, but don’t reject 
i t  w h o l esal e ,  n o r  d o  th e y  se e k  t o  co n -
struct a completely different conceptual 
register in which they would articulate 
their claims. Generally, semi-peripheral 
countries embrace the rule of law, popu-
lar sovereignty but their application in 
these contexts either raises problems for 
theory, or leads to the mutations of these 
concepts that respond to their particular 
environment.
Aims of the Project
The central aim of the project is to chal-
lenge the one-way broadcast and dissem-
ination of theoretical insights from the 
politically consolidated legal and consti-
tutional ‘centre’ and to the semi-periph-
ery. Over the decades and centuries, the 
conceptual building-blocks mentioned 
above have captured the imagination 
of peripheral actors and framing their 
political and legal imagination, setting 
the aspirations and tempo, providing 
resources for naming and shaming. In 
tional and legal theorizing in the Eng-
lish-speaking world can roughly be situ-
ated within two camps.
In the ﬁ  rst, there is a body of thought 
that uses the political and legal preoccu-
pations of the leading Western countries 
as a foil for making claims in the ﬁ  eld 
of constitutional, and legal theory gener-
ally. These preoccupations tend to inﬂ  u-
ence the theoretical analysis of founda-
tional political and legal concepts. Thus, 
debates about foundational concepts 
like ‘popular sovereignty’, constituent 
power, social contract, and the rule of 
law, are either explicitly, or implicitly 
situated within the American, British, 
or European contexts. Even the volumes 
that seek to provide a comparative per-
spective on the foundational concepts 
engage the constitutional experiences 
of Germany, France, UK, the US, etc. In 
the second, there is a growing literature 
that challenges the dominant perspec-
tive from the vantage point of aborigi-
nal struggles for recognition and eman-
cipation. The authors in this camp seek 
either to recast the existing legal and 
political structures to make them more 
accommodating of the Aboriginal differ-
ence, or to reframe the central constitu-
tional ideas of Western modernity to be 
reﬂ   ective of Aboriginal narratives and 
worldviews.
Thematic Focus
What we feel is missing is the engage-
ment with the foundational concepts 
of constitutional and legal theory from 
the vantage point of the semi-periph-
ery, a locus between the two camps 
this regard, our aim is to explore the ex-
tent to which these concepts have been 
crimped, expanded, or otherwise modi-
ﬁ  ed in the cut and thrust of political and 
legal debate in the semi-periphery.
To be clear, our purpose is not necessar-
ily ‘counter-hegemonic’ or hostile to the 
heritage of ‘Western’ legal and constitu-
tional modernity. Rather, the reliance 
of various actors on these foundational 
concepts in the semi-periphery evidenc-
es the inherent importance and prag-
matic utility of these concepts. However, 
we think that it is both interesting and 
important to clarify precisely why and 
how these concepts can continue to do 
work even within normative contexts 
that seem to stand in sharp contrast to 
their characteristic normative habitats in 
consolidated liberal democratic polities.
The outcome of the proposed workshop 
could equally be to:
a) Point to the limitations of the inher-
ited vocabularies and their application in 
the semi-peripheral contexts. For exam-
ple, the idea of the constituent power of 
the people may be inappropriate in the 
context of state-building in Kosovo; or 
the ideas of social contract can be seen as 
problematic in that it justiﬁ  es Malaysian 
ethnocracy.
b) Suggest reﬁ  nements in the concepts 
under scrutiny, given the context in 
which they are invoked.
c) Articulate a more self-reﬂ  ective em-
brace of the examined concepts stem-
ming from an inquiry of the alternatives 
and tradeoffs that present themselves in 
the semi-periphery.
d) Point to links between the operation 
of these concepts in the semi-periphery 
and how they operate in their core habi-
tats in a way that also problematizes un-
stated assumptions about their operation 
in the latter.
List of Lectures:
Lucas Arimada (Buenos Aires Law 
School / Argentinia)
Democracy as a precondition to consti-
tutionalism
Rueban Balasubramaniam (Carleton 
University, Ottawa / Canada)
Understanding Malaysia’s “Social 
Contract” Debate
Miodrag A. Jovanovic (University of 
Belgrade Faculty of Law / Serbia)
Does Jurisprudence Need Anthropol-
ogy?
Zoran Oklopcic (Carleton University, 
Ottawa / Canada)
Title t.b.a.
Alexander Schwartz (Queens Univer-
sity, Kingston / Canada)
Nested Nomos: Tensions between 
Sub-state Constitutionalism and the 
Integrity of Law
Stephen Tierney (University of Edin-
burgh / UK)
‘Sub-state nations on the semi-periph-
ery: discrete expressions of pouvoir 
constituant through the referendum’ 214 215
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society, human rights, democracy, de-
velopment, economy and governance, 
amongst many others – can expand the 
reach of arguments that predominate 
contemporary legal theoretical and ju-
risprudential literature regarding glo-
bal problems. In exploring such issues, 
the workshop cannot avoid considering 
the nature and content of African legal 
theory itself, including its similarities, 
and differences from the more dominant 
legal theoretical tradition. Issues for 
consideration also include the extent to 
which, or the ways in which African le-
gal theory can work with or independent 
of dominant legal theoretical traditions.
List of Lectures:
1. Dr. M. Chikosa Silungwe (Malawi 
Law Commission) (Dr. Silungwe is par-
ticipating in his personal capacity)
On ‘African’ Legal Theory: A possibil-
ity, An impossibility or Mere Conun-
drum?
2. Dominic J. Buridge (University of 
Oxford / UK)
Between Marxism and Individualism: 
Interpersonal solidarity in African 
jurisprudence.
3. Dr. Sulieman I. Oji (Usmanu Danfo-
dio University / Sokoto-Nigeria)
African concepts of Law, Commnuity 
and Justice as a Pancea to Contempo-
rary Global Challenges
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 54
The Relevance of African Legal Theory 
to Contemporary Problems
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF 3.45 / Sydney
Organizers Dr. Oche Onazi, Univer-
sity of Dundee / UK
About the workshop:
The aim of this workshop is to explore 
the vision of African legal theory and 
jurisprudence regarding contemporary 
global challenges, such as the preva-
lence of war to the misery of poverty to 
the crises of the environment, amongst 
many other pressing problems. The justi-
ﬁ  cation for this workshop is simple. Dis-
cussions concerning the unprecedented 
challenges of today have too often pro-
ceeded without any consideration of the 
potential contributions from African 
legal theoretical or philosophical schol-
arship. There are, of course, different 
reasons why African legal theory has 
been marginalised in this respect, on e 
of which is simply that given Africa’s co-
lonial history, it is often considered as a 
recipient and not a bearer of knowledge, 
especially the type of knowledge that is 
relevant to issues beyond Africa. Yet Afri-
can concepts of law, justice, community, 
reciprocity, solidarity, humanity, equity, 
property, duty, responsibility, fairness, 
punishment – or how they impact on 
received concepts of state, market, civil 
4. Dr. Ferdinand M. Kasozi (Makerere 
University / Uganda)
Inferential Grounds of Badanda Court 
Processes – Logical Guidance for 
Contemporary Legal System Efﬁ  cacy
5. Dr. Babafemi Odunsi (Obafemi 
Awolowo University / Ife-Nigeria)
Pychic Witness as an American Ap-
proach to solving Crimes: A case for 
revisitng Indigenous African Crimi-
nology System in Nigeria
6. Elena Sanella
Decolonising Legal Theory: The way 
ahead for the breakthrough of African 
Legal Theory
7. Dr. Oche Onazi (University of 
Dundee / UK)
African Legal Theory and Contempo-
rary Problems
8. Madalitso Phiri (MPhil [UCT], Junior 
Researcher, Human Sciences Research 
Council (HSRC), Cape Town)
Mozambique’s Post-Conﬂ  ict Political 
Economy: Africa’s Success Story? – 
1992-2009
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 55
Kelsen and Hart: History of Legal 
Philosophy in the 20th Century
Date THU 18 Aug 2011 + 
FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time THU 14.30 h – 18.30 h + 
FRI 15.30 h – 18.00 h
Location HZ 8
Organizers Prof. Enrico Pattaro, Uni-
versity of Bologna / Italy
About the workshop:
This special workshop – which we have 
been entrusted with organizing as part 
of the celebrations for the centennial of 
the foundation of the IVR – is aimed at 
providing a discussion of the history of 
20th-century legal philosophy. It is quite 
natural that such a discussion should 
take as its starting point the two major 
ﬁ  gures of 20th-century legal philosophy 
in the civil-law and the common-law 
world respectively, namely, Hans Kelsen 
and H.L.A. Hart. The main problem here 
is not only to understand how these two 
major ﬁ  gures and their theories have in-
ﬂ  uenced the rest of legal philosophy in 
the different language areas of the West-
ern world, but also to assess how their 
inﬂ   uence has interacted with other, 
more local strands of legal-philosophical 
thought – and, if no such inﬂ  uence can 
be detected, how these strands devel-
oped through a path of their own. 
This workshop draws from the work done 
on 20th-century legal philosophy in Vol- 216 217
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Friday, August 19
1. Manuel Atienza (University of Ali-
cante / Spain)
Kelsen and Hart in 20th-century Le-
gal Philosophy in Spanish-speaking 
Countries
2. José de Sousa e Brito (New Univer-
sity of Lisbon / Portugal)
Kelsen and Hart in 20th-century Legal 
Philosophy in Portuguese-speaking 
Countries
3. Carla Faralli (University of Bologna) 
and Eric Millard (Paris West University 
Nanterre La Défense / France)
Kelsen and Hart in 20th-century Legal 
Philosophy in Italy and France
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 56 
Meaning, Truth and 
the Concept of Law
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF E.22 / Commerzbank
Organizers Prof. Dennis Patterson, 
European University 
Institute / Italy
About the workshop:
This workshop will present 3 or 4 pa-
pers on various aspects of the concept of 
meaning in law.
um e s  1 1  an d  1 2  o f  A  Tr e a tis e  o f  Le g al  
Philosophy and General Jurisprudence 
(Springer: Berlin, 2005). Volume 11, ti-
tled Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth 
Century: The Common Law World and 
written by Gerald Postema, will be ofﬁ  -
cially presented in print during the con-
gress. Volume 12, titled Legal Philosophy 
in the Twentieth Century: The Civil Law 
World and edited by Enrico Pattaro and 
Corrado Roversi, though not yet in print, 
is at an advanced stage of development, 
and several of its contributors will present 
their work during the workshop.
List of Lectures:
Thursday, August 18
1. Agostino Carrino (University of 
Naples / Italy)
Hans Kelsen between “Purity” and 
Ideology: For a Political Interpretation 
of the Pure Theory of Law
2. Gerald Postema (University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill / USA)
Hart and His Legacy
3. Svein Eng (University of Oslo / 
Norway)
Kelsen and Hart in 20th-century Legal 
Philosophy in Northern European 
Countries
4. Bartosz Brozek (Jagiellonian Univer-
sity of Cracow / Poland)
Kelsen and Hart in 20th-century Le-
gal Philosophy in Eastern European 
Countries
List of Lectures:
1. Dennis Patterson (European Univer-
sity Institute [EUI] / Italy)
Meaning and Truth in Law
2. David Duarte (University of Lisbon / 
Portugal)
Norm’s Presupposition
3. Ralf Poscher (Albert-Ludwigs-Univer-
sität Freiburg / Germany)
An Agonal Account of Legal Disagree-
ment
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 57
(cancelled)
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 58
Biopolitics
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 1.303
Organizers Prof.Dr. Luis Antonio 
Cunha Ribeiro, Universi-
dade Federal Fluminense 
– UFF / Brazil
Prof.Dr. Lucas de 
Alvarenga Gontijo, 
Pontifícia Universidade 
Católica de Minas Gerais 
– PUC-Minas / Brazil
About the workshop:
Michel Foucault summarizes his un-
derstanding of the term Biopolitics in 
the abstract of his 1978-1979 Course at 
College de France: it is understood as 
the way it was tried, since the XVIII cen-
tury, to rationalize the problems faced 
by governmental practices by means of 
phenomena concerning a group of liv-
ing beings taken as a population: health, 
hygiene, birth rates, races... In his 1975-
1976 course he deﬁ  nes it as the move-
ment by which power takes charge of 
life concerns. Gilles Deleuze spoke of the 
i d e a  o f  m an a gin g  a  m ul ti p li ci ty  o f  b e - 218 219
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4. Verena Erlenbusch (Emory Univer-
sity / United States of America)
Sovereignty or biopolitics? Mapping 
power with Agamben and Foucault
5. Lucas de Alvarenga Gontijo (Pontifí-
cia Universidade Católica – PUC-Minas 
/ Brazil)
Culture of Urban Violence: theory of 
recognition and creative expansion of 
rights versus biopolitical practices of 
safety devices
6. Quoc Loc Hong, VU University Am-
sterdam / The Netherlands)
The Role of Courts in the War on 
Terror
7. Jacopo Martire (King’s College Lon-
don / United Kingdom)
Is There a Biopolitical Approach to 
Law?
8. Volha Piotukh (University of Leeds / 
United Kingdom)
Power over Life: the Concept of Bio-
politics in Foucault, Agamben, and 
Esposito
9. Ali M. Rizvi (Universiti Brunei Da-
russalam / Brunei Darussalam)
Biopower, governmentality, and capi-
talism through the lenses of freedom: 
A conceptual enquiry
10. Luís Antônio Cunha Ribeiro (Uni-
versidade Federal Fluminense – UFF / 
Brazil)
The Archaeological Method in 
Foucault and Agamben
ings (a given population) over a vast and 
open space, where probabilistics become 
increasingly relevant. Giorgio Agamben 
states that the totalitarianism of our cen-
tury is founded on the dynamical iden-
tity of life and politics.
This special workshop is intended to 
gather members and scholars who con-
sider the idea of Biopolitics as under-
stood by the authors above mentioned 
– as well as by other contemporary phi-
losophers – useful for a better compre-
hension of XX and XXI century national 
and international politics. There is a spe-
cial interest in discussions towards the 
ways Biopolitics can be related to the 
role of Social Philosophy and Philosophy 
of Law in the present world.
List of Lectures:
1.João Chaves (Federal Public Defend-
er’s Ofﬁ  ce School / Brazil)
Law inside biopolitics as a conceptual 
problem: a new approach on Foucault, 
Agamben and Negri
2. André Dias (Universidade Nova de 
Lisboa / Portugal)
Dismantling the Arrested Political 
Axis: On the Intersection of Biopolitics 
and Involuntarism
3. Ina Dimitrova (Bulgarian Academy of 
Sciences / Bulgaria)
Emerging Biopolitics: Techniques of 
the Self and Reproductive Genetics in 
Bulgaria
11. Herivelto P. Souza (Universidade de 
Brasília – UnB / Brazil)
Primacy of anomalousness: life, 
norms and politics in Canguilhem and 
Foucault
12. Samuel R .Talcott (University of the 
Sciences in Philadelphia / United States 
of America)
Canguilhem, Jacob, and Foucault: the 
Emergence of Biopower as Concept
13. Ahmet Ulvi Turkbag (University of 
Galatasaray / Turkey)
The Bare Life and the Modern Law: 
A Journey to Some Key Concepts or 
Conceptions of Agamben
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 59
Objectivity in Legal Discourse. 
The Comparative Perspective
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF 1.28 / Shanghai
Organizers Dr. Lidia Rodak, Univer-
sity of Silesia / Poland
About the workshop:
Objectivity a special role in application 
of law. It seems a necessary constituent 
of law application and legal reasoning. 
Objectivity is about similar treatment of 
subjects in comparable position, equal-
ity before law, justice or impartiality. 
Additionally, the concept of objectivity 
seems to form a junction between the 
formal and substantive elements of legal 
systems.
We want to analyze how the argument 
from objectivity is used in judicial deci-
sions in various legal environments.
On one hand we want to track down de-
tailed nuances across the legal orders, on 
the other one we do not want to impose 
too strict pre-conceptions. Our task is to 
describe the family of objectivity mean-
ings. We do not want to delimitate the 
scope at the start by pointing to a dic-
tionary deﬁ  nition which could make a 
point of reference. The researchers are to 
rely on their intuition as native speakers 
and trace various senses and functions of 
objectivity based on their linguistic and 
legal competences, the ability to track 
down non-standard usages and ascribe 
functions to the discerned senses. In 
this way we want to analyze conceptual 
networks of national languages, or their 
legal sub-standards for special purposes. 
We want to map the related elements 
within the complex language game (in 
Wittgenstein’s sense).
We are only interested in the court’s ar-
gumentation from objectivity. We want 
to preserve the bottom-up model, start-
ing at judicial usage, and only then draw 
generalizations, since we believe that 
meaning is a contextual phenomenon 
detectible by analysis of utterances.
The overall aim of the research is to ﬁ  nd 
the answer to the question about the 
special meaning of legal objectivity, any 
sense of the term characteristic only of 
law. 220 221
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8. Dr Rūta Kazanavičiūtė (Vilnius Uni-
versity / Lithuania)
Lithuanian legal system
9. Dr Karine Caunes (Sciences-Po and 
Center of European Studies)
French legal system
10. Dr Agnieszka Bielska-Brodziak 
(University of Silesia / Poland)
European Court of Justice
11. Dr Vito Breda (Cardiff Law School 
/ UK)
Common legal system (UK)
12. Jaqueline Sena (University of Sao 
Paulo, Brazil)
Brasilian legal system
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 60
Net Neutrality or Not Neutrality? 
Law, Politics & Internet.
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 4.201
Organizers Rafael Rodríguez Prieto, 
Pablo de Olavide Univer-
sity of Seville / Spain
About the workshop:
Net neutrality or not neutrality? When 
national governments want to block par-
ticular Internet activities or content – or 
List of Lectures:
I. Moderator: Pietro Denaro
II. Persons presenting the general ﬁ  nal 
research results: Lidia Rodak, Grzegorz 
Panek, Mateusz Stepień, Michał Kielb
III. Persons presenting the research re-
sults from the perspective of their own 
legal system:
1. Prof. Mark Van Hoecke (University of 
Ghent / Belgium)
European Court of Human Rights
2. Dr Pietro Denaro (University of Pal-
ermo / Italy)
Italian legal system
3. Dr Antal Szerlics (University of Essex 
/ UK)
Hungarian legal system
4. Andrej Kristan (University of Genoa 
/ Italy)
Slovenian legal system
5. Maximiliano Aramburo (University 
of Alicante / Spain)
Spanish legal system
6. Katelijne Stranz (University of Ham-
burg / Germany)
German legal system
7. Dr Bogdan Iancu (University of Bu-
charest / Romania)
Romanian legal system
see what users are doing – they typically 
turn to the private companies that man-
age pieces of the Internet, including In-
ternet Service Providers, search engines, 
blogging and news portals, and even 
hardware providers. It is a sort of “gov-
ernmental limitation” on internet. 
For some types of online material, such 
as pornography, racist speech, defama-
tion, or unauthorized posting of person-
al information, governments, NGOs, and 
others may encourage or even require 
Internet companies to restrict content. 
In other cases, however, governments 
expect Internet companies to similarly 
restrict content that is protected expres-
sion under international standards, such 
as videos about current events, online 
fora for religious expression, and blogs 
criticizing or ridiculing national leaders.
As pressures to ﬁ  lter, censor, and moni-
tor this type of protected speech on the 
Internet have mounted, some Internet 
and communications technology (ICT) 
companies, academics, human rights 
activists, socially responsible investors, 
and civil society participants have held 
a series of conversations about how to 
respond. This event will tap project par-
ticipants to have as candid a conversa-
tion as possible about the process in 
which they’ve engaged, and the role that 
corporations should play in response to 
government-mandated Internet censor-
ship and surveillance, with particular 
but not exclusive emphasis on authori-
tarian regimes.
But there are other “limitations”. Neu-
trality proponents claim that telecom 
companies seek to impose a tiered serv-
ice model in order to control the pipeline 
and thereby remove competition, create 
artiﬁ  cial scarcity, and oblige subscribers 
to buy their otherwise uncompetitive 
services. Many believe net neutrality to 
be primarily important as a preserva-
tion of current freedoms. On December 
21, 2010, the FCC’s Democrats approved 
new “network neutrality” rules for the 
Internet in the USA. The regulation has 
sparked considerable controversy in 
USA. 
We will deal with internet and private 
and public limitations. We will study the 
impact of the regulations on democracy 
and human rights.
List of Lectures:
1. Rafael Rodríguez Prieto (Pablo de 
Olavide University of Seville / Spain)
2. Nolan Bowie (Harvard University / 
USA)
3. Alberto González Pascual 
(Complutense(University of Madrid / 
Spain)
4. Gotzone Mora (Universidad del País 
Vasco / Spain)
5. José María Seco Martíne (Pablo de 
Olavide University of Seville / Spain)
6. Fernando Martínez Cabezudo (Pablo 
de Olavide University of Seville / Spain) 222 223
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cated at the intersection of ancient and 
medieval philosophy of action (Aristotle 
and Aquinas), contemporary philosophy 
of action, practical reason (Aristotelian 
and Kantian) and legal philosophy. Dis-
tinguished representatives from both the 
Aristotelian and Kantian traditions to-
gether with eminent legal philosophers 
h a v e  b e e n  i n v i t e d  t o  r e ﬂ   ect on these 
issues for three days at the IVR World 
Congress in the bustling and cultural 
city of Frankfurt, Germany.
The IVR World Congress in Legal Phi-
losophy is the perfect intellectual en-
vironment to foster thought and ideas 
at the highest level on the overlapping 
relationships between practical philoso-
phy, the philosophy of action and legal 
philosophy. The congress has been held 
every two years for more than 100 years 
and has been a driving force in the crea-
tion of intellectual partnerships and the 
generation of important ideas in legal 
philosophy. Some of the most important 
legal philosophical ideas of the 20th and 
21st century were once presented at a 
IVR Congress, amongst them Hans Kel-
sen’s notion of the basic norm, Joseph 
Raz’s concept of authority, and Robert 
Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation.
The format of the workshop will include 
short presentations (up to 10 minutes) 
followed by extensive open discussion 
(up to 35 minutes) per paper. All papers 
will be circulated 3 weeks in advance 
of the event and prior knowledge by all 
participants will be assumed. A top aca-
demic publisher will be sought to pub-
lish the papers in an edited collection, 
7. Jonathan Pass (University of Man-
chester / UK and Pablo de Olavide 
University of Seville / Spain)
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 61
Legal Normativity and the Philosophy 
of Practical Reason
Date MON 15 Aug 2011 + 
TUE 16 Aug 2011 + 
THU 18 Aug 2011
Time MON 14.30 h – 18.30 h + 
TUE 14.30 h – 18.30 h + 
THU 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HZ 7
Organizers Prof. Dr. Veronica Rod-
riguez-Blanco, University 
of Birmingham / UKProf. 
Dr. George Pavlakos, 
University of Antwerp 
and Glasgow / Belgium 
and UK
About the workshop:
Arguably law should be understood in 
continuity with practical reason. Howev-
er, there has been little effort to this day 
to clarify the interconnection between 
the sphere of legal rules and principles, 
intentional action and practical reason. 
The workshop aims to provide a platform 
for the discussion of these relationships, 
by bringing ideas from key philosophi-
cal traditions to bear on central juris-
prudential concepts such as ‘authority’ , 
‘obligation’, ‘rule-following, ‘normativ-
ity’, ‘causation’ and ‘responsibility’. The 
should there exist a sufﬁ  cient number of 
high-quality papers. 
List of Lectures:
1. Matyas Bodig (University of Aber-
deen / UK)
The Normativity of Law and the Meth-
odological Implications of Interpretiv-
ism
2. Sharon Byrd (University of Jena / 
Germany) and Joachim Hruschka (Er-
langen University / Germany)
Hobbes, Kant and the Original Con-
tract
3. Sylvie Delacroix (University College 
London / UK)
Normativity, Practical Deliberation 
and Moral Courage
4. Luis Duarte Almeida (Oxford / UK)
A Proof-Based Account of Legal Ex-
ceptions
5. William Edmundson (Georgia State 
University / USA)
On G.A. Cohen, Political Philosophy 
and Personal Behaviour
6. Ken Ehrenberg (The State University 
of New York at Buffalo / USA)
Law’s Claim to Authority is not a 
Claim to Preemption: Choice of Evils 
and Legal Gaps
7. Kevin Falvey (University of Califor-
nia at Santa Barbara / USA)
The Cause of What It Understands, 
Practical Knowledge and Intentional 
Action
8. Matthew Hanser (University of 
California at Santa Barbara / USA)
Practical Reason and Moral Mereology
9. Antony Hatzistavrou (University of 
Hull / UK)
Reconsideration and Exclusionary 
Reasons
10. Ulrike Heuer (University of Leeds / 
UK)
Acting for the Right Reasons
11. Heidi Hurd (University of Illinois / 
USA)
Interpreting Without Intentions: How 
the Limits of Interpretation Deﬁ  ne the 
Limits of Legal Authority
12.Stanley Paulson (University of 
Washington at Saint Louis / USA and 
Kiel University / Germany)
A ‘Justiﬁ  ed Normativity’ Thesis versus 
‘Modal Normativity’”. An Enquiry 
into Normativity in Kelsen’s Pure 
Theory of Law
13. George Pavlakos (University of 
Antwerp / Belgium and Glasgow / UK)
Title t.b.a.
14.Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (Univer-
sity of Birmingham / UK)
Legal Authority and the Paradox of 
Intention in Action 224 225
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legal theory. Notions associated (more 
or less eligibly) with science e. g. clar-
ity of thought, effectiveness of method, 
expectation of practical outcome for al-
most every choice made, encourage us 
into further investigation of medical and 
psychological experiments that might be 
of any meaning
to legal doctrine.
Faced with this state of affairs, should 
we develop legal theory and philosophy 
further, into the direct reference with 
quantum mechanics or maybe abandon 
the tendency and take a step back, ac-
cept that neurolaw as such is just an im-
aginary friend of psychology? Obvious 
as it seems, not all ﬁ  elds of science are 
of equal importance to legal reasoning. 
The point of the workshop is an attempt 
to select some reasonable prospects for 
the development of legal theory and to 
deal with the looming vision of scientiﬁ  c 
methodology.
Do we need to adjust our reasoning to 
scientiﬁ  c tendency or just stick to com-
monsensical base of our unique theory? 
Is revision of legal philosophy required 
in any of these cases? Which type of le-
gal philosophy would ﬁ  t scientiﬁ  c meth-
odology best? Papers dealing with these 
and connected questions are welcome to 
start a discussion on the place of modern 
legal theory among the fast expanding 
branches of thought.
15. Sergio Tenenbaum (University of 
Toronto / Canada)
The Rationality of Vague and Indeter-
minate Ends and Legal Discretion
16. Bruno Verbeek (University of Leiden 
/ The Netherlands)
The Authority of Conventions, Social 
Norms and Law
17.Ken Westphal (University of East 
Anglia / UK)
Title t.b.a.
18. Ekow Yankah (Yeshiva University, 
Cardozo Law School / USA)
Civic Vices and the Rule of Law”
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 62
Philosophy of science and legal 
philosophy – a blending or a clash?
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 1.303
Organizers Aleksandra Samonek, 
Jagiellonian Univeristy / 
Poland
About the workshop:
Philosophy of science has become an ex-
tremely inﬂ  uential heir of philosophical 
tradition of analysis. Due to this fact, we 
are tempted to employ the achievements 
of scientiﬁ  c interpretation and method-
ology of philosophy of science within 
List of Lectures:
1. Michał Araszkiewicz (Jagiellonian 
Univeristy / Poland)
Title t.b.a.
2. Mikołaj Barczentewicz (University of 
Warsaw / Poland)
Against scientiﬁ  c method in legal 
Theory
3. José Manuel Linhares (Universidade 
de Coimbra / Portugal)
Is law’s practical-cultural project con-
demned to fail the test of ‘contextual 
congruence’? A dialogue with Hans 
Albert’s social engineering
4. Aleksandra Samonek (Jagiellonian 
University / Poland)
Criminal law agency and STIT Theory
5. Wojciech Załuski, Jagiellonian Uni-
versity / Poland)
Deontic
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 63
The Scope of Liberalism in Bioethics; 
The limit of consenting will
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF 3.36 / Chicago
Organizers Prof. Itaru Shimazu, 
Chiba University / Japan
About the workshop:
Progress in bioscience and biotechnology 
has been making the impossible possible. 
And it has been expanding the scope of 
potential liberty in our lives. Under the 
liberal framework every medical treat-
ment has to be authorized by consent -
ing will of the patients. But even if some 
new treatment is technologically possi-
ble and those concerned sincerely desire 
and are eager to consent with its utili-
zation, our society tends to impose vari-
ous legal and moral limits on the scope 
of consenting will. And we sometimes 
ﬁ  nd it difﬁ  cult to articulate the reasons 
for that. But what if we go on the princi-
ple of ‘no reason no limit’ which sounds 
quite suitable for liberalism of our legal 
framework? The hypothesis which is 
lingering in our minds is that the mod-
ern legal principles may connote within 
them something which may, at least ap-
parently, conﬂ  ict with individual liberty. 
We will identify this as “social anxiety 
about unspeciﬁ   ed consequences” and 
ask if it can ever provide a sufﬁ  cient nor-
mative foundation for regulation of indi- 226 227
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SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 64
Analogical and Exemplary Reasoning 
in Legal Discourse
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HZ 13
Organizers Dr. Carel Smith, 
Leiden Law School / 
The Netherlands
Dr. Hendrik Kaptein, 
Leiden Law School / 
The Netherlands
Dr. Harm Kloosterhuis, 
Erasmus School of Law / 
The Netherlands
About the workshop:
Analogical reasoning is, on the one 
hand, considered a way of reasoning 
that has special prominence in legal rea-
soning, as a way to ﬁ  nd new solutions in 
law and to defend legal claims (recently 
Sunstein, Brewer). But it has also been 
attacked, on the other, for analogical 
reasoning would be, in fact, nothing but 
deductive and moral reasoning (Schau-
er, Posner, Alexander).
This Workshop addresses the (alleged) 
character and import of analogical rea-
soning in legal reasoning and legal ar-
gumentation. Topics to be discussed are, 
among others, the role of analogy with 
regard to institutional changes and de-
velopments (such as the increasing sig-
niﬁ   cance of principals, and the rising 
phenomenon of multi-layered legal sys-
vidual liberty. This idea derives from the 
social philosophy of F.A. Hayek, who is 
regarded as a thorough-going liberal but 
used to call himself irrationalist and af-
ﬁ  rms the social necessity of certain ta-
boos.
List of Lectures:
1. Yukiko Saito (Kitasato Univ / Japan)
Who can give consent to use/make 
one’s gametes?
2. Akiko Nozaki (Hiroshima City Univ. 
/ Japan)
The Inﬂ  uence of Relationship on 
Relational Rights
3. Itaru Shimazu (Chiba Univ. / Japan)
Limitting the Scope of Consent by 
Unarticulated Reasons
4. Maru Yuichi (Chiba University 
Hospital / Japan)
Informed consent in clinical research 
and the respect for autonomy
Comment
Christoph Lütge (Technische Univer-
sität München / Germany)
Stathis Banakas (University of East 
Anglia / UK)
tems as the European Union), the role of 
exemplary reasoning in science and law, 
and the justiﬁ  catory force of analogical 
reasoning.
List of Lectures:
1. Amalia Amaya (Research Fellow, 
Institute for Philosophical Research, 
National Autonomous University of 
Mexico)
Exemplars, Legal Reasoning, and 
Legal Ethics
2. Bartosz Brozek (Adjunct Professor 
Jurisprudence, Jagiellonian University, 
Kraków / Poland)
Is Analogy a Form of Legal Resoning?
3. Angela Condello (PhD Candidate, 
Philosophy of Law, University of Rome 
III / Italy)
Being instead of a Deﬁ  nition
4. Martin P. Golding (Professor of 
Philosophy and Law. Duke University, 
Durham, NC / USA)
The Force of Arguments in the Law
5. Hendrik Kaptein (Research Fellow, 
Department of Jurisprudence, Leiden 
Law School, Leiden University / The 
Netherlands)
Analogy, Precedent, Paradigm, Meta-
phor: So Many Cases of Unintentional 
Inexistence (and why this des not 
always really matter)
6. Harm Kloosterhuis (Research fellow, 
Department of Jurisprudence, Erasmus 
School of Law, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam / The Netherlands)
On the Rhetorical Use of Analoy-
Argumentation in Legal Decisions
7. Carel Smith (Research Fellow, 
Department of Jurisprudence, Leiden 
Law School, Leiden University / The 
Netherlands)
The Rhetoric of Literallity: Rules and 
Metaphor in Law
8.Giovanni Tuzet & Damanio Canale 
(Assistant Professor, Department of 
Legal Studies, Università di Bocconi, 
Milano / Italy)
Analogical Reasoning and Extensive 
Interpretation 228 229
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List of Lectures:
1. O. Stovba (Kharkov’s National 
University / Ukraine)
Law and “Ge-stell”
2. A. Polyakov (St. Petersburg State 
University / Russia)
Normative fact as the object of phe-
nomenological analysis
3. E. Timoshina (St. Petersburg State 
University / Russia)
The Tradition of Phenomenological 
Interpretation of L. Petrazycki’s Legal 
Philosophy
4. O. Meregko (Lublin’s Catholics Uni-
versity / Ukraine)
Five worlds of Law
5. S. Maksimov (National University, 
Law Academy of Ukraine / Ukraine)
The issue of recognition in phenom-
enological and hermeneutical 
perspective
6. Juho Joensoo (Helsinki University / 
Finland)
Law and Calculative Thinking
7. (Vitaliy Voitsishen / Ukraine)
Phenomenology of Judgement
8. Vyacheslav Bigun (Law research Ko-
retskiy Institute / Ukraine)
Philosophy of Justice
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 65
Law, Science, Technology: Phenome-
nological-hermeneutical approach
Date MON 15 Aug 2011 + 
THU 18 Aug 2011
Time MON 14.30 h – 18.30 h + 
THU 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HZ 14
Organizers Dr. Oleksiy Stovba, 
Kharkov’s National 
University / Ukraine
About the workshop:
Science and techniques are the different 
forms of ruling over the world. The same 
is valid about law, which the means to 
control society is. But law, technique, 
science are the forms of “Ge-stell” (M. 
Heidegger). Thus, we don’t produce the 
power by the means of law, science e.t.c., 
but enslaved by it. The possibilities of our 
Being are enslaved. Because the science 
is one of the mentioned forms of Ge-stell, 
we need something other in order to re-
pair this situation. What we can? On the 
way of phenomenological-hermeneutics 
legal thinking free attitude towards law, 
techniques and other forms of the “Ge-
stell” to produce.
The topic of the workshop is law, science 
and technique in modern world.
The aim is to produce the free attitude 
towards law, techniques and other forms 
of “Ge-stell” on the way of phenomeno-
logical-hermeneutics legal thinking.
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 66
Dynamics of Law and Society: 
The Promise of Interactionism and 
Pragmatism
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14-30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF 2.45 / Boston
Organizers Prof. Dr. Sanne Taekema, 
Erasmus University 
Rotterdam / The Nether-
lands
Prof. Dr. Wibren Van der 
Burg, Erasmus Univer-
sity Rotterdam / The 
Netherlands
About the workshop:
In different corners of the ﬁ  eld of legal 
theory, there is a renewed interest in in-
teractional and pragmatic theory, prima-
rily as an alternative to positivism. There 
is a return to the thought of of theo-
rists such as Lon L. Fuller, John Dewey, 
Philip Selznick and Karl Llewellyn, as a 
source of inspiration for coping with the 
changing relationship between law and 
society.
The aim of this workshop is to construct 
a new paradigm of interactionist and 
pragmatist theory by bringing together 
scholars who develop interactionism and 
pragmatism theoretically with schol-
ars who use these theories to cope with 
problems of legal practice. The common 
starting point of interactionist and prag-
matist theory is the idea that law should 
be understood as emerging from the in-
teractions and mutual expectations of 
the participants in legal practices. In this 
workshop, attention will be both on the 
theoretical grounds for such ideas and 
on the implications for practices in inter-
national law, legislation and the rule of 
law.
List of Lectures:
1. Wouter de Been (Erasmus University 
Rotterdam / The Netherlands)
American Legal Realism: Sound and 
Fury Signifying Nothing?
2. Jutta Brunnee (University of Toronto 
/ Canada) [to be conﬁ  rmed]
Interactional International Law
3. Rachel Herdy (Federal University of 
Rio de Janeiro / Brazil)
Peirce’s Contribution to Legal Philoso-
phy: A Threefold Distinction
4. Martin Krygier (University of New 
South Wales / UK)
Philip Selznick’s Pragmatism
5. Lonneke Poort (VU University Am-
sterdam / The Netherlands)
An Ethos of Controversies operating in 
a Two-Track Approach. Analysis of an 
Interactive Model of Legislation.
6. Kristen Rundle (London School of 
Economics / UK) [to be conﬁ  rmed]
Before the debate: reading Fuller 
through eunomics 230 231
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can be studied from two different per-
spectives: either how it should be (Sol-
len) or how it is (Sein). These two per-
spectives correspond with two different 
disciplines from which law can be stud-
ied: respectively, a normative science of 
law that determines deductively which 
rules are valid, and an explanatory so-
ciology of law that establish inductively 
a certain regularity for which it tries to 
ﬁ  nd a causal explanation. It is equally 
possible and legitimate to study law from 
both perspectives, but not at the same 
time. 
If Kelsen would be right, the possibilities 
for interdisciplinary research into law 
would be very limited. However, a strict 
fact-value separation is rejected by schol-
ars adhering to other, non-positivist sci-
entiﬁ  c approaches, in particular herme-
neutics and pragmatism. A forceful 
pragmatist defense of the inseparability 
of facts and values is provided by Hilary 
Putnam. According to him, knowledge 
of facts presumes knowledge of values 
and, vice versa, knowledge of values pre-
sumes knowledge of facts. Although we 
can in principle distinguish factual judg-
ments from evaluative judgments, many 
of those judgments are mixed and there 
is not a clear separating line between the 
two categories. 
In our workshop we intend to organize 
a discussion about the tenability of the 
fact/value distinction and its relevance 
for interdisciplinary research. Propo-
nents of different (positivist, pragmatic 
and hermeneutic) positions are invited 
to give their view on the matter.
7. Sanne Taekema (Erasmus University 
Rotterdam / The Netherlands)
A Pragmatist Account of Legal 
Dynamics
8. Wibren van der Burg (Erasmus Uni-
versity Rotterdam / The Netherlands)
What is Legal Interactionism?
9. Henrik Palmer Olsen (University of 
Copenhagen / Denmark) [to be con-
ﬁ  rmed]
Title t.b.a.
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 67
The Fact/Value Separation and its Rel-
evance for Interdisciplinary Research
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 1.101
Organizers Prof. Dr. Sanne Taekema, 
Erasmus University Rot-
terdam / The Netherlands
Prof. Dr. Bart Van Klink, 
VU University Amster-
dam / The Netherlands
About the workshop:
In his Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen tries 
to a construe a solid scientiﬁ  c foundation 
for the science of law. For that purpose, 
the question has to be answered what is 
typical or unique about the way the sci-
ence of law understands its object. Kel-
sen argues that the phenomenon of law 
List of Lectures:
1. Amalia Amaya (Institute of Philo-
sophical Research, National Autono-
mous University of Mexico)
Legal Reasoning as Re-description: 
Murdoch, Facts, and Values
2. Maksymilian Del Mar (Department 
of Law, Queen Mary, University of Lon-
don / UK)
Impure Theory: Pragmatic Reactions to 
the Fact / Value Distinction
3. Anne-Ruth Mackor (Department 
Theory of Law, Faculty of Law, Univer-
sity of Groningen / The Netherlands)
Norm-descriptions, norm-contentions 
and norm-recommendations
4. Marcin Pieniążek (Faculty of Law 
and Administration, Andrzej Frycz Mo-
drzewski Krakow University / Poland)
Paul Ricoeur’s dialogue of “Sein und 
Sollen” and its possible contribution to 
the philosophy of law
5. Carel Smith (Leiden Law School, Lei-
den University / The Netherlands)
Understanding Value-conﬂ  icts in Law: 
Towards a Cultural Vocabulary of Law
6. Sanne Taekema (Erasmus School of 
Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam / 
The Netherlands)
The Neglect of Facts
7. Bart van Klink (Faculty of Law, VU 
University Amsterdam / The Nether-
lands) and Oliver Lembcke (Friedrich 
Schiller University Jena / Germany)
“The Normative Force of the Factual“. 
Georg Jellinek, Hans Kelsen and Carl 
Schmitt on the Is-Ought Distinction
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 68
Political Obligation
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF 2.45 / Boston
Organizers Prof. Hirohide Takikawa, 
Osaka City University / 
Japan
About the workshop:
Since Socrates, political obligation has 
been one of the central issues in legal 
philosophy. A fundamental question is 
whether or not there is a moral duty to 
obey the law, and if so, why. A classi-
cal answer to this question is the social 
co n tra ct  th eo ry  e xpo un d ed  b y  T .  H ob-
bes and J. Locke, but it has been severely 
criticized since D. Hume. Many other 
theories have been advanced to explain 
and justify political obligation by appeal-
ing to a natural duty of justice (J. Rawls, 
J. Waldron), the principle of fair play 
(H. L. A. Hart, G. Klosko), associative 
obligation (R. Dworkin), or samaritan-
ism (C. Wellman), while some of them 
show a hybrid argument of these theo-
ries. Furthermore, others just deny the 
existence of a moral duty to obey the law 
(A. J. Simmons, J. Raz). 232 233
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4. Tatsuya Yokohama, Shizuoka Univer-
sity, Japan
Intrinsic Value of Law and Good Gov-
ernance: A Reorganization of Legal
Obligation and Political Obligation
5. Tatsuo Inoue, Graduate School of Law 
and Politics, The University of Tokyo, 
Japan
Legitimacy, Critical Democracy and 
Political Transformation of Japan
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 69
Genetically Modiﬁ  ed Foods and 
the Turkish Legislation
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF 1.27 / Dubai
Organizers Ass.-Prof. Dr. Zeynep 
Özlem Üskül Engin, 
Galatasaray Üniversity 
Law Faculty / Turkey
About the workshop:
The main purpose of the workshop is to 
discuss what GMOs are, the controver-
sies about this speciﬁ  c issue and the re-
lated regulations that are put forward by 
the authorities. GMOs are genetically al-
tered organisms which have been widely 
produced and breeded in certain parts 
of the world. According to some ex-
perts, this special practice of agriculture 
emerged in order to put en and to famine 
and prevent food scarcity. As growing 
The purpose of this workshop is to care-
fully examine these classical and mod-
ern theories.
Papers are invited to address such top-
ics as:
What exactly is the problem of political 
obligation? Are there any differences 
among political obligation, civic obliga-
tion and legal duty?
Why do we need to explore the problem 
of political obligation? Is it worth the ef-
fort to be addressed? How should we sit-
uate it in the realm of legal philosophy?
Do we have a moral duty to obey a bad 
law? If we do, why? If we do not, then 
does it mean that we have a moral duty 
to morality, not law?
Which approach is most successful to 
justify political obligation: consent, fair-
ness, natural duty, association, grati-
tude, or else? What is the criterion of the 
success of a theory?
List of Lectures:
1. Win-chiat Lee, Department of Phi-
losophy, Wake Forest University,
USA
Political Obligations as Associative 
Obligation
2. Hirohide Takikawa, Graduate School 
of Law, Osaka City University, Japan
Free Riders Play Fair
3. Massimo Renzo, York Law School, 
The University of York, UK
Fairness, Self-deception and Political 
Obligation
GMOs seems to be more convenient than 
the traditional farming, it is more eligi-
ble to produce food in large scale which 
will be a ﬁ  ne solution for food scarcity. 
However, there are some opposition to 
the GMOs. It is strongly believed that 
the real causes of famine are not related 
to production, it is a problem of distri-
bution of food. Moreover, patenting the 
seeds leads to an unstoppable control 
and dominance over food by the private 
enterprises. Therefore, the opponents 
state that the aims of these companies 
are solely ﬁ  nancial gain and monopoli-
zation in food production. Patenting the 
seeds is another arguable issue. It poses a 
great threat for the organic farmers since 
GMO seeds can contaminate the others 
through natural ways. This is not the 
only danger that organic farmers face 
with; they also can be sued by the GMO 
producers for unintended exposure to 
GMO seeds. Not only the diminishing of 
the variety of species but also the pos-
sible adverse effects of GMOs on human 
health create a debate between the two 
groups. These are the only topics that are 
open to discussion. In addition to these, 
labeling the products creates a huge 
problem among the poorly educated 
consumers as they have not been clearly 
regulated in some countries. Hence, this 
subject having such a close connection 
to human health cannot be ignored by 
the law. In fact, a number of countries 
have enacted legislation in order to reg-
ulate this sensitive ﬁ  eld. All these con-
temporary issues for Turkey and other 
European countries will be highlighted 
in the work shop.
List of Lectures:
1.  Dr. Dobrochna Bach-Golecka, 
University of Warsaw, Poland
“Is the use of Genetically Modiﬁ  ed 
Organisms Immoral? The Debate on 
the European Legislation (Directive 
2001/18/EC) in Poland”.
2. Dr. Bige Açımuz, University Özyeğin
„Turkish GMO legislation. Risk 
Management without Precationary 
Principle“.
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 70
Legal Discourse and Human Rights
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 4.202
Organizers Ass.-Prof. Gülriz Uygur, 
Ankara / Turkey
About the workshop:
Discourse theories generally give place 
to procedural rules, but not to human 
rights. If we claim that legal discourse 
should include human rights, the prob-
lem arises regarding how we can justify 
this claim within the framework of the 
requirements of the discourse. One of 
the difﬁ   culties is that while discourse 
theory is procedural, human rights are 
substantive in their nature. If we claim 
the discourse theory should include hu-
man rights, this means discourse theory  234 235
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SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 71
Involving the Experts – A Critical Anal-
ysis of the Role of Expert Committees 
in Legal Decision Making con-cerning 
Complex Technological Issues with a 
Strong Moral Impact –
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 4.101
Organizers Dr. B.C. Britta van Beers, 
VU University Amster-
dam / The Netherlands
Ph.D. Lonneke Port, VU 
University Amsterdam / 
The Netherlands
About the workshop:
Within the regulation of bioethical is-
su es experts’ opinions ha v e become of 
increasing importance. In light of the 
widely diverging moral viewpoints on 
current technological developments, 
the semi-neutrality of expert commit-
tees seems very appealing. Moreover, 
experts can contribute in making these 
technically complex issues accessible for 
laypersons. Lastly, it is said that consult-
ing and involving experts will improve 
the adaption of legal norms to practice. 
In this workshop, however, we wish to 
challenge the view that involving ex-
perts will lead to more adequate regula-
tion.
The thesis that expert committees should 
n o  l o n g e r  p l a y  a  d e ci s i v e  r o l e  in  d e ci -
sion making will be a focus-point of 
should include also a substantive dimen-
sion. On the other hand, it is possible to 
claim that human rights can be included 
among the requirements of the discourse 
and consequently claim that discourse 
theory has procedural and substantive 
dimensions.
The need for a substantive dimension for 
discourse theory may be justiﬁ  ed on the 
basis of different reasons. For example 
one may argue that, if discourse theory 
yield the right answer as the result of a 
procedure, it should have a substantive 
dimension, or, one may discuss that 
in the context of moral pluralism, dis-
course needs a common ground. Regard-
ing this, the problem arises how can we 
reconcile the procedural and substantive 
dimensions of discourse. 
Actually, human rights are considered 
for some as a discourse theory, and 
hence this workshop will also explore 
this relationship.
These are just some of the questions that 
fall under the scope of the workshop on 
Legal Discourse and Human Rights. 
List of Lectures:
t.b.a.
the workshop. To start, their demo-
c r a t i c  l e g i t i m a c y  c a n  b e  d o u b t e d ,  e s -
pecially given the fact that within this 
ﬁ  eld matters of life and death are often 
a t  s tak e .  Furth e rm o r e ,  i t  can  b e  q u e s -
tioned whether their mostly technical or 
scientiﬁ  c expertise can also justify their 
authority in legal and political decision 
making. Moreover, if experts have to op-
erate within a legal framework, can they 
still function as experts from their own 
ﬁ  eld? After all, their reasoning is, then, 
limited by legal boundaries given by the 
context of decision making. 
Purpose of the workshop is to re-eval-
u a t e  t h e  r o l e  o f  e x p e r t  c o m m i t t e e s  i n  
bioethical decision making. Which as-
pects of decision making can be delegat-
ed to the experts, and which should be 
left to the political domain? Is the use 
of expert committees inevitable within 
a liberal-proceduralist democracy? Fi-
nally, are there any alternative ways to 
bridge the gap between the legal con-
text of decision making and the complex 
practice of bioethical issues?
List of Lectures:
1. Prof. M. Hildebrandt (VU Brussels / 
Belgium)
Experts, Experience, Representation, 
and pTA
2. Prof. M. Adams(Tilburg University / 
The Netherlands)
The Role of Dutch Medical Ethical 
Committees in Bio-medical Issues 
such as Euthanasia
3. Drs. F. Fleurke (TILT, Tilburg Univer-
sity / The Netherlands)
The EFSA. Risk-Assessment on GMOs
4. Dr.mr. L.M. Poort (VU Amsterdam / 
The Netherlands)
The Role of Expert-committees in Con-
troversial Decision making
5. Dr. mr. B. van Beers (VU Amsterdam 
/ The Netherlands)
Role of Experts in Decision Making on 
Artiﬁ  cial Pro-creation
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 72
Legal Theory and Education: 
The Way Ahead
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30h – 18.30h
Location HZ 13
Organizers Prof. Mark van Hoecke, 
European Academy of 
Legal Theory / Belgium
Dr. jur. Christoph Good, 
University of Vienna / 
Austria
Mag. LL.M. D.E.A. 
Jürgen Busch, Univer-
sity of Lucerne / 
Switzerland
About the workshop:
The internationalization of law & legal 
education points to the need for a debate 
of a (re-) enforcement of the foundations 
of law (legal theory/legal philosophy, le- 236 237
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List of Lectures:
1. Mark van Hoecke (Univ. Ghent / Bel-
gium), Christoph Good (Univ. Lucerne 
/ Switzerland) and Jürgen Busch (Univ. 
Vienna / Austria)
Introduction (“European Co-operation 
and Best Practice in Legal Theory Edu-
cation: Past, Present, Future”)
2. Walter Van Gerven (University of 
Leuven / Belgium)
Politics, Ethics & The Law – Legal 
Practice & Scholarship
3. Otto Pfersmann (Université Paris 1/
France)
Title t.b.a.
4. Benoit Frydman / David Restrepo 
Amariles (Université Libre de Brux-
elles/Belgium)
Teaching Global Law
5. Nicoletta Bersier-Ladavac (THEMIS 
Geneva / Switzerland)
Law taught for purely practical ends or 
also as a science?
6. Ekaterina Samokhina, National 
Research University, Higher School of 
Economics, Faculty of Law, Saint-Pe-
tersburg / Russia)
The problem of a romanticized vision 
of law in legal education
7. Balazs Ratai (University of Pécs/Hun-
gary)
Title t.b.a.
gal sociology, legal history) within legal 
education in order to provide students 
with the necessary contexts and tool-set 
for a proper understanding of complex 
legal problems. The organizing EALT has 
long lasting experience in developing 
and realizing various educational pro-
grammes in legal theory as well as pro-
viding a platform for a mutual exchange 
of ideas and experience in legal theory 
education among different institutions 
all over Europe and on a global scale. 
The workshop intends to share experi-
ence among national and transnational 
experts in organizing such educational 
programmes and/or in the teaching of 
legal theory as well as related (i.a. em-
p i r i c a l )  r e s e a r c h .  B e s t  p r a c t i c e  e x a m -
ples among current programmes and/
or projects and future trends and needs 
for new and innovative responses from 
stakeholders in the ﬁ  eld of legal theory 
education shall be identiﬁ  ed. 
Papers proposed will address one of the 
following topics:
a) general aims of educating legal theory 
– a transnational view
b) current challenges of legal theory ed-
ucation
c) solutions to current and future chal-
lenges – a needs analysis
d) best practice examples of innovative 
legal theory education
The workshop will focus on a thorough 
discussion of the draft papers (10 min of 
presentations, 20 min of discussion for 
each paper).
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 73
Law and Memory. Transitional justice 
in Legal Philosophical Perspective
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14-30 h – 18.30 h
Location IG 254
Organizers Prof. Dr. Wouter Veraart, 
Vrije Universiteit Amster-
dam / The Netherlands
Dr. Derk Venema, 
Radboud University Ni-
jmegen / The Netherlands
About the workshop:
Transitional justice is a hot multi-disci-
plinary research ﬁ  eld. Yet, some funda-
mental issues have not received the nec-
essary legal philosophical attention. In 
this special workshop we present a few 
key issues. Common thread through-
out the papers is the close but difﬁ  cult 
connection between the technicalities 
of the legal system and processes of re-
membering and peace building. On the 
one hand the presenters appear to be op-
timistic about the role the law can play 
in response to extreme injustice. On the 
other hand, they interrogate the inher-
ent limits of the legal system in its re-
sponse to an unjust past.
List of Lectures:
1. Luigi Corrias (VU University Amster-
dam / The Netherlands)
A Silence That Remains: Notes on 
Transitional Justice
2. Ernesto Fabián Mieles González 
(Freie Universität Berlin / Germany)
Strategic Litigation, Social Mobiliza-
tion, and Memory Building in Colom-
bia
3. Victoria Roca (Alicante University / 
Spain)
The Role of Legality in the Struggle for 
Democracy
4. Derk Venema (Radboud University 
Nijmegen / The Netherlands)
Transitional Justice Mechanisms as 
Rites of Passage
5. Wouter Veraart (VU University 
Amsterdam / The Netherlands)
You Asked for Justice, But What You 
Received was Legal Peace. The Struc-
ture of Disappointment in Some Cases 
of Transitional Justice 238 239
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to open the ﬂ  oor for an active dialogue 
among private law theories.
List of Lectures:
1. Marco Haase (China University of Po-
litical Science and Law, Peking / China)
Civil Law as a Legal System
2. Yuki Asano (Gakushuin University / 
Japan)
Private Law and Legal Pluralism
3. Souichirou Kozuka (Gakushuin Uni-
versity / Japan)
Soft Law, Private Authority and Social 
Norms: When and how non-state law 
replaces the private law of the State?
4. Bertram Keller (University of 
Cologne / Germany)
Private Law as Political Deliberation
5. Dai Yokomizo (Nagoya University / 
Japan)
Technological Evolution and the 
Method of Conﬂ  ict of Laws
6. Lorenz Kähler (University of 
Göttingen / Germany)
Contractual Consent under the 
Condition of Information Overload
7. Dan Wielsch (University of Cologne / 
Germany)
Public Dimension of Licencing
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 74
Private Law Theory (PLT) – Politics of 
Private Law in a Technological Age
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF 1.28 / Shanghai
Organizers Prof. Dr. Dan Wielsch, 
University of Cologne / 
Germany
Bertram Keller, Universi-
ty of Cologne / Germany
About the workshop:
Our societies are more and more gov-
erned by private interactions and private 
law regulation. In the technological age 
private governance grows global. Big 
industrial projects as well as science in 
general transcend boundaries. The prob-
lems remain. 
The politics of private law is not purely 
a state policy any more. The policies 
spring of spontaneous privates orders 
themselves. Thus, the different politics 
of private regulation or law depend on 
underlying implicit theories. 
This PLT workshop aims to clarify what 
uniﬁ   es, distinguishes, and relates dif-
ferent theoretical approaches to private 
law. It does not want to develop shared 
deﬁ  nitions or concepts among scholars, 
but to establish a forum that reﬂ  ects the 
diversity of approaches. It might disclose 
the continuous process redeﬁ  ning  the 
institutional boundaries and the founda-
tions of private law. The workshop aims 
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 75
Legisprudence – Rethinking 
Legislation and Regulation in the Light 
of Legal Theory
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30h – 18.30h
Location RUW 3.102
Organizers Prof. Dr. Luc J. Wintgens, 
University of Brussels/ 
Belgium
Dr. A. Daniel Oliver-
Lalana, University of La 
Rioja/ Spain
About the workshop:
The overall purpose of the workshop is 
to reﬂ  ect on legislation from the view-
point of legal philosophy and to discuss 
the role of rational lawmaking and leg-
islation theory within modern constitu-
tional states. In this line, the workshop 
addresses two major, interwoven topics: 
on the one hand, it focuses on recent 
advances in the ﬁ  eld of Legisprudence, 
with a special empahis on evaluation, 
drafting, and policy aspects of legisla-
tion; on the other, it connects Legis-
prudence with the study of legislative 
argumentation, particularly as for the 
implications of reasonableness and pro-
portionality requirements on the justiﬁ  -
cation of legislative measures.
List of Lectures:
1. Andrej Kristan (Slovenia)
Legislative Choice and Its Justiﬁ  ability
2. Luc J. Wintgens (University of 
Brussels HUB-KUB / Belgium)
Rationality of Legislation and 
Legislative Evaluation
3. Woomin Sim (Institute of Legal Stud-
ies, Yonsei Law School / South Korea)
Disagreement and Proceduralism in 
the Perspective of Legisprudence
4. Cheoljoon Chang (Visiting Professor, 
Handong Global University / 
South Korea)
Legisprudence in the Asian Context
5. Gema Marcilla(University of Castilla-
La Mancha / Spain)
The Areas of Legislative Argument
6. A.Daniel Oliver-Lalana (University 
of La Rioja / Spain)
Argumentation in Lawmaking 
Debates
7. Jan-R. Sieckmann (University of 
Erlangen-Nürnberg / Germany and 
University of Buenos Aires / Argentina)
Legislation as Implementation of 
Constitutional Law
8. Laura Clérico (University of Buenos 
Aires / Argentina)
Proportionality as a criterion of 
rationality in the legislative discourse:  240 241
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“Civil Society” and “Europe”. A Study 
of Constitutionalism after Communism” 
(Grażyna Skąpska, Brill, Leyden and 
Boston, 2011) .In Eastern Europe, the 
scope and range of the shifts were enor-
mous. After 1989, some seventy ﬁ  ve mil-
lion people in Central and an additional 
more than two hundred million in East-
ern Europe experienced the changes; 
the geo-political map of the continent 
was altered dramatically. New countries 
emerged in its central, eastern, north-
ern and southern regions, and some old 
ones ceased to exist. We witnessed the 
collapse of an imperial power, “velvet 
divorces,” as well as re-uniﬁ  cations; the 
realignments have been not only Eu-
ropean but, in fact, global. Territorial 
changes and shifts in alliances followed 
closely, one after another in the immedi-
ately succeeding years. As a result of the 
relatively successful consolidation of de-
mocracy and reformations of economies, 
eight Central European countries were 
accepted as members of the European 
Union in the year 2005, and a further 
two in 2007 – events entirely unforeseen 
only several years ago. At the same time, 
however, a noticeable and considerable 
disenchantment with democracy and 
the market economy were observed – a 
growing distrust in public institutions, 
populism, and apathy. These outcomes 
were unforeseen at the beginning of the 
transformation. Yet one wonders about 
the contributions the peaceful post-1989 
rev olutions ha v e made to th e dev elop-
ment of liberal constitutionalism, the 
imprint they have left on constitutional 
provisions, and their impact on the de-
List of Lectures:
t.b.a.
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 77 
(cancelled)
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 78
Constitutionalism After Communism: 
Author meets her critics
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HZ 13
Organizers Grażyna Skąpska, 
Jagiellonian University, 
Krakow / Poland
About the workshop:
Title of the session: „Author Meets Her 
Critics: A Critical Debate on Grazyna 
Skapska’s Book „From „Civil Society” to 
„Europe”: A Sociological Study on Con-
stitutionalism after Communism” (Brill, 
2011)
This session aims at a critical debate on 
constitutionalism after the collapse of 
the communist regimes in East Central 
Europe on the verge of the 21st cen-
tury. The debate is provoked by the re-
cent publication of a book “ “Between 
tional morality is highlighting their im-
portant features, especially in the con-
text of the justiﬁ  cation of certain human 
rights and in their distribution – both 
in legal, political, cultural or just social 
dimension. We shall be therefore inter-
ested in the area that is determined, on 
the one hand, by the substantiation and 
justiﬁ  cation of legal regulations related 
to human rights issues. In this context 
there arises the question of the principle 
of recognition as a universal normative 
condition and of the type of the sources 
for institutional morality (namely indi-
vidual / collective and normative / fac-
tual ones), constituting the so-called 
background morality of numerous deci-
sions. On the other hand, we shall focus 
our attention on actual matrix of human 
interactions which are based on these le-
gal regulations. Some of the most crucial 
questions which arise in this regard are 
as follows: Do human rights make it pos-
sible to generate a genuine mutual social 
recognition among the participants of 
the interaction? Does the action consist-
ent with the legal model automatically 
imply social recognition, or whether 
leaving the area of discretionary deci-
sion-making and acting on the basis of 
the latter can generate some conﬂ  ict sit-
uations, both individual and social ones? 
Modern social sciences, after all, strong-
ly suggest the need for analysis, not only 
systemic ones, but also – correlated with 
the latter – everyday interaction analy-
ses, case studies and individual institu-
tional decisions (including institutional 
– legal ones).
exploring the constructive side of 
proportionality
9. Imer B. Flores (UNAM / México)
Legislatures Not-Judging in their Own 
Cause. On the principle nemo iudex in 
sua causa applied to Legislation
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 76
Legal recognition of minority groups 
in light of social sciences
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 1.102
Organizers Prof. Dr. Marek Zirk-
Sadowski, University of 
Łódź / Poland
Prof. Dr. Bartosz 
Wojciechowski, Univer-
sity of Łódź / Poland
Dr. Karolina Cern, Adam 
Mickiewicz University in 
Poznań / Poland
About the workshop:
The primary objective which – by virtue 
of its importance – determines the scope 
of the workshop in question will be both 
critical analysis of social- and philo-
sophical-legal importance of the princi-
ple of recognition and institutional mo-
rality as well as demonstrating the role 
which they have in the modern world. 
What we aim at in the consideration of 
the principle of recognition and institu- 242 243
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List of Lectures:
Chair: Marek Zirk-Sadowski (University 
of Lodz / Poland)
Participants:
1. Martin Krygier (University of New 
South Wales / Australia)
Constitutionalism afer Communism: 
Fears, Hopes, Achievements, and 
Disappointments
2. Marek Zirk-Sadowski (University of 
Lodz / Poland)
Modern State Model and Postmodern 
Consciousenss of Lawyers
3. Grażyna Skąpska (Jagiellonian Uni-
versity, Krakow / Poland)
Postcommunist Constitutionalism 
Twenty Years After. A Critical Reﬂ  ec-
tion on My Book
velopment of ideas regarding justice, 
civic and human rights, and human 
dignity – the topical issues of the “peace-
ful revolutions”. This issue is even more 
important in the new, enlarged Euro-
pean Union. One thing is certain, recent 
experiences with totalitarianism would 
not go without leaving a permanent 
trace on the consciousness and political 
and legal cultures of the people involved.
Thus, twenty years after the initial 
changes, and only little less after the 
ﬁ  rst democratic constitutions were pro-
claimed, it is a time to analyze the for-
mation of constitutionalism after com-
munism. Considering the goals and their 
results in their current form, one should 
not forget, too, that postcommunist 
transformation does not represent an un-
wavering, linear change from one point 
of history – communist totalitarianism, 
or Stalinism – to another, a well-deﬁ  ned 
and unproblematic liberal democracy. 
On the contrary, one should remember 
that it is as much an open process as de-
mocracy is an open project. It must also 
be kept in mind that the new, postcom-
munist constitutions are proclaimed in 
a time of accelerated global change en-
tailing growing international coopera-
tion, and the formation of international 
or transnational legal orders. This means 
growing complexity, a considerable am-
biguity and uncertainty with regard to 
the trajectories of the liberal democracy, 
and new self-deﬁ  nitions of political soci-
eties emerging out of communism.
SPECIAL WORKSHOP
SW 79
Neo-Communitarian approach on the 
human rights in the East Asia
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location HOF 3.45 / Sydney
Organizers Prof. Akihiko Morita, 
Shokei Gakuin University 
/ Japan
About the workshop:
In this special workshop, following 
Charles Taylor’s dual distinction of the 
human rights as legal language and 
its underlying philosophical founda-
tion, I would like to argue that the hu-
man rights, as cosmopolitan impera-
tive, needs different cultural reasoning/
justiﬁ  cation and it can be formulated by 
deconstructing and reconstructing each 
local tradition/culture through dynamic 
intermingling and interaction among 
communities within state and other so-
cieties beyond national borders.
For this exercise, ‘a neo-communitarian’ 
approach, which means breaking away 
from all traditional and authoritarian 
types of collectivism and simultaneously 
embracing and defending individual-
ity within a ﬂ  ourishing  community, 
seems useful and viable in the East Asia 
because what we need in the midst of 
ongoing individualization without indi-
vidualism is its own philosophical foun-
dation for the human rights as universal 
social norm and as Han Sang-Jin indi-
cated, such reasoning must be based on 
the communitarian tradition available 
in the region which can be appealing to 
ordinary citizens. 
For further discussion, I would like to 
present my thought on how we could 
develop and articulate the neo-commu-
nitarian reasoning(s) of human rights in 
the East Asia, which, I believe, will com-
plement and enrich the promising ap-
proach on human rights as cosmopolitan 
imperative advocated by Ulrich Beck.
List of Lectures:
Rafael Rodríguez Prieto (Universidad 
Pablo de Olavide de Sevilla / Spain)
Individualization without individu-
alism. A critical analysis of identity 
in the framework of the Alliance of 
Civilizations245
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Group A: Methodology, Logics, Hermeneutics, Linguistics, Law and Finance 
WG 1 Logics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Legal Informatics
WG 2 Methodology, Interpretation, Language, Hermeneutics
WG 3 Legal Judgement
WG 4 Legal Argumentation
WG 5 Scientiﬁ  c Knowledge and Legal Decision
WG 6 Law and Finance / Economics
WG 7 Liability, Criminal Law
WG 8 Society, Culture, Politics und Law I
WG 9 Society, Culture, Politics und Law II
WG 10 Justice, Distributive Justice, Non-Discrimination
WG 11 Ethics und Law
Group B: Human Rights, Democracy; Internet / intellectual property, Globalization
WG 12 Globalization
WG 13 Human Rights – general
WG 14 Human Rights – speciﬁ  c questions
WG 15 Democracy in modern society
WG 16 Democratic development in individual countries I
WG 17 Democratic development in individual countries II
WG 18 Democracy and new technologies
WG 19 Internet I
WG 20 Internet II
Group C: Bioethics / Medicine / Technology / Environment
WG 21 Bioethics, Biopolitics and Law
WG 22 Medicine, Law, Eugenics
WG 23 Environment
WG 24 Technology and Law – general questions
WG 25 Science, Technology and Law
WG 26 Technology and Law – selected problems
Overview 246 247
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Group D: History of Philosophy; Hart, Kelsen, Radbruch, Habermas, Rawls, 
Luhmann; General Theory of Norms, Positivism
WG 27 Kelsen and analysis of the „Pure Theory of Law“
WG 28 Habermas, Honneth
WG 29 Dworkin, Hart, Luhmann, Raz, Rawls
WG 30 Philosophy of Law 19th century and before
WG 31 General Theory of Law, General Theory of Norms
WG 32 Positivism, The Normativity of Law
Disclaimer: This abstract book has been 
produced using texts submitted by au-
thors until June 2011. No responsibility 
is assumed for the content of abstracts.
Group A: Methodology, Logics, 
Hermeneutics, Linguistics, Law and 
Finance
WORKING GROUP
WG 1 
Logics, Epistemology, Philosophy of 
Science, Legal Informatics
Session 1
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 4.202
Chair Adachi, Hidehiko 
(Kanazawa / Japan)
Session 2a
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time 15.30 h –18.00 h
Location RUW 4.202
Chair Cyras, Vytautas (Vilnius / 
Lithuania)
Session 2b
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time 15.30 h –18.00 h
Location RUW 4.201
Chair Shiner, Roger A. 
(Kelowna / Canada)
Lectures: 
Session 1
1.
Hidehiko Adachi (Faculty of Law, Kana-
zawa University / Japan)
Goal of Legal Philosophy and Subjects 
of Legal Logic
Abstract:
The aim of this study is to point out some 
subjects of a formal approach of legal 
philosophy. If the “law” is a class of legal 
norms, then an important goal of legal 
p hil o s o p h y  is  t o  r e v e al  th e ir  c o n di ti o n  
of truth (or validity). To reach this goal, 
two theories are required: material and 
formal. Material theories of legal phi-
losophy, which many theories of justice 
or social philosophies also include, are 
not my present concern. I limit the dis-
cussion to a formal theory, especially le-
gal logic as applied deontic logic. It’s my 
view that legal logic must be concerned 
with at least the following two subjects.
1. Semantic of norms: According to the 
possible worlds semantic, the truth val-
ues of deontic propositions depend on 
such properties as seriality and transitiv-
ity for the accessibility relations between 
possible worlds. The DT system assumes 
only serial relations. The D4 system as-
sumes not only serial but also transitive 
relations. It is an interesting subject to 
consider whether the DT or D4 system 
of standard deontic logic is appropriate 
for legal logic. 
2. Norms of competence: According 
to Hans Kelsen, a legal norm is valid 
within a hierarchical regal system if it 
is issued in a manner determined by a 
higher “norm of competence” that rules 
who and how the norm can be issued. 
But this theory fails to explain how a 
lower norm is logically inferred from a 
higher norm. I’ll solve this problem with 
second-order predicate logic. 248 249
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tual law, conﬂ  ict between modern intel-
lectual property concepts and the notion 
of virtual property, and the suggestion 
of using the virtual worlds as a platform 
for ethically correct social experiment in 
legal ﬁ  eld which is still an undervalued 
approach.
3.
Vladislav Arkhipov (Faculty of Law, 
Saint-Petersburg State University / Rus-
sia)
Speaking About Law: General Fiction 
of Legal Theory
Abstract:
This paper presents an attempt to re-con-
sider a “popular” methodological attitude 
in jurisprudence, that is to formulate con-
cepts and conclusions as if (or „als ob“ 
in German) law is some kind of tangible 
object independent of what the research-
ers themselves. Such an attitude may be 
shortcutted to a ﬁ  ction of „speaking about 
law“. The ﬁ  rst issue challenged in the pa-
per is general „ﬁ   ctionalism“ of human 
thought as it was debated by German phi-
losopher Hans Vaihinger and translated 
into jurisprudence by American theorist 
Lon L. Fuller. The second one is the im-
pact which the outcomes of the legal phi-
losophy discourse do have on the effec-
tive legal systems. The paper refers to the 
notion of “social construction of reality” 
elaborated in sociology of knowledge by 
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann. 
The paper also draws in close, but not di-
rectly associated approaches practiced in 
“general semantics” of A. Korzybski and 
the ideas of language-games developed 
b y  L u d wi g  Wi ttg e nst e in.  B asin g  o n  th e  
2.
Vladislav Arkhipov (Faculty of Law, 
Saint-Petersburg State University / Rus-
sia)
Virtual Worlds in Legal Studies
Abstract:
This paper deals with virtual worlds and 
the opportunities they give for research. 
As online communities nested in a com-
puter-based simulated environment, vir-
tual worlds are on the rise as a medium 
not only for entertainment, but for social 
communication as well. Virtual worlds 
can be considered as one of the most 
topical ﬁ  elds for social (including legal) 
studies taking into an account social im-
pact they have and research capabilities 
they provide. The most obvious reason 
for this may be that most virtual worlds 
reproduce the social reality in whole of 
in part as we know it, doing this „from 
a scratch“, so that highly insitutionalised 
and habitualised social practices are re-
constructed in a way which allows to 
track the process of their evolution. Since 
virtual worlds are inherently models of 
what may be called the „real life“ (how-
ever this naming may be questioned by 
modern philosophy), studying them may 
give much insight on real institutions 
and practices, including without limita-
tion law. The paper provides an updated 
deﬁ   nition and classiﬁ   cation of virtual 
worlds along with the outline of recent 
developments in this ﬁ  eld of research as 
a methodological prerequisite, and de-
bates two main questions: „What virtual 
worlds can give to law?“ and „What law 
can give to virtual worlds?“ The debate 
is concentrated over the concept of vir-
discussion of the two aforesaid issues a 
suggestion is made to deem the “speak -
ing about law” as a general ﬁ  ction of legal 
theory which obscures the fact that legal 
theorists rather “speak law”, since any 
consistent and accepted theoretical ap-
proach is inherent to the respective legal 
system and it shapes legal system as an 
instrument of “social construction of re-
ality”. As such it is not much less impor-
tant than, for instance, a legal enactment, 
being engaged in practical legal argumen-
tation and a factor which evolves profes-
sional mindset (for instance, throughout 
legal education). Therefore, it implies 
positive re-consideration of the social re-
sponsibility of jurisprudence by revealing 
its fundamental and constructive role in 
legal system.
4.
Ion Craiovan (George Baritu University 
/ Romania)
On Integrative Juridical Knowledge
Abstract:
My paper is trying to point out several 
matters affecting the vizibility peaks in-
tegrative juridical concept of knowledge 
in legal doctrine stating his notes deﬁ  n-
ing and effectiveness.
In thus,we proposed the following steps:
1. Law as normatif and complex knowl-
edge object is placed in relation to the 
thesis that any way to understand a 
complex phenomena is insufﬁ  cient.
(Longino, 2002).
2 .  W e  ar e  a p p r o a ch  s o m e  p e r s p e cti v e s  
that inherent juridical knowledge and 
having multiple paradigms-normative, 
conceptual, behavioral, moral, cultural,
hermeneutics, postmodern, etc. – as the 
knowledge of the law: 
3. About tensions and conﬂ  icts  in 
knowledge of conﬁ   guring borders. On 
the concepts of disciplinary, multi-dis-
ciplinary, inter-disciplinary, trans-dis-
ciplinary, cross-disciplinary, focusing o 
epistemological issues that dogmatism, 
exclusivity,mutual ignorance, boycot, 
lockout or refuzal collaboration between 
areas of knowledge.
4. Horizon integrative science and legal 
knowledge into arguments and contra-
arguments. Some several coordinates:
Fostering knowledge as border closures 
t h a t  o p e n  c o n n e c t i o n s ;  t o  c o g n i t i v e  
skills and experience issues from several 
perspectives and contexts; acceptance 
of epistemological pluralism contrasting 
paradigms; the initiation of restructur-
ing and mergers setting up a certain un-
derstand for solving complex legal prob-
lems. Some considerations on a generic 
integrative application in the academic 
discipline General jurisprudence.
5.
Luis Duarte D’Almeida (University Col-
lege, Oxford / UK and LanCog Group 
and Law Faculty, University of Lisbon / 
Portugal)
Answerability
Abstract:
In this paper I discuss some problematic 
aspects of the received view of defeasi-
bility in the domain of criminal trials. If 
we model valid criminal accusations and 
convictions as correctly made utterances 
of sentences of the form ‘X   ed’, the re-
ceived view maintains that the circum- 250 251
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Few realise the critical role of legal the-
ory in shaping the world’s destiny. The 
science of Law is a missing component 
in the development of global govern-
ment of economies, industry and com-
merce on the planet. The people may 
not appreciate that they are calling for a 
much more scientiﬁ  c approach to Law to 
provide exact results. This paper surveys 
in formal terms the metaphysical signiﬁ  -
cance for jurisprudence of how the Law 
forms part of the fabric of our scientiﬁ  c 
universe.
Session 2a
8.
Vytautas Cyras (Vilnius University 
/ Lithuania) + Friedrich Lachmayer 
(Innsbruck University / Austria)
Legal machines and legal act produc-
tion within multisensory operational 
implementations
Abstract:
This paper addresses machines in the 
role of legal actors. Examples are trafﬁ  c 
lights, vending machines, form proceed-
ings workﬂ   o w s ,  s u c h  a s  F i n a n z O n l i n e  
in Austria, and machines which replace 
human beings in the role of ofﬁ  cials. 
Their acts have legal importance and 
draw legal consequences. Thus the con-
cept of iustitia distributiva and societal 
distribution is enhanced. This research 
can be viewed from several perspectives: 
legal informatics, multisensory jurispru-
dence (or multisensory law; cf. Colette 
R. Brunschwig) and operationalisations. 
The latter are explored by computer sci-
entists in electronic agents and norma-
bound up with the facts of this world 
and have therefore to obey those self 
same laws of physics. This gives rise to 
an international common law whose ef-
fect is of little consequences locally as in 
domestic legislation but comes power-
fully into force like a tsunami sweeping 
along on the tide of globalisation. The 
positivism of the last two centuries has 
proved inadequate in the face that tide.
International law both civil and crimi-
nal is more than a scaling up of paro-
chial jurisdictions which have weak 
foundations. International institutions 
and movements are proving to be built 
on sand. Thus for instance the law of the 
environment does not recognise local 
boundaries whether geographical or legal 
It comes down to us from a higher meta-
physical order. It is the obvious and ex-
treme example where the laws of science 
and of the law cannot be prised apart. 
International commerce needs a logically 
consistent theory for the creation and op-
eration of corporate law. Economics has 
not proved of sufﬁ  cient scientiﬁ  c exact-
ness to guide the development of ﬁ  nan-
cial services. International organisations 
like the UN, European, Arab, African 
and other like Unions are not proving to 
have constitutions that are sufﬁ  ciently 
sound scientiﬁ   cally to cope with con-
ﬂ  icts in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Libya or transactions of the Euro. Even 
the human rights movement has proving 
to have feet of clay . The unresolved di-
chotomy of human rights and freedom of 
speech is currently bringing the English 
courts the police and the whole rule of 
law in the UK into disrepute. 
Abstract:
From chaos to the theory of chaos, from 
the primordial perception of the world as 
disorderedness to the scientiﬁ  c research 
of disorder a long distance has been 
covered. That path implies openness of 
mind and scientiﬁ  c boldness which con-
nect mythological perceptions of the 
world with philosophical and scientiﬁ  c 
interpretations of phenomena through-
out the world in a quite distinctive way 
resting on the creation of a model and 
application of computing Kelsen’s model 
of the concept of law, custom model and 
legal system model. Owing to that, for 
the ﬁ  rst time instead of asking “What 
awaits us in the future?”, we can ask 
“What can be done in future?” and get 
a reliable scientiﬁ  c answer to that ques-
tion. Let us, therefore, measure all that is 
measurable and let us make measurable 
all that is not measurable at the moment, 
because the world is a self-regulating 
phenomenon driven by perpetual insta-
bility while law pulsates in the universal 
rhythm of order and disorder.
7.
Michael Heather & Nick Rossiter (North-
umbria University, Newcastle / UK)
Law as Exact Science
Abstract:
While physics is the exact science of the 
natural sciences Law is the exact sci-
ence of the social sciences and needs the 
same formal rigour if it is to give exact 
answers in the way the social world is to 
be conﬁ  gured. Legal normative order is 
no more arbitrary than the laws of na-
ture. Indeed legal norms are inherently 
stances sufﬁ  cient for a token of ‘X   ed’ 
to be correctly uttered in the context of 
a criminal accusation are not sufﬁ  cient 
for ‘X   ed’ to be uttered in the context 
of a conviction. More precisely, presence 
of the elements of the ‘offence’ (or the 
‘Tatbestand’) is deemed both necessary 
and sufﬁ  cient in the former context, and 
therefore sufﬁ  cient for X to be held an-
swerable for   ing; but for the unquali-
ﬁ  ed ‘X   ed’ to be properly uttered in 
the context of a conviction it must more-
over be the case that further ‘elements’ 
obtain. According to this view, the pro-
cedural emergence of a valid defence, in 
the form of a justiﬁ  cation or an excuse 
successfully offered by the defendant, is 
taken to establish the absence of some of 
those elements. Yet justiﬁ  cations and ex-
cuses, thus believed to render improper 
(to ‘defeat’) an unqualiﬁ  ed  ﬁ  nal deci-
sion that ‘X did   ’, seem to be deemed 
irrelevant for the appropriateness of an 
utterance of ‘X did  ’ in the context of 
an accusation. This account I ﬁ  nd very 
puzzling. It seems descriptively false, in 
civil law as well as common law systems. 
Taken as a normative account of crimi-
nal answerability, as it sometimes is, it is 
implausible. I shall develop these claims, 
suggesting that the received view rests 
upon an unwarranted conﬂ  ation of two 
different and fully independent notions 
of defeasibility.
6.
Dragan Mitrovic (Belgrade / Serbia) + 
Gordana Vukadinovic (Novi Sad / Serbia)
The new path of law – From Theory of 
Chaos to Theory of Law 252 253
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Session 2b
11.
Roger A. Shiner (University of British 
Columbia Okanagan / Canada)
Law’s Naive Realism
Abstract:
I want to explore the idea that naive real-
ism is central to the nature of law – that 
modes of apprehension essentially simi-
lar to that to which G.E. Moore appealed 
in his celebrated Proof of the External 
World play a crucial role in the method-
ology of the law. At its cutting edge – at 
the point where its deliverances impact 
on the lives of citizens – the law is not a 
technical or a scientiﬁ  c discipline, but a 
naively realistic discipline. I will explore 
this theme by considering two speciﬁ  c 
cases – the alleged exposure of the law, 
especially the criminal law, to the ﬁ  nd-
ings of neuroscience, and the idea that 
the law’s interest in causation is an in-
terest in a scientiﬁ  cally technical notion 
of cause.
12.
Gonzalo Villa Rosas (Universidad Exter-
nado de Colombia / Colombia)
Über Tatsachen und Handlungen
Abstract:
Es gab eine Zeit, in der die analytische 
Philosophie die logischen Wahrheiten 
von den empirischen deutlich trennte. 
Ihrer Ansicht nach konnte diese Unter-
scheidung auf alle bedeutsamen Urteile 
der gesamten Kenntnisbereiche ange-
w endet w erden (s. z. B. Schlick; A y er; 
Carnap). Diese Dichotomie (Putnam, 
2002) basierte auf der Differenzierung 
alism, I want to defend a particularistic 
account of moral laws, which allows 
exceptions, and I will outline a model 
of reasoning which is able to deal with 
such laws, which dismisses absolute cer-
tainty from reasoning – without intro-
ducing relativism.
Giving up the assumption that absolute 
certainty is possible in moral reasoning 
has also repercussions on other basic 
moral concepts like that of moral duty. 
It follows directly that we can’t be ab-
solute certain about what our duties are 
and I propose that we have to elucidate 
this concept with David Ross’ concept of 
prima facie duty.
Finall y ,  bo th  co n cep ts  –  tha t  o f  a  la w ,  
which allow exceptions and prima facie 
duty – are parts of what we may call a 
pragmatist account of moral reasoning. 
I propose that we should change our 
views about morality to a model that is 
based on the same dynamics like that 
of a scientiﬁ  c theory, ruled by the laws 
of non-monotonic logic as supposed by 
modern pragmatists in the philosophy of 
science. Adopting such a model will al-
low us to understand what it means for 
the moral agent to do moral judgments 
from the ﬁ  rst-person perspective.
10.
Jan C. Schuhr (Friedrich-Alexander-
University, Erlangen-Nürnberg / Ger-
many)
Rechtswissenschaft mit axiomatischer 
Methode?
Abstract:
Der moderne, Hilbert-Ackermannsche 
Axiomenbegriff war ab der Wende zum 
tive multiagent systems, where various 
normative frameworks and security plat-
forms are being built. Software engineers 
do not know the concepts of Ought and Is 
worlds (cf. Hans Kelsen, Enrico Pattaro, 
etc.) though implicitly make use of them. 
We reﬂ   ect from legal informatics per-
spective as advocated by Friedrich Lach-
mayer. The concept of e-Person is tack-
led; cf. Erich Schweighofer. A range of 
computers can regulate through code; cf. 
Lawrence Lessig’s “code is law”. Simple 
machines such as trafﬁ  c lights imply sim-
ple descriptions of normative positions. 
Complex ones such as electronic institu-
tions involve complicated security pat-
terns, such as role-based access control 
expressed in SecureUML. Their lifecycles 
lead from legal requirements through 
implementation to norm enforcement. 
This paper aims to identify law produc-
tion and communication patterns.
9.
Daniel Karonovic (Goethe University, 
Frankfurt / Germany)
Moral Laws, Duties and Certainty in 
Moral Reasoning
Abstract:
The concept of a moral law is the basic 
concept for most theories of moral rea-
soning as well as the concept of duty. 
In the presentation of my paper I start 
with the discussion of certainty in mor-
al judgments. It is often assumed that 
moral laws are universal laws, which are 
unconditionally valid, and that absolute 
certainty about their validity is possible 
and necessary to gain the same certainty 
in our moral judgments. Against gener-
20. Jh. in einigen Wissenschaften unge-
heuer erfolgreich, in zahlreichen Gebi-
eten zumindest ein fruchtbarer Anstoß 
(so z.B. architektonisch im Bauhaus) 
und teilweise sogar Grundlage neuer 
Technik. Anders als bei Aristoteles, des-
sen Axiome wahr, eines Beweises aber 
weder fähig noch bedürftig sind, liegen 
moderne Axiome einem deduktiven 
System ohne intrinsischen Wahrheits-
gehalt und evtl. gar ohne eigene Bedeu-
tung zugrunde.
Axiomatisierung ist an sich nur eine 
Form der Darstellung vorhandenen Wis-
sens bzw. bekannter logischer Abhän-
gigkeiten. Oft führt sie aber indirekt zu 
neuen Erkenntnissen, insbesondere weil 
sie zur Auﬂ  ösung  begrifﬂ  icher  Mehr-
deutigkeiten und zur Aufdeckung von 
Widersprüchen zwingt.
Naturrecht „more geometrico“, Begriff-
sjurisprudenz, Rechtsquellen-Positivis-
mus, der Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung 
und die Arbeit an juristischen Experten-
systemen haben jeweils eigenartige 
gedankliche Ähnlichkeiten zur axioma-
tischen Methode. An ihr besteht bei Re-
chtswissenschaftlern gleichwohl wenig 
Interesse. Das beruht teilweise auf Feh-
lvorstellungen und Missverständnissen, 
und der Text würde gern einige davon 
aufklären. Die Rechtswissenschaft hat 
aber auch Eigenheiten, die einer umfas-
senden Axiomatisierung entgegenstehen 
und die es herauszuarbeiten gilt. Das 
Ziel begrifﬂ  icher Klarheit und des Of-
fenlegens von Prämissen und Ableitung-
szusammenhängen muss indes auch die 
Rechtswissenschaft verfolgen. 254 255
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we considered a version NL of their Nor-
mative Logic (=Logic of Norm-Proposi-
tions), to which they added a number of 
deﬁ  nitions generating certain normative 
operators “proper” by means of a new 
operator N (or indexed family {Nx} with 
x denoting some appropriate agent) that 
they take to represent the dyadic rela-
tion of promulgation. Thirdly, in Åqvist 
[2008] we dealt with a third formal sys-
tem NOBL constructed with a view to 
isolating the normative fragment of NL 
that arises as a result of adding those def-
initions to NL. The main outcome of this 
previous paper was then a represent-
ability result to the effect that the set of 
sentences provable in NOBL turns out to 
be exactly the set of the sentences which 
are provable in NL on the basis of those 
deﬁ  nitions.
In  t h e  c o min g  s e ct i o n s  w e  p l a n  ( i )  t o  
explain the basic Alchourrón-Bulygin 
distinction norms vs. norm-propositions 
in general terms, (ii) to report on earlier 
work by some well-known Scandinavi-
an philosophers that led up to essentially 
the very same distinction, (iii) to con-
sider three important consequential dis-
tinctions that ensue from the basic one, 
and (iv) to summarize and to comment 
somewhat more in detail on the three 
formal systems (DL, NL, NOBL) of De-
ontic Logic / Normative Logic mentioned 
above. We then close the paper by giv-
ing (v) a brief scrutiny of the so-called 
Frändberg Adequacy Condition on Ex-
plications of the distinction at issue.
Denken des letzten Jahrhunderts for-
muliert werden konnten, voranzutrei-
ben. Diese kritische Position bietet eine 
Aufwertung der Rolle der Kompetenz im 
Rechtssystem sowie ein schärferes Ver-
ständnis der Beziehung zwischen die-
sem und seiner Umgebung an.
13.
Markku Kiikeri (University of Lapland / 
Finland)
Science and law as collective intention-
ality
Abstract:
Science and law are both collective en-
terprises. The basic uncertainty is ex-
perienced as collective, cooperative, 
and social or institutional. In sciences 
reasons and causes of the unexpected 
is studied scientiﬁ  call y .  In  la w ,  o n  th e  
other hand, the reason is found in hu-
man intentionality, which cannot be 
generalized. In sciences it is enough to 
explain the reason and remove the cause 
of the uncertainty. In law, the cause of 
the uncertainty within the social act-
ing is explained by particular human 
intentions. The uncertainty is abolished 
by trying to change intentions in a legal 
discussion. One tries to remove the re-
sults of these intentional human actions. 
The basic difference is then the human 
intentionality. In law there is a constant 
tension between the individual and col-
lective intentionality, which cannot be 
resolved. The conﬂ  ict between law and 
science is actualized in the way they re-
move the cause of the uncertainty. The 
sociological, statistic and psychological 
explanations see humans as causes of 
zwischen analytischen und syntheti-
schen Urteilen, die eine wesentliche Rol-
le nicht nur im modernen Empirismus, 
sondern auch in der Philosophie Kants 
gespielt hatte. Trotz des Vertrauens der 
Philosophen des Positivismus in die-
se summa divisio der philosophischen 
P r o b l e m e ,  s i n d  i h r e  G r u n d l a g e n  s e i t  
den fünfziger Jahren des letzten Jahr-
hunderts in Zweifel gezogen worden. 
Verschiedene Denker haben das Unter-
scheiden zwischen analytischen und 
synthetischen Urteilen entweder abge-
stritten (Quine, 1951) oder revidiert (s. 
z. B. Putnam 1962, 1975; Kripke, 1972; 
Burge 1979, 1986). 
Basierend auf den Beiträgen Kants hat 
die Pandektenwissenschaft im 19. Jahr-
hundert die Differenzierung zwischen 
juristischen Tatsachen und Handlun-
gen eingeführt (Savigny, 1840). In den 
letzten Jahren wurde auch ein ähnli-
ches umstrittenes Unterscheiden von 
verschiedenen Rechtsphilosophen an-
erkannt (s. z. B. Bulygin, 1991; Alexy, 
2008), das sich auf der Theorie Searles‘ 
von regulativen und konstitutiven Nor-
men errichtet (Searle, 1969). Seine The-
orie, wie diejenige der Pandektenwissen-
schaft, bringt die Spuren der modernen 
Differenzierung zwischen analytischen 
und synthetischen Urteilen wieder in 
Erinnerung.
Auf der Basis des holistischen Vorschla-
ges Quines‘ ist die Schrift bestrebt, die 
Forschung von einigen Kritiken und 
Konsequenzen, die in der Rechtsthe-
orie aufgrund von Verweigerung oder 
Abschwächung des Bereiches dieser Dif-
ferenzierung in dem philosophischen 
uncertainty on the basis of their physi-
cal characteristics and acting. The re-
sults are valued functionally. The func-
tional evaluation takes place in ﬁ  nding 
the cause as well as in executing policies 
based on scientiﬁ  c discoveries. The sci-
entiﬁ  c activity or political interest for-
ma tion cannot be in itself the starting 
point for collective activity of the soci-
ety. Namely, scientiﬁ  c explaining has a 
tendency to see collective intentional-
ity as a matter of social scientiﬁ  c issue. 
The scientiﬁ  c “law” functions as a law. 
The claim is that the modern ideology 
of science is fundamentally incompat-
ible with the legal ideology because of 
the different conception of the collective 
intentionality.
14.
Lennart Åqvist (Uppsala University / 
Sweden)
On the Distinction Norms vs. Norm-
Propositions and its Logic
Abstract:
In this paper w e inten d to summarize 
some main results obtained in an ear-
lier contribution of mine, viz. Åqvist 
[2008] – see the References at the end of 
the paper. In turn, Åqvist [2008] dealt 
with problem of axiomatizing three for-
mal systems of Deontic Logic/Normative 
Logic in a sense derived from Alchour-
rón & Bulygin [1973] and Alchourrón 
[1969]. First of all, we considered a ver-
sion DL of their Deontic Logic (= Logic 
of Norms) which, in point of expressive 
power, was seen to be slightly richer 
than the version originally due to our 
authors. Secondly, in that earlier paper,  256 257
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3.
Péter Cserne (Tilburg University / Neth-
erlands)
Legal theory, legal policy, and the law’s 
assumptions about human behavior
Abstract:
This paper analyses the theoretical status 
of the law’s assumptions about human 
behavior. Legal epistemology is con-
cerned with “how the law thinks” (cf. 
Teubner 1989). Legal rules and doctrines, 
e . g .  o n  c a u s a t i o n ,  l e g a l  c a p a c i t y  o r  t h e  
voluntariness of contracts make implicit 
assumptions about human behavior and 
the role of law in society. While these 
constructs are often well-articulated and 
have a clear technical meaning, they half-
knowingly reﬂ  ect philosophical ideas of 
earlier ages or express common sense 
psychological notions which are empiri-
cally unfounded. Whether one wants to 
criticize law’s implicit presuppositions or 
not, they should be made explicit. This 
rational reconstruction points at theoreti-
cal concerns about the relations between 
legal epistemology, common sense psy-
chology and scientiﬁ   c knowledge. How 
seriously should these doctrinal theories 
be taken? If they are not factual, can they 
s t i l l  b e  ‘ o b j e c t i v e ’ ?  T h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  
this legal worldview should be challenged 
in light of empirical data is often based 
on the view that law is a means to policy 
ends or a speciﬁ  c social technology. Un-
der this instrumental view, the reason 
why legal policy should be informed by 
empirical research on human behaviour 
is straightforward: rational legal policy 
requires reliable predictions about the in-
centive effects of legal rules. Still, even if 
In Central Europe during last twenty 
years we face signiﬁ  cant changes in the 
process of interpretation and application 
of law. Some of them are consequences 
of new technologies. We can observe 
that:
(1) judges and lawyers gradually elimi-
nate paper collections of legal texts and 
replace them with electronic data basis 
on CDs;
(2) E-data basis include texts of laws as 
well as huge number of judicial decisions 
of various court. Decisions are, howev-
er, organized as references to particular 
laws. 
All that causes important evolution of 
legal interpretation, decision making 
and argumentation.
( 1 ) we face “new textualism”: easy ac-
cess to legal texts pushes other con-
texts (ideological, functional etc.) out of 
consideration. Constant changes of law 
make judges to follow texts of laws as a 
defense of legal certainty; 
(2) judges are not encouraged to take a 
“systemic” approach in the interpreta-
tion, i.e. looking at EU law, judgments of 
ECHR etc.;
(3) it’s a standard to cite several court 
decisions in even short legal documents. 
Some call this a de facto case law in civil 
law countries. Citing previous decision 
is, however, schematic and not based on 
deeper analysis of facts;
(4) technology has also negative impact 
on a quality of court decisions: a prac-
tice of “copy and paste” becomes popu-
lar among judges. We can ﬁ  nd identical 
paragraphs in several decisions taken in 
completely different cases.
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Session 1
1.
Tomasz Stawecki + Wieslaw Staskiewicz 
(University of Warsaw / Poland)
Impact of new forms of collecting legal 
information to the process of legal in-
terpretation
Abstract:
Unfortunately legal theory does not re-
act quickly enough to new practices.
2.
José Antonio S. Pontes (Faculdades de 
Campinas / Brazil)
Some advances in practical reason: for 
a progressist dialogue with contempo-
rary hermeneutics
Abstract:
This paper intends to identify some 
points of the contemporary thesis con-
cerning constitutional hermeneutics 
and methodology of law. Once identi-
ﬁ  ed some authors and the lines of argu-
mentation afﬁ  liated grosso modo to the 
linguistic turn and rhetoric, as well as 
the core of the transcendental powers of 
communication (v.g. R. Alexy, N. McCor-
mick, K.Gunther etc.), the objective is to 
identify some dialogue with economics, 
enlightened by recent researches about 
Hegel-Marx interpretations of social life. 
Of course the discussion inevitably pass-
es through methodological questions, 
opposing analytics vs. dialectics, idealis-
tic v.s realists standpoints. In a effort to 
foment the inclusive dialogue between 
po in ts  o f  vi e w  co n ce rnin g  th e  co n cep t  
of law that may create (not necessarily) 
radical opponents, the lines of conclu-
sion intents to revisit some foundations 
of hegelian “method” (so to speak) and 
intends to give a modest contribution to 
a more profound analysis of the relations 
between sein and sollen categories, in 
order to enrich the discussions about 
technology and social life, specially the 
life of the law nowadays. 258 259
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Session 2a
7.
Geraldina Gonzalez De La Vega (Hein-
rich Heine University Düsseldorf / Ger-
many)
Verfassungswandel als dynamische 
Verfassungsinterpretation 
Abstract:
Man kann nicht feststellen, ob es eine 
Lehre vom Verfassungswandel tatsäch-
lich gibt oder geben kann. Obwohl alle 
Autoren das Konzept als ein Phänomen 
der Anwendung von Verfassungsnormen 
behandeln, ﬁ   ndet man keine Überein-
stimmung der Thesen hinsichtlich ihrer 
Deﬁ  nition oder ihrer Grenzen. Ungeach-
tet dessen, dass alle Autoren das Konzept 
als einen Wandel des Sinnes von Nor-
men erläutern, ist diese Antwort nicht 
zufriedenstellend. Es sieht so aus, als ob 
das Konzept der Verfassungswandlung 
bzw. des Verfassungswandels eine Chif-
fre für ganz verschiedene Möglichkeiten 
der Fortentwicklung von Normen einer 
offenen Verfassung ist. Keiner der Auto-
ren vermag eine durchgängige Deﬁ  niti-
on des Verfassungswandels zu geben. Sie 
akzeptieren, dass die bloße Interpretation 
offener Normen und Prinzipien (noch) 
kein Verfassungswandel ist. Sie räumen 
ein, dass es Normen gibt, die entwickelt 
werden müssen und dass sich der Lauf 
der Zeit sowie der Wandel der sozialen 
Wirklichkeit in der Konkretisierung von 
Normen widerspiegeln kann. Wenn dem 
so ist, dann stellt sich die Frage, was Ver-
fassungswandel eigentlich ist und wann 
er vorliegt. Das Verhältnis zwischen In-
terpret und Norm hängt von dem jewei-
theoretically relevant – should not dis-
turb the soundness of its argument nor 
should it be read as if it had moral impli-
cations. This paper concludes that posi-
tivist theories cannot be ruled out. Since 
the choice between descriptive and in-
terpretative models requires a circular
5.
Mathieu Carpentier (Université Paris-1 
Panthéon Sorbonne / France)
Intention in Interpretation. Why it 
Should Matter and How It Does Not
Abstract:
Intention in legal interpretation can be 
understood in two different ways. In 
the ﬁ   rst sense, intention can be con-
ceived as a particular interpretive tech-
nique which allows the judge to reach 
the meaning of a legal text when it is 
not clear how it should be applied (and 
whether it should be applied at all); in 
this sense intention should be explained 
by contraposition with plain meaning. 
In the second sense, intention is un-
derstood as a general constraint on ju-
dicial interpretation (whether the case 
is «hard» or not), which distinguishes 
legal interpretation from other kinds of 
interpretation. The many controversies 
concerning intentional interpretation 
(Radin v. Landis, Fish v. Posner, Dwor-
kin v. the Originalists, Moore v. Raz, 
Marmor v. Waldron, Alexander’s coun-
terfactual realism, etc.) have most often 
failed to distinguish between these two 
accounts of an intentional interpreta-
tion. My claim is that the ﬁ  rst account 
cannot be seriously upheld, and my ar-
gument to this point shall be a classic 
we assume an instrumental perspective, 
it does not follow that legal scholarship 
unavoidably becomes a simple instru-
ment of translating scientiﬁ  c insights into 
legal rules and doctrines. In other words, 
e v e n  w i t h i n  a n  i n s t r u m e n t a l  v i e w  o f  
law, there are various considerations that 
require that the law should not adopt a 
„psychologically adequate” view of man – 
or so shall I argue.
4.
Danillo Almeida + Cecilia Lois (Federal 
University of Santa Catarina / Brazil)
Legal Theory and Epistemic Values: 
against authoritary interpretativism
Abstract:
In his new book, R. Dworkin advocates 
the unity of values thesis. He wants to 
circumscribe morality as a proper episte-
mological domain which is methodolog-
ically different from scientiﬁ  c  inquiry. 
The epistemological independence of 
morality is supposed to be a consequence 
of the irreducible fact/value dichotomy. 
This paper sustains that unity of values 
thesis is methodologically correct; all 
moral reasoning must be a constructive 
interpretation of its meaning. However, 
that author fails to recognize that not 
every axiological interpretation implies 
moral consequences. From H. Putnam’s 
indispensability argument, this paper 
intends to demonstrate that much of 
scientiﬁ  c inquiry relies on values inter-
pretation, and that this kind of reason-
ing is morally neutral. Finally, it should 
be clear that epistemological choices in 
legal positivism – e.g. the decision on 
which aspects of social interaction are 
hartian one. But this does not mean that 
a case for a moderate intentionalism is 
not justiﬁ  ed, as long as it is not a norma-
tive thesis. But this of course requires to 
deﬁ  ne more precisely what one under-
stands by ‘intention’.
6. 
Oles Andriychuk (Centre for Competition 
Policy, University of East Anglia / UK)
The Dialectics of Law
Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to explore 
the essence of law from the perspective 
of dialectics. It internalises the principles 
of dialectical analysis proposing a meth-
od by which most of the jurisprudential 
dilemmas can be explored and address-
ing some of them. The paper begins with 
clariﬁ  cation of the very notion of dialec-
tics; it poses a thesis that the concept of 
the ideal law should be perceived as an 
indispensible part of any law – as well 
as any social norm in general – negat-
ing the view that the ideal elements are 
related to legal axiology (what the law 
should be), and transposing the notion 
of the ideal law to legal epistemology 
(what the law is). It reverts then to the 
problem of legal indeterminacy, seek-
ing to reveal its cognitive potential, per-
ceived as a dynamic tension between 
different legal interpretations. In the last 
part Dworkin’s thesis of legal morality is 
explored with a proposal to amend his 
metaphorical omnipotent judge Her-
cules with his alter ego Sisyphus, which 
constantly strives to ﬁ  nd the right an-
swers between the equally plausible but 
competing readings of the law. 260 261
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Freiheitsgewährleistung auch unter Un-
gewißheit zu erfüllen.
9.
Andreas Krell (Federal University of 
Alagoas / Brazil)
Diskussionswandel über juristische 
Hermeneutik: Voraussetzung der Ziele 
des Sozialen Umweltstaates in Brasilien 
Abstract:
Die Garantien des demokratischen Rechts-
staates durch die Verfassung Brasiliens 
von 1988 sind eine wichtige Vorausset-
zung zur Entwicklung der Strukturen 
des Staates, der auch zukünftig eine 
aktiv-proeminente Rolle übernehmen 
muss, um die von der Globalisierung 
verstärkten sozialen ökologischen Pro-
bleme zu vermindern. Die Kombination 
konstitutioneller Detailregelungen und 
weitreichender Klagerechte ermöglicht 
die gerichtliche Überprüfung fast aller 
politisch relevanten Entscheidungen. 
Gerade in den Bereichen Umweltschutz 
und Sozialleistungen, wo die individu-
ellen und kollektiven Rechte ausgiebig 
positiviert wurden, erscheint eine ver-
stärkte Judizialisierung weniger als Irr-
weg in Richtung Jurisdiktionsstaat als 
eine Etappe zur politischen Bewusst-
seinsbildung der Gesellschaft. Der Um-
fang dieser komplexen sozialen Heraus-
forderung steht jedoch (noch) in einem 
Missverhältnis zum Fachwissen der 
Richter und der von ihnen gewöhnlich 
angewendeten Methoden zur Auslegung 
der einschlägigen Rechtsnormen. Die 
akademische Diskussion über die In-
terpretation des Rechts beschränkt sich 
größtenteils auf Dispute bzgl. philoso-
Rahmen eines materiellen Rechtsstaates 
wird die materiell-inhaltliche Ausrich-
tung der Gesetzgebung an einer höhe-
ren Normenordnung mit Nachdruck 
hervorgehoben. Im Zeitalter der Unge-
wißheit aber fragt es sich, ob die Frei-
heitssicherung immer noch im Rahmen 
der klassischen, die materiell-inhaltliche 
Vorbestimmtheit des Gesetzes voraus-
setzenden Rechtssicherheit zu verwirk-
lichen ist. Mit Blick auf die erhebliche 
Dynamik sowie hohe Komplexität der 
technischen und wissenschaftlichen 
Entwicklungen erwächst zuallererst 
der Zweifel, ob und inwiefern der Ge-
setzgeber noch mit hinreichenden Sa-
cherkenntnissen materiell-inhaltlich 
bestimmte und vollständige Vorgaben 
aufstellen kann. Daher überrascht es 
nicht, daß besonders im Rahmen des 
Umwelt-, Technik- und des Telekom-
munikationsrechts die behördliche Aus-
gestaltungsfunktion überwiegend im 
Vordergrund steht. Beim Schwerpunkt-
wechsel von der Inhaltsbestimmung des 
Gesetzes zur Inhaltsergänzung durch 
die Verwaltung kommt allerdings das 
Problem kaum in Betracht, ob diese Ent-
wicklungstendenz zugunsten der Exeku-
tive nicht zur Freiheitsbeeinträchtigung 
führen würde. Ausgehend von dieser 
Problemstellung versucht dieser Beitrag 
zu zeigen, weshalb und wie im Streben 
nach der materiell-inhaltlichen Vorbe-
stimmtheit des Rechts unter Ungewiß-
heitsbedingungen die freiheitssichernde 
Funktion des Gesetzes in Kauf genom-
men wurde. Dadurch soll verdeutlicht 
werden, was das Gesetz beinhalten soll, 
um seine rechtsstaatliche Aufgabe der 
Verfassungsgericht wandelt den Sinn der 
Norm nicht; die Norm ist und bleibt die-
selbe: Ontologisch ist sie dasselbe Objekt, 
da die Norm, wenn man sie interpretiert, 
ihre essentiellen Eigenschaften nicht ver-
liert. Da es nur darum geht, Änderungen 
– oder wenn man so will: den Wandel – 
festzustellen, dann ist das Konzept des 
Verfassungswandels allein für historische 
Recherchen oder eine soziologische Per-
spektive relevant. Zur Rechtsdogmatik 
und Normensetzung trägt das Konzept 
des Verfassungswandels nichts bei und 
führt eigentlich zu einer unnötigen Dis-
kussion.
Es wird hier behauptet, dass das Konzept 
des Verfassungswandels mit einem de-
mokratischen Konstitutionalismus nicht 
kompatibel ist, da die Verfassungsdogma-
tik des Grundgesetzes der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland sowohl als organisatorische 
Norm als auch als Werteordnung einer 
pluralistischen Gesellschaft verstanden 
wird. Wer behauptet, dass man, um die 
Verfassung zu interpretieren, als einzige 
Methode die Subsumtion benutzen soll-
te, wird ganz sicher die Hermeneutik als 
ein Mittel, um die Inhalte der Normen zu 
wandeln, ablehnen.
8.
Shu-Perng Hwang (Institutum Iurispru-
dentiae, Academia Sinica / Taiwan)
Zur Inhaltsbestimmung des Gesetzes 
unter Ungewißheitsbedingungen
Abstract:
In herkömmlicher Hinsicht richtet sich 
der Inhalt des Gesetzes vornehmlich 
auf dessen rechtsstaatliche Aufgabe der 
Freiheitsgewährleistung. Besonders im
ligen Verfassungsverständnis ab und be-
inhaltet entweder eine Annäherung an 
eine Verfassungsänderung oder an eine 
Verfassungsauslegung. Die Trennung 
dazwischen liegt in der Unterscheidung 
zwischen einer dynamischen und verfas-
sungsmäßigen Interpretation auf der ei-
nen Seite bzw. einer verfassungswidrige 
Anwendung auf der anderen Seite. Der 
zeitgenössische Verfassungsstaat vermag 
ein Gleichgewicht zwischen der Demo-
kratie und der Verfassung herzustellen. 
Derjenige, der die Balance zur Demokra-
tie schafft, bevorzugt die politischen Ent-
scheidungen, d.h. die Entscheidungen der 
Mehrheit und wird in diesem Sinne die 
Fortentwicklung der Verfassungsnormen 
vom Bundesverfassungsgericht ablehnen. 
Im Gegensatz dazu schafft derjenige die 
Balance zur Verfassung, der die Bewah-
rung der Normativität der Verfassung 
und die Minderheitsrechten durch das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht gegenüber der 
durch die politischen Mehrheiten im Par-
lament bevorzugt.Das Konzept der Ver-
fassungswandlung bzw. des Verfassungs-
wandels versteht die Norm als Dogma, als 
etwas das ﬁ  xiert und unveränderlich ist. 
Heutzutage ist unter Berücksichtigung 
der Idee der normativen Verfassung das 
Konzept der Verfassungswandlung mit 
dem demokratischen Ideal inkompatible 
und irrelevant für die normative Theo-
rie der demokratischen Verfassung. Eine 
pluralistische und wandlungsfähige Ver-
fassung, die nach Offenheit für die poli-
tische Debatte in Zeit und Raum strebt, 
sollte konsequenterweise ihre Konkre-
tisierung anhand der Realität und dem 
demokratischen Willen zulassen. Das  262 263
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pretation. In this framework, the states 
have tried to defend the citadel of rea-
sonable text against the aggressive in-
cursions resulted from various unfore-
seen contexts.
The prospect of the legal interpretation 
speech contains some criterias different 
from all the legal systems. In this con-
text, Eco’s concept can provide a system 
of selectivity and reasonableness.
13. 
Oskar Pogorzelski (Jagiellonian Univer-
sity / Poland)
Modelling of concepts in criminal law 
using cognitive linguistic.
Abstract:
This paper presents certain concepts of 
actions forbidden by criminal law as cog-
nitive radial categories which are based 
on the concept of prototype. Categories 
having such structure occur not only in 
every day life but also in law. It is well 
known that classical categories, based on 
necessary and sufﬁ  cient features which 
can be assigned to all elements belong-
ing to such category, are dominating in 
our every day perception of the external 
world. 
However, as the law refers to many 
different phenomena, it is hard to be 
framed into stiff classical categories. It 
poses a problem for criminal law and 
in particular for the fundamental prin-
ciple of nullum crimen sine lege, which 
requires a precise description of any ac-
tion forbidden by the law. Anyhow, as it 
appears the actions forbidden by crimi-
nal law are frequently referred to in the 
criminal code by use of certain descrip-
o f  t h e m  p l e d g e  t o  s e t  u p  t h e  j u d i c i a l  
control system, which can prevent the 
unconstitutional events from happen-
ing. The others think that due to the 
imperfection of the text of Chinese Con-
stitution there should be some good un-
constitutionality according some stand-
ards from or above the Constitution. 
Recently, a new approach tries to deﬁ  ne 
some kinds of the praxis in contrast to 
the Constitution as unwritten Constitu-
tion. The article wants to ﬁ  nd a solution 
towards the issue and explain how to 
deal with the antipode between the text 
of Chinese Constitution and the reality 
concerning the Chinese Constitution.
12.
Rares-Sebastian Puiu-Nan (“George Ba-
ritiu” University / Romania)
On Suprainterpretation Concept And 
Lawyer’s Work 
Abstract:
M y  p a p e r  w o r k  p r o p o s e s  s o m e  r e ﬂ  ec-
tions on the hermeneutical approach 
and on Umberto Eco’s suprainterpreta-
tion concept in particular. 
It covers the connection of this concept 
with real legal facts and lawyer’s every-
day work experience. Thus we proposed 
following the next few steps:
The Hermeneutics – Theory of under-
standing
According to Umberto Eco, the su-
prainterpretation of a text means to 
explore the fact that, undoubtedly, a 
certain point of view has a relation of 
analogy, continuity and similarity with 
any other (point of view). That implies 
meeting certain criterias of suprainter-
es sich nachzugehen lohnt, z.B. die Ge-
neration der Beteiligten oder das Be-
wusstsein, eine frühere Methodenlehre 
zu bewältigen. Interessant ist auch die 
Frage, warum diese Ereignisse gerade 
1 953 stattfanden. Um sie zu beantwor-
ten, sollen ihre Hintergründe und Um-
stände untersucht werden, die bislang 
nur wenig beleuchtet worden sind. Kur-
usus Referat ist vor dem Hintergrund 
der Unrechtsdebatte zu sehen, die m. 
E. in Zusammenhang mit der „inﬁ  niten 
Auslegungslehre“ steht. In Bezug auf 
Westermann ist u.a. die Bedeutung von 
Wilhelm Sauer hervorzuheben, der viel-
leicht als erster die Methodenlehre Wes-
termanns als „Wertungsjurisprudenz“ 
bezeichnet hat.
In meinem Referat versuche ich, unter 
Berücksichtigung dieser Hintergründe 
den bislang ungelösten Fragen der da-
maligen Methodenlehre nachzugehen 
und neue Erklärungsansätze zu präsen-
tieren.
Session 2b
11.
Qingbo Zhang (Faculty of Law , Macau 
University of Science and Technology, 
Macau / China)
Judicial Control, Good Unconstitution-
ality or Unwritten Constitution. How 
to deal with the antipode between the 
Text of Chinese Constitution and the 
Reality?
Abstract:
The Chinese Scholars are always con-
fronted with the question, whether the 
Chinese Constitution is effective. Some 
phischer Hermeneutik, Sprachtheorie, 
Argumentation, Systemtheorie usw., die
allesamt die angebliche Nutzlosigkeit 
der traditionellen juristischen Metho-
den verkünden. Dabei wäre gerade eine 
Vertiefung diverser Fragen im Bezug auf 
eine Umformung und Anreicherung der 
klassischen Auslegungslehre vonnöten 
(Kaufmann, Esser, Kriele, Hassemer, 
Ricoeur), um der rechtsanwendenden 
P r a x i s  b r a u c h b a r e  L ö s u n g s a n s ä t z e  z u  
liefern.
10.
Hattori Hiroshi (Research Fellow of Ja-
pan Society for the Promotion of Science 
/ Japan)
1953 – ein Markstein der juristischen 
Methodenlehre in Japan und Deutsch-
land 
Abstract:
Vergleicht man die Entwicklungen der 
juristischen Methodenlehre in Japan 
und Deutschland, so kann man neben 
vielen Unterschieden eine interessan-
te Gemeinsamkeit feststellen. In bei-
den Staaten fanden 1953 unabhängig 
voneinander zwei Ereignisse statt, die 
zu Marksteinen in der Methodenlehre 
beider Staaten werden sollten. In Japan 
hielt der Zivilrechtler, Saburo KURUSU 
anlässlich der Tagung der Japan Associ-
ation of Private Law ein Referat, welches 
den sog. Rechtsauslegungsstreit auslöste. 
In Deutschland hielt Harry Westermann 
an der Universität Münster seine Rekto-
ratsrede, die seinen Ruf als Pionier der 
Wertungsjurisprudenz begründen sollte.
Zwischen beiden Ereignissen bestehen 
zunächst äußerliche Parallelen, denen  264 265
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theories and asserts that positivist mod-
els such as Hart’s and Kelsen’s were not 
only models of and for rules (as Dworkin 
believed, especially regarding Hart’s theo-
ry), and that even if they were, that would 
not be discretion’s main cause, for rules 
provide a smaller playroom than princi-
ples. It reaches then the partial conclusion 
that discretion’s main cause in Hart’s and 
Kelsen’s theories was not the absence of 
principles, but rather the absence of an 
interpretation theory. After that it inves-
tigates the relation between discretion, 
legal interpretation theories and the de-
scriptive-normative character of legal the-
ories. It does that by using Alexy’s concept 
of law, in which law has a dual nature, 
namely a factual and an ideal. It tries to 
show why descriptive theories can only 
diagnose discretion, but have no proposal 
to minimize it. Then it tries to show why 
solving or at least minimizing discretion 
is necessary, and that only a normative 
theory can be a good candidate to this 
task. But it recognizes that being norma-
ti v e  is  n o t  e n o u gh  t o  fulﬁ  ll it; in other 
words, it asserts that being normative is 
a necessary condition to minimize discre-
tion, but not a sufﬁ  cient one. Finally it 
tries to show how the ideal dimension of 
law, which raises a claim of correctness, is 
connected to normative theories.
4.
Danielle Anne Pamplona + Amelia Sam-
paio Rossi (Pontiﬁ  cal Catholic University 
of Paraná / Brazil)
The knowledge of judges of disciplines 
outside the law and their responsibility 
for the image of the Judiciary Branch
Abstract:
It is a fact that mediation and other al-
ternative dispute resoltion means are 
becoming increasingly popular. Actual-
ly, governments are encouraging people 
to use them instead of going to Court, 
as they are quicker, cheaper and more 
informal than trials, and can be imple-
mented using internet. The author fo-
cus on the analysis of the structure and 
purposes of mediation, in particular. The 
paper aims to discuss and understand 
what kind of justice, if any, is offered by 
alternative dispute resolution.
2. 
Torquarto Castro Jr. (Federal University 
of Pernambuco / Brazil)
“Exception” or “Equity”? The power of 
“miracle” in legal decision
Abstract:
Carl Schmitt asserted that all signiﬁ  cant 
concepts of the theory of State are secu-
larized theological concepts. One con-
cept, however, which does not belong 
to Legal or State theory, but only to the 
realm of Theology, is that of “miracle”. 
T o  S c h m i t t ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h i s  w o u l d  a l s o  
ﬁ  nd a correlate in the idea of the decision 
on a “case of exception”. In such context, 
he who bears sovereignty could miracu-
lously decide both beyond and through 
the rule, as if it empowered him to do 
so, when, by deﬁ  nition, it could never. 
This insightful argument circularly re-
inforces Schmitt’s perspective that Law 
is essentially Politics (and this, persua-
sive gathering of friends against foes). In 
spite of the richness of the idea for the 
sociology of Legal concepts, it seems cor-
tions which rather refer to a prototype 
of a radial category, than to a classical 
category. 
Actual actions frequently depart in cer-
tain respect from such prototype, but 
nevertheless are assigned to the radial 
category deﬁ  ned by such prototype. By 
analysis of several examples, the paper 
shows the mechanism of such assignment.
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1.
Maria Clara Calheiros De Carvalho 
(University of Minho Law School / Por-
tugal)
Justice online: a new kind of justice?
rect to criticize it. It seems possible to 
show that Schmitt’s image tries to ex-
plain something from the point where it 
really ceases to be what it is, thus fail-
ing. If metaphorically the Law was to be 
compared to the King’s garments (the 
Law would dress Politics, but not change 
it), than Schmitt would be trying to 
understand the King’s clothes from his 
very nudity. Schmitt’s expedient makes 
sense in a measure, but only for the very 
rudiments of an understanding of what 
“dressing” here means. It is far from ca-
pable to explain what power it might 
have. On the other hand, if something 
was to be rendered miraculous, to the 
point that it could explain the persuasive 
power of such rhetoric, this would be 
the concept of equity, in the sense of the 
Aristotelian concept of epieikeia: a deci-
sion, which is literally against a statute, 
succeeds to be deemed lawful and is so 
generally accepted. That this discursive 
rupture of ostensive language is not seen 
as such is something of a wonder and 
shows what all such “dressing” is about.
3.
Alexandre Travessoni (Federal Univer-
sity of Minas Gerais [UFMG] + Pontiﬁ  -
cal Catholic University of Minas Gerais 
[PUC-MG] / Brazil)
Discretion and the claim of correctness: 
effects of the relation between law and 
morality in legal adjudication
Abstract:
The essay investigates the problem of le-
gal discretion and its relations to descrip-
tive and normative legal theories. It starts 
by investigating Hart’s and Kelsen’s legal  266 267
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constitutional courts have the very task 
to defend individual rights, principles of 
liberty and authentic equality. Therefore 
it is justiﬁ  ed to speak of the “jurisdiction 
of liberty”, as the Italian constitutional 
expert Cappelletti has said. But also 
without such legitimacy in many coun-
tries the Courts intervene in the ﬁ  eld of 
the legislator. The courts themselves dis-
cuss the limits of judicial interventions, 
emphasising themselves, that they have 
to respect the legislative decisions prin-
cipally, but do not abide always by their 
own proclaimed principles. In Spanish 
r e c e n t  p u b l i c a t i o n s  i t  i s  s p o k e n  o f  t h e  
principle “in dubio pro legislatore”, (in 
case of doubt in favour the legislator), 
reminding of “in dubio pro reo”, in order 
to treat the legislature power not worse 
than the defendant in a criminal proc-
ess.
Session 2
7.
Bei Yang (Law Faculty, University of In-
ternational Business and Economics / 
China)
The Role of Reasonableness in Law
Abstract:
Reasonableness plays a big role in law. 
On the one hand, it serves as an impor-
tant legal principle in a lot of legal ﬁ  elds. 
On the other hand, the reasonableness 
could be taken as the fundamental value 
that makes legal decisions acceptable in 
the perspective of legal argumentation. 
This paper aims to describe the role of 
reasonableness in law and ﬁ  nd the real 
reason of it. By examining the “duty of 
5.
Oscar Perez De La Fuente (Carlos III of 
Madrid University / Spain)
What kind of theoretical agreements 
are needed in resolving judicial cases
Abstract:
“Should judges be philosophers? Can 
judges be philosophers?” The answers 
that are given to these questions de-
ﬁ  ne two distinctive positions. First, the 
Law as integrity approach. In Dwor-
kin’s view, judges, to resolve judicial 
cases, must undertake an interpretative 
e x e r cis e  in  t e rms  o f  v al u e .  V al u e s  an d  
principles, and conﬂ  icts between them, 
are the vocation of moral and political 
philosophers. The moral reading of the 
Constitution is a task of judges and phi-
losophers that share topics and interests 
for concepts and values. Dworkin views 
favourably the scope and potentiality of 
the ﬁ  eld of Philosophy of Law . In this, 
he thinks that the Law Faculty is a bet-
ter place for studying political and moral 
philosophy than others. Second, the Le-
gal pragmatism approach. In the Posn-
er’s view, the Moral Theory, the intellec-
tual product of an academic morality, is 
a useless tool for a judge. The pragmatic 
outlook of Law is characterised for being 
practical, instrumental, forward-look-
ing, activist, empirical, sceptical, anti-
dogmatic and experimental. The judges, 
then, should have an instrumental view 
that their main aim in a case is appro-
priately answering the question, What 
w orks? From this view , It’ s interesting 
the Sunstein’s Incomplete Theorized 
Agreements approach.
In this article, I wish to analyse the ap-
Abstract:
There is some research showing that 
there is a signiﬁ   cant increase in the 
number of lawsuits brought to the Judi-
ciary in Western countries. This obser-
vation is accompanied by the realization 
that there is a deterioration of the image 
of this Branch, which leads to question-
ing about the causes of such a negative 
image of the Judiciary. Research has 
pointed to citizens’ discredit in relation 
to the Judiciary and their frustration on 
the lawsuits resolution by the courts. 
There are many angles under which 
we can evaluate the problem of the im-
age of this Branch. The most common 
way faces technological improvements 
and the numerous innovations that al-
low a larger organization, optimization 
of time and routine procedures, with 
the negative image of this Power. How-
ever, there is still room to follow a dif-
ferent path and inquire about the activ-
ity of the judge and how it contributes 
to the strengthening or deterioration of 
the image of the Judiciary. The present 
work searches adequate judges’ proﬁ  les 
to the expectations of societies, even 
though the need for them – especially in 
Western countries – to conform to gov-
ernment programs that seek legal secu-
rity and uniformity of judicial decisions 
at any price. The search focuses on the 
training of magistrates with a focus on 
non-legal issues which can assist in the 
understanding of society, philosophy, 
economics, politics, among others, im-
proving the quality of their results and 
therefore, improving the image of the 
Judiciary Branch.
propriate role of Theory for resolving ju-
dicial cases.
Examined is the need for some kind of 
theoretical basis, in both the Law as in-
tegrity approach and the Legal pragma-
tism approach, in two speciﬁ  c cases: a) 
The decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights on a gipsy widow’s right 
to a state pension; b) The controversy 
surrounding the rights of irregular im-
migrants to public services and state 
beneﬁ  ts. 
6.
Hans-Rudolf Horn (Instituto de In-
vestigaciones Jurídicas der Universität 
Mexiko Stadt / Germany)
Judicial Review in Democratic Systems
Abstract:
When judges are authorised to invalidate 
legal acts for being unconstitutional, the 
competence of the legislator is directly 
concerned. The question raises, if thus 
judges do not usurp legislative power. 
In the traditional doctrine of the sepa-
ra ti o n  o f  po w e rs  th e  par liam e n t  is  th e  
ﬁ   rst power, based on its direct demo-
cratic legitimacy. Yet cancelling legal 
acts completely or partially does evoke 
more irritations in the public that could 
be expected. The people seem to have 
more conﬁ  dence to the assumed impar-
tiality of the judges than to the results 
of the parliamentary work which seems 
to be dominated by the struggles of the 
parties. The necessity of judicial review 
mainly is based on the consideration 
that individual rights even in an authen-
tic democratic system may be violated by 
a legal act of the parliament. In this case  268 269
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are the legislator and the judge. While 
it is obvious the legislator determines 
rules that apply in general, this is more 
complicated with judges. A judge has 
to decide in individual cases, she has to 
construct a legal solution based on the 
facts of the case and the applicable legal 
rules. In the majority of cases that come 
before the court, a judge formulates a 
decision that applies only to the case 
at hand. These decisions do not add to 
the body of applicable rules in the legal 
system. However, in cases where a judge 
ﬁ  rst has to construct an applicable rule, 
before being able to decide the case on 
the basis of this rule, we have a differ-
ent type of decision. The rule construct-
ed by the judge to decide the case, may 
add to the body of applicable rules in the 
legal system. Legal practitioners and le-
gal scientists need to have knowledge of 
the general rules that apply in the legal 
system. This involves both knowledge 
of the legislation and knowledge of the 
decisions by judges that function as gen-
eral rules of law. Law students prepar-
ing themselves for the legal profession of 
course also need these kinds of knowl-
edge. They have to acquire knowledge 
about the role of decisions by judges in 
the legal system, and they need to un-
derstand the two categories of decisions 
by judges. A student has to have knowl-
edge about where to look for decisions 
of the second category, understand the 
structure of decisions and learn to deter-
mine what makes a decision relevant to 
the body of applicable rules in the legal 
system. Therefore it is necessary that stu-
dents practice reading and analyzing de-
as a general matter or as a matter speciﬁ  c 
to judicial practice and the legal context, 
judges are, with some degree of necessi-
ty, incapacitated from acquiring certain 
kinds of concepts. Such concepts include 
those possessed by the members of cul-
turally different minority groups.
Drawing on contemporary trends in 
analytic and naturalistic philosophy of 
mind, this paper explores the extent to 
which a judge might be incapacitated 
from acquiring new concepts over the 
course of a legal hearing. In so doing, 
the paper provides a theoretical account 
of the cognitive and practical process 
by which new concepts are acquired by 
judges in that context, identifying those 
factors which condition the success or 
failure of that process and elaborating 
a theoretical framework for identifying, 
critically reﬂ   ecting upon and reform-
ing those aspects of the normative re-
gime presently regulating legal hearings 
which facilitate or obstruct that process.
9.
Anna Kalisz + Adam Szot (University of 
Sosnowiec / Poland + University in Lub-
lin / Poland)
Mental models theory and a paradigm 
of law application process 
Abstract:
Aapplicatio est vita regulae
The paper is a modest attempt of intro-
d u cin g  s o m e  e l e m e n ts  o f  an al yti c  p hi -
losophy to jurisprudence (legal theory 
and logics). Mental model – generally 
speaking – is a representation of objects 
and its connections which are viewed as 
a sample of given phenomena (classes). 
reasonable care” in tort law and criminal 
law, the “reasonable usage” in intellec-
tual property law, we might achieve the 
meaning and position of reasonableness 
in law. By going through the making 
process of legal decisions, the role of rea-
sonableness as the fundamental value 
will be proved.
The reason of these will be analyzed in 
historical and philosophical way. The 
history of justice will show that reasona-
bleness has been a major criterion used 
by judges of all times. Moreover, reason-
ableness has a close relationship with le-
gality and legitimacy. Reasonableness is 
not the opposite of legality or legitimacy. 
To some degree, they are compatible. It 
is the coexistence of reasonableness and 
legality and legitimacy makes legal de-
cisions acceptable, moreover, makes law 
reliable.
8.
Anthony J. Connolly (Law School Aus-
tralian National University / Australia)
Judicial Understanding and the Limits 
of Conceptual Difference
Abstract: 
Occasionally, in pursuing their adjudi-
cative duties over the course of a legal 
hearing, judges are called upon to ac-
quire new concepts – that is, concepts 
which they did not possess at the com-
mencement of the hearing. In perform-
ing their judicial role they are required 
to learn new things and, as a result, 
conceptualise the world in a way which 
differs from the way they conceived of 
things before the hearing commenced. 
Some theorists have argued that either 
Thus, creation of mental models turns 
into generalization of individual subject 
and phenomena. This model is a rep-
resentation involving the presentation 
of a ﬁ  nite number of objects and their 
relations. These items are presented in 
concreto, but treated as a sample of the 
objects of a certain type
The aforementioned introduction of an 
idea of mental models to the theory and 
practice of decisional process results 
with numerous detailed considerations 
that concern: objective truth versus 
judicial truth, legal presumption and 
deﬁ  nitions as well as a question of deci-
sional discretion while applying general 
clauses. The common grounds for such 
diverse matters is a reduction phase of 
decisional process.
The goal of the paper is to answer the 
question, whether the Philip Johnson-
Laird’s mental models theory is applica-
ble to a paradigm of a decisional process 
and to what extend it is able to illustrate 
of legal reasoning in its narrow sense – 
as psychological processes undergone in 
reaching the legal decision.
10.
Antoinette Muntjewerff (University of 
Amsterdam / The Netherlands)
An explicit model for learning to struc-
ture and analyze decisions by judges
Abstract:
The law that applies in a legal system 
such as the Dutch legal system consists 
of general rules that are determined or 
acknowledged by authoritative bodies. 
The two most important authoritative 
bodies within the Dutch legal system  270 271
ABSTRACTS
Working Groups
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
–
 
A
b
s
t
r
a
c
t
s
Given this background, this paper is 
interested in exploring the jurinom-
ics of African legal thought. The paper 
discovers that reconciliation, consensus 
and restoration are pertinent jurinomic 
concepts in African legal thought. The 
p a p e r  a r gu e s  t h a t  t hi s  p o s s i b ili t y  i s  s o  
because, apart from being revered legal 
concepts, they also carry and embody 
the economic backside to African legal 
thought especially in matters of adjudi-
cation. The paper further argues that the 
jurinomics of African legal thought is, in 
many cases, proverbial and contained in 
the terse but profound expression that 
‘for each a crumb of right, for neither the 
whole loaf’. Apart from providing a new 
orientation in jurisprudential studies, 
the nuances provided by this economic 
orientation in jurisprudence also helps 
in transcending the myopic and unen-
lightened remarks about African legal 
thought. 
The paper concludes that African usage 
of the concepts of crumb, the loaf and 
the whole and, such other words, have 
very interesting economic implications 
in the understanding of law given the 
African milieu. In doing this, it is my 
view that apart from stressing the im-
po rtan ce  o f  eco n o mi c  j urisp ru d en ce  as  
an innovative approach in the study of 
law, it equally foregrounds the impor-
tance of exploring cultural jurispru-
dence as an emerging front in jurispru-
dential studies.
3.
Nathália Lipovetsky e Silva (Federal Uni-
versity of Minas Gerais – UFMG / Brazil)
Lectures:
1.
Felix Gantner (Austria)
Die Interpretation von Rechtstexten 
und der Stufenbau der Formatierungen
Abstract:
Der Einsatz von Textverarbeitungspro-
grammen hat die Ansprüche an Texte 
verändert. Sie werden nicht mehr nur 
geschrieben, sondern „gestaltet“. Dies 
hat auch Auswirkungen auf die Gestal-
tung von Rechtstexten. 
In Österreich unterschied der Gesetzge-
ber 2003 in der Novellierung des Bun-
des-Verfassunggesetzes (B-VG) und des 
VfGHG zwischen fett gesetzten Text-
teilen im Verfassungsrang und einfach 
gesetzlichen Texten, die ebenfalls fett 
gesetzt wurden. Die Folge waren For-
matierungsanweisungen („fett, normale 
Laufweite“) als Teil der österreichischen 
Verfassung.
Der Gesetzgeber ordnet der Forma-
tierung eine besondere juristische Qual-
ität zu. Diese ist daher als Erweiterung 
des Stufenbaus der Rechtsordnung 
anzusehen. Der Stufenbau der Forma-
tierungen ist im Rahmen der Auslegung 
von Rechtsvorschriften zu beachten.
An Hand von Beispielen aus Gesetzes-
texten, die Formatierungen des Textes 
enthalten, werden Konsequenzen für 
die juristische Argumentation darg-
estellt.
2. 
William Idowu (Obafemi Awolowo Uni-
versity / Nigeria)
For Each a Crumb of Right, For Neither 
cisions by judges. However, this is not a 
trivial activity. Learning to read and un-
derstand a legal decision is difﬁ  cult. The 
complex structure and the incomplete 
content make it difﬁ  cult to reconstruct 
the line of argumentation. The question 
is how we can support law students with 
reconstructing the argumentation in the 
decision. The answer has been sought 
in a rational reconstruction of the legal 
knowledge and legal reasoning involved 
in a decision. This reconstruction is then 
used as a model to instruct a law student 
how to structure and analyze a decision. 
This attempt resulted in the instruc-
tional environment CASE. However, the 
problem with reconstructing the legal 
knowledge and legal reasoning neces-
sary for the construction of a model is 
that often within the text of the decision 
the line of argumentation remains im-
plicit and incomplete. This makes it dif-
ﬁ  cult and sometimes even impossible to 
fully reconstruct the reasoning process. 
In this paper we describe our attempt to 
ﬁ  nd a solution to this problem.
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Chair Oh, Byung-Sun (Seoul / 
South Korea)
the Whole Loaf’: African Legal Thought 
and the Jurinomics of Reconciliation
Abstract:
Before now, modern jurisprudence 
seems to be obsessed entirely with a 
purely speculative concern over what 
the nature and subject matter of law is 
and how it can be distinguished from 
other cultural and normative institu-
tions, such as morality, religion, in hu-
man societies. The central controversy 
centers on the so-called objectivity of 
law. Such analyses led to the belief, on 
one hand, by legal naturalists, that law 
is a purely normative and idealistic en-
terprise without due application to world 
of empirical reality and, on the other 
hand, the belief, by legal positivists, for 
instance, that law is a purely descriptive, 
scientiﬁ  c and empirical enterprise with-
out any attachment to abstraction and 
transcendental reality.
However, in recent times, contemporary 
jurisprudence seems to have introduced 
a shift away from this speculative con-
cern to a properly scientiﬁ  c and empiri-
cal angle to the understanding of law. 
One of the very important approaches 
is what is termed “an economic” analy-
sis, interpretation, and application of 
legal concepts into mainstream juris-
prudence. Richard Posner (1973), Lewis 
Kornhauser (2005), Kaplow and Shavell 
(2002), Coleman (1988), and Jones 
(1983), to mention a few, are some of 
the excellent and painstaking analysis 
demonstrating the economic side to legal 
concepts and ideas. This possibility and 
practice is what I have personally termed 
jurinomics. 272 273
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Abstract:
Recently a leading Korean Constitution-
al Court justice expressed an opinion 
that the meaning of language of “judge’s 
conscience“ denotes a judge’s profes-
sional conscience, not a judge’s individ-
ual conscience formulated on the basis 
of personal worldview and value struc-
ture. When the meaning of the Article 
103 of the Korean Constitution “Judges 
shall rule according to their conscience 
and in conformity with the Constitu-
tion and the statutes“ is at stake, some 
of progressive young judges try to inter-
pret the judge’s conscience as a personal 
conscience. Progressive judges explicitly 
imbue their decision with value judge-
ments derived from personal conscience 
in hard cases where the conﬂ  icting value 
judgement is involved and the languages 
in the statute are not clearly indicative.
Because of these apparently prejudicial 
judgement derived from either judge’s 
hunch or ideological bent, there arise 
criticisms against the way of understand-
ing the meaning of judge’s conscience as 
a judge’s personal one. But the alterna-
tive way of understanding the meaning 
of the judge’s conscience as a judge’s pro-
fessional conscience is not also clear.
With regard to this role of conscience 
in judge’s adjudication in hard cases, a 
lesson may be drawn from a traditional 
ethical debate on the relevance of mor-
al sense to judgement, which had been 
m u c h  e x p l o r e d  i n  K o r e a n  C o n f u c i a n  
moral discourse. On the role of moral 
sense in establishing judgement, debates 
centered on the operation of four differ-
ent kind of moral sense, such as commis-
tivity means correspondence between a 
statement and its object in the discern-
i b l e  w o r l d .  T hi s  c o n c e p ti o n  i s  unif o rm  
with philosophical naturalism. It is not 
acceptable in the frames of legal dogmat-
ics.
The second and weaker conception can 
b e  c a l l e d  t h e  s e m a n t i c  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  
objectivity. A statement is objective if it 
is a statement about an object, and it is 
subjective if it is about the subject mak-
ing the statement. This conception is not 
helpful, either.
The third conception can be called the 
logical conception of objectivity. A state-
ment is objective if it has a determinate 
truth value. An objective legal statement 
provides information about the legal or-
der of a society as a fact-based institu-
tion. Notwithstanding its attractiveness, 
I abandon it. All the three conceptions 
provided by Marmor are too strong. The 
fourth and weakest conception intro-
duced my Rawls can be called the con-
structive conception of objectivity. It 
focuses our attention on the criteria of 
reasoning instead of presumed entities, 
objects or truth conditions. This concep-
tion is consistent with the nature of legal 
reasoning: an objective statement is at 
the general level and free from particu-
lar interests. It is possible to see objective 
legal reasoning in this sense.
6.
Byung-Sun Oh (Sogang University Law 
School / South Korea)
Relevance of Moral Sense to Legal Rea-
soning: A Critical Appraisal of Korean 
Debate 
4.
Jorge Mena (National Autonomous Uni-
versity of Mexico / Mexico)
The use of politic science methods in 
jurisprudence
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is evalute the posi-
bility of measuring principles in law. For 
the political science the concepts can be 
“operationalized”, the deﬁ  nitions  were 
repleced by measuring. 
In legal theory, one of the most impor-
tant isssues is the posibility of the enfon-
cerment of principles, but the major cri-
tique is the subjetivity of that pretension.
Some of the proposals, like Alexy’s for-
mula, have similitudes and differences 
with political science measuring.
5.
Matti Ilmari Niemi (School of Business, 
Lappeenranta University of Technology 
/ Finland)
Objective Legal Reasoning – Is It Pos-
sible?
Abstract:
Discussing the objectivity of legal knowl-
edge is a way to outline the relation be-
tween the sentences of legal dogmatics 
and reality and the nature of legal rea-
soning.
The fundamental question is: Is it possi-
ble to combine the perspective of a par-
ticular person in the world with an ob-
jective view of the same world (Nagel).
There are different ways to understand 
objectivity: three conceptions intro-
duced by Marmor and a fourth by Rawls.
The ﬁ  rst and strongest conception can 
b e  call e d  th e  m e ta p h y s i cal  o n e:  o b j e c -
The place of philosophy of law between 
justice and efﬁ  ciency 
Abstract:
The discussion around the complex rela-
tion between the concepts of efﬁ  ciency 
and justice goes a long way and brings 
several arguments. One of them, and it 
must be rejected in advance, is that pub-
lic law should be concerned about justice 
while private law should be concerned 
about efﬁ  ciency. The legal system is one 
and it is unacceptable that the balance 
between conﬂ  icting laws is found with 
such a division. Legislators and judges 
are responsible for ﬁ  nding the balance 
and no theory can just postulate that the 
balance will always be found with a sim-
ple cut between public and private law to 
distinguish when the criteria should be 
justice and when it should be efﬁ  ciency. 
Besides, it is unbelievably reductionist to 
conﬁ  ne the discussion to single goals as 
efﬁ  ciency and justice, when there is so 
m u ch  m o r e  t o  l oo k  u po n  lik e  ce rtain -
ty, human dignity and human rights. 
Moreover, even if the discussion is kept 
between justice and efﬁ   ciency only, it 
is the easiest thing to demonstrate that 
they are not mutually exclusive. The 
e c o n o m i c  a n a l y s i s  o f  l a w ,  P o s n e r  s a i d  
it himself, has limits and philosophy of 
law plays an extremely important role in 
this discourse (that must be interdisci-
plinary) to clarify that there can not be a 
goal other than the realization of human 
rights and that there can not be justice if 
it is not shared for all mankind. 274 275
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plete different virtue. Although today, 
in Brazil, the Escola do Direito Civil-
Constitucional (Private-Constitutional 
School of Law) concentrates its efforts in 
trying to make us believe that the law 
must be a condition not for the virtue of 
justice, but for the virtue of love. It is as 
if love could be commanded by law . If 
the narrator of Frost’s poem, in a narrow 
view, may be pictured trying to put the 
wall down in order to create a kind of a 
new society in which love would be the 
only virtue and the only law, the Escola 
do Direito Civil-Constitucional (Private-
Constitutional School of Law), in a more 
audacious project, goes a different way: 
it wants to create a love society by law. 
This paper will present two examples of 
this project.
The ﬁ   rst example will be called “the 
right to be loved”. This expression here 
is not a metaphorical expression. The 
Escola do Direito Civil-Constitucional 
(Private-Constitutional School of Law) 
thinks that a person has a right of be-
ing loved and, as a logical consequence, 
thinks that some other person has a cor-
respondent duty of loving. If the person 
who has the duty of loving fails in per-
forming his/her legal obligation, he/she 
can be condemned to pay a monetary 
compensation to the one who was left 
without his/her due love. This absolute 
nonsense is what has been contempo-
rarily defended in various ﬁ  elds on the 
Family Law by the Escola do Direito 
Civil-Constitucional (Private-Constitu-
tional School of Law). Its roots are easy 
to trace. Once love (taking in modernity 
not as a virtue but as a person sentiment 
which the narrator expresses his doubts 
about the reasons for the very existence 
of walls and relates his dialogue with his 
neighbor, it seems now that it is the nar-
rator himself who doesn’t love a wall. 
It seems that the narrator does not love 
the wall and wants it down, although his 
neighbor insists that “good fences make 
good neighbors”. The statement “good 
fences make good neighbors” appears 
two times as well. In both occasions, it is 
the neighbor’s statement. In fact, it is all 
the neighbor says. It appears for the ﬁ  rst 
time in line 27, and a second time in the 
last line of the poem. Its ﬁ  rst appearance 
is just an expression of an old proverb. 
That casualness fades away when it ap-
pears in the closing of the poem. At that 
point, the narrator is already conscious 
about the power of violence that is, at 
the same time, encapsulated and frozen 
in the fence. So, although it seems that 
the theme of the poem is a simple criti-
cism of the existence of walls, a deeper 
in t e rp r e ta ti o n  m a y  s h o w  th a t  i t  i s  n o t .  
What does not love a wall is love. Love 
does not accept fences. As Diotima once 
taught to Socrates, love wants union. The 
lover wants to be one with her/his belov-
ed. But if it is true that love does not love 
a wall, it is also true that the destruction 
of a wall does not create love. Put in a 
different way: bad fences (or no fences at 
all) do not make good lovers, but certain-
ly bad fences (or no fences at all) make 
bad neighbors.
So, in the world of human affairs, it must 
be a place for law (represented by walls) 
as a condition for the virtue of justice, 
and it must be a place for love, as a com-
terization of some important institutes 
of private law in the name of some not 
well understood constitutional ethical 
principles. This movement is known as 
Escola do Direito Civil-Constitucional 
(Private-Constitutional Law School). It 
is as if the law should carry the responsi-
bility of being the source of every ethical 
(and theological) virtue. It is, of course, 
a movement in which both ethics and 
law are misunderstood. One thing is to 
know that law cannot be separated from 
ethics. This is right. A different thing is 
to think that law must command every 
ethical or theological virtue. This is a 
mistake. And even worse, it is a mistake 
that signiﬁ  es a threat both to ethics and 
law. In this paper, we will use an analy-
sis of Robert Frost’s poem Mending Wall 
as a key to investigate and criticize two 
examples of the oblivion of the right dis-
tinction and the right relationship be-
tween ethics and law proposed by this 
new Brazilian private law movement.
Mending Wall is a long one-stanza poem 
published in 1914. It is written in blank 
verse and contains a narrative-like style. 
It opens with an intriguing verse: “Some-
thing there is that doesn’t love a wall” 
(this same verse will appear once more in 
line 35). At this point, by the reading of 
the next nine verses, it seems to be that it 
is nature that doesn’t love a wall. The nar-
rator observes that there are gaps made 
by hunters and his dogs. But he also ob-
serves that there are gaps in the wall that 
were not made by men. Those gaps seems 
h a v e  b e e n  m a d e  b y  n a t ur e .  T h a t  s am e  
verse appears again in line 35. But at that 
point, considering the previous verses, in 
eration, shame, modesty, and discern-
ment. These four kind of moral sense 
has been known respectively as the be-
ginning the four virtuous judgement, 
such as humanity, righteousness, pro-
priety, and wisdom. I shall investigate 
whether, if any, there is any relevance of 
these four kind of moral sense to con-
temporary context of understanding the 
meaning and application of judge’s con-
science.
7.
Julio Oliveira (Pontiﬁ  cal Catholic Uni-
versity of Minas Gerais; Federal Univer-
sity of Ouro Preto / Brazil) + Rodolpho 
Sampaio Jr. (Pontiﬁ  cal Catholic Univer-
sity of Minas Gerais / Brazil)
Good fences make good neighbors: an 
investigation on the place of law and 
its limits in the context of the Brazilian 
private law movement Escola do Direito 
Civil-Constitucional (Private-Consti-
tutional Law School)
Abstract:
As Martha Nussbaum observes (in Po-
etic Justice: the literary imagination and 
public life), the literary imagination is 
a part of public rationality. It is not the 
whole of public rationality. But as a part, 
it plays a fundamental role. It is an ingre-
dient of an ethical ground that sustains 
the universe of rules and formal decision 
procedures (the universe of the law). 
The impoverishment of this ground nec-
essarily implies in a correlate impover-
ishment on the ﬁ  eld of law. Law cannot 
be separated from ethics. Notwithstand-
ing, today, there is a movement on Bra-
zilian private law towards a mischarac- 276 277
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What Jurisprudence Must Learn from 
History and Philosophy of Science
Abstract:
This paper argues that the so-called “re-
p l a c e m e n t  t h e s i s ” ,  a s  p r o p o s e d  b y  t h e  
contemporary naturalized jurisprudents 
such as Brian Leiter, should be signiﬁ  -
cantly modiﬁ  ed. The replacement thesis 
requires that the necessary or essential 
features of the law provided by analytical 
jurisprudence be replaced by the contin-
gent ﬁ  ndings due to the corresponding 
naturalized jurisprudence. To support 
my argument above, I maintain that the 
methodologies of philosophy and science 
are continuous with each other. In do-
ing so, I pay special attention to “thought 
experiments” as found in the history 
and philosophy of science (hereafter 
‘HPS’), and their common role in both 
sciences and philosophy in general. In 
my view, thought experiments typically 
employ a reductio ad absurdum to derive 
a certain conclusion at least about the 
way of our talking or thinking, or even 
the way the world is. So construed, the 
conclusion of the thought experiment is 
a priori in that it never derives from em-
pirical data, while it is contingent in that 
it is not a logical truth that is totally im-
mune to the demands of empirical sci-
ence. As a consequence, the methodol-
ogy of thought experiments plays a role 
in bridging the apparent gap between 
sciences and philosophy. 
This line of argument exactly applies to 
the context of jurisprudence. Analytical 
jurisprudence and naturalized jurispru-
dence are continuous, so that natural-
ized jurisprudence cannot be done solely 
As Frost’s Mending Wall helps us to see, 
if it is true that there is something that 
doesn’t love a wall, it is also true that 
good fences make good neighbors. And 
still, it is important to understand that it 
is simply impossible expecting that law 
could be responsible for the implemen-
tation of the realm of love in this world. 
The purpose of law is quite more modest: 
its purpose is to make possible the exist-
ence of good neighbors.
WORKING GROUP
WG 5 
Scientiﬁ  c Knowledge and Legal 
Decision
Session 1
Date MON 15 AUG 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location IG 454
Chair Leczykiewicz, Dorota 
(Oxford / UK)
Session 2
Date MON 15 AUG 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location IG 457
Chair Rodriguez, José Rodrigo 
(São Paulo/ Brazil)
Lectures:
Session 1
1.
Gunoo Kim (College of Law, Seoul Na-
tional University / South Korea)
for it”. One of the main theses proposed 
by Escola do Direito Civil-Constitucional 
(Private-Constitutional School of Law) is 
that the contract, instead of a manifesta-
tion of the person’s autonomy, must be 
understood as an instrument to achieve 
solidarity (another kind of love) in so-
ciety. So, a contract that is not a mani-
festation of solidarity has its obligatory 
power threatened. This way of reasoning 
has achieved the status of a federal stat-
ute in Brazilian law. The practical effects 
can be seen in various places. It can be 
seen in the contracts between private 
educational institutions and its students. 
A student who stops paying his monthly 
fees has the right of going on assisting 
classes and performing all educational 
activities until the end of the class pe-
riod. The argument behind this right is 
that such a thing as education cannot be 
subordinated to such a thing as honoring 
contracts. As it is understood by the Es-
cola do Direito Civil-Constitucional (Pri-
vate-Constitutional School of Law), the 
individualistic economics interests of the 
private schools must not be allowed to 
overcome the right of a person to be edu-
cated in a private school without paying 
for it. The quite paradoxical outcome of 
this statute is that, as recent researches 
shows, for a default percentage of 30.3, 
there is an increase of 15% on the value 
of the school monthly fees. As it is eas-
ily observed, the project of transforming 
contracts in an instrument for solidarity 
has achieved the goal of transforming 
g o o d  p a y e rs  in  c o m p uls o ry  h e l p e rs  f o r  
bad payers. At the end, it is not solidar-
ity. Its proper name is exploitation.
of affection) is established as the sole ba-
sis for the family institution, since it is 
possible to detect this feeling, it is pos-
sible to detect the constitution of a fam-
ily. Institutes like marriage, for instance, 
are in a process of loosing its formal ele-
ments (the effects of this loss of formal 
elements is paradoxical: today, in Brazil, 
getting a divorce is quite an easier task 
for formally married couples than for 
those who have chosen not to marry for-
mally). So, if it is possible to state that 
love bonds are important in the institu-
tion of family, it is not correct to conclude 
that there should be a legal duty to love. 
But this is just the conclusion put forth 
by the Escola do Direito Civil-Constitu-
cional (Private-Constitutional School of 
Law). In the relationship between par-
ents and children, the duty of loving was 
added to the traditional duties of respect 
and mutual assistance. Parents must, 
then, provide not only for material and 
traditional moral needs of education for 
their offspring, they are also obliged to 
provide love. The Escola do Direito Civil-
Constitucional (Private-Constitutional 
School of Law) talks about “affection/
love desertion”, which is thought as a 
cause for a monetary compensation. It is 
not said how a monetary compensation 
(and how much) can be a proper com-
pensation for the alleged lack of parental 
love. But it seems not to be a problem. 
For the Escola do Direito Civil-Constitu-
cional (Private-Constitutional School of 
Law) what matters is the institutionali-
zation of love by law.
The second example will be called “go-
ing to a private school without paying  278 279
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excitation of new needs (and no longer 
on the demand for satisfaction of needs); 
(ii.) the growing pursuit for total admin-
istration of conﬂ  icts. These factors are 
constitutive of what Gadamer sees as a 
great threat to our civilization: the ex-
cessive emphasis given in our times to 
the human capacity to adapt. What is 
demanded of individuals is the speciﬁ  c 
a b i l i t y  t o  m a k e  a n  a p p a r a t u s  f u n c t i o n  
properly. Less resistance and more adapt-
ability is requested, and because of that, 
autonomous thought – that is, free from 
functional determinations – is devalued. 
The threat we currently face is that the 
abilities of a good technocrat become the 
only qualities requested of those who 
are responsible for practical decisions 
(especially in politics and law). Techni-
cal reason (which requires know-how in 
a speciﬁ  c area and consists of choosing 
means to reach a previously established 
goal) cannot substitute practical reason, 
as the former requires adaptability to ex-
perience (not to an anticipated plan) and 
is grounded on solidarity.
5.
Karen Petroski (Saint Louis University 
School of Law / USA)
Making Public Meaning: The Legal 
Use of Technical and Textual Expertise 
Abstract:
Legal systems’ use of non-legal expertise, 
especially scientiﬁ  c expertise, continues 
to generate controversy despite reforms 
responding to concerns about expert 
bias and inﬂ  uence. This paper argues for 
a reconsideration of the ways non-legal 
expertise contributes to legal systems. 
ment“ is now the central political idea of 
the Party, but the „scientiﬁ  c“ here just 
means right, has nothing to do with sci-
ence itself. In a similar way, we can ﬁ  nd 
this distance in law , such as „scientiﬁ  c 
legislation“, that means making law cor-
rectly.
Another consequence of ideologicl sci-
ence is that law was regarded from in-
strumental perspective. As same as sci-
ence can be used to make aircraft and 
nulear weapon, law also was counted as 
the instumental of governing the soci-
ety and people. For a long time, Chinese 
government uphold an idea of rule of 
law, but an idea of instrumentalism in 
law.
4.
Mariana Pacheco (Federal University of 
Pernambuco / Brazil)
On the excessive role of technocracy 
(from a gadamerian perspective)
Abstract:
The role of experts grows in the present 
time and that is, in part, justiﬁ  able: as 
complexity rises, the ones who delib-
erate feel the need of the help of those 
who have know-how in speciﬁ  c ﬁ  elds. 
The question that must be asked revolves 
around the type of expectations devel-
oped in modern societies in regards to 
what experts can do. Though speciali-
zation is not a peculiarity of our time 
(the process can be observed since hu-
man beings became sedentary); it has 
presently gained speciﬁ  c characteristics. 
Two aspects of modern life are particu-
larly signiﬁ  cant for the matter: (i.) the 
fact that the economic system is based on 
tainty by expanding the province of fact, 
and portrays judicial decision-making as 
based on exceedingly idealised ‘scientiﬁ  c 
truth’. As a result of this approach, judg-
es do not have to explain how they deal 
with the limits of scientiﬁ  c knowledge. 
The latter approach, which admits the 
existence of uncertainty behind scien-
tiﬁ  c conclusions, entails the creation of 
legal rules governing the proof of causa-
tion in order both to factor in the uncer-
tainty and to allow exceptions to general 
principles in situations where fairness 
requires that it is the defendant who 
should bear the consequences of limits 
in scientiﬁ  c knowledge. The paper will 
assess which of these two approaches of-
fers a better response to the use of scien-
tiﬁ  c data in litigation.
3.
Yi Liu (Law School of BIT [Beijing Insti-
tute of Technology] / China)
Science as „Ideology“ and Modern Chi-
nese Law
Abstract:
In early stage of mordern China, „Si-
cence“ was regarded as the most im-
portant value and idea of the West, it 
was called „Mr. Sai“, which is the par-
tial tone of science. Another important 
value is democracy, which was called 
„Mr. De“. From then on, science was 
endowned with an ideological role. In 
another word, science means right and 
modern, and even just and holy. 
Just because science is an ideological 
concept, „science“ and „scientiﬁ  c“  be-
came universal and pragmatic. For ex-
emple, „scientiﬁ   c outlook on develop-
by empirical investigations but requires 
conceptual or a priori business. In con-
clusion, for a jurisprudent, there is much 
to be learned from HPS, for it is replete 
with a variety of thought experiments, 
and one can ﬁ   nd analogous cases of 
thought experiment and their role in ju-
risprudence.
2.
Dorota Leczykiewicz (University of Ox-
ford / United Kingdom)
Law and Science in the Proof of Cau-
sation: Redeﬁ  ning the Boundaries be-
tween Law and Fact 
Abstract:
The paper discusses the relationship be-
tween law and science in the context of 
establishing causation between a rel-
evant factor (a breach of standard) and 
the harm suffered by the claimant. It 
analyses the use of scientiﬁ  c data in the 
proof of facts on which the action rests 
and considers problems which emerge 
i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t .  T h e y  i n c l u d e  c o n c e p -
tual difﬁ  culties about the subject-matter 
of proof, as well as the question of the 
evidential potency of scientiﬁ  c ﬁ  ndings 
which offer only some, but not abso-
lute, level of certainty. The response of 
the law to these problems may be two-
fold: the jurisprudential principles can 
remain unchanged and accept scientiﬁ  c 
facts as given, regardless of how much 
uncertainty is hidden behind particular 
scientiﬁ  c conclusions; or they can accept 
that scientiﬁ  c data can be tainted with 
some level of uncertainty and adapt the 
legal tests accordingly. The former ap-
proach masks the presence of uncer- 280 281
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ence and law in narratives of justiﬁ  ca-
tion of the Brazilian Law
Abstract:
Legal discourse and scientiﬁ  c-technolog-
ical discourse have a complex relation-
ship in a democratic state. On the one 
hand, the scientiﬁ   c discourse justiﬁ  es 
technical rules autonomously according 
to the criteria applicable for the research 
community that is a social voice that 
must be taken into account in a demo-
cratic legislative process and in a demo-
cratic administration of justice. On the 
other hand, these technical rules com-
bined with power and interests can form 
zones of autarchy that cannot be reached 
by the debate on the public sphere.
The article will present this ambivalent 
relationship between science and law in 
two narratives of justiﬁ  cation of Brazil-
ian law: (1) legal opinions of judges of 
the Constitutional Court on research 
with embryonic stem cells and (2) the 
debate on traditional knowledge and in-
tellectual property.
The contrast between these two cases 
will demonstrate that the incorporation 
of scientiﬁ  c arguments to legal discourse 
varies according to its acceptance by so-
ciety.
Taking this analysis into account, this 
article makes an attempt to distinguish 
between technical rules and legal rules 
taking into account their relation to the 
public sphere.
7.
Andrés Santacolma (Catholic University 
of Colombia / Colombia)
“I Don’t Suppose You Can Bluff a Bac-
According to prevailing theories, the 
non-legal expert serves an epistemologi-
cal role, helping legal actors reach true 
or justiﬁ   e d  c o n c l u s i o n s .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  
however, to understand the legal use 
of non-legal expertise differently, as a 
technique for giving legal dispositions a 
form of legitimacy. Legal systems enlist 
experts to help shape legal products in 
a way that will make a variety of social 
actors willing and able to put those prod-
ucts to use. Through examples, I show 
how this process might be best under-
stood not in terms of truth-seeking but 
as a matter of the extent to which legal 
systems’ products can be integrated into 
existing systems of meaningfulness. The 
analysis suggests that the vocabularies 
most suited to clarifying the legal use 
of non-legal experts may be those of 
the philosophy and science of meaning, 
not epistemology. Indeed, expertise in 
the theories and technologies of mean-
ing creation could turn out to be key to 
procedural reform as well as theoretical 
clariﬁ  cation. To explain how, the paper 
describes some of the kinds of technical, 
and even scientiﬁ   c, expertise in prac-
tices of text use and information man-
agement that are likely to become legally 
signiﬁ  cant.
Session 2
6.
José Rodrigo Rodriguez (Fundação Get-
ulio Vargas’s Law School, São Paulo/ 
Brazil) + Samuel Rodrigues Barbosa 
(University of São Paulo / Brazil)
The ambivalent relation between sci-
terium”: How the Law has to Deal with 
Science, Junk Science, and Scientism 
to Pursue the Truth
Abstract:
Today, some take a very uncritical atti-
tude to the natural sciences (and some-
times to the social sciences), perhaps, as 
one of the consequences of all the devel-
opments and advances that this human 
activity –a valuable endeavor– has given 
us. This attitude, manifested in many sit-
uations and places, is traceable in Courts 
and Legal decisions, at least, in two dif-
ferent ways:
(1) As a very deferential attitude to Sci-
ences; this can mislead legal decisions by 
allowing anything, so long as it is called 
“science,” to be considered as such in le-
gal cases. (English speakers might call 
this a kind of “scientism”).
(2) As a very suspicious attitude to the 
Sciences; this mislead legal decisions by 
making legal decision makers believe 
that any kind of science must be in part 
(or be entirely) junk science. 
If (1), they let in too much just because 
it’ s called science; if (2) instead of ( 1 ), 
they keep out too much because they are 
suspicious of science. There is no doubt 
that Science, with all the developments 
and progresses achieved by human kind, 
has a role to play in Courts and some le-
gal cases. But if it is so, courts have to do 
not (1), not (2), but:
(3) Have a critical attitude allowing sci-
ence to be part of the cases in the proper 
way.
I will take rulings from the U.S. Courts, 
the Spanish Courts, and the Colombian 
Courts, to show how courts do (1) and 
( 2), b u t also h o w , in som e cases, th ey 
have done (3) and by doing so, they have 
reached the Truth.
8.
Filip Przybylski-Lewandowski (Univer-
sity of Gdansk / Poland)
Application of game theory in predict-
ing court decisions
Abstract:
The subject of this elaboration is an at-
tempt to answer the question whether it 
is possible to apply game theory in the 
analysis of decisions made by courts, 
based on the example of Newcomb’s 
paradox. The reasoning presented in the 
paper approaches the matter from the 
perspective of a party in the proceed-
ings, not the court. This change of the 
usual perspective, dominating in theo-
retical-legal reﬂ  ection on applying law 
in courts, reverses the way of explain-
ing decision-making mechanisms in law 
application. What is more, the proposed 
type of game, which assumes that one 
of the players (in our case – the court) 
has already made their decision and the 
sole objective of law application process 
is to guess what this decision is, makes it 
possible to perform the reasoning simul-
taneously at the level of ontological and 
epistemological reﬂ   ection; an enquiry 
about sources of law once again becomes 
the fundamental issue.
9.
Rui Sorares Pereira (Faculty of Law, Uni-
versity of Lisbon / Portugal)
Challenging The “Cause-In-Fact”/ 
“Cause-In-Law” Dichotomy 282 283
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WORKING GROUP
WG 6 
Law and Finance / Economics
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time 15.30 h –18.00 h
Location RUW 1.101
Chair Bisogni, Giovanni (Salerno 
/ Italy)
Lectures:
Session 1
1.
Siarhei Artsemyeu + Xiaonan Hong + 
Yigong Liu (Dalian University of Tech-
nology, School of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, China)
Inﬂ  uence of sources of Constitutional 
Law on the national economic Policy 
(Chinese and Belorussian experience)
Abstract:
Because of the special nature of consti-
tutional law (it is the most fundamen-
tal and the most political branch of law 
as well as it regulates the foundation of 
economic system) the issue of its sources 
is important for proper functioning of 
national economy . It is worthy to state 
that norms, concepts and principles of 
other branches of law which directly in-
ﬂ  uence any national economy (civil law, 
economic law, commercial law, labor 
law) should not be understood without 
taking into consideration of content of 
constitutional law. 
Legal systems of China and Belarus share 
many similar features. Constitutional 
Abstract:
In law, causality is particularly relevant 
in the ﬁ  eld of civil liability and criminal 
liability. Some authors believe that eve-
rything that relates to a logic of respon-
sibility will have to refer to causality, 
assuming this as crucial to law. In this 
sense the so called causal nexus is seen 
as a necessary a priori, particularly in 
civil liability, for allowing a connection 
between the damaging event or breach 
and the damage to be repaired. However, 
some authors, considering that, in order 
to afﬁ  rm responsibility, it is necessary 
to start from a legally relevant notion of 
cause and to distinguish between fact or 
naturalistic causality (stricto sensu cau-
sality) and legal causality (imputation), 
argue that causality in law is nowadays 
mainly an imputation problem, since the 
pure and simple causality of a harmful 
event represents a mere starting point 
for the attributive judgment of responsi-
bility, which in some cases does not nec-
essarily have to be based on fact or natu-
ralistic causality. Moreover, there are 
those who state that questions regarding 
responsibility can be addressed directly 
without the need to ask whether there 
is a causal relation between agency and 
harm, since only fact or naturalistic cau-
sality would be genuinely causal. This 
article seeks, on one hand, to discuss 
the relevance of the fact/law distinction 
to the causal inquiry and, on the other 
hand, to discuss how can be sustained 
the fact causality/legal causality distinc-
tion and if it is necessary to give greater 
importance to one or another of these 
elements.
law of both countries was inﬂ  uenced by 
civil law concepts, ideas of Soviet legal 
tradition as well as by Anglo-Saxon legal 
t h o u g h t .  In  s p i t e  o f  m an y  s imil a ri t i e s ,  
the two countries have accumulated 
their own unique experience of consti-
tutional development which is also wor-
thy to be examined to understand how 
genetically similar legal ideas in societies 
with different traditional cultures can 
diverge, and how unlike legal concepts 
inﬂ  uenced by similar factors can typo-
logically converge. 
The purpose of the present research is: 
to examine peculiarities of the inﬂ  uence 
of the most important elements of the 
system of sources of modern constitu-
tional law of People’s Republic of China 
and the Republic of Belarus on the eco-
nomic situation; 
to investigate the correlation between 
constitutional law and economy; 
to analyze the possible ways of improv-
ing the regulative effect of norms of con-
stitutional law on the economic system; 
to explore opportunities to reduce con-
ﬂ  icts between different sources of con-
stitutional law to improve functioning of 
national economies.
2.
Giovanni Bisogni (Università di Salerno 
/ Italy)
Legal Theory and the Global Financial 
Crisis
Abstract:
What can legal theory say on the current 
ﬁ  nancial crisis?
Apparently, very little. In scientiﬁ  c liter-
ature as in the press the‘lion’s share’was 
held by economists, partly ratione mate-
riae, partly because of the charge of not 
having foreseen the crisis at all.
Y e t ,  th e r e  is  m u ch  talk  o f’ rul e s ’ :  rul e s  
that are missing, rules that did not work, 
rules that were not voluntarily complied 
with, rules that were not enforced by 
those who had to do it ... In short, we 
have a remarkable use of a very common 
concept in legal theory –‘rule’– and my 
aim is to demonstrate that this perspec-
tive (especially of a normativist nature) 
can help not only to understand the rea-
sons for this crisis – in particular, the 
illusion of the ‘business community’to 
live as a‘simple society’, in which duty-
imposing-rules are backed by a social 
pressare not institutionalized –, but also 
to show what chance have the present 
attempts to overcome it at international 
level through a rule of recognition for 
the business community (e.g., interna-
tional treaties or agreements or existing 
supranational agencies).
3.
Adrualdo Catão (Federal University of 
Alagoas / Brazil)
Law and Economics, consequentialism 
and Legal Realism: the inﬂ  uence of Ol-
iver Holmes Jr.
Abstract:
This paper aims to present the similari-
ties and differences between Posner’s 
defense of Law and Economics(LAE) 
and Holmes’ Legal Realism. The inves-
tigation is centered in the arguments of 
economic consequences of judicial deci-
sions. Law and Economics tends to em-
phasize these arguments as a determi- 284 285
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debates about the economic analysis of 
law, one of the persistent problems is 
the role of economic arguments in le-
gal reasoning. The problem has been 
extensively discussed in the legal litera-
ture but has not been ultimately solved. 
This paper is a contribution to this dis-
cussion. The argument goes as follows. 
First, I argue that insights from law and 
economics, to the extent that they claim 
to be directly relevant for legal reason-
ing, should carry a jurisprudential pref-
ace that states that this very relevance is 
limited by and conditional upon a can-
on of acceptable arguments. Second, I 
argue that the typical normative claims 
of law and economics based on econom-
ic efﬁ  ciency can be interpreted as con-
sequence-based arguments of a special 
kind. Third, in the analytical core of the 
paper, the conceivability, feasibility and 
desirability of the judicial appreciation 
of general social consequences of legal 
decisions is considered. Referring to the 
philosophical, jurisprudential and insti-
tutional dimensions of the issue I argue 
that in a modern constitutional democ-
racy the scope of consequence-based ju-
dicial reasoning is limited mainly by the 
expertise of courts. A more general im-
plication of this analysis is that the im-
pact of law and economics scholarship 
on law can only be understood through 
a close look at legal reasoning in general 
and consequence-based arguments in 
particular.
nant characterization of Legal Realism. 
These arguments involve some dilem-
mas: Is it possible to eliminate a rule, or 
reinterpret it according to the effect of its 
application in practical life? May these 
e c o n o mi c  c o n s e q u e n c e s  s e rv e  a s  a r g u -
ment for a replacement of traditional 
interpretation? To what extent can we 
rule out the law with arguments of con-
sequence? Despite the inﬂ  uence,  LAE 
has some important differences with 
respect Holmes’ Legal Realism. Posner’s 
LAE involves the economic principle of 
wealth maximization and its relations 
with utilitarianism and economic liber-
alism. Consequentialism in Holmes, by 
contrast, is based on a teleological inter-
pretation of existing rules. It is impor -
tant the judge does not decide based on 
a speciﬁ  c economic theory. Also, Legal 
Realism do not advocate abandoning the 
tenets of positivism that form the basis 
for the rule of law. Holmes defends a 
judicial restraint. Accordingly, the ar-
gument of consequence must have pre-
vious limits in precedents and statutes. 
However, both Legal Realism and LAE 
are connected by the idea that the adap-
tation of the law to a reasonable end can 
not be absent from the canons of inter-
pretation and adjudication.
4.
Péter Cserne (Tilburg University / Neth-
erlands)
Consequence-based arguments in legal 
reasoning: a jurisprudential preface to 
law and economics
Abstract:
In philosophical and methodological 
WORKING GROUP
WG 7 
Liability, Criminal Law
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 2.101
Chair Sangero, Boaz (Jerusalem 
/ Israel)
Lectures:
1.
Pawel Banas (Jagiellonian University / 
Poland)
Akrasia – status of weak willed actions 
in philosophy of law
Abstract:
Akrasia, or weak-will, is a term describ-
ing a phenomenon when one acts freely 
and intentionally contrary to his or her 
better judgment. Discussion on the pos-
sibility of akrasia originates in the Plato’s 
Protagoras where he states that “No one 
who either knows or believes that there 
is another possible course of action, bet-
ter than the one he is following, will ever 
continue on his present course”. Howev-
er, in his inﬂ  uential article from 1970, 
D o n a l d  D a v i d s o n  a r g u e d  t h a t  a k r a s i a  
is theoretically possible yet irrational. 
Some other critics of Plato’s stance point 
out that phenomenon of akrasia is com-
mon in our everyday experience, there-
fore it must be possible. 
These two arguments in favour of akra-
sia existance – theoretical and empirical 
– will be discussed from both – philo-
sophical and psychological points of 
view. Especially, George Ainslie’s argu-
ment that akrasia results from hyperbol-
ic discounting will be taken into consid-
aration to show how it affects traditional 
thinking about weak-willed actions.
Finally, the paper will discuss how may 
the contemporary notion of akrasia af-
fect the idea of responsibility and free 
will. Implications for the philosophy of 
law will be shown, i.a. to which measure 
it is possible to claim that a given exam-
ple of a weak-willed action was indeed 
free and intentional and one should be 
hold responsible for its results.
2.
Henrique Carvalho (King’s College Lon-
don / United Kingdom)
Terrorism, Punishment and Recogni-
tion
Abstract:
The proposed paper will be an article 
based on contemporary discussions on 
punishment and responsibility, directly 
related to the possibility of punishing ter-
rorists within a system of criminal law. 
The principal research question can be 
articulated as: ‘can recognition provide 
a better understanding of the challenges 
that terrorism pose to a normative theory 
of punishment?’ The basic argument fol-
lows a discussion by Anthony Duff of the 
problems that terrorism pose to a norma-
tive theory of punishment, which ought 
to presuppose communication (and, it 
will be argued, recognition) as its basis.
It will be argued that while Duff is prob-
ably right to presuppose some notion of 
communication are a presupposition to 
a fair normative theory of punishment  286 287
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Abstract:
A felony is the rupture of communica-
tive rationality that exists between the 
factuality of an action and the concrete 
validity of the rule. The penalty, in turn, 
is the counterfactual reafﬁ  rmation of the 
normative validity through the denial of 
the denying factor of the felony. In this 
regard, it is necessary to make two (2) 
warnings in a way of contextual clariﬁ  -
cation: a) the word action is raised and 
exposed throughout this thesis in its 
broader Kant’s connotation, as a possi-
bility of public use, at all times and plac-
es, of one’s reason rather than in its nar-
rower naturalistic sense, as an external 
to do that implies the correlative accep-
tation of the not to do (omission). The 
public use of reason is a subjective right, 
understood as the faculty of demanding 
from another person the intervention, 
which is incumbent by competence, to 
a given normative pretension. It is about 
a right to intersubjective recognition of 
the existence of the individual freedom 
as an event consistent with the freedom 
of all and b) the communicative ration-
ality is based on the assumptions of lan-
guage, universality, clearness, veracity 
and ﬁ   nality, included in the world of 
life thanks to the social pact subscripted 
by the individuals when they migrated 
from the state of nature to the rule of 
law. The interpretative vision of the right 
of control in a risk society is not new, it 
goes back in its broader perspectives to 
the German philosophical stream of ide-
alism that characterized the epistemo-
logical development of XVIIIth century. 
In the complexity of postmodern socie-
Towards Safety in the Criminal Justice 
System
Abstract:
In light of the proven phenomenon of 
false convictions and the severe harm 
caused to society and to the convicted, 
this article focuses on the necessary pre-
liminary stages toward the development 
of a safety theory in the criminal justice 
system, as it is entirely absent today. The 
criminal justice system is a “safety criti-
cal system”: it deals with actual matters 
of life and death, and an error in the 
system is liable to cause grave damage. 
We consider a false conviction as an ac-
cident, just like a ﬁ  ghter jet crash. This 
comparison is not only metaphorical, 
but rather – when the damage is assessed 
ﬁ  nancially – quite realistic. The differ-
ence in awareness of safety between the 
ﬁ  elds of engineering and of medical de-
vices and the criminal justice system is 
linked to what we deﬁ  ne as “the hidden 
accident principal of criminal law”. False 
convictions are typically hidden. We 
will provide an assessment of the risks of 
false convictions, and show that the risks 
are great. We will propose a few specif-
ic solutions of the safety problems that 
this article raises, and explain why these 
speciﬁ   c solutions are insufﬁ  cient,  and 
why a complete safety theory must be 
developed for the ﬁ  eld of criminal law.
5.
Diego Victoria + Fernando Ochoa (Libre 
University / Colombia)
Communicative rationality in the 
standardization of legal relevant crimi-
nal conduct
apathetic towards others and society, we 
need to expand the notion of individual 
responsibility. 
In relating to the responsibility expan-
sion, this paper targets shame punish-
ment such as requiring defendants to 
wear signs in public or advertise their 
convictions in newspaper. It seems 
to be the common arguments among 
criminologists that these practices are 
the results of penal populism and these 
expressive punishments are simply bad 
policies because they are costly, not ef-
fective deterrent, and moreover they are 
against human dignity. Obviously those 
scholars are against representations of 
public opinions. However, people’s sen-
timents do not necessarily go to harsh 
punishments, instead they may move to 
lenient treatments if they are given the 
opportunity to know the offenders. 
This paper will focus on:
1) Can a symbolic social disapproval, 
such as shame punishments or naming 
& shaming, change people’s moral atti-
tudes?
2) If so, can such moral attitudes become 
a norm for those people? 
3) Can such a social expressive disap-
p r o v a l  g i v e  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  u n d e r -
stand the offender and the cause of the 
crime, and provoke people’s concerted 
participation in dealing with the cause 
of crimes, and hence generate the wider 
sense of responsibility beyond the nar-
row boundary of individuality?
4.
Boaz Sangero (Academic Center of Law 
& Business / Israel)
(or should we say, in a more general 
tone, justice), the account that he makes 
of liberal law, even normatively more 
than descriptively, still fails to provide 
the necessary basis for individual agency 
and communication. Rather, a dialec-
tical notion of recognition must be de-
veloped and schematised in order to es-
tablish what is really implied in the idea 
of a communicative normative theory, 
and only after such a theory is establish 
could a proper theory of punishment be 
established (or, better again, examined 
or criticised).
Rather than terrorism challenging a 
theory of punishment, a ‘recognitive’ 
theory of justice would necessarily chal-
lenge terrorism as the concept is cur-
rently understood by orthodox legal and 
social theory.
3.
Miyuki Hasegawa (Chiba University / 
Japan)
Can expressive social disapproval gen-
erate the wider sense of responsibility 
over apathetic people?
Abstract:
I have long been discussing that the no-
tion of individual responsibility, which is 
the principle of the modern law, should 
be expanded beyond the narrow bound-
ary of individuality. An individual is 
responsible for her own acts, not for 
others’ acts. This is the principle of the 
modern law which is based on the ra-
tional self. I have argued that such an 
individual is the ideal and the ideologi-
cal human model of the modern law, 
and in order not to be irresponsible and  288 289
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dignity done by the police, judicial insti-
tutions and prison actors has persisted, 
which has not simply occurred against 
the law, but law itself rules the excep-
tion when disregarding the individual as 
one provided with fundamental rights. 
These rules are motivated, among other 
factors, by political and media speeches 
of “ﬁ  ght against the crime”. So, the state 
of exception is expressed in the spheres 
of facts, laws and speeches, highlighting 
the presence of Agamben´s state of ex-
ception in contemporary Brazil.
7.
Yu-An Hsu (Taipei / Taiwan)
Die subjektive Zurechnungslehre von 
Aristoteles und Strafrecht (Aris-totle‘s 
Theory of Subjective Imputation and 
Criminal Law)
Abstract:
As is well known, the Greek philosopher 
Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC) has devel-
oped the theoretical foundation for so 
many ﬁ  elds of science that, during the 
mid-century, his name has been recog-
nized as the synonym for “philosopher”. 
As the father of modern science, Aristo-
tle is devoted to constructing a deonto-
logical approach to ethics, according to 
which the supreme good is happiness. 
In pursuing the supreme good, there-
fore, humans base their decisions on 
thoughtful considerations and choices 
and thereby are evaluated on the basis 
of these considerations and choices. Ac-
cordingly, Aristotle developed a theory 
of voluntary action which maintained 
that only voluntary behaviors can be 
morally judged and evaluated. From 
ties of nowadays, on which virtuality 
is merely one feature, the hermeneutic 
f u n c t i o n  o f  r o l e  a n d  s o c i a l  s y s t e m  a c -
complishes a teleological and communi-
cative function.
6.
Ana Luisa Zago De Moraes (Federal Pub-
lic Defenders Ofﬁ  ce School / Brazil)
The state of exception and the penal 
system in contemporary brazil
Abstract:
The state of exception, in the sense pro-
posed by Carl Schmitt, is the suspension 
of a law state due to a decision taken by a 
sovereign power during a certain period 
of time; in the opposite direction of Wal-
ter Benjamin´s theory, which presents 
the state of exception as the indistinction 
between the law itself and the normal-
ity, picturing the indistinguishable space 
of anomic violence. Giorgio Agamben 
deﬁ  nes the state of exception as the very 
limit of the system, which means, an 
area of topological indistinction between 
law and reality, where the law itself can 
rule the exception when disregarding 
the individual as one provided by consti-
tutionally assured fundamental rights. 
Bringing these theories to the reality, 
more speciﬁ  cally to Contemporary Bra-
zil, this work examines the existence of 
typical criminal actions emerging from 
a state of exception in the ﬁ  ght against 
crime. For that, it analyzes Carandiru, 
Candelaria and Vigario Geral massacres, 
episodes tied to the concrete actions of 
agents who compose the criminal jus-
tice system in the country. After these 
events, systematic violations to human 
then on, the theoretical framework of 
voluntary action has always been one of 
the most discussed issues in the western 
ethics.
Because Aristotle’s theory of voluntary 
action is closely related to the issue of 
whether a certain human should be 
blamed, it has inﬂ  uenced the legal de-
termination of subjective imputation 
ever since the Roman law. Moreover, 
the inﬂ  uence of this theory has extend-
ed to discussions and developments on 
many important subjects such as Hand-
lungslehre, Irrtum, action libra in causa, 
Affekt, Unkenntnis des Gesetzes. From 
this perspective, it is worth exploring the 
spirit of Aristotle’s voluntary action not 
only because it helps clarify the nature 
and developments of numerous criminal 
law issues, but because its sharp contrast 
with the modern theory of subjective 
imputation under the inﬂ  uence of psy-
chology provides an opportunity to criti-
cize the modern theory. Against such a 
background, this essay purports to ana-
lyze the characteristics of the theory of 
voluntary action in order to reexamine 
the modern system of criminal law.
8.
Miroslav Imbrisevic (Heythrop College 
[University of London] / UK)
Hart and Nino on Punishment
Abstract:
It has been suggested (by Nicola Lacey) 
that Carlos Nino’s theory of punishment 
is ‘a consent-based version of Hart’s lim-
iting distributive principle.’ In this paper 
I will try to answer two questions: In 
how far is Nino a Hartian? As well as: 
What are the merits of Nino’s theory in 
comparison with Hart? Both thinkers 
justify the institution of punishment on 
consequentialist grounds: it brings about 
a reduction of future harm to society. 
And both agree that the institution of 
punishment is subject to the constraints 
of Kant’s humanity formula of the Cat-
egorical Imperative. Hart’s retribution-
in-Distribution principle is, despite its 
name, only retributive in a minimal 
sense. It should more accurately be de-
scribed as a principle of justice, because 
it stipulates that only those who broke 
the law may be punished. Nino’s answer 
to the question ‘To whom may punish-
ment be applied?’ is: only those who 
consented to assume a liability to pun-
ishment. Hart’s focus is on the voluntary 
action: If you commit a crime it would 
be permissible for society to override the 
principle which forbids the use of one 
human being for the beneﬁ  t of others. 
Nino’s structure is similar, but he spells 
out that the voluntary actions of the 
criminal constitute consent to assume 
liability to punishment. I will argue that 
Nino’s justiﬁ   c a t i o n  o f  p u n i s h m e n t  i s  
more powerful because Nino’s justiﬁ  ca-
tion rests, to a much greater degree than 
Hart’s, on principles which we encoun-
ter outside of the institution of punish-
ment and which we accept as fair. 290 291
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the concepts of structural coupling, sys-
tem irritation and code corruption are 
tested as possibilities to understanding 
the processes of approximation between 
Law and Art. The phenomenon of in-
tertextuality in decisions of Brazilian’s 
Supreme Court, the country’s Constitu-
tional Court, which refer to recognized 
Literature works, citing them expressly 
and bringing about the memory of Art’s 
social subsystem, comes as invitation to 
reﬂ  ection about the possible urge for cre-
ativity in Law’s subsystem. On the other 
hand, it questions the legitimacy of such 
inﬂ  uence, which would have straight re-
percussion on the concept of legitimacy 
understood as functional differentiation. 
The meaning of the overlaying of lan-
guages in the phenomenal level of legal 
decision and its supposed incompatibil-
ity with the requirements of autonomy 
and binary code based reproduction of 
Law’s subsystem expose the central is-
sues guiding the discussion.
2.
Felipe Bambirra + Gabriel Barroso (Law 
School of Federal University of Minas 
Gerais / Brazil)
Crisis and Philosophy: Aeschylus and 
Euripides on Orestes’ crime
Abstract:
Since the XIX century, a pleiad of phi-
losophers and historians support the 
idea that Greek’s philosophy, usually 
reported to have started with the preso-
cratics, lays its basis in a previous mo-
ment: the Greek myths – systematized 
by Homer and Hesiod – and the Greek 
arts, in particular the lyric and tragedy 
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Session 1
1.
Graziela Bacchi Hora (Faculdade Damas 
da Instrução Cristã / Brazil)
The use of art’s specialized language 
in the Brazilian Supreme Court’s deci-
sions and the demand for creativity in 
Law
Abstract:
This communication aims to analyze the 
relations between Law and Art, consid-
ering the presence of Art’s specialized 
language in Legal decisions. The func-
tional differentiation of Law’s subsystem 
and of Art’s subsystem, in the terms of 
Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory, 
will allow the identiﬁ  cation of limits be-
tween the two spheres. In the deﬁ  nition 
of the intersection points between them, 
literature. According to this, it is impor-
tant to retrieve philosophical elements 
even before the presocratics to under-
stand the genesis of speciﬁ  c concepts in 
P h i l o s o p h y  o f  L a w .  B e s i d e s ,  a s s u m i n g  
that the Western’s core values are inher-
ited from Ancient Greece, it is essential 
to recuperate the basis of our own justice 
idea, through the Greek myths and trag-
edy literature.
As a case study, this paper aims on the 
comparison of two key-works, each one 
representing a phase of the Greek trag-
edy: The Orestea, by Aeschylus, and 
Orestes, by Euripides. Both contain the 
same story, telling how the Greeks un-
derstood the necessity of solving their 
conﬂ   icts not by blood revenge, but 
through a political way. Although, in 
Aeschylus’s one, men are still leashed 
by their fate, while the gods play a ma-
jor role, in order to punish human pride 
(hybris). In a different way, on Euripi-
des’s work men face their own loneli-
ness, in a world fulﬁ  lled with gods, each 
one demanding divergent actions. That 
represents a necessary moment to the 
ﬂ  ourishing freedom and human subjec-
tivity, and, once the exterior divinity is 
unable to resolve human problems, men 
will need to discover their interior divin-
ity: that is how the Philosophy emerges.
3.
Uta Bindreiter (Faculty of Law, Univer-
sity of Lund / Sweden)
The Steward: Legal Institution and 
Ethical Metaphor
An inquiry into the potential of “thick” 
moral concepts
Abstract:
Stewardship, the ultimate expression of 
the principle of care, is a “thick” moral 
concept, comprising - to use the proper 
Roman Law terms – cura, ﬁ  ducia and 
integritas. Stewardship is about the re-
s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  t a k e  c a r e  o f  s o m e t h i n g  
owned by somebody else; in
organizational contexts, it concerns the 
responsibilities of the managing director 
and board. Curiously, more is expected 
from a company’s steward than from an 
“ordinary” managing director. 
In my view, the entire potential of stew-
ardship is expressed by the word “stew-
ard”: it renders the meaning of the bib-
lical metaphor. The biblical steward is 
characterized by two mutually
informing conceptions - accountabil-
ity and responsibility. There is a dialec-
tic here: the steward is accountable (in 
the last analysis to God), but he is also 
responsible, acting with wisdom and 
foresight. His chief loyalty belongs to his 
Master, but he is also mindful of the in-
terests of third parties. Stewardship is a 
vocation, not a commission.
In strictly legal contexts, the steward’s 
status is frequently unclear. In Sweden, 
for instance, the term steward does not 
ﬁ  gure in the main body of certain major 
statutes, whereas 
their traveaux préparatoires, or motives, 
mention stewardly accountability vis-à-
vis shareholders and third parties. 
This is where my paper comes in. Isn’t it 
odd that a timeworn institution without 
any current legal function, is deemed 
sufﬁ  ciently important to be adduced in 
the motives? 292 293
ABSTRACTS
Working Groups
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
–
 
A
b
s
t
r
a
c
t
s
ciﬁ  c uptake model of knowledge in the 
positivism system itself. In this sense, it 
is afﬁ  rmed in the present essay that the 
s o  c a l l e d  “ l e g a l  p o s t - p o s i t i v i s m ”  f a c e s  
false fronts on the crucial question on 
the relationship between law and mod-
ern society, once its main argument is 
focused on the legal reasoning process 
as a substantial correctness function of 
law discourse in attempt to describe the 
insufﬁ  ciency of the model of term sta-
ble rules of the legislature from the legal 
positivism. Rather, to deal with crescent 
uncertainty in the modern society, a 
suitable concept of law must bind uncer-
tainty in law system itself and take the 
cognitive aspects of law into account to 
face, in the concept of norm, the neces-
sity to develop connectionist model of 
knowledge creation and, over and above 
that, make legal theory productive for 
the new non-continuous society.
5.
Ronaldo Macedo Jr. (Direito GV,USP 
Law School / Brazil)
Overcoming orientalizing views of Lat-
in American Law . New approaches to 
new legal experiences in Brazilian Law
Abstract:
Latin American legal studies is a subﬁ  eld 
of area studies led by legal comparativ-
ists and economic development schol-
ars. The work-product of these ﬁ  elds is 
highly relevant and inﬂ  uential for they 
serve as the background for decisions by 
states and international institutions on 
development aid and play a big inﬂ  uence 
in legal education.
In the past, the area was an example of 
Against the framework of A. Peczenik’s 
theory of cultural heritage and drawing 
on R. Poscher’s ﬁ  ndings as to the spe-
ciﬁ  city of legal conceptions, I argue that 
“thick” moral concepts can be so deeply 
anchored in the culture of a society that 
their intension outweighs the speciﬁ  city 
of their legal conceptions.
4.
Ricardo Resende Campos (Goethe Uni-
versity / Germany)
Can Law cope with Uncertainty? A 
methodological approach from Law to 
modern Society
Abstract:
The crunch question on the current de-
velopment of legal theory about the rela-
tion between law, science and technol-
ogy is certainly how the methodology of 
law deals with uncertainty. Taken into 
account the continuously advanced sci-
entiﬁ  c and technological achievements 
in the modern society and its soaring 
necessity for innovation, must those be 
understood as a central knowledge prob-
lem. However those non-territorial, de-
centralized anonymous communication 
processes seem frequently to be inef-
ﬁ  ciently treated from the main concep-
tual archetypes of the national based 
law systems. Focused on the legal theory 
mainstreams related to the coordination 
of law and social changes – technology, 
science, economy etc advancements – 
can be stated that the long attested limit 
from the legal Positivism of the nine-
teenth century is not deep-seated in the 
“subsumption-machine” grounded in 
the rule-application-model, but in a spe-
the cultural domination imposed by the 
North to the South. As acknowledged 
by some recent criticisms (Jorge Esqui-
rol), the main literature in the ﬁ  eld of 
Latin American legal studies has taken 
one of two dominant forms: “either (1) 
it dismisses ofﬁ  cial law all together as 
irrelevant in the face of outside social 
forces and systems which are said to 
more aptly explain societal phenom-
ena; or (2) ofﬁ  cial law is examined and 
analyzed through an ideological lens 
searching for dysfunction”. The under-
lying assumption of these analyses was 
that Latin American law was structur-
ally condemned in producing economic 
underdevelopment and democratic deﬁ  -
cits. Two examples of this view can be 
found in the “law and society” or the 
“law and development” classic litera-
ture. In spite of the usefulness and rich-
ness of the legal theory produced by this 
scholarship it could only offer a partial 
and pessimistic view of law American 
law. This limited picture of real law pro-
duced a kind of “Orientalizing” struc-
ture that results in negative diagnoses 
of the problem of “law” in Latin Amer-
ica from a neocolonial perspective. This 
view dismisses the politics of law un-
derlying law-making and legal inter-
pretation in the various Latin American 
c o u n t r i e s .  T h i s  p a p e r  a i m s  t o  o f f e r  a  
counter example of such analyses and 
highlight the role and nature of the in-
tervention of the Ofﬁ  ce of the Attorney 
General in Brazilian law, as well as its 
place in the Brazilian Judicial System. 
It also shows the basic pitfalls for an ap-
propriate structural arrangement of this 
Brazilian institution and the originality 
of its institutional building.
6.
Anthony Amatrudo (University of Sun-
derland / UK)
Nazi Law: the censuring of modernist 
culture and the elimination of memory 
formation
Abstract:
This paper will trace the development of 
Nazi cultural and legal policy towards 
the arts. It will examine the role of cen-
sure in the development in this process. 
The paper will draw on previously pub-
lished work on the subject by the author 
and set out a clear methodology in Nazi 
cultural and legal policy towards the 
arts: a process of censure, exclusion and 
annihilation. The purpose of Nazi poli-
cies towards the arts being no less than 
the elimination of all modernist (Jewish 
and ‘degenerate’) culture and the impos-
sibility of a memory of it. The paper will 
argue that the destruction and elimina-
tion of modernist (notably Jewish) cul-
ture was in a real sense the destruction 
of all Jewish history.
Session 2
7. 
Ilton Norberto Robl Filho + Pablo Mal-
heiros Da Cunha Frota (University of 
Paraná’s / Brazil)
Post Legal Positivism: New Paradigm 
of Legal Science (Jurisprudence) and 
Practice in Brazil
Abstract:
The relation between law, moral, society  294 295
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8.
Mônica Sette Lopes (Minas Gerais Fed-
eral University / Brazil)
Jurists and Journalists: impressions e 
judgements
Abstract:
The process of ﬁ  nding evidence of what 
truthfully happened in a conﬂ  itive situa-
tion interests journalists and jurists (con-
sidered here as law graduates, in general, 
judges, lawyers, prosecutors, solicitors, 
professors, researches, legal scholars 
etc.). But they do it different ways, what 
can be clearly seen when journalists and 
jugdes are concerned. Both cathegories 
must tell a story about a conﬂ  ict, must 
listen to all envolved, must inform what 
happen to the general public. Although 
both cathegories must use the freedom 
of speech to expose their point of view 
about something, their timing is differ-
ent as well as the process and the effect 
of fulﬁ  ling their task.
The question that should be made is what 
happens to law when it becames the sub-
ject matter of the news in the world of 
full information? In what mesurement 
journalists also pass judgements and 
how does this affects the formal proc-
esses of law?
The effort to answer to those questions 
and the ones relatated to them is im-
portant to understand some of problems 
that must be approached by those who 
want to understand the ways of law in 
the mass media technological society.
9.
Gustavo Siqueira (Federal University of 
Minas Gerais / Brazil)
and science is shifting in Brazil as it is 
c h a n g i n g  i n  d e m o c r a t i c  c o n t e m p o r a r y  
societies. This paper proposes to reﬂ  ect 
about this change in the Brazilian legal 
and social context. Jurisprudence and 
legal practice have been transformed in-
tensively after the Brazilian redemocra-
tization that began in 1985 and Federal 
Constitution of 1988. In the ﬁ  eld of Ju-
risprudence (Legal Theory), a new legal 
theory called post positivism progres-
sively has been overcoming legal critical 
studies and legal positivism. In recent 
years, ideas as any moral values can be 
improved by law (positivism) or law is 
one of many oppressive institutions in 
capitalist society (legal critical studies – 
Marxism) have been losing place in le-
gal theory.Nowadays that constitutional 
Brazilian law implements just society 
and legal system different of the authori-
tarian military regime (1964 – 1985), it 
is difﬁ  cult to work with a complete rela-
tivist idea of law (positivism) or difﬁ  cult 
to accept that law is necessarily oppres-
sive in capitalistic societies. Otherwise 
the idea of science in law at post posi-
tivistic point of view try to overcome in 
a dialectic way a pure science method-
ology (normativistic positivism) and the 
complete political and economic studies 
of law (critical legal studies – Marxism). 
After that, the text will show that Bra-
zilian legal practice have changed inten-
sively after post positivistic methodology 
of law and will reﬂ  ect about same dilem-
mas of post positivism in Brazil in the 
legal theory and practice.
Experience, Culture and Legal History
Abstract:
In this article, the author tries to demon-
strate how a concept of legal experience, 
little used, studied and criticized in phi-
losophy of law and jurisprudence, can be 
an essential concept for understanding 
the historical and cultural legal.
Usually the legal history is reduced to a 
history of legal thought or a history of 
positive law. Superseded the traditional 
concepts of legal experience, the pur-
pose is to see how this concept can best 
demonstrate the relationship between 
legal culture and history, providing a 
better understanding of the legal phe-
nomenon in a given period, making vis-
ible the contradictions between the law 
and its application and more noticeable 
the questionable or present ruptures and 
continuities in the legal and political his-
tory.
10.
Sapan Baruah Bhikkhu (Mahamakut 
Buddhist University / Thailand)
Humanism And Religion
Abstract:
When human beings ﬁ  rst  considered 
their existence,there was no religion at 
that time. Through experience, they real-
ized the danger of cruelty, anger,jealousy 
and so on. Although these are natural 
characteristics On the other hand, they 
realized the importance of compassion, 
sympathy, generosity, harmony, pa-
tience, and tolerance. These characteris-
tics were not given by god or devil,but 
were natural products of the interaction 
of our ﬁ  ve senses. When they interact,the 
sixth sense,mind,arises. Then through 
experience,our ancestors understood 
t h e  d an g e r  o f  n e g a t i v e  b e h a vi o u r . T h e y  
developed humanism instead of religion 
to live in harmony with their fellow be-
ings with understanding cooperation, 
practicing tolerance and abstaining from 
evil immoral and wicked thing. That is 
humanism that is how they have illus-
trated the concept of heaven and hell 
extending their present experience of 
peace pleasure and these endless suffer-
ing. When they developed these good 
qualities according to their knowledge at 
that time they also realized that there is 
a universal energy which goes through 
every kind of existence.
Brieﬂ  y Buddhism philosophy
The word philosophy comes from two 
words philo, which means love, and 
sophia,which means wisdom. So phi-
losophy is the love of wisdom or love 
and wisdom both meanings describe 
Buddhism perfectly. Buddhism teaches 
that we should try to develop our intel-
lectual ability to the fullest so that we 
can understand clearly. It also teaches us 
to develop love and kindness so that we 
can be like a true friend to all beings. So 
therefore we can called Buddhism also 
philosophy.
11.
Hadayat Rashidi (Islamic Azad Univer-
sity / Iran)
Blood money in the yesterday and to-
day Islam 296 297
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WG 9 
Society, Culture, Politics und Law II
Session 1
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location IG 254
Chair Qi, Chunyi (Frankfurt am 
Main / Germany)
Session 2
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time 15.30 h – 18.00 h
Location IG 254
Chair t.b.a.
Lectures:
Session 1
1.
Miaofen Chen (College of Law National 
Taiwan University / Taiwan)
“Internalization” of norms and forma-
tion of “self”: a modiﬁ  ed ethical natu-
ralism
Abstract:
If social existence is not pretend as mere 
recoil of words, does it really have a spa-
tio-temporal domain for “being there”? 
This is the question of the very essence of 
laws at issue, which conceal the ineffable 
sphere of being as “norm” and “norm-
user”. While Karl Marx gave an account 
of “surplus value” and “class subordina-
tion” as key concepts of explaining sub-
jectivity and subjection of proletariat, he 
hardly explained how the subject is as-
Abstract:
The exertion of scholars must not be tak-
en as the meaning last countries Schol-
ars exertion must mean effort in stating 
new command for a social or Update 
scientiﬁ   c problem not stating imitated 
command from the previous Jurists. Per-
haps prophet’s opinion of exertion has 
been the above mentioned Meaning. As 
he stated when a judge efforts for under-
standing of correct Command and then 
perceives the correct commands. He will 
be rewarded with one spiritual reward. 
So just as w e sa w , in this rev erse, the 
prophet (p.b.u.h) has referred to some 
commands to which there isn’t any 
command and so the legist has to obsess 
their mind with the use of correct cri-
terion which are derived from religion. 
Deﬁ  nitely legists who have judged to up 
to date dower must also judge to cases 
like blood money, women blood money, 
women retaliation, blood money and re-
taliation of non Muslims up to date and 
must be imitate the previous jurists. 
Keywords: blood money, Islam, exer-
tion, tradition, Women, Non Muslims
sumedly “subject” to subordination and 
to what extent his/her awareness of sub-
jection affects the concrete being of life. 
T o  d e a l  w i t h  p r o b l e m s  o f  t h e  p s y c h e ,  
structure of power relation and the af-
fected bodily presence is one of the most 
challenging tasks of late-modern (or 
postmodern) social and legal philoso-
phy. Taking “virtual reality” as a sensible 
conceptual invention to understand the 
changing living world today, it seems to 
many necessary to conjure a “pre-onto-
logical” domain from which the know-
ing, perceiving, demanding, persecuting 
or suffering subject is emerging, embod-
ied with social classiﬁ  cations. This do-
main is determined in psycho-phenom-
enological terms as the “primary” and 
“seconcary” scene of being, that is, as the 
“signiﬁ  cation” of self. 
This paper will discuss thouroughly the 
views of self-signiﬁ  cation in the writings 
of Slavoj Žižek and Judith Butler. It tries 
to reveal the dialectical paradox of Mas-
ter Signiﬁ  er and the passionate (dis-)at-
tachment of self to the order on the one 
hand, and will provide a modiﬁ  ed ethi-
cal naturalism to clarify modes of sub-
jection and internalization of such norm 
(dis-)attachment with respect to our de-
veloping multi-dimentional societies on 
the other hand.
2.
Jakub Krajewski (Jagiellonian Univer-
sity / Poland)
Virtue Jurisprudence and the Question 
of Multiculturalism?
Abstract:
Virtue jurisprudence, as new rising 
intellectual force in the ﬁ   eld of legal 
theory, has to face the burning issue of 
multiculturalism. When authors such as 
L.Solum try to develop a coherent theo-
ry of judging, they also have to give an 
image of the legal system. The revival of 
Aristotle’s ethics can provide an inspira-
tion to point the telos of law and the le-
gal system in particular. Unfortunately, 
it doesn’t directly cope with the plural-
ism of moral beliefs. 
Even the modern virtue ethicists use the 
term eudaimonia or it’s modern version 
- human ﬂ  ourishing as if there was only 
one scenario of self - development. If the 
telos of a legal system is to enable and 
even encourage human ﬂ  ourishing – as 
Solum claims – the system has to pro-
vide a clear scenario of agent develop-
ment. Clearly different legal systems give 
us a different scenario. Also the judicial 
virtues that enable the fair adjudication 
process are dependent on the principles 
that underlie the system.
The answer to this problem and a impor-
tant voice in the debate is Alasdair Mac-
Intyre’s concept of tradition. This mod-
ern philosopher of virtue argues that 
the virtues are the dispositions that help 
u s  t a k e  p a r t  i n  s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e s .  T h o s e  
practices form a coherent system of 
norms which Solum would call nomoi. 
If a judge exercises those virtues to per-
form a special social practice, which is 
the practice of adjudication, he reaches 
to formulate the basic principles inher-
ent to this particular legal system. This 
version of virtue jurisprudence can also 
justify the difference in the ways human 
beings can ﬂ  ourish. 298 299
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lowing its own logic. While Alexander 
claims that his theory is rooted both in 
sociology and philosophy of law in fact 
his approach is closer to normative phi-
losophy.
4.
Javier Ferreira Ospino (Universidad del 
Atlántico / Colombia)
Analysis of the ﬁ   rst sentence of the 
Justice & Peace law – Mampujan case 
– and its contribution to the design of a 
policy of memory as justice for victims 
in Colombia
Abstract:
2 0 t h  C e n t u r y  w i l l  b e  r e m e m b e r e d  b y  
Colombians as one of the bloodiest mo-
ments in national history. The degra-
dation of violence and the appliance of 
increasingly terrifying methods by con-
fronted sides was a constant during this 
period. 
The degradation and intensity of armed 
conﬂ  ict in Colombia and the way civil 
population has been involved in it lead 
to the institutionalization of the concep-
tion of a certain para-institutional im-
punity that raised mixed emotions that 
went against the rule of law and legal 
security.
It is in this context that the law 975 of 
2 00 5  a p p e ars ,  th e  s o  call e d  “ J u s ti c e  &  
peace law”. Although its domain was 
limited to demobilized members of the 
Colombian Autodefensas, it was as-
sumed that it could also encompass 
other forces. With the identiﬁ  cation of 
the discourse of the theory of justice for 
victims it is expected to widen the range 
of interpretation of the language of vic-
3.
Elena Maslovskaya (Nizhnii Novgorod 
State University / Russia)
Jeffrey Alexander’s Theory of the Civil 
Sphere Between Philosophy and Soci-
ology of Law
Abstract:
Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere 
can be placed in the context of devel-
opment of sociology of law. However, 
paradoxically, Alexander draws not so 
much on sociological theories but rather 
on the approaches of philosophy of law, 
particularly the ideas of Fuller, Dworkin 
and Habermas. The civil sphere is pre-
sented by Alexander as the embodiment 
of Dworkin’s principal integrity. Locat-
ing law within civil morality Alexander 
reveals the similarity of his viewpoint to 
Dworkin’s position. Drawing on Fuller’s 
works Alexander singles out the pro-
cedural foundations of the democratic 
order. At the same time for Alexander 
the source of morality of law is not the 
legal system itself but a certain level of 
civil solidarity. Like Habermas, Alexan-
der emphasizes the culturally embedded 
character of the legal norms. Alexander 
shares Habermas’s understanding of law 
as a regulative mechanism affecting all 
spheres of social life. However, Haber-
mas is more sensitive to the danger of 
colonization of law by the imperatives of 
the economic and political subsystems. 
Alexander’s approach can be contrasted 
with Luhmann’s sociological theory of 
l a w .  A l e x a n d e r  c o n c e n t r a t e s  o n  i n t e r -
relation and mutual penetration of the 
civil sphere and law while Luhmann re-
gards law as an autonomous system fol-
tims in Colombia, as it has been done by 
Manuel Reyes Mate in Spain.
The goal is to conceal the discourse of 
justice for victims from the vindication 
of memory, and it is right there where 
the hermeneutical work of Paul Ricoeur 
becomes important –Especially his pre-
tension of assuming the symbols of lan-
guage beyond their illusory moral con-
sciousness that casts words away from 
reality. It is a sense of justice that goes 
beyond the supposition of the limita-
tions that are given by this regulation.
This is the case of the sentence of the legal 
process 200680077 (Superior Tribunal 
of Bogotá), Court of Justice and Peace, 
also known as the Mampujan case. 
This paper aims to answer the question 
of which is the contribution of the ﬁ  rst 
legal sentence of the Law and Justice 
Law to the design of a policy for memory 
as justice for the victims in Colombia.
5.
Chunyi Qi (Goethe University Frankfurt 
am Main / Germany)
Methodischer Ansatz der Gesetzge-
bung mit chinesischer Prägung – Er-
fahrungen und Probleme
Abstract:
Am Beispiel der Entwicklung der Ge-
setzgebung im Bereich des Zivilrechts, 
und zwar, hauptsächlich im Bereich 
der Vertragsrechtsgesetzgebung, möchte 
ich den einzigartigen methodischen 
Ansatz der Gesetzgebung in China (als 
ein unentwickeltes Land) beschreiben. 
Die Besonderheit des Ansatzes liegt in 
der „Entwicklung mit der Zeit (advance 
with the times)“, denn bevor sich die 
Marktwirtschaft in China endgültig 
eingehend entwickelt hatte, wurden die 
Gesetze des BGB nicht als Gesamtheit 
auf einmal, sondern als Einzelgesetze 
hintereinander erlassen. Diese wur-
den zugleich durch Verordnungen des 
Zentralen Amtes und Auslegungen des 
Volksgerichtshofs ergänzt. Der method-
ische Ansatz besteht im Wesentlichen 
darin, dass ein Gesetz genau dann er-
lassen wird, wenn es notwendig und 
„reif“ ist. Die Vorteile dieser Methode 
liegen darin, dass die Schwierigkeiten 
der Inkompatibilität gemildert werden, 
die bei einer Rechtstransplantation oft 
entstehen, die die Gesetze auf einmal 
in ein anderes Sozialsystem integriert, 
denn nach der Systemtheorie koevolu-
tionieren die Rechtsnormen mit dem 
Produktionsregime. Dennnoch bringt 
der methodische Ansatz dieser Art der 
Gesetzgebung auch Probleme mit sich, 
nicht nur weil er die Rechtssicherheit 
und Voraussehbarkeit des Rechts gefähr-
det, sondern auch weil die Rechtsnor-
men miteinander in Konﬂ  ikt  stehen 
und den Rechtsinstitutionen unter Um-
ständen die Möglichkeiten bieten, un-
gerechte Entscheidungen zu treffen.
6.
Josefa-Dolores Ruiz-Resa (University of 
Granada / Spain)
Connections between Education for 
Citizenship and equality between 
women and men (Analysis of the claims 
against this subject before the Spanish 
courts and their rulings)
Abstract:
This paper try to analyse the debate on  300 301
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7.
Yulia Ten (Southern Federal University 
/ Russia)
Symbolic representation of the legal 
concepts in culture: the problem of in-
terpretation
Abstract:
Each culture creates the speciﬁ  c system 
of symbols embodying the ideas, con-
cepts, values and norms which make up 
fundamental part for living of the socie-
ty. A symbolic system of culture includes 
the social, ethnic, mythological, reli-
gious, artistic, scientiﬁ  c, political, legal 
and national types of symbols. The cri-
terion for classiﬁ  cation of such types of 
symbols is the different forms of human 
self-realization in the socio-cultural 
space. The social, ethnic, mythological, 
religious, artistic, political, legal and na-
tional types of symbols are interrelated 
and interacted. 
Symbols perform several functions in 
culture. They are cognitive function 
(symbol as the universal method of cog-
nition), adaptive-regulative function 
(cultural symbols stimulate individual 
to accept notions, norms and values of 
the society); identiﬁ  cative-integrative 
function (through symbols an individu-
al can identify himself with the concrete 
social groups); informative-communica-
tive one (symbols communicate the in-
formation) and the function of socializa-
tion of individuals in culture.
The legal symbols play a very important 
role in the constructing of the symbolic 
system of the national state. The inter-
equality between women and men found 
in the claims against the subjects re-
lated to Education for Citizenship. These 
claims were resolved in the Spanish Su-
preme Court and High Courts of the Au-
tonomous Communities. In this debate, 
there is a strong rejection of antidiscrimi-
nation law assumptions, namely that the 
different roles and social roles of women 
and men have a cultural and social base 
and it is unnatural, as evidenced by the 
concept of gender. Conversely, many ap-
pellants and judgments defend the dif-
ference between women and men as if it 
was informed and legitimated on human 
nature. Hence gender is considered an 
ideology, that is, a category of analysis by 
mean of which you can conceal or distort 
the reality of true human nature. But if 
these arguments are taken into account, 
some important contents of recent legal 
reforms may be meaningful, as it is ques-
tioned their normative value, by prioritiz-
ing certain moral principles against these 
laws. We ara talking about the Law for 
Effective Equality Between Women and 
Men (Ley Orgánica 3/2007 para la Igual-
dad Efectiva de Mujeres y Hombres), the 
Law on Integrated Protection Measures 
a g a i n s t  G e n d e r  V i o l e n c e  ( L e y  O r g á n i c a  
1/2004 de Medidas de Protección Integral 
contra la Violencia de Género) and the 
Law on Education (Ley Orgánica 2/2006 
sobre Educación).
pretation of the national symbols is de-
termined by the special legal documents. 
At the same time the interpretation such 
symbols becomes complicated if we will 
interpret these symbols in the mytho-
logical, religious, artistic or advertising 
contexts.
Members of the same culture must share 
sets of images, ideas, concepts, norms, 
values and symbols which enable them 
to think and feel about the world, and 
thus to interpret the world in similar 
ways. Nordic societies have been con-
sidered as the countries where egalitar-
ian values have had greater success than 
elsewhere. I’d like to draw attention on 
the following problem. Several socie-
ties may use the same legal symbols, but 
these symbols may stand for different 
things. For example, concept “equality” 
can have different meanings in English 
and Norwegian. The Norwegian word 
for equality, “likhet” may stand for both 
similarity and equality. Here and other 
example. The cheese slicer is a Norwe-
gian symbol of moderation. It is obvious 
that this symbol has other meanings in 
the French and Russian cultures. In this 
case we come across with the problem 
o f  uni v e rsali ty  o f  symb o li c  m e anin g .  I  
assume that each symbol of any society 
and state must be investigated in its im-
mediate social, political, religious and 
historical contexts. I’d like to analyze 
and interpret the legal symbols of the 
Germany which can be represented the 
concepts, norms and values of a model of 
welfare state. The comparative investiga-
tions of the legal symbols in the different 
national contexts may be very important 
for modern legal philosophy both for 
Russia and for Germany.
8.
Mustafa Yaylali (University of Luiss Gui-
do Carli, Rome / Italy)
“Community and Law Approach”: 
Identifying the locus of Law in Com-
munity
Abstract:
In Identifying the locus of “law in com-
munity” I will employ Tönnies’ distinc-
tion between Gemeinschaft and Gesells-
chaft. By juxtaposing the elements trust, 
values and Alternative Dispute resolu-
tion, (typifying Gemeinschaft) against, 
logic, rules and judicial adjudication, 
(typifying Gesellschaft) I want to exem-
plify the difference in approach to law 
between gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. 
Trust relationship constitutes an es-
sential characteristic of a community, 
because it embraces the proximity of 
its members, based on a shared com-
mon values. Trust makes any external 
intervention from the state obsolete. I 
will claim that logical construction of 
relationships is a substitute for trust re-
lationship.
Secondly, I will argue that value is the 
glue that directs the society into a cer-
tain direction. In contrary to rules, it has 
an intrinsic effect instead of extrinsic 
likes. Rules, on the other hand are ini-
tially imposed from outside.
Lastly, ADR exempliﬁ  es the essence of 
what law is about in community struc-
ture. Namely in upholding and main-
taining (trust) relationship between 
members. I will argue that in contrary to  302 303
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above arguments are not true. The Gabo 
Reform that the Korean government 
maintained was a political reform made 
by the Japanese government’s pressure. 
In addition, new laws enacted in the 
process of judicial reform were not ap-
plied to actual trials. Accordingly, this 
study intends to analyze major trials and 
cases at that times, thereby describing 
the complete failure in the Korean gov-
ernment’s modern reforms of legislative 
and judicial systems. Furthermore, is-
sues like foreigners’ right to stand before 
the court and protection of legal rights 
such as one’s life and property in Korea, 
and political meanings of Ito Hirobumi’s 
assertion which stressed the need for 
protecting Koreans’ legal rights will be 
explained. 
Currently, Korean and Japanese courts 
a n d  p r o s e c u t i o n s  h a v e  m a n y  c o m m o n  
characteristics in their structure, or-
ganization, and functions. Japan’s inﬂ  u-
ence on Korea’s judicial modernization 
cannot be ignored, and it is necessary to 
objectively analyze Japan’s inﬂ  uence in 
order to properly understand the cur-
rent status and problems of the Korean 
judicial system. This is the main reason 
why this study pursues objective em-
pirical study, away from a nationalistic 
perspective. This study is expected to be-
come the cornerstone for research that 
expounds East Asian countries’ accept-
ance of Western legal system and judicial 
modernization.
10.
I v a n  P a d j e n  ( U n i v e r s i t y  o f  R i j e k a  /  
Croatia)
judicial adjudication in Gesellschaft, the 
aim of ADR in Gemeinschaft is to solve 
disputes and make sure that relation-
ships between members are restored. 
Conclusively, by juxtaposing those ele-
ments with each other, I will be able to 
exemplify the locus of law within com-
munity.
9.
Junghoon Lee (University of Ulsan / 
South Korea)
Japan’s Inﬂ   uence on Korea’s Judi-
cial Modernization : Examination of 
the Reality of Judicial Modernization 
through the Analysis of Legal Cases in 
late 19th Century
Abstract:
Korean scholars argue that the na-
tion achieved judicial reform for itself 
through the Gabo Reform (a political 
reform for Western-style modernization 
in 1894). According to them, therefore, 
the establishment of Japanese Residen-
cy-General in Korea (Tonggambu, a co-
lonial governing body Japan set up in 
Korea) in early 20th century was not for 
the modernization of Korean legal sys-
tem but a means for the imperialist’s in-
vasion into Korea. In other words, they 
insist that Korea was able to accomplish 
modern judicial reform and Western-
style judicial modernization, but the 
J a p an e s e  im p e ri ali s t s  d e p ri v e d  t h e  n a -
tion of such an opportunity. They also 
portray Ito Hirobumi as the chief insti-
gator of Japan’s imperialist invasion and 
some Japanese scholars agree to them. 
However, empirical research based on 
historical documents shows that the 
Student Rights and Revival of Imma-
turity: Can Jurisprudence Account for 
Coercion?
Abstract:
The problem of this paper is prompted by 
the claim of Zagreb University students 
residing in government subsidized dor-
mitories that their duty to act for free as 
dorm night porters amounts to forced 
labour. After a preliminary note on the 
nature and types of legal scholarship, 
the paper restates jurisprudential argu-
ments against student rights and analy-
ses limitations inherent in legal schol-
arship in action, or jurisprudence, that 
make it unresponsive to student rights: 
a limited normative framework and a 
limited subject-matter, most notably a 
limited focus of inquiry when it comes to 
force or coercion. A glimpse at an analy-
sis of force in international law indicates 
that the naked force typical of elemen-
tary criminal law has dissolved long 
ago into phenomena remotely related to 
naked force, such as economic pressure 
and ideological propaganda. Two legal 
and social contexts of force are of pri-
mary interest to understanding student 
rights. The ﬁ  rst is legal recognition of the 
vulnerability of children to naked force. 
The second is the blind eye of jurispru-
dence for the vulnerability of workers to 
economic need. The belief in economic 
necessity and subjugation of the state to 
capital has resulted in a bizarre reversal 
of the roles of corporations and students. 
Jurisprudence cannot change the world 
but can interpret it more sensibly by 
coming closer to the studies of politics 
and economics.
WORKING GROUP
WG 10 
Justice, Distributive Justice, 
Non-Discrimination
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time 15.30 h – 18.00 h
Location RUW 3.201
Chair Seoane, José Antonio 
(A Coruña / Spain)
Lectures:
1.
Laura Carlson (School of Law, Stock-
holm University / Sweden)
Critical Race Theory in a Swedish Con-
text
Abstract:
This article reviews the Swedish dis-
crimination legislation and case law 
against the background of Critical Race 
Theory. Critical Race Theory offers ex-
planations for the some of the paradoxes 
arising in the Swedish case law between 
the explicit statutory protections against 
unlawful discrimination on the basis of 
ethnic origins and the application and 
interpretation of the legislation by the 
courts, here speciﬁ  cally the Swedish La-
bour Court.
Part One of this article sets out the le-
gal theoretical framework addressing 
race based on Critical Race Theory and 
Intersectionality. Part Two explores the 
treatment of “race” as deﬁ  ned by these 
theories with respect to religion, immi-
gration and ethnic origins in the Swed-
ish legislation and the case law of the  304 305
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of the taxpayer. This principle ﬁ  rst ap-
peared in the Brazilian legal order in the 
1946 Constitution, was excluded from 
the texts of 1967/69, and reappeared in 
paragraph 1 of article 145 of the 1988 
Constitution. The aim of this paper is to 
examine two possible grounds for the 
principle of ability to pay (equal sacri-
ﬁ  ces and proportional sacriﬁ  ces) to show 
how, in Brazil, the interpretations that 
seek to assign a positive content to this 
principle are limited to the horizons of a 
particular form of State associated with 
the theory of equal sacriﬁ  ce. This theory 
for its turn is consistent with a theory 
of justice, under which no expense or 
charge levied by the government can al-
ter the distribution of welfare produced 
by the market. As the application of the 
ability to pay principle is done within 
th e  limi ts  o f  tha t  h o rizo n,  as  a  co nse -
quence, this principle does not play an 
important role in the issue of reduction 
of inequality in Brazil.
3.
Josefa-Dolores Ruiz-Resa (University of 
Granada / Spain)
Jurisprunce and the society of knowl-
edge (how to adapt a dogmatic knowl-
edge to the demands of the collective 
intelligence)
Abstract:
The basic motto of the European Higher 
E d u c a t i o n  Ar e a  ( E HEA )  i s  t o  t u rn  t h e  
university into an important agency of 
the so-called “knowledge society”, whose 
primary task is the research and devel-
opment of new products that expand the 
market of the European economy. On the 
Swedish Labour Court. The case law of 
the Swedish Labour Court is chosen for 
several reasons. First, the initial claims 
brought to court were under the statuto-
ry protections of the 1994 act against dis-
crimination on the basis of race and eth-
nic origins in the ﬁ  eld of employment. 
Even if an employee not represented by 
a labour union or the ombudsman can 
bring such claims to the general trial 
courts, they are then appealed to the La-
bour Court, so that the Labour Court is 
the ultimate arbitrator of such questions 
in the Swedish legal system. The body 
of case law is fairly developed before 
the Labour Court, with twenty-six cases 
having been brought in the past twenty 
years. Last, space constraints prevent a 
similar analysis with respect to the case 
law in the general courts as to unlaw-
ful ethnic discrimination claims in areas 
other than employment.
2.
Leonel Pessôa (Universidade Nove de Ju-
lho / Brazil)
Inequality, Ability to Pay and the theo-
ries of equal and proportional sacriﬁ  ces
Abstract:
Brazil has one of the worst distribu-
tions of income in the world. The wealth 
of the richest 1% of the population is 
equal to that of the poorest 50%. Bra-
zil has a greater concentration of wealth 
than ninety-ﬁ   ve percent of countries 
on which data are available. In the le-
gal ﬁ  eld, tax justice is based on the con-
stitutional principle of the “ability to 
pay”, according to which taxes should 
be paid based on the economic capacity 
other hand, the reform of the European 
universities intends to move away from 
the uncritical transmission of traditional 
knowledge, based on the authority of 
teachers, in order to stimulate learners to 
discover themselves the object of study. 
It is a purpose that is consistent with the 
new concepts of social science and phi-
losophy of science, which consider indi-
vidual an active subject when learning, 
and equipped with prior knowledge and 
a community culture in which he lives. 
At the same time, it is accepted that the 
knowledge society implies a participa-
tory perception of intelligence, so that 
knowledge is considered as community 
knowledge that is transmitted by means 
of new information and communication 
technologies (ICT). Nevertheless, Juris-
prudence (that is, the science made by 
lawyers) was not designed to be discov-
ered and interpreted freely by means of 
certain educational tools, or to be made 
by any individual, but to be transmitted, 
guarded and then cultivated for its recipi-
ents, in a dogmatic and authoritarian tra-
dition of knowledge. 
I intend to analyze how the conception 
of the knowledge society and the use 
of ICT could inﬂ  uence  Jurisprudence 
and conclude that the requirements of 
adaptability and ﬂ  exibility for legal pro-
fessions and the new model of learn-
ing which are demanded in the EHEA, 
s h o u l d  b e  s e e n  a s  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  
Jurisprudence to redeﬁ  ne its status and 
become aware of its cultural, social and 
practical dimension.
4.
Loisima Schiess + Miranda Lossian (Bra-
silianischer Richterverband / Brazil)
Physikalische und Mathematische Ver-
bindungen von Justiz Division
Abstract:
Es wird eine Verbindung zwischen dem 
von Antiphon entwickelten inﬁ  nitesima-
len Berechnungsverfahren, der Theorie 
Verteilungsgerechtigkeit von Aristoteles, 
des Hebelgesetzes, der eben radialen Fi-
guren und der Verteilung hergestellt.
Die Problemstellung stellt sich wie folgt 
dar:
dem Kennenlernen der Gründe, die An-
tiphon mutmaßen ließ, die Exhaustions-
methode als ein Mittel der Bildung des 
Quadratur des Kreises anzusehen,
Beziehungen von grundsätzlicher und 
historischer Art zwischen der Vertei-
lungsgerechtigkeit und den Hebelgesetz 
herzustellen, 
ein Model der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit, 
basierend auf der modernen Mathema-
tik der Verteilung, von multipler Partizi-
pierung zu konstruieren.
Die Zielsetzungen sind:
Die These zu erstellen, dass die Exhaus-
tionsmethode aus der Gerichtspraxis 
stammt; dass das Hebelgesetz und die 
Theorie der Proportionen von Eudoxos 
Modelle der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit 
von Aristoteles sind; 
weiter soll gezeigt werden, dass die ebe-
ne Verteilung der materiellen Partikel 
auch ein Modell der Verteilungsgerech-
tigkeit ist. 
Das Modell der Mehrteiligkeit der Ver-
teilung, das vorgestellt wurde, enthält 
zwei Arten von Freiheitsgraden, einen  306 307
ABSTRACTS
Working Groups
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
–
 
A
b
s
t
r
a
c
t
s
thinking about the meaning of justice in 
disability matters is the aim of this paper.
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Session 1
1.
Antonio Cota Marçal + José Emílio 
Medauar Ommati + Paula Maria Nasser 
Cury (Pontifícia Universidade Católica 
de Minas Gerais + Pontifícia Universi-
dade Católica de Minas Gerais / Brazil 
+ Ruprecht-Karls University Heidelberg 
/ Germany)
Ethik und Wissenschaft im brasil-
ianischen Juradiskurs – eine Analyse 
der Argumente, die das Urteil des ober-
sten Bundesgerichts über die Legalität 
für den Wert der zu verteilenden Gü-
ter an jeweils einen der Beteiligten und 
einen zweiter Freiheitsgrad für die ver-
schieden Ebene zwischen den Beteilig-
ten im Falle der Ungleichheit.
5.
José Antonio Seoane (University of A 
Coruña / Spain)
Human rights and disability: a ques-
tion of justice
Abstract:
The manifolds conceptions and treat-
ments of disability can be summarized 
through the dialectic between the medi-
cal model, understanding disability from 
a biological perspective as an individual 
problem that might be removed, and 
the social model, understanding dis-
ability as a social construction that must 
be improved with changes in the social 
environment. Recently the biopsycho-
social model, presented as a synthesis 
of the previous models, or the diversity 
model, stressing the value of disability as 
a difference and the need of recognition 
as a question of justice, suggest new ap-
proaches and conceptions. 
Nevertheless, a most comprehensive the-
oretical and normative proposal for jus-
tice and disability comes from the model 
of rights, whose paramount example is 
the UN Convention on the rights of per-
sons with disabilities (2006). Describing 
and assessing the foundations and basic 
features of the human rights approach, 
arguing with the other models as well as 
with another theoretical proposals (ca-
pabilities approach, secure functioning 
approach, theories of recognition), and 
der Abtreibung von hirnlosen Föten in 
Brasilien begründet haben
Abstract:
Gemäß dem brasilianischen Strafgesetz-
buch ist der Schwangerschaftsabbruch 
eine Straftat gegen das Leben, die nach 
den §§ 124/126 mit einer Freiheitsstra-
fe von eins bis vier Jahren bedroht ist. 
Ausnahmeerlaubnisse sind der Abbruch 
mit dem Zweck, ein Todesfallrisiko für 
das Leben der Schwangeren abzuwen-
den, und der Abbruch im Fall einer Ver-
gewaltigung.
Heute wird in Brasilien diskutiert, ob 
das allgemeine gesetzliche Verbot des 
Schwangerschaftsabbruchs hinsichtlich 
der Menschenrechte noch legitimiert 
sein kann. Ein besonderer Teil dieser 
Diskussion ist das Recht, eine Schwan-
gerschaft abzubrechen, wenn es wissen-
schaftlich erwiesen wird, dass der Fötus 
hirnlos ist. 
Im Jahre 2004 hat sich das brasiliani-
sche oberste Bundesgericht (Supremo 
Tribunal Federal) mit dieser Frage be-
schäftigen müssen. Um seine Entschei-
dung zu begründen, hat dieses Gericht 
verschiedene Sozialbereiche in eine öf-
fentliche Debatte einbezogen, wie z.B. 
Wissenschaﬂ   t e r ,  Ä r z t e ,  M i t g l i e d e r  v o n  
Frauen- sowie von Menschenrechtebe-
wegungen und Vertretter von bestimm-
ten Glaubensrichtungen. Dadurch sind 
wissenschaftlich-technische Argumente 
neben rein moralisch-religiösem Plädie-
ren vorgetragen.
Obwohl diese Argumente von Bedeu-
tung für die Rechtfertigung der Ent-
scheidungen und für die sogenannte 
richterliche Fortbildung des Rechts sind, 
es sieht so aus, als ob die Grundfrage der 
Diskussion nicht berücksichtigt worden 
ist, einmal der Anlass des Vorgehens 
eigentlich um den wissenschaftlichen 
Charakter des heutigen Rechts geht. 
Darauf zielt unser Beitrag: um eine in-
tersubjektive Konstruktion und An-
wendung des Rechts gewährleisten zu 
können, müssen Rechtstheoretiker und 
Rechtsanwender wissenschaftlich vor-
g e h e n .  I n  d i e s e r  P e r s p e k t i v e  w i r d  d i e  
Begründung des Urteils von Supremo 
Tribunal Federal analysiert sein.
2.
Marcin Kilanowski (Nicolas Copernicus 
University / Poland and Harvard Univer-
sity / USA)
On Pragmatism, Politics and objectiv-
ity of Ethics
Abstract:
In my presentation I would like to dis-
cuss Hilary’s Putnam philosophy, which 
is very much rooted in pragmatism. As 
Putnam says, there are ideas in pragma-
tism that deserve to be part of the future 
of philosophy and are part of his. There 
are many things that we can learn from 
it – as he says. He admits that he does 
not normally call himself a pragmatist, 
but he is not unhappy when he is de-
scribed as one. In saying this, he makes 
one reservation, that even though he 
might be described as a pragmatist he 
d o e s  n o t  w a n t  h i s  v i e w  t o  b e  a s s i m i -
lated with the views of his friend and 
philosophical opponent Richard Rorty. 
At the beginning I would like to show 
that Putnam thinks alike about certain 
issues as Rorty and Habermas when the  308 309
ABSTRACTS
Working Groups
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
–
 
A
b
s
t
r
a
c
t
s
life and within goods or values which 
are themselves internally complex and 
inherently pluralistic. Isaiah Berlin ac-
cepted the reconstruction, though he 
did not agree with all the consequences 
derived by Gray. As I was priviledged 
to discuss this subject-matter in person 
with both Isaiah Berlin and John Gray, I 
shall comment on their respective posi-
tions.
It is the third, internal kind of conﬂ  ict 
that proves to be the richest in implica-
tions. Because it undermines a whole 
constellation of contemporary liberal 
doctrines informed by the Kantian-
Lockean tradition that conform to the 
legal paradigm. From the pluralist per-
spective such monumental theories (e.g. 
those of Rawls or Dworkin) are no longer 
sustainable due to the recognition that 
no ultimate value is immune to the phe-
nomenon of incommensurability. Thus, 
irresolvable conﬂ  icts may also break out 
within the given regulative value. 
Confronting ethical pluralism with gen-
eral reﬂ  ection on law has mostly nega-
tive consequences. Nevertheless, the 
incommensurability thesis sheds consid-
erable light on certain legal disputes. I 
shall illustrate this claim by interperting 
in pluralist terms the controversy over 
the verdict by the European Tribunal of 
Human Rights of 3.11.2010 concerning 
hanging crosses in classrooms.
4.
Karolina Prochownik (Jagiellonian Uni-
versity / Poland)
Law and disgust. Is it reasonable for a 
lawyer to be disgusted?
issue discussed is politics. Presenting this 
issues is important to understand Prag-
matism as a whole, not only the classi-
cal one but contemporary, that it has a 
very important massage to deliver. And 
I strongly believe – as Putnam – that it 
can be „part of the future of philosophy“. 
For that to happen certainly much more 
must be said and new steps are neces-
sary. I believe another important step 
m u s t  b e  t ak e n  t o w a r d  b r o a d e nin g  o u r  
understanding of the role of ethics. And 
Putnam is making this step. Of course 
to understand his position about ethics 
it is important ﬁ  rsthand to present his 
criticism of certain philosophical points 
of Rorty and Habermas. In other words 
ﬁ  rst I would like to show common point 
of his philosophical thinking with Rorty 
and Habermas, next where they differ 
and later Putnam’s perspective on ob-
jectivity of ethics, which is rooted in his 
criticism of fact/value dichotomy.
3.
Beata Maria Polanowska-Sygulska (Jag-
iellonian University / Poland)
John Gray and the Implications of Val-
ue-Pluralism for Legal Philosophy
Abstract:
John Gray is the thinker who has re-
constructed the main tenets of ethical 
pluralism inherent in the work of its ini-
tiator - Isaiah Berlin - and pointed to its 
consequences for political philosophy. In 
particular he singled out three levels of 
conﬂ  ict in ethics identiﬁ  able in Berlin’s 
writings: among the ultimate values be-
longing to the same morality or code of 
conduct, among whole ways or styles of 
Abstract:
Emotions are very relevant in social life, 
and law as an institution that always cor-
responds with it to some degree, usually 
takes some social emotions into consid-
eration. According to an American law 
and philosophy professor Martha Nuss-
baum, in certain circumstances emo-
tions may be regarded as rational and 
applied in law. Cases that she describes 
include anger, fear, grief, compassion, 
shame and disgust. She argues that 
emotions like anger, fear, compassion 
and grief may play a role – to some ex-
tent – in two legal processes: legislation 
and legal proceedings – because they are 
in some sense reasonable and justiﬁ  ed. 
She, on the contrary, refers to the liberal 
standards and criticizes inﬂ  uence of dis-
gust in both processes.
In my paper I would like to brieﬂ  y 
present the emotion which Nussbaum 
ﬁ   nds inadequate and unreasonable in 
reference to the liberal legal system and 
answer the question: is the presence of 
disgust in legal system indeed irrational 
and inconsequent if we assume some lib-
eral standards? I agree with Nussbaum 
and my general answer is ‘yes’.
But here arises a question: what does it 
mean to have a rational reason for using 
an emotion in law?
I would like to discuss the arguments 
a g a i n s t  N u s s b a u m ’ s  t h e o r y  a s  w e l l  a s  
those for the use of disgust in legal do-
mains.
My main thesis is that standards of ra-
tional consideration of emotions in law 
may change according to the legal sys-
tem which we regard in such delibera-
tions. For example a conservative legal 
system may be more tolerant of, suscep-
tible and open to disgust – and we may 
say that it will be consequent, coherent 
and, ﬁ   nally, reasonable if it considers 
this emotion in legislation and legal pro-
ceedings. It appears that a liberal system, 
on the contrary, should be immune to 
such inﬂ  uence.
I will actually show how rationality 
standards (and therefore standards of 
rational use of emotions in law or rating 
them as ‘reasonable’) may change when 
we use different socially constructed hi-
erarchies of values protected by particu-
lar legal systems.
5.
Cesar Antonio Serbena (Federal Univer-
sity of Parana / Brazil)
Is Ethics with moral dilemmas possi-
ble? A paraconsistent proposal
Abstract:
Since Thomas Aquinas and Kant, ethical 
systems formulated by the classical phi-
losophers attended to general principles 
considered rational. There was a con-
nection between logic and metaphysics 
and ethics. Aquinas deduced syllogisti-
cally the civil law from natural and eter-
nal law as well as Kant formulated the 
principle that “obligatory implies possi-
ble”. In this philosophical tradition, the 
ethical problems were conceived to be 
practical problems in which it was pos-
sible to ﬁ  nd one solution and a rational 
response. Consequently, there would be 
no moral or ethical dilemmas. Nowadays 
there are still attempts to found the Eth-
ics of Speech and the Theory of Legal Ar- 310 311
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Ausgangspunkt ist die Vorstellung, dass 
Rechtszuschreibungen eine bestimmte 
Art von normativer Beziehung zwischen 
Individuen implizieren. Das Speziﬁ  kum 
dieser Beziehung kommt darin zum Aus-
druck, dass ein Individuum ein Recht be-
sitzt, wenn ein anderes Individuum ihm 
gegenüber eine korrelative Pﬂ  icht hat.
Zunächst wird aufgezeigt, dass die beiden 
klassischen Theorien subjektiver Rechte 
auch in ihren überzeugendsten Ausge-
staltungen in einigen Hinsichten unbe-
friedigend voraussetzungsstark sind. In 
kritischer Anlehnung an einige jünge-
re Theorien subjektiv er Rechte wird im 
Anschluss eine Statustheorie subjektiver 
Rechte entwickelt, die diesen Beschrän-
kungen nicht ausgesetzt ist, obwohl sie 
selbst auf einem anspruchsvollen moral-
theoretischen Fundament steht. Die Sta-
tustheorie postuliert nämlich, dass Rech-
te eine bestimmte Begründungsstruktur 
von Pﬂ  ichten implizieren. Die Pﬂ  ichten, 
die Rechten korrelieren, bestehen um der 
Rechtssubjekte willen. Die Statustheorie 
arbeitet die begrifﬂ  ichen Voraussetzun-
gen dieser Begründungsstruktur heraus.
Session 2
7.
Peter Swan (Carleton University / Can-
ada)
“There’ll be the breaking of the ancient 
western code”?: Explorations of Law at 
the End of History’
Abstract:
The “negative political theology” of the 
philosopher, Jacob Taubes represents 
one of the most interesting theoretical 
gumentation on rational principles. Both 
K. O. Appel and R. Alexy are examples 
and a part of their theories are based 
on “Münchhausen Trilemma” (Hans 
Albert). According to H. Albert and his 
Trilemma, it is not possible to support a 
philosophical theory or scientiﬁ  c argu-
ment using the circular argument and 
the regressive one. In the second half 
of the twentieth century logical systems 
alternative to systems of classical logic 
were formulated. One such logic is para-
consistent logic, which admits contradic-
tions. We argue that, from the paracon-
sistent logic point of view, it is possible 
to formulate ethical and philosophical 
theories that accept the moral dilemmas 
as existing, real. In the same way, the 
circular argument of Münchhausen Tri-
lemma would be no longer an impedi-
ment to support philosophical theories.
6.
Hubert Schnüriger (Universität Basel / 
Switzerland)
Eine Statustheorie subjektiver Rechte
Abstract:
In der Frage, was ein subjektives Recht ist, 
stehen sich klassisch zwei Theorielager 
gegenüber. Willenstheoretiker betonen, 
dass Rechte einen Handlungsspielraum 
der Rechtssubjekte schützen. Interessen-
theoretiker gehen davon aus, dass Rechte 
Interessen der Rechtssubjekte schützen. 
In jüngster Zeit weisen verschiedene Au-
toren im angelsächsischen Raum beide 
Ansätze zurück und fordern eine ‚dritte 
Theorie subjektiver Rechte‘. Ziel dieses 
Beitrages ist es denn auch, eine solche 
dritte Theorie vorzulegen.
challenges to law in the 20th -century. 
Using Taubes’ s interpretation of the po-
litical theology of Saint Paul as a point 
of departure, this paper will explore two 
alternative conceptualizations of law 
at the end of history. Basing his inter-
pretation of law on the work of Schmitt 
Benjamin, Taubes argues for a messianic 
break with history in which law is over-
t h r o w n .  H o w e v e r ,  i n  a n  a s i d e ,  T a u b e s  
links his project of “negative political 
theology” to the French philosopher, Al-
exander Kojeve. I will show how law be-
comes a central category of their respec-
tive visions of “post history”. However, 
with Kojeve we see law as an institution 
that remains in tension with social jus-
tice and as such can be interpreted as an 
historical project which may or may not 
be realized as “just law” at the “end of 
history” For some this prophetic vision 
may be more frightening than Taubes’ 
messianic overcoming of law. However, 
Kojeve’s view of law and justice remains 
too important to be conceded to an in-
terpretive monopoly by the political 
right for it can illustrate the partial char-
acter of instituted justice in a continual 
interrogation of the political relationship 
between ruler and ruled. In this paper I 
will show how Kojeve’s vision remains 
more open to contingency than we have 
been led to believe by both contempo-
rary conservative and postmodern inter-
pretations.
8.
Antal Visegrády (University of Pécs / 
Hungary)
Comparative Judicial Ethics
Abstract:
The paper consists of two main parts. The 
ﬁ  rst passage presents the administration 
of justice in a historical segment, then it 
examines the relationship between mor-
als and the law. Finally the leagal status 
of judges and juditial power is shown.
The second part of the paper endeav-
oures to present the fundamental prin-
ciples and rules of judicial ethics as 
„distilled“ from the European, Italian, 
Croatian, Canadian, American, Austri-
an, and Hungarian ethical-codes.
These are: A Judge Shall Be Independ-
ent; A Judge Shall be Impartial; Juditial 
Conduct of Proceedings Shall Be Cha-
raterised By Fairness, Integrity, Equal-
ity, and Diligence; A Judge shall Refrain 
from Pursuing Any Political Activity; 
Judges’ Activity in Public Life Must Also 
Be Ethical; A Judge Shall Conduct Him-
self Ethically Also in His Private Life; 
According to the authors opinion the 
ethical codes protect and guide the ju-
diciary – one of the pillars of the „Rech-
tsstaat“ – at the same time they inform 
society about the requirements it may 
expect the juditiary to satisfy.
Finally the paper analises some decisions 
of the National Judicial Ethics Council of 
Hungary just as the sanctions for bridge 
of the ethical rules in Lithuania, Estonia, 
Moldova, Slovenia, and Czech Republic.
9.
Wojciech Zaluski (Jagiellonian Univer-
sity / Poland)
Evolutionary Theory and Metaethics
Abstract:
The goal of the paper is to reﬂ  ect  on  312 313
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ing an evolutionary success (and thus a 
moral norm is ‘debunked’ as subservient 
to an evolutionary goal of transmitting 
one’s genes to further generations). The 
third view asserts that demonstrating an 
evolutionary genealogy of a disposition 
to take a moral act P has no implications 
whatsoever for a justiﬁ  cation of a moral 
norm prescribing P: by itself neither does 
it strengthen nor weaken a justiﬁ  cation 
of this moral norm. The paper provides 
arguments for the last view. One of these 
arguments says that the second view 
would be a correct one only if demon-
strating an evolutionary genealogy of an 
agent’s disposition to take a moral act P 
were tantamount to demonstrating that 
an agent’ s motive to take this act is to 
foster his or her evolutionary success. 
The problem tackled in this paper in-
scribes itself into a broader problem of 
the limits of scientiﬁ  c explanation: the 
paper is aimed to show that the metaeth-
ical questions (unlike questions of moral 
psychology or the sociology or morality) 
are beyond the reach of scientiﬁ  c meth-
ods.
10.
Marco Antonio Oliveira de Azevedo 
(Unisinos, São Leopoldo / Brazil)
Moral duties and legal permissibility
Abstract:
Some philosophers think that it is per-
fectly possible to have a moral duty of 
doing something even if it is legally per-
missible not to do that; and they usually 
think also – and this is stronger – that it 
is possible to have a moral duty of not 
doing something where we have a legal 
whether the evolutionary insights into 
human nature are relevant for the cen-
tral question of metaethics, i.e., the 
question about the justiﬁ  cation of moral 
norms. The point of departure of the 
analysis pursued in the paper is the 
rather uncontroversial claim that in the 
light of evolutionary theory human be-
ings are ‘moral animals’, i.e., they have 
become endowed by natural selection 
with dispositions to act morally. To put 
it more precisely, the claim says that 
one can provide a plausible evolution-
ary genealogy of many (but not all) of 
our moral dispositions. It is clear that 
this claim has important implications 
for moral psychology and sociology or 
morality: many of the crucial questions 
of these branches of moral sciences (e.g., 
the question about moral motivation or 
the evolution of moral systems) cannot 
be fruitfully tackled without taking into 
account the results of evolutionary theo-
ry. However, it is much less clear wheth-
er these results have any implications for 
the aforementioned metaethical ques-
tion. Painting with a broad brush, one 
can distinguish three general views on 
this matter. The ﬁ  rst view asserts that by 
demonstrating an evolutionary geneal-
ogy of a disposition to take a moral act 
P one thereby strengthens a justiﬁ  cation 
of a moral norm prescribing P. The sec-
ond view asserts that by demonstrating 
an evolutionary genealogy of a disposi-
tion to take a moral act P one thereby 
weakens a justiﬁ  cation of a moral norm 
prescribing P, because acting with this 
norm, besides what it may be beyond 
that, proves to be a means for achiev-
d u t y  o f  a ct in g  in  t h e  s a m e  w a y .  T h e y  
think not merely that there are circum-
stances where people can have reasons 
of doing what is nevertheless legally for-
bidden (or of not doing what they are 
anyway legally obliged); the view is that 
there are situations where people have a 
more strong duty, a moral duty of doing 
(or not doing) what they are however le-
gally forbidden, that is, that persons can 
have a moral duty of doing what they, 
nevertheless, have, at the same time 
and circumstances, a legal duty of not. 
W h a t  e xp l ain s  i t  i s  t h e  all e g e d  a u t o n -
omy of morality in the face of law. We 
should note here that this view implies 
a deontological dualism; but this dual-
ism in untenable. One reason for not 
accepting that dualism is that morality 
cannot be completely departed from law, 
for law forbids behaviors for the sake of 
ends not completely autonomous from 
some universally acceptable moral ends 
or principles. Nevertheless, that is not 
my direct point in this communication. 
What I want to show is that the deon-
tological dualism is rationally and logi-
cally unsustainable. It is plainly accept-
able that, following the principles of the 
Rule of Law, we cannot have any politi-
cal duties except the legal ones. A sensi-
ble version of Mill’s Harm Principle can 
explain that. But a more complete argu-
ment runs as follows. Regarding Hohfel-
dian semantics, to have a duty of doing 
something is equivalent of not having 
the privilege of not doing that; conse-
quently, not having the same duty is the 
same as having a privilege of not accom-
plishing the same action. Hence, to say 
that someone has a moral duty to do A 
(take it as a verbalization of an action), 
but he has not any legal duty of doing A, 
implies that he doesn’t have any duty at 
all; for he has a (Hohfeldian) privilege of 
not doing A. Then, to say that someone 
has a moral duty to do A (take it as a ver-
balization of an action), but he has not 
any legal duty of doing A, implies that 
he doesn’t have any duty at all; for he 
has a (Hohfeldian) privilege of not do-
ing A. We cannot have a duty of doing A 
and have at the same time a privilege of 
not doing A. Of course, this conjunction 
is possible for the philosophers that ac-
cept the deontological dualism between 
morality and Law. But that deontological 
dualism is unacceptable. First, because 
no one has duties against himself (that 
would imply to have a claim against 
himself) – a very acceptable thesis that 
Schopenhauer made ﬁ  rst against Kant, 
and a view also expressed in 1958 by 
Elizabeth Anscombe in “Modern moral 
philosophy” (against Kant, again) – she 
said, besides a lot of important things, 
that a duty against himself is psycho-
logically unintelligible; and, second, be-
cause we cannot claim A even morally 
against someone else if that alleged duty 
bearer has also a privilege to not-A: since 
he cannot be forced to do A (for he has a 
claim of not being forced of doing or not 
doing something except lawfully), how 
could we have a claim against him of do-
ing A if this claim is not (and cannot be) 
lawfully – that is, legally – enforceable? 
A very different issue concerns the rea-
sons for not doing what we have a legal 
duty of. That problem encompasses the  314 315
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are good in themselves, whereas under 
morality, they are those norms which 
are laid down by the society to regulate 
the conduct of a person in the society. 
Morality consists of those ideals which 
are set for a social group. Ethics, there-
fore, concentrates on individual rather 
then society. Norms of ethics are not 
variable whereas the norms of morality 
move with the advancement of society 
at a particular time. They are, therefore, 
variable. 
In the present era of scientiﬁ  c develop-
ment, medical advancement, informa-
tion technology and use of internet for 
numerous human technologies, the role 
of law vis-a-vis such activities have be-
come a hot topic of debate today. Law 
as the regulator of human behavior has 
made an entry into several multifarious, 
complex and difﬁ  cult problems of civil 
and criminal nature, effecting moral-
ity. If law fails to respond to the needs of 
the changing soci3ty either it will stiﬂ  e 
the growth of the society and choke its 
progress or, if the society is pragmatic 
and vigorous enough, it will cast away 
the law which stands in the way of its 
growth. Law is applicable both online 
human activities and also the off line 
activities. 
The development of law, at all times and 
places, has in fact been profoundly inﬂ  u-
enced both by the conventional moral-
ity and ideals of particular social groups, 
and also by forms of enlightened moral 
criticism of those people, whose moral 
horizon has transcended the morality 
currently accepted. Thus, a legal system 
must exhibit some speciﬁ  c  conform-
problem of civil disobedience. My last 
a n d  c o n c l u d i n g  r e m a r k  w i l l  b e  a b o u t  
how we must understand the concept of 
having reasons for action encompassing 
the issue of having occasionally reasons 
for disobeying. This is an issue of politi-
cal morality; but accepting that we can 
have occasionally or eventually strong 
reasons for disobeying does not imply a 
deontological dualism, for we obviously 
can have reasons for refusing some legal 
commands and we can have occasional 
reasons of not accomplishing what is our 
legal duty too, but this does not imply 
that in those situations we are bound or 
submitted to any other kind of duty.
11.
Krishna Agrawal (Indian Institute of 
Comparative Law / India)
Law, Morality and Science
Abstract:
A study of various legal systems makes it 
clear that law and morals have had a long 
union. There are, indeed, many different 
types of relation between law and moral 
and there is nothing that can be proﬁ  t-
able singled out for study as the relation 
between them. It is ﬁ  rmly believed that 
Jurisprudence depended much upon 
moral ideals, as just law has need of ethi-
cal doctrine for its complete realization. 
There is a conception that ethics and 
morality are one and the same thing. 
These terms are interchangeable. But it 
is not so. Ethics are those norms or ide-
als which are laid down for an individ-
ual Ethics is the study of supreme good 
– an attempt to discover those norms 
which should be followed because they 
ity with morality or justice or must rest 
upon a widely diffused conviction that 
there is moral obligation to obey it.
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Session 1
1.
Massimo Fichera (University of Helsinki 
/ Finland)
Criminal Law Beyond the State: The 
European Model
Abstract:
Criminal law has been recently acquir-
ing an increasingly higher proﬁ  le at the 
transnational level and this has not yet 
been adequately recognised by criminal 
law theorists. The most pressing issue 
in the face of this event is that this con-
tradicts the way criminal law has been 
traditionally conceived so far, i.e. as in-
extricably linked with the nation State. 
What is curious of the most recent devel-
opments is that they are all taking place 
separately from each other, with little or 
no interference. It is possible to discern 
different models and patterns but their 
complexity can perhaps be schematised 
and some common features can be iden-
tiﬁ  ed. This paper will attempt to do so 
by analysing two general models, which 
are here termed the “eunomic” and the 
“dialogic” one. It will illustrate the main 
implications of the emergence of these 
models and their connection with hu-
man rights. It will be evident that when 
we talk about international criminal law 
we refer to two parallel dimensions. One 
has as its centrepiece the International 
Criminal Court and the other, perma-
nent and non-permanent, courts that 
h a v e  b e e n  i n s t i t u t e d  a c r o s s  t h e  w o r l d  
with a speciﬁ  c geo-legal and geo-polit-
ical role. The other one is the outcome 
of a network of intertwined relations 
that overlap and are built around well-
tested institutions and practices. Similar 
patterns have gradually emerged also at 
the European level. The paper will focus 
on one particular case study that has at-
tracted the attention of many experts: 
European criminal law. It will be shown 
that this model was inherently “dialogic” 
until the last decade of the past century, 
but has now come to the fore as an inde- 316 317
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clusion of the beneﬁ  ts of functional so-
cial systems – what has led, specially in 
high industrialized countries with high 
levels of inclusion, to a considerable sen-
sibility of the legal code regarding these 
matters. In fact, modern society seems to 
be based on a kind of radical differentia-
tion of social spheres in which the stabi-
lizing function of the legal system seems 
to be indispensable. Modern democratic 
law guarantees both (1) the differentia-
tion of functional systems against each 
other – an immunizing function – and 
(2) the neutralization of possible exclud-
ing tendencies of particular systems, as 
in the classic case of economy – an ex-
clusion-neutralizing function. In today’s 
world society a post-national global law, 
which has become fragmented in a very 
complex web of specialized regimes, 
seems indeed to perform in a quite sat-
isfactory way the ﬁ  rst (1) of those func-
ti o ns .  I t  d o e s  n o t  s e e m  h o w e v e r  t o  b e  
able to perform its exclusion-neutral-
izing task (2) in a way that blocks the 
continuous growth of functional subsys-
tems, which might jeopardize its social 
and human environment. The main as-
sumption of the present paper proposal 
is that fragmented global law is not able 
to perform (2) because it lacks the sort 
of internal semantics which made pos-
sible the politicization of issues regard-
ing the excluding tendencies implied in 
functional differentiation. The impera-
tive towards inclusion and participation 
in the formulation of legal norms, which 
seemed to make possible the legal “ob-
servation” of political conﬂ  icts, does not 
shape the semantical framework of the 
pendent and unique example of “crimi-
nal law beyond the State”, perhaps as a 
result of the simultaneous appearance of 
European constitutionalism beyond the 
State. Its slow but steady evolution has 
been strongly inﬂ  uenced by free market 
paradigms and this affects inevitably the 
way the relationship between the citi-
zen and the public authority is shaped. 
In accordance with classic liberal views, 
criminal law has always been concep-
tualised as one of the most salient at-
tributes of the sovereign State. This was 
admitted under a very strict condition. 
Holding the monopoly on the use of vio-
lence was to be legitimised by the State’s 
deep concern for the sphere of autonomy 
of the individual. It is submitted in this 
paper that it is precisely this condition 
that is lacking in the current European 
model. These considerations are closely 
linked to the nature of the European 
Union (EU) as a polity that possesses 
some State-like traits. It is for this reason 
that it is also argued that criminal law, 
if properly conceived, can function as a 
powerful vehicle of integration.
2.
Pablo Holmes Chaves (University Flens-
burg / Brazil)
Global Law and Global Exclusion: Di-
lemmas of constitutional semantics in 
the World Society
Abstract:
Thanks to the legal and political seman-
tics of democratic constitutionalism it 
has been possible, even in the periphery 
of capitalist global economy, to politicize 
to a great extent issues regarding the ex-
sort of functional constitutionalism gov-
erning today’s specialized international 
law.
3.
Quoc Loc Hong (Vu University Amster-
dam / Netherlands)
The Role of Courts in the War on Terror
Abstract:
The normative position of the judiciary 
under the traditional conception of de-
mocracy as self-legislation by the people 
is too weak to protect in an effective way 
the rights of suspects in the global War 
on Terror. Drawing on arguments elabo-
rated by Hans Kelsen and Karl Popper, 
we shall attempt to devise in this paper 
an alternative democracy conception 
that could serve as a much more solid 
foundation for the judicial branch of gov-
ernment in a democratic state. Through 
this jurisprudential strategy, we hope to 
be able to maintain the balance of nor-
mative power among the Trias Politica, 
which, in turn, may contribute to the 
preservation of the legal rights of every 
person during the struggle against ter-
rorists.
4.
Isabel Turegano (Universidad de Castil-
la-la Mancha / Spain)
The Role of International Law in State 
Building: Levels of Transitional Justice
Abstract:
The debate on transitional justice since 
the 1990s has been focused mainly in 
the devices, institutions and procedures 
more suitable for confronting and deal-
ing with a legacy of conﬂ  ict and past vio-
lations of human rights. From the analy-
sis of retributive and restorative models 
of justice, the relative merits of criminal 
prosecutions and truth commissions 
have been discussed. But transitional 
justice must also reﬂ  ect on the relative 
m e r i t s  o f  l o c a l ,  n a t i o n a l  a n d  i n t e r n a -
tional resources involved in peacebuild-
ing and of empowerment of population 
and internal institutions or international 
community intervention in postconﬂ  ict 
situations. That is, space dimension must 
be included in reﬂ  ections about transi-
tional justice, analyzing how internal 
and external processes affect the funda-
mental problems of rebuilding commu-
nities, such as legitimacy, accountability, 
security, governance and social and eco-
nomic development.
Efforts to achieve initiatives of transi-
tional justice can come from a variety 
of spheres or levels, each of which con-
tributes differently to rebuilding and 
reconciliation. Maybe, transitional jus-
tice is only attainable in that interaction 
between different levels that is able to 
combine the contribution of each. This 
multilevel approach demands a concept 
of legitimacy in which international 
normativity is coherent with state sover-
eignty, being the language and strategy 
tha t  can  b e  u s e d  t o  inﬂ  uence internal 
events and lead them to overcome con-
ﬂ  ict.
5.
Ramón Ruiz Ruiz (Universidad de Jaén 
/ Spain)
Globalization, Law, and citizien politi-
cal Partizipation 318 319
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manding for the citizens of our individ-
ualistic societies, too much enclosed in 
their private lives. In my paper, as well 
as expounding in more detail all the pre-
vious questions, I shall also try to give 
an account of the institutional arrange-
ments that these republicans propose to 
enable a greater participation – not only 
at an internal level, but also internation-
al – and thus to give a reply to those who 
sustain that it is impossible to motivate 
citizens to participate more and to in-
volve themselves more in public affairs.
6.
Bizina Savaneli (St. Grigol Peradze Uni-
versity / Georgia)
General Plan of Mutual Transition, 
Spiral and Evolutionary Development 
of Positive Law and Normative Order
Abstract:
I. In contemporary world we have three 
levels of Single Positive Law: single in-
ternational law of all states (common 
international law), single international 
law of group of states (for example, the 
E u r o p e a n  U n i o n  l a w ,  O r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  
American States and African Union law) 
and single laws of nation states (laws of 
UN member states).
In contemporary world we correspond-
ently have three levels of Plural Nor-
mative Order: plural transnational 
normative order of all states (common 
international order), plural transna-
tional normative order of group of states 
(for example, the European Union nor-
mative order, Organization of American 
States and African Union normative or-
der) and plural normative order of each 
Abstract:
Democracy has been conceived in many 
different ways throughout history, 
though nowadays the hegemonic is the 
one usually referred to as “liberal”. The 
problem with this idea of democracy is 
that it reduces the role of the citizen to 
that of mere voter who, once has voted, 
has nothing more to do in the public 
realm, as after all, liberal democracy 
does not consist in the government of 
the people, but in the government of 
some persons authorized by them: the 
politicians, who are to rule the com-
munity in a very discretional way. This 
means that on too many occasions, laws 
and political decisions do not correspond 
to the real opinions, wishes and interests 
of the people, which, in turn, gives rise 
to increasing discontent and disbelief in 
politics. And this situation is aggravated 
even more in a globalised world, where 
the inﬂ  uence of the citizens in the major 
part of the decisions which are going to 
affect their lives is even less, as they are 
taken by instances which they very of-
ten do not even know.
Nevertheless, even though this concep-
tion of democracy is the most wide-
spread it is not unanimously accepted, 
but has been contested from a number 
of intellectual positions, one of the most 
central in our days being the so-called 
“civic republicanism”. Republicans stress 
the importance of an intense, responsi-
ble and widespread participation due to 
a  n u m b e r  o f  r e a s o n s .  H o w e v e r ,  m a n y  
contemporary scholars argue that such 
a wide and intense participation is im-
possible because it can be excessively de-
nation states (normative orders of UN 
member states).
Single Positive Law or Legal Monism 
(Public Positive Law and Private Positive 
Law) indicates how public bodies and 
private persons ought to act ideally. Plu-
ral Normative Order or Normative Plu-
ralism (Public Normative Order and Pri-
vate Normative Order) shows how public 
bodies and private persons acts really. 
“Im Aufang war die Tat”. (Goethe).
At the level of the philosophy of law Plu-
ral Normative order connected with the 
idea that the individual acts of private 
persons (normative facts) do not depend 
on the positive law or its sources based 
on the Giant Goethe’s formula: “Im Au-
fang war die Tat”. Instead of “How to Do 
Things with Words”, I support the for-
mula: “How to Do Words with Things”. 
Human beings do things without words. 
The things do words, the words do new 
things, new things do the new words, 
the new words do new things and etc. 
Of course, on the one side, speech act is 
one of the forms of human being’s activ-
ity. Through speech act human being’s 
activity can be transmitted from one po-
sition to another, or its normative state 
c a n  b e  c h a n g e d ,  o r  t h e  v o l u m e  o f  i t s  
individual rights and obligation can be 
broaden or get narrow, but, on the other 
side, in any case, human being more si-
lently acts than speaks. Related to the 
strictly normative space, speech act is 
one of the forms of normative fact, but 
in any case, private person more silently 
acts than speaks. In whole, speech acts 
are one of the forms of normative or-
der, but in any case, public bodies and 
private persons more silently acts than 
speaks. Permanent and cyclical interac-
tion between things and words, inter-
substitution of things and words, and 
permanent and cyclical inter-transition 
of things and words at global, regional, 
national and local levels has a trend to 
comprehend a sense of law of Human-
kind, which must be based on the Uni-
versally Recognized Human Rights. 
The aim and goal of such interaction, 
inter-substitution and inter-transition is 
to achieve sustainable development of 
Humankind. Formula “New things pro-
duce new words” means that new facts 
produce new mutual rights and obliga-
tions. The entity of new facts and new 
mutual rights and obligations create 
new normative space, which causes ne-
cessity to establish new positive law and 
etc. Generally talking: to claim “ought 
t o  b e ”  m e ans  th a t  s u ch  “ o u gh t  t o  b e ”  
practically possible. In other words: it is 
nonsense to claim human action which 
is not practically possible. “Ought to be” 
should be based on the individual hu-
man capacity. In any case, the basis of 
the law of the negation of the negation 
concerning jurisprudence is the norma-
tive order, because “Im Aufang war die 
Tat”. Things negate words, words ne-
gate things, things negate words, and 
etc. In this sense, for me the Normative 
Order is “Ordo Ordinans”. Legal Mon-
ism (what ought to be) and Normative 
Pluralism (what is) never coincide. Gen-
erally, my theory of dialectical jurispru-
dence is founded on the laws of dialec-
tics of Hegel. They are: the law of the 
unity and conﬂ  ict of opposites; the law  320 321
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tree green”, as Shota Rustaveli – the fa-
mous Georgian philosopher and poet of 
the XII Century – proclaimed. The Idea 
of Just Law suggest what sort and kind 
of law legislators (in Roman-Germanic 
i.e. “civilianist” legal space) or judges (in 
Anglo-American, i.e. common law legal 
space) should make, so that any laws 
would be just from the Universal Hu-
man Rights Law. The Mutual-Transition 
of Legal Monism, Normative Pluralism 
and Idea of Just Law must be based on 
the Universal Human Rights Law as Ba-
sic Norms’ System, and this process must 
be repeated dialectically, i.e. spirally, 
constantly, evolutionary and endlessly. 
Therefore, we the people of the world 
need a New Human Philosophy under 
the auspice of Universal Human Rights 
Law, which links the East and West, 
North and South, ethics and religions, 
public and private life, technologies and 
environment, and the myriad problems, 
which have never been exist in the his-
tory of Humankind in widespread as-
pect. Humankind has one high type of 
law – Universal of Human Rights Law 
– as the pick of World Law, which rises 
above the positive laws and normative 
orders.
Session 2
7.
Domenico Siciliano (Dipartimento di 
teoria e storia del diritto, Facoltà di 
Giurisprudenza, Firenze / Italy)
Global Governance des Militärs: Ein-
satzregeln als Hybride zwischen Recht, 
Politik und Technik
of the passage of quantitative changes 
into qualitative changes; the law of the 
negation of the negation. Dialectical Ju-
risprudence is a sphere of science, which 
explore dialectics of law and order sepa-
rately and together, and propose a model 
of dialectics of law and order separately 
and together. 
II. The “legal families” theory or Com-
parative Law ignores the phenomenon 
of normative order. Almost all scientists 
operating in comparative law and legal 
theory ignore any role of practice of in-
dividual normative acts of public bod-
ies and private persons in formation of 
normative order. However, the state and 
certain combination of practice of indi-
vi d u a l  n o r m a t i v e  a c t s  o f  p u b l i c  b o di e s  
and private persons construct individual 
legal face of country, which is always 
different from normative orders of other 
countries, disregard that both could be 
even entered in the same legal family. So 
it is necessary to introduce a new branch 
of legal science: Comparative Normative 
Orders Study, which at the beginning 
should not be investigating in the frame-
works of Comparative Law Study. In this 
sense I put forward an idea of practical 
jurisprudence. Comparative Law is the 
part of Comparative Jurisprudence. An-
other part of Comparative Jurisprudence 
is the Comparative Normative Order. 
III. It is a deep mistake to consider posi-
tive law as decisive factor of conﬂ  ict pre-
vention and resolution, because unjust 
law of legislative power could be factor 
of conﬂ   icts. Important factor of con-
ﬂ   ict prevention and resolution is the 
formula: “Making just law makes a dry 
Abstract:
Die europäischen Regierungen setzen 
an  d e r  In t e rse kti o n  zwisch e n  d o m esti c  
law und internationalem Recht immer 
stärker öffentlich-rechtliche Politik „von 
oben“ durch. Damit entsteht eine Regie-
rungsform, die mit Martti Koskenniemi 
als Global Governance genannt werden 
kann. Sie zeichnet sich durch die Merk-
male Entformalisierung (informelle Ab-
sprachen), Fragmentierung (strategische 
Ausdifferenzierung des Wissens) und 
Empire (Top-down-Entscheidungen) 
aus. Diese Tendenz wird am Beispiel des 
Militäreinsatzes im Kampf gegen den 
Terrorismus rekonstruiert und kritisch 
hinterfragt. Da dieser keine Grenzen 
kennt, kennt auch seine Bekämpfung 
keine Grenzen. So wird das Militär nicht 
nur zur äußeren, sondern auch zur in-
neren Sicherheit eingesetzt. Damit ent-
steht ein Regime der Sicherheit, dass 
die Differenz Innen/Außen zunehmend 
aufhebt. Die Einsatzregeln sind der Tò-
pos zur Durchsetzung eines solchen 
Sicherheitsregimes. In einem ersten 
Schritt wird durch die Analyse der Pro-
duktion der Einsatzregeln im deutschen, 
italienischen und spanischen Recht die 
entsprechende Global Governance des 
Militärs rekonstruiert. Zum einen wer-
den die jeweiligen Regeln zum Einsatz 
der Gewalt gegen Zivilfahrzeuge im In-
land rekonstruiert. Zum zweiten werden 
die Regeln zum Einsatz der Gewalt im 
Ausland rekonstruiert und hinterfragt. 
Die Netzwerke, in denen die Einsatz-
regeln entstehen, sind informell, die 
Rechtsquellen meist geheim und durch 
strategisches Wissen gesteuert. In ei-
nem zweiten Schritt wird die technisch-
militärische, politische und rechtliche 
Komponente der Einsatzregeln genauer 
beobachtet: weder rechtliche Regeln, 
noch politsche oder technische sind die 
Einsatzregeln ein Hybride aus allen Re-
geln, bei dem die technisch-militärische 
Komponente der Disziplin die Oberhand 
zu gewinnen scheint.
8.
Mehmet Tevﬁ  k Ozcan (Istanbul Univer-
sity / Turkey)
The Rule of Law After Globalisation: Is 
Myth or Reality?
Abstract:
The rule of law is unique establishment 
that had taken place in historical milieu 
as politico-legal creation of capitalist so-
ciety. Apart from our legal philosophies 
upon how the society might be bettered, 
legal system in action relies on certain 
conditions, as considered likely to the 
existential condition of living organism 
which cannot be reduced to its solitari-
ness. To the extent that any legal system 
was established in historical context, 
its form and functioning are cannot be 
channelled by introverted actions of 
lawyers and legal philosophers. The rule 
of law emerged in certain conditions, 
which we say “classical liberalism”, in 
power allocation wherewith we diver-
sify political power and legal power in 
the milieu of political society, as enun-
ciated as “republic” or “commonwealth”. 
Contrary to earlier forms of legal order, 
where legal machinery had clearly been 
an apparatus of political power, capital-
ism was unique that its super structure  322 323
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with consumerism and cultural identity 
politics, detrimental to the civic virtue of 
greater (i.e. national) society in favour of 
glocal arenas. Finally, I point an ex post 
facto property of the rule of law that it 
would be safeguarded by power alloca-
tion, instead of benevolence or superero-
gation of economic and political power. 
In this milieu, today, the rule of law is 
not only most debatable topic among 
lawyers and legal philosophers, but also 
it is most vulnerable and unpromising, 
neither no any reliable guaranteeing 
provision to safeguard its being.
9.
Seiko Urayama (Senshu University / Ja-
pan)
Immigration Justice as a Theory of Glo-
bal Distributive Justice
Abstract:
Not only global distributive justice the-
orists but also theorists who are trying 
to dealing with justice in immigration 
have not paid an adequate attention on 
the beneﬁ  t and burden caused by the in-
ternational movement of people. On the 
one hand, remittances from rich coun-
tries to developing world today are so 
huge that they help the economy of de-
veloping world. The international remit-
tances to developing countries in 2006 
year which amounted to 220 billion US 
dollars far exceeded the amount of ODA 
in the same year which was 104 US dol-
lars. Admitting more and more people 
in developed countries from develop-
ing ones might contribute to the global 
redistribution of wealth. On the other 
hand, there is a growing concern about 
was articulated according to the pivotal 
role of legal machinery. There was ac-
tual or taken for granted equilibrium 
between legal and political domains that 
fairly matched with public and private 
dichotomy, as legal power was very like-
ly to the depoliticized setting of liberal 
individuals. After monopoly capitalism, 
social setting of liberalism was dramati-
cally incurred some major modiﬁ  cations 
in two respect, that was ﬁ  rstly pervasive-
ness of liberal individual was dislocated 
by monopoly accumulation of capital, as 
devastation of the society of small prop-
erty owners; that was secondly political 
achievement of the working classes ob-
tained political equality, as drastic con-
sequence of mass society. Additionally, 
monopoly capitalism willy-nilly under-
mined individual as natural person in 
economic and legal domains in favour of 
legal personality of corporations or other 
associations, because private entrepre-
neurs dramatically left out after corpo-
rate bodies prevalent. In this milieu, the 
rule of law metamorphosed to depoliti-
cal scene of democratised mass society 
instead of modus vivendi of liberal in-
dividuals, which demarcated the rule 
of law according to welfare society or 
sozialrechtsstaat model. After neo-liber-
al globalisation after 1980’s, republican 
model of political society faded away 
that transformed to transnational mar-
kets, hierarchies and communal settings 
how crosscut inner equilibrium between 
politics and law. Under unfortunate de-
cay of working class politics, regionalism 
and communalism became main tenets 
of political participation that matched 
the brain-drain problem. It is said that 
more than 20% of physicians practicing 
in the highly developed English speak-
ing countries such as US, Canada, UK, 
Australia and New Zealand are foreign-
trained. Sending countries would suf-
fer from a lack of human resources for 
creating and running the society by los-
ing the most talented and active part of 
their population. This means that there 
exists beneﬁ  t and burden on the move-
ment of people, which their fair distri-
bution matters. On my view, any theory 
of immigration justice should adequately 
take it into consideration. I will examine 
how existing lines of thought on immi-
gration admissions deal with these posi-
tive and negative impacts of the inter-
national movement of people. Theories I 
will examine are Joseph Carens’ argu-
ment from freedom of movement, David 
Miller and Michael Walzer’s nationalism 
argument, and Daniel Bell and Chris-
tine Straehle’s view of global economic 
redistribution. Finally, I will propose 
that the borders of developed countries 
be open fairly. Developed countries may 
welcome the people from the developing 
countries. At the same time, their immi-
gration policy should not harm the de-
veloping countries.
10.
Csaba Varga (Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences; Catholic University of Hungary 
/ Hungary)
Where Law, Science and New Technol-
ogy can Meet: The Philosophy of Euro-
pean Law
Abstract:
In reconsideration of the composition 
and operation of European law, describ-
ing its mentality may also answer the 
query whether European law is the ex-
tension of some domestic laws or a sui 
generis product with no antitype. In ac-
tion, European law is destructive upon 
underlying traditions of legal positivism; 
it recalls post modern clichés rather. 
L i k e  a  s o l a r  s y s t e m  wi t h  p l a n e t s ,  i t  i s  
two-centred from the beginning, com-
missioning implementation and initial 
judicial control to member states. As 
part of global post modernism, (1) Eu-
ropean law stems from artiﬁ  cial reality 
construction freed from historical par-
ticularities and human experience, any-
thing given hic et nunc. By its operation, 
(2) European law dynamises large struc-
tures and makes thereby to move what 
is chaos itself. It is solely reconstructive 
human intent that tries to arrange what-
ever outcome within some posterior 
ideal of order, without the operation it-
self (assuring daily management) striv-
ing for anything of order or systemicity. 
This is the way for European law to be-
come an adequate reﬂ  ection of a (macro) 
economic basis to which it will serve as 
superstructure. According to the above, 
(3) the whole construct is operated (mo-
bilised and integrated into one working 
unit) within the framework of an arti-
ﬁ   cially animated dynamism. With its 
“order out of chaos” principle it assures 
member states’ standing involvement 
and competition, achieving a ﬂ  exibly 
self-adapting but unprecedentedly high 
degree of conformity. 324 325
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and legal mechanism to protect this 
right? 
1. The basic meaning and essential char-
acters of the right to be free from pov-
erty. 
2. The jurisprudential foundation of the 
right to be free from poverty.
3. The pedigree of obligation about the 
right to be free from poverty
4.The legal mechanism of implementing 
the right to be free from poverty.
12.
Mauro Zamboni (Stockholm University 
/ Sweden)
Transnational Corporate Law: Lex 
Mercatoria or Lex Americana?
Abstract:
Looking closely at the ﬁ  eld of transna-
tional corporate law, one ﬁ  nds that de-
spite the fact the classical question of 
“what is a corporation” has on one side 
been central for the corporate debate 
in state or state-based legal systems, on 
the other side this issue seems to have 
been left at the margins when attention 
is shifted to the transnational context. 
The main goal here is to analytically 
identify “what is a corporation” from a 
legal perspective within the transna-
tional discourse or, using Stanley Fish’s 
terminology, within the transnational 
interpretative community. 
In order to get to the bottom of this cen-
tral issue, the focus in this paper is on 
the evolutionary processes that the le-
gal concept of corporation has under-
gone while moving from a state-based 
legal regime to a non-state based (tran-
snational) regulatory system. Almost 
11.
Wang Xigen (Wuhan University / Chi-
na)
On the right to be free from poverty – a 
perspective of global justice
Abstract:
The results of the research on poverty 
issues in international society may be 
summed up in six categories, includ-
ing (1) the income approach, (2) the 
equality approach, (3) the capability ap-
proach, (4) the basic needs approach, (5) 
the human rights-based approach, and 
(6) the responsibilities approach. Few of 
these views treat freedom from poverty 
as a human right directly. Even if some-
one recognizes it as a human right (e.g., 
Thomas Pogge), he can not explore its 
meaning, foundation, legitimacy and le-
gal protection from the perspective of le-
gal philosophy and legal practice. In the 
current international human rights law 
system, the right to be free from poverty 
has not been regarded as an independ-
ent human right. Thus, in this paper, we 
try to disclose the concept of the right to 
be free from poverty in order to realize 
the global justice. We will focus on three 
issues as follows: (1) what – what is the 
basic meaning and essential characters 
of the right to be free from poverty? (2) 
why – why is it a new human right and 
different from the existing rights, such 
as right to life, right to health, right to 
food, right to housing and right to work, 
etc? Can it be replaced by the existing 
rights? What is the jurisprudential foun-
dation of this right? (3) how – how to 
realize this right by rule of law? How to 
construct a set of system of obligations 
paradoxically, this investigation of the 
e v o l u t i o n a r y  p r o c e s s  i s  d o n e  t o  e s t a b -
lish the “hard-core” of the legal concept 
of corporation through its various evo-
lutionary phases, i.e. the legal meaning 
attached to the legal idea of corporation 
that has remained steadfast through the 
time and space of its use.
Through the use of a legal perspective 
as to the evolution of the concept of 
corporation in transnational corporate 
law, the basic goal here consequently is 
to delineate the external boundaries of 
the possible developments of this very 
concept, in particular in relation to the 
idea of corporate social responsibility in 
a transnational context. A clear demar-
cation of the external legal boundaries of 
the idea of corporation in a transnation-
al context, i.e. its ultimate legal require-
ments, is particularly relevant in order 
to determine, from a legal perspective, 
what can and cannot be demanded as an 
internal legal duty for a corporation.
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1.
Marcelo De Araujo (Universidade do 
Estado do Rio de Janeiro; Universidade 
Federal do Rio de Janeiro / Brazil)
Die kontraktualistische Begründung 
der Menschenrechte
Abstract:
Klassische Theorien des Gesellschafts-
vertrages gehen von der Annahme aus, 
dass Menschen Träger von angeborenen 
Rechten sind. Diese Theorien versuchen, 
aus der Idee eines Gesellschaftsvertrages 
bestimmte politische Prinzipien für die 
Begründung einer Gemeinschaft her-
zuleiten, durch die diejenigen morali-
schen Rechte, mit denen die Natur die 
Menschen ausgestattet habe, geschützt 
werden. Seit Mitte der 18. Jh. bezieht 
man sich auf solche Rechte auch als Ty-
pen von Menschenrechten. In den klas-
sischen Theorien des Gesellschaftsver-
t r a g e s  w e r d e n  m o r a l i s c h e  R e c h t e  b z w .  
Menschenrechte also nicht begründet, 
sondern eher vorausgesetzt. Deshalb 
waren die Theorien des Gesellschafts-
vertrages bis in die zweite Hälfte der 20. 
Jh. hinein keine Moraltheorien, sondern 
in erster Linie politische Theorien. Seit 
Mitte der 1980er Jahre versuchen eini-
ge Autoren jedoch, die Moral aus einer 
kontraktualistischen Perspektive zu be- 326 327
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sion of maximum satisﬁ  ability, in which 
a variable assignment is sought to satisfy 
the maximum number of clauses in a 
Boolean formula, the weighted maxi-
mum satisﬁ   ability asks for the maxi-
mum weight which can be satisﬁ  ed by 
any assignment, given a set of weighted 
clauses. The framework is designed to 
model the legal reasoning that warrants 
court decisions based on norms, legal 
ﬁ  ndings, and values for any general or 
particular legal case concerning the op-
timization of human rights’ weighted 
clauses. And, although it emphasizes the 
importance of other formal representa-
tions, the paper addresses a claim that all 
arguments, including rules and princi-
ples of fundamental rights, can properly 
be represented in the proposed weighing 
formula. 
3.
José Renato Gaziero Cello + Cassiana 
Lara Zequinão (Pontifícia Universidade 
Católica do Paraná / Brazil)
Reason Crisis in the 20th and cultural 
relativism: it is possible to establish an 
universal ethic for human rights?
Abstract:
Originally Philosophy tried to ﬁ  nd ra-
tional answers to explain the develop-
ment of the world and the meaning 
of life, and, throughout the history of 
Western civilization, has been supplant-
ed, in the perspective of the masses, by 
techno-science and the explanations of 
Christianity. But the disenchantment 
of modernity leads to security that was 
provided by metaphysics - particularly 
the Christianity - and science, especially 
gründen. Der moralische Kontraktualis-
mus zielt darauf ab, das Phänomen der 
Moral in Anlehnung an die klassischen 
Gesellschaftsvertragestheorien als ein 
System wechselseitiger Beschränkungen 
zu verstehen, dem Individuen aus ihren 
eigenen Interessen zustimmen würden. 
Wichtige Vertreter des moralischen Kon-
traktualismus sind z.B. John Leslie Ma-
ckie, David Gauthier und in der deutsch-
sprachigen Philosophie Peter Stemmer 
und Norbert Hoerster. Ihr Anliegen be-
steht darin, anhand von kontraktualisti-
schen Ansätzen zu zeigen, dass die Mo-
ral ohne Rekurs auf metaphysische bzw. 
naturrechtliche Annahmen begründet 
werden kann. Diese Autoren versuchen 
aber nicht in erster Linie, Menschen-
r e c h t e  z u  b e g r ü n d e n .  D a s  Z i e l  m e i n e s  
Beitrages besteht darin, Menschenrech-
te aus einer kontraktualistischen Pers-
pektive zu begründen.
2.
Samuel Brasil (Faculdade de Direito de 
Vitória / Brazil)
Weighted Maximum Satisﬁ  ability  in 
the Optimization of Human Rights
Abstract:
Human rights are a set of basic, funda-
mental entitlements in the context of 
justiﬁ  ed moral norms or legal rights, and 
are usually reinforced according to the 
weight of the circumstances balanced 
one another in a version of practical 
concordance. In this paper, the author 
argues that balancing human rights can 
properly be represented and solved as 
weighted maximum satisﬁ  ability prob-
lem. As one of the optimization exten-
since the explosion of atomic bombs, 
no longer the safe haven that promised 
to be in the nineteenth century . Given 
this philosophical skepticism, which 
had been mostly relegated to ostracism 
from Descartes, returns with force in the 
twentieth century, a fact that becomes 
relevant to the analysis of individual and 
culture, especially with regard to cul-
tural relativism. However, when apply-
ing relativism to cultures in which peo-
ple or small groups would have the right 
to maintain autonomy from the moral 
standards of living, even if it means the 
acceptance by the rest of the population 
practices considered to violate rights es-
tablished as fundamental to human dig-
nity, faces the pressing question of how 
is the debate about the necessity of es-
tablishing an universal ethic; ﬁ  rst, that 
reason – and its crisis – is grounded in 
what might call capitalist instrumental 
reason, and, secondly, that tolerance 
derived from the ideal of scientiﬁ  c neu-
trality is not capable of doing the debate 
about the necessity of establishing an 
universal ethics and what are its founda-
tions, a fact that culminates ultimately, 
the debate about human rights, whose 
foundations are still a philosophical 
open problem.
4.
Ulrich Penski (University Siegen / Ger-
many)
Menschenrechte im Zeitablauf
Abstract:
Entscheidungen des EGMR, in denen 
vertreibungsbedingte Eigentumsentzie-
hungen nach dem 2. Weltkrieg bei Qua-
liﬁ   zierung als Augenblicksakten von 
der Anwendung menschenrechtlicher 
Normen ausgenommen wurden, lassen 
die Frage stellen, ob und unter welchen 
Voraussetzungen historische zurück-
liegende Staatshandlungen der Anwen-
dung solcher Normen entzogen werden 
dürfen.
Von einem Verständnisses der Men-
schenrechte als Rechte, die einzelnen 
– durch diese vermittelt auch Kollek-
tiven – wegen des bloßen Menschseins 
gegenüber Staaten zukommen, her wäre 
zu folgern, daß ihre Geltung keiner 
zeitlichen Begrenzung für die Vergan-
genheit unterliegen darf. Einer solchen 
Einschränkung widerspräche ihrem an-
gegebenen Rechtscharakter.
Unabhängig davon ist jedoch zu fra-
gen, ob und inwieweit die Folgen einer 
Verletzung von Menschenrechten und 
damit verbundene Wiedergutmachung 
im Hinblick auf den Zeitablauf anzu-
erkennen sind. Diese wäre unter dem 
Gesichtspunkt des zeitlichen Abstandes 
und der Art und dem Ausmaß der noch 
vorhandenen Auswirkungen der Verlet-
zung bei den Betroffenen zu beurteilen.
Eine zeitliche Anwendungsbeschrän-
kung zeigte sich demnach als unverein-
bar mit dem Rechtscharakter von Men-
schenrechten. Bei der Festsetzung der 
Rechtsfolgen von Verletzungen wären 
jedoch veränderte Umstände im Hin-
blick eines angemessenen Ausgleichs zu 
berücksichtigen.
5.
Jacob Dahl Rendtorff (Roskilde Univer-
sity / Denmark) 328 329
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6.
Katya Kozicki (Federal University of 
Parana, Pontiﬁ  cal Catholic University of 
Parana / Brazil)
Human Rights and Justice in a Multi-
cultural World
Abstract:
This paper intends to discuss some con-
temporary issues on human rights re-
lated to the concept of justice. Is the set 
of individual rights that is assumed by 
western democracies really universal? If 
so, how are they supposed to be inter-
preted? On the other side if I take into 
account the “other” and pluralism in a 
serious way how to conciliate different 
concepts of justice? Taking Jacques Derr-
ida’s approach of justice as its standpoint 
this  pa pe r  aims  t o  str es s  th e  difﬁ  culty 
to achieve a unique concept of justice 
as well as to think justice in the sphere 
of international law and the problem of 
ensuring human rights in the interna-
tional order. Western democracies has 
becoming more and more multiethnic 
and multicultural and the set of rights 
that is at the center of the legal order has 
to be interpreted in a dialogical sense, 
one that assumes difference and plural-
ity as its starting point. The plurality of 
conceptions of the good and the impos-
sibility of establishing a unique concept 
of justice demands the re-creation of a 
democratic sphere where the dissent and 
the conﬂ  ict could be experienced and, 
at the same time, the legal order needs 
to ensure individual and group rights 
against majority’s dictatorship. The 
main goal of this paper is to re-think the 
interpretation of law in a multicultural 
Ethical principles for biomedical and 
biotechnological challenges to law
Abstract:
In a number of books and articles I have 
been promoting the ethical principles of 
respect for autonomy, dignity, integrity 
and vulnerability as four important ideas 
or values for a European bioethics and 
bio-law. Together with Professor Peter 
Kemp I was initially responsible for writ-
ing the report from the project: Basic Ethi-
cal Principles in European Bioethics and 
Biolaw, VOL 1-2 (Copenhagen and Barce-
lona 2000). An important resume of the 
BIOMED project was the partner’s Policy 
Proposals to the European Commission, 
the Barcelona Declaration of, which is 
unique as a philosophical and political 
agreement between experts in bioethics 
and bio-law from many different coun-
tries. In this presentation I want to discuss 
the ethical and legal relevance of the Bar-
celona Declaration and other internation-
al Documents on bioethics and bio-law, 
e.g. the Council of Europe’s Convention 
for the Protection on of Human Rights 
and Dignity of the Human Being with 
Regard to the Application of Biology and 
Medicine, Adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers in 1996 and The UNESCO Dec-
laration on the Humana Genome 1997. 
The idea is to defend the argument that 
the basic ethical principles of the Barcelo-
na Declaration do not only represent Eu-
ropean ethical principles for bioethics and 
biolaw, but they should also be conceived 
as a conceptual clariﬁ  cation and articu-
lation of global ethical principles, which 
are central to international concerns for a 
universal bioethics and biolaw.
s c e n ari o  in  w hi ch  i t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  
have only one criteria of justice and dif-
ference and pluralism are envisaged are 
values themselves.
7.
Ali Hassan Razal (University of the Pun-
jab, Lahore / Pakistan)
Global peace in the view of religion
Abstract:
This paper will discussed the challenge 
of global peace from the view of religion. 
Firstly, peace is conceptualized with re-
spect to order: defense of people in their 
person their things and their deals. In 
respect of each of these challenges the 
role of religion is examined as potential-
ly positive or negative depending on its 
connection with politics. The analysis is 
then extended to order with justice. Spe-
cial consideration is paid to the “social 
contract” as a base of the publicpolitical 
society. In this connection some expla-
nation are made regarding the theocracy 
vs. democracy argument. How far could 
each of these systems be seen as a pos-
sible danger to peace and if so, is there 
room for reconciliation? The second 
part of the paper starts with a concep-
tualization of human rights as essential 
human interests sheltered by law. These 
center interests are based on human self-
respect as such, while entailing certain 
major freedoms and entitlements that 
everyone ought to enjoy.
Session 2
8.
Amy Bartholomew (Carleton University 
/ Canada)
(Re)Legitimating International Human 
Rights: Toward a ‘Decent Respect for 
the Opinions of Mankind’
Abstract:
I argue that Habermas’s discourse theory 
of domestic democracy may fruitfully be 
extended to international human rights 
debates. While it is ambivalent, Haber-
mas’s work on the political constitution 
of world society may be more produc-
tive than even his friendly critics have 
charged. I will show this by focusing on 
its implications for the (re)legitimation 
of international human rights. 
While Habermas seems to sever opinion- 
from will-formation at the supranational 
level he also provides more deliberative 
democratic possibilities.
First, by conceptualizing the necessity 
for a democratic chain of legitimacy 
Habermas implies that states must de-
mocratize themselves through rights 
struggles in order to be able legitimately 
to inﬂ  uence supranational politics. 
Second, his recent argument for two 
paths of legitimation running through 
the supranational level, through the 
roles of cosmopolitan and national citi-
zens, and conceiving the General As-
sembly as a constituent assembly lay the 
conceptual groundwork for viewing the 
“constitutional project” at the suprana-
tional level as radically open to contes-
tation and argumentation under some-
thing approaching discursive conditions,  330 331
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m o r e  f a m i l i a r  t o  e a c h  o t h e r  t h a n  a n y  
t im e  in  hi s t o ry .  S o  t hinkin g  an d  c o n -
ducting in a pattern or thinking with 
prejudices seems to get hard in this tech-
nologically advanced world. But would 
we say that information technology and 
human rights are directly proportional?
This paper tries to give an answer to the 
question above. In the ﬁ  rst part it traces 
cultural patterns and gives some exam-
ples of stereotypes and prejudices which 
determine our thinking. The second part 
tries to state impact of advanced tech-
nology on patterned thinking, namely 
stereotypes and prejudices. The last part 
discusses the relations or interactions 
among prejudices, advanced technology 
and human rights both theoretical and 
sociological levels.
10.
Denis Franco Silva (Universidade federal 
de juiz de Fora / Brazil)
From human rights to person rights: 
legal reﬂ  ections on posthumanism and 
human enhancement
Abstract:
In the intersection between law, sci-
ence and technology lies the debate on 
the overcoming of the boundaries of the 
biological structure of the human being 
and its implications on the idea of hu-
man rights, on the concept of person and 
on the conception of equality – being the 
latter a fundamental tenet of a democ-
racy.
Posthumanism assumes a biological in-
adequacy of the human body regarding 
the quantity, complexity and quality of 
information which it can muster. The 
thus rendering the (re)legitimation of 
international human rights susceptible 
of the presumption of rational global ac-
ceptability.
On this reading, Habermas’ s argument 
is well-suited to responding to the critics 
and to developing a legitimation strategy 
for necessary but fraught international 
legal-political norms. We are in need of 
such a robust construction of the justice 
of international norms which are still 
contested and have increasingly far- and 
deep-reaching implications.
9.
Ahmet Ulvi Turkbag (University of 
Galatasaray / Turkey)
Stereotypes and Prejudices Versus Hu-
man Rights in An Advanced Techno-
logical World
Abstract:
Human rights are believed to be the 
subject matter of law and expected to 
be primarily under the assurance of in-
ternational laws then to be followed by 
national laws. But our everyday experi-
ences draw us a completely different pic-
ture than what we learn from
human rights books and documents. 
Everyday life is governed by social norms 
and social norms are mostly designed by 
culture. Every culture has a life vision, a 
pattern of life including stereotypes and 
prejudices against the other.
On the other hand advanced technol-
ogy, especially information technology, 
increases all kinds of relations and gives 
new opportunities for face to face rela-
tions too. We can easily get information 
about other people and culture. We are 
same occurs with the needs of accura-
cy, speed or strength demanded by the 
contemporary environment. Under such 
perspective, the body is considered to 
be an inefﬁ  cient structure, with a short 
lifespan, easy to break and hard to ﬁ  x.
The body, always seen as the locus for 
the deﬁ  nition of human, emerges as the 
object of a commodiﬁ  cation process that 
seeks to exonerate men from their bur-
den - by declination towards a virtual 
existence, totally free and rational – or 
to enhance them with bionic devices or 
drugs.
This issue has already been the subject 
of attention by many scholars like Savu-
lescu, Rodotà, Broston, Fukuyama and 
even Habermas.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to 
seek, by criticism and revision of the 
positions on the foreseen problems of 
this process, an adequate theoretical ap-
proach on issues like the concept of per-
son and its connection with the idea of 
human rights in order to promote the 
fundamental statement that all men are 
equal without disregard to the values of 
diversity and personal identity.
12.
Anja Matwijkiw (Indiana University-
Northwest / USA) + Bronik Matwijkiw 
(Southeast Missouri State University / 
USA)
Stakeholder Jurisprudence: The New 
Way in Human Rights
Abstract:
In their joint paper, entitled Stakeholder 
Jurisprudence: The New Way in Human 
Rights, Dr. Anja Matwijkiw (Indiana 
University Northwest) and Dr. Bronik 
Matwijkiw (Southeast Missouri State 
University) examine and evaluate the 
stakeholder terminology, methodology 
and philosophy in connection with the 
United Nations’ “tacit conversion” to the 
relevant terminology, methodology and 
philosophy. In spite of the rudimentary 
nature of the conceptual and normative 
framework that derives from the new 
way, which the United Nations intro-
duced in the same time period the so-
called Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), there are sufﬁ  cient  premises 
consistent with the claim that the Unit-
ed Nations have adopted what might be 
described as a stakeholder jurisprudence 
for human rights. In the ﬁ   rst part of 
their paper, Dr. Anja Matwijkiw and Dr. 
Bronik Matwijkiw outline the premises 
in question with a speciﬁ  c view to expli-
cating their link with the kind of theory 
which was originally presented by R. Ed-
ward Freeman, namely stakeholder the-
ory. As a consequence of the facts that 
(1) stakeholder theory was designed, de-
veloped and defended within the disci-
pline of business management, and (2) 
was split into two versions, respectively 
a broad version and a narrow version, 
the authors argue that while the mission 
of the United Nations is deﬁ  nitely differ-
ent from that of a for-proﬁ  t business, the 
relevant global organization and part-
nership nevertheless operates on the ba-
sis of a mission that entails management 
strategies that are supposed to help the 
United Nations accomplish its mission, 
however unique. In the event of failure, 
the outcome would show an absence of  332 333
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general jurisprudence) in the future so 
as to avoid serious (self)image issues or, 
alternatively, that human rights theo-
rists and United Nations managers may 
be better off by choosing a third way 
pertaining to general jurisprudence.
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Session 1
1.
Aurelio De Prada (Rey Juan Carlos Uni-
versity / Spain)
Between Confucianism and Human 
Rights:  -the ‚jun individual
Abstract:
In this paper we focus on the question of 
China and human rights from the point 
of view that, according to common opin-
ion, is at the very basis of Chinese cul-
peace and security for humanity. That 
granted, the two authors also show that 
the United Nations’ new way in hu-
man rights puts a great emphasis on the 
promotion and protection of economic 
and social human rights and, further-
more, does this in order to affect peace 
and security for humanity positively, 
for the sake of justice enhancement in 
other words. Analytically, it follows that 
the new way is consistent only with the 
broad version of stakeholder theory. In 
the second part of their paper, Dr. Anja 
Matwijkiw and Dr. Bronik Matwijkiw 
make use of M. Cherif Bassiouni’s schol-
arship in order to illustrate the practical 
aspect of the stakeholder theory and ju-
risprudence. More precisely , they draw 
on M. Cherif Bassiouni’s report on the 
human rights situation in Afghanistan 
for the purpose of showing its applica-
tion potential within the United Nations’ 
business domain. Finally, in the third 
part of the paper, the two authors raise 
a series of critical questions which may 
pose challenges, either to the success-
ful demarcation cum substantiation of 
stakeholder jurisprudence as a possible 
branch of traditional/contemporary gen-
eral jurisprudence or to the overall cred-
ibility of the idea and project of resort-
ing to theoretical input from a thinker 
like R. Edward Freeman, who – in 2010 
– set out to correct “misunderstandings 
and misuses of stakeholder theory”, in-
cluding the absence of a distinction be-
tween comprehensive moral doctrine 
and stakeholder theory. Such theoretical 
fact-ﬁ  nding may suggest the need for a 
separation (of stakeholder theory and 
ture: Confucianism. This point of view is 
analyzed in its contextual frame as well 
as in itself and related to human rights. 
The conclusion is that human rights are 
foreign to Confucianism and, by exten-
sion, to Chinese culture. Ultimately, 
however, human rights are not necessar-
ily incompatible with that perspective. It 
is possible to imagine a synthesis based 
on what here we shall call  : the jun 
individual.
2.
José Antonio López-Garcia (Jaén-Uni-
versity / Spain)
Die Wandlung der Souveränität und 
die Grundrechte
Abstract:
Die Bedeutung der Souveränität hat im 
20. Jahrhundert gewechselt. Nicola Ma-
quiavelo und Jean Bodin hätten den 
Fürst als superiorem non reconoscunt 
gezeichnet. Wenn das Fürstentum un-
tergegangen wird, die Aufklärung hat 
die Souveränität als Volkssouveränität 
begriffen. Aber die Idee der Hohheit des 
Fürsten, die aus dem 16. Jahrhundert 
kommt, bleibt noch. Das Volk ist das 
neue Fürst. Anfang des 20. Jahrhun-
derts, wenn die Demokratie als normale 
Regime gehalten wird, zezt diese aufklä-
rische Idee von Hohheit des Volkes fort. 
Warum das? Eine Demokratie muss die 
Regime der Grundrechte sein. Aber die 
Hohheit kann ein Volk höherer als ander 
machen. Vielleicht muss man einen neu-
en Begriff suchen, um eine neue Kon-
zeption des demokratischen Volkes zu 
erreichen. Nicht mehr das Souverän als 
„superior“ sonder als „inferior“. Souve-
rän wäre das inferiorem non reconosc-
unt. Eine Idee des Souverän die in unse-
rer Geschichte sein muss oder kann.
3.
Nishino Mototsugo (Aichi University / 
Japan)
Menschenwürde und Menschenleben
Abstract:
In der Neuzeit hat man sich auf Men-
schenwuerde angesichts des Krisen der 
Menschheit buruft; erstens gegen un-
menschliche Ausuebungen der totarita-
eren Staatsgewalt, zweitens gegen den 
Eingriff in das fruehembryonale Leben 
und das
Erbgut eines Menschen in der rasch sich 
entwickelnden Bereich der Biotechno-
logie und Humangenetik. 1. Soll man 
darin die Veraenderung des Gehalts der 
Menschenwuerde (Von der Wurede der 
Person zur Wuerde des Lebens) oder die 
Erweiterung der Extension der Men-
schenwuerde sehen? 2. Wie muss man 
die Beziehung zwischen der Menschen-
wuerde und Menschenleben verstehen? 
Die Position der Entkoppelung der Bei-
den oder die Position der Zusammenge-
hoerigkeit der Beiden? 3. Wie soll man 
den sogenannte Status des fruehen Em-
bryos denken? Traeger der Menschen-
wuerde oder das Objekt des Schutzes des 
Lebensrechts? 4. Soll man die enge Kon-
zeption oder die weite der Menschen-
wuerde adoptieren? In diesem Referat 
moechte ich die obige Problematik an-
hand von der deutschen mannigfaltigen 
Diskussionen betrachten. 334 335
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5.
Sten Schaumburg-Müller (Aarhus Uni-
versity / Denmark)
The challenges of technology and a three 
leveled protection of freedom of speech
Abstract:
Freedom of speech has always had a close 
and ambiguous relationship to technol-
ogy: 1) Technology provides the techni-
cal means of dissemination of ideas and 
information. This goes for the printing 
press, ﬁ  lm, records as well as the internet. 
However, 2) technology can be abused in 
order to provide false information, to in-
ﬂ  uence the general opinion, create scape-
goats, pogroms etc. Books, ﬁ  lms and to a 
lesser extend music has provided propa-
ganda, and the internet is used for the 
dissemination of racism, terrorism etc. 
Lastly, 3) control of the technical means 
of publicizing has always entailed power 
to decide what to publicize and what not 
to publicize. This is true for editors, ﬁ  lm 
makers and internet hosts alike. In rela-
tion to the challenges posed by the in-
ternet, such as infringement of privacy, 
dissemination of hate speech, blocking of 
politically incorrect pages etc, I contend 
that the challenges are not entirely new 
but generally attached to technology. 
Secondly, I argue in favor of a three lev-
eled protection of freedom of speech: 1) 
Protection of the right to receive and im-
part ideas and information, 2) protection 
against abuse, and 3) providing the struc-
tural framework for this to be possible. 
All three levels have normative backing 
in i.a. the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and they can be defended 
from a legal philosophical point of view.
4.
Ofer Raban (University of Oregon / USA)
Capitalism, Liberalism, and the Con-
stitutional Right to Privacy
Abstract:
The paper is an examination of the prin-
ciples of political liberalism, and the role 
they play in the American constitutional 
Right to Privacy – arguably the most lib-
eral of constitutional rights. Put differ-
ently, the paper offers a theoretical lens 
– that of political liberalism – through 
which to view and criticize the doctrine 
developed around the constitutional 
right to privacy (which includes, inter 
alia, the right to have an abortion, to 
refuse medical treatment, to marry the 
partner of one’s choice, and to engage in 
sexual sodomy free from fear of criminal 
prosecution).
The paper is divided into two parts. Part 
I is an exposition of the tenets of politi-
cal liberalism, pursued via an analogy 
with capitalism. The purpose here is the 
elaboration of a short and concise set of 
principles encapsulating the essence of 
Anglo-American liberalism. Part II con-
sists in the application of Part I to U.S. 
Supreme Court cases dealing with the 
constitutional right to privacy.
The paper criticizes the U.S. Supreme 
Court for lack of ﬁ  delity to political liberal-
ism – which, arguably, is the one coherent 
theory underlying its constitutional right 
to privacy cases. Greater understanding 
of political liberalism, it is argued, would 
bring greater coherence and consistency 
t o  t h i s  c o n f u s e d  b o d y  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
doctrine, which was aptly described by a 
lower court as “a rickety structure.”
6.
Hans Morten Haugen (Diakonhjemmet 
University College / Norway)
Human rights in scientiﬁ  c professions‘ 
codes of conduct?
Abstract:
While the medical professions have a 
long history of codes of conduct, less em-
phasis has been on codes for scientiﬁ  c 
(science and engineering) professions. 
Those that exist have been adopted by 
associations on the national level, in-
cluding Engineers Australia, Engineers 
Ireland and Engineers India.
Paragraph 41 of the Final Declaration 
of the World Conference on Science in 
1999 recommended that “a code of eth-
ics based on relevant norms enshrined in 
international human rights instruments 
should be established for scientiﬁ  c pro-
fessions.”
No code of ethics has been adopted. Par-
agraph 76 of UNESCO 2008-2013 Strat-
egy says that “UNESCO will support the 
implementation and reﬁ  nement of exist-
ing normative instruments, and the ap-
plication of practices and tools to facili-
tate the growth and use of science and 
technology respecting human dignity 
and human rights. It will also support 
the development of new instruments as 
may be deemed necessary by the govern-
ing bodies.“
Moreover, at the second World Confer-
ences on Research Integrity in 2010, the 
home page announced that there would 
be work on ‘Global codes of conduct’. 
The ‘Singapore Statement on Research 
Integrity‘, does not, however, refer to 
neither global codes or human rights.
The paper will analyse the need for a 
code of conduct for the scientiﬁ  c profes-
sions, and whether a global approach and 
a human rights approach is desirable, 
and also if it is desirable that UNESCO or 
the relevant associations take the lead in 
this process.
7.
Toshihiko Suehisa (Tohoku Gakuin Uni-
versity / Japan)
The Right of Self-determination and Its 
Functions
Abstract:
The technical development of the artiﬁ  -
cial reproduction or prolonging the end-
life caused serious bioethical problems. 
People have lost the trust in medical 
professionals, known human rights and 
doubted an objective value judgment on 
which the paternalistic relationship be-
tween doctors and patients was based. 
That was why the idea of the self-de-
termination was expected to solve such 
problems. The idea of the informed con-
sent which is one of its necessary condi-
tions also brings us a merit that a medi-
cal treatment is informed more openly 
and precisely. It presses doctors to re-
spect patients as persons who can decide 
their own questions by themselves.
However most of them are in fact weak 
and not normal so far as they are in hos-
pitals. There is a deep gap between the 
idea and the reality of the self-determi-
nation. Sometimes it compels patients to 
be in an isolated situation without any 
support by medical staffs, just because 
the matter belongs to their privacies. 
That lets me doubt whether it still can  336 337
ABSTRACTS
Working Groups
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
–
 
A
b
s
t
r
a
c
t
s
to do with secular ideologies and power-
politics than religion, and it is therefore 
unreasonable to accuse Buddhism of 
neglect in this area. The Buddhist scrip-
tures do not refer directly to speciﬁ  c 
modern human rights; however in them 
we may identify a concept that forms 
the foundation of human rights. To 
borrow the terminology of modern hu-
man rights we may call this the concept 
of human dignity. This ideological task 
requires the practical study of various 
Buddhist doctrines carried out to date by 
religious groups, and in addition to Bud-
dhology, which involves philological and 
corroborative research on Buddhism, a 
new Buddhist theology.
Session 2
9.
Yukiko Stave (Japan)
Confucianism and Rule of Law: Their 
Compatibility and Inherent Injustice
Abstract:
“[President] Lee [Teng-hui] is my presi-
dent, and I support him in whatever 
way I could,” said one justice of Taiwan’s 
Supreme Court. Rule of Law is a prin-
ciple of governance that the State itself 
is bound by law thus requires separa-
tion of powers. In Japan, formal policy 
of corporations is that men and women 
are equal in compliance with Japanese 
e m p l o y m e n t  l a w .  H o w e v e r ,  a t  m a n y  
corporations, female employees are re-
quired to wear employer-provided uni-
form whereas male employees assigned 
to similar duties are not required. In 
Rule of law, all persons and entities are 
be a key concept in the medical practice, 
while I recognize its great merits.
So, I would like to examine the idea of 
the self-determination to ﬁ   nd a path 
in which every patient can be really 
respected and supported. I start with 
the clariﬁ  cation of its theoretical back-
ground, then investigate its real func-
tions, turn attention to the legislation 
and lastly propose a model of the doctor-
patient relationship not based on this 
idea.
8.
Riken Barua (Premier University, Chit-
tagong / Bangladesh)
Human Rights in Buddhism
Abstract:
In this paper I want to be summed up 
as the conceptual and doctrinal basis for 
human rights in Buddhism. I am con-
cerned with the intellectual bridgework 
which must be put in place if expressions 
of concern about human rights are to be 
linked to Buddhist doctrine. There are 
many aspects to this problem, but three 
related issues will be considered here: 
the concept of rights, the concept of hu-
man rights, and the question of how hu-
man rights are to be grounded in Bud-
dhist doctrine.
(...)
The present paper is a contribution to 
this process from a Buddhist perspective. 
Its aims are limited to an exploration of 
some of the basic issues which must be 
addressed if a Buddhist philosophy of 
human rights is to develop. Buddhism, 
that concern for human rights is a post 
religious phenomenon which has more 
accountable to the laws that are equally 
enforced and are consistent with inter-
national human rights norms and stand-
ards. Why do we see this odd puzzle: 
there is law written but little rule of law?
Ms. Kim Soon-duk, a former comfort 
woman who was raped by as many as 
forty Japanese soldiers for three years, 
hid her story for over tens of years. 
There is pressure not to express anger 
in order not to jeopardize social order 
even against victims whose fundamen-
tal rights were severely violated. Where 
does this pressure come from?
C o n f u c i a n i s m  i s  p h i l o s o p h y  d e ﬁ  ning 
ethical behavior and social responsibil-
ity, which evolved into one of the most 
inﬂ  uential values in East Asian societies. 
Confucianism emphasizes social order 
over individual autonomy and prefers 
propriety to law as a method of ruling. 
I review Confucianism and Rule of law 
to address two issues embedded in the 
examples above: compatibility and in-
justice. For compatibility, I contrast Con-
fucianism and Rule of Law. For injustice, 
I explain what injustice is inherent in 
Confucianism.
With this analysis, I would like to bring 
Rule of Law awareness closer to one. 
Further, I desire it help ending the un-
necessary cry of the socially disadvan-
taged.
10.
Musa Toprak (Baskent University / Tur-
key)
Implementation as a Key Concept 
for International Courts (of Human 
Rights)
Abstract:
20th century was a stage for so many new 
mechanisms and concepts, international 
human rights courts is one of these new 
mechanisms. Courts are founded and 
designed as a tool of the ruler to reset 
and reproduce their will and power, and 
as a result of the power’s nature; rulers 
were extremely jealous about sharing 
the power among the history. It is not 
a n  e a s y  t h i n g  t o  s h o w  a n  e x a m p l e  o f  
sharing power unless they have to. We 
can ﬁ  nd examples of separated courts, 
rights given to certain religious or ethnic 
communities in speciﬁ  c areas. Such as 
letting a religious community to decide 
on family law issues or letting them for 
deciding about their cases about inner 
disputes of their organizations. But in all 
these occasions we see that jurisdictions 
are divided preciously with thick lines. 
Authorities did not wanted to share 
their jurisdiction unless they have to 
and when they did because of necessities 
they had always divided the ruling areas 
and never shared it with any other. 
There was no example of a court depend-
ing on different authorities power at the 
s am e  t im e  b e f o r e  t h e  2 0 t h  c e n t u ry .  I t  
was an era for the development through 
international commissions to courts. 
The discussions are focused mainly 
about deciding if that certain mecha-
nism is an independent court or not. Be-
side that discussion we should look onto 
implementation of the decisions because 
the true nature of a court decision shows 
the characteristics of its decision makers 
during its implementation. Is it possible 
to call a certain mechanism as a court,  338 339
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protect posthumous reputation, whether 
in the name of honour, individual prop-
erty, human dignity or personality; and 
many of them tackle it directly by law.
First this article will brieﬂ  y review the 
signiﬁ  cance of the posthumous reputa-
tion argument in the philosophical de-
ba te o f posth um o us harm an d explain 
the dilemma thus it encountered. Then 
it will turn to law and exam some legal 
cases selected from different countries 
such as Germany, China, Israel, etc. to 
establish solid evidence of posthumous 
reputation. It argues that our central 
concern should be why we need this 
concept and we have to explain further 
why it is more protected in some com-
munities than in others. These problems 
have not been fully addressed before and 
they are the main topics of this article. 
It concludes that posthumous reputation 
is a social construct and its protection is 
contingent on the nature and character-
istics of a given community.
12.
Joseph Indaimo (Curtin University / 
Australia)
Human Rights & the Law: the Un-
breachable Gap between the Ethics of 
Justice and the Efﬁ  cacy of Law
Abstract:
This paper explores the structure of 
justice as the condition of ethical, in-
ter-subjective responsibility. Taking a 
Levinasian perspective, this is a respon-
sibility borne by the individual subject in 
a pre-foundational, proto-social proxim-
ity with the other human subject, which 
takes precedence over the interests of 
even it has no power on the implementa-
tion of its decisions?
11. 
Bo Zhao (University of Groningen / The 
Netherlands)
The Social Construct of Posthumous 
Reputation
Abstract:
Posthumous reputation has been used as 
a solid argument to support the posthu-
mous harm thesis in the long-hovering 
philosophical debate initiated by Fein-
berg. In a sense, however, this argument 
is so much taken for granted that it lacks 
a more in-depth analysis from both sides 
of the debate. The dilemma that lies in 
this argument, as in other arguments 
supporting the thesis, is this: on the one 
hand, there is no subject existing after 
death and thus no one is in fact harmed; 
while, on the other hand, it feels just 
quite right according to our conscious-
ness that one has a reputation even after 
death and may be harmed as such.
This short essay intends to address the 
issue in a way some different from the 
traditional approaches in the debate. It 
argues that posthumous reputation is a 
social construct of a community more to 
help with smooth social transition after 
one’s death and to retain order of that 
community, large or small. Defamation 
post-mortem is not done substantively 
to a deceased person, but to these who 
remain alive and most related: relatives, 
friends and acquaintances, and even 
the whole community. This is the fun-
damental reason why our communities 
the self. From this speciﬁ  c post-human-
ist perspective, human rights are not the 
restrictive rights of individual self-will, 
as expressed in our contemporary le-
gal human rights discourse. Rights do 
not amount to the prioritisation of the 
so-called politico-legal equality of the 
individual citizen-subject animated by 
the universality of the dignity of auton-
omous, reasoned intentionality. Rather, 
rights enlivened by proximity invert this 
discourse and signify, ﬁ  rst and foremost, 
rights for the other, with the ethical bur-
den of responsibility towards the other. 
From this post-humanist position, the 
structure of our contemporary human 
rights law does not go far enough in en-
suring the ethical space for the other. 
Rather, contemporary human rights 
law is marked with the potential of an 
ego-politics of the Self and a justice for 
the Same, reducing alterity under a ho-
mogeneity of socio-political processes, 
and ethical responsibility to a minimum 
level of legal tolerance between so-called 
equal individuals. 
The paper explores the potential efﬁ  cacy 
of the law in fulﬁ  lling this ethical justice 
of responsibility for others found in a 
post-humanist human rights of the oth-
er. It argues that there is an unbreach-
able gap between the structure of law 
and the ethics of justice – the ethical gap 
between self and other – which neces-
sarily fates law with failure. This is the 
necessary failure in human rights law 
of the unending demand of ethical re-
sponsibility placed upon us in proximity 
with others; of an inﬁ  nite justice always 
open to the potential reduction of oth-
ers under the systemic machinations of 
marginalisation and repression.
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Session 1
1.
Claudia Maria Barbosa + José Querino 
Tavares Neto (Pontiﬁ   cal Catholic Uni-
versity of Parana / Brazil)
Reﬂ  ection on the social and political re-
sponsibility of the Magistrate and the 
Judicial Power in the context of the Ju-
dicialization of Politics
Abstract:
The Constitution of the late 80’s marked 
the phenomena of constitutionalization 
of social relations in Brazil. The moral 
reading of the Constitution, the formu-
lation of a theory of principles, the af- 340 341
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sions on political philosophy and legal 
theory after the publication of Zwischen 
Naturalismus und Religion (2005), and 
his most recent texts and debates on 
religion and the public sphere, suggest 
a revision of the Habermasian theory 
of rationalization as it was ﬁ  rstly pre-
sented in Theorie des Kommunikativen 
Handelns (1982), especially on what 
concerns the processes of dessacraliza-
tion and the linguistiﬁ  cation of religious 
a u t h o ri t y .  In  s e a r c h  o f  c o n t ri b u t in g  t o  
this revision, this paper intends to focus 
on the problem of a supposedly “lost” 
aesthetic-expressive understanding of 
the secularization of religious authority 
in  Ha b e rm a s  th e o ry  o f  r a ti o n aliza ti o n,  
which may have contributed to a theory 
of law in Faktizität und Geltung (1992) 
that does not give satisfactory account 
to the aesthetical-expressive character 
of the modern understanding of legal 
authority. A deeper study of this special 
character of authority may contribute, 
however, not only to the avoidance of 
fundamentalisms and new attempts of 
“aesthetization of politics”, but also to a 
rational strengthening of the solidarity 
of the citizens of democratic constitu-
tional states, through the negative soli-
darity of identifying oneself to the suf-
fering of the other.
3.
Samuel Brasil (Faculdade de Direito de 
Vitória / Brazil)
The NOSSA LEI Project: Direct De-
mocracy in a Virtual Assembly
Abstract:
Many legal systems have very limited 
ﬁ  rmation of the juridical value of the 
rules then taken by programatics, the 
constitutional provision of social rights 
and the broad list of fundamental rights 
recognized, as well as the recognition 
of new rights and new legal actors are 
characteristics of this contemporary 
constitutionalism. This movement ex-
pands the space for deﬁ  ning the patch, 
convenience and desirability to the judi-
cial decision-making, previously taken 
in the political sphere of the executive 
and legislative. Such phenomena, which 
is called judicialization of politics, has 
imposed to the Judicial Power and the 
Magistrates as well, a new political role 
in contemporary democratic states or-
ganized under the civil law system. It re-
quires studies aiming to deﬁ  ne the limits 
of the judicial responsibility, which must 
consider a social and political responsi-
bility of the Magistrate and of the Judi-
cial Power and it is out of the reach of the 
doctrine of state liability. This discussion 
involves issues like freedom of judging, 
legitimacy and legitimation of Judicial 
Power, as well as the responsibility of 
judges for their harmful actions or poor 
delivery public policies, which are the 
focus of this article.
2.
Vitor Blotta (University of São Paulo / 
Brazil)
The Fascination of Authority and the 
Authority of Fascination. Rationaliza-
tion and legal theory in Habermas re-
vised
Abstract:
The requaliﬁ  cation of Habermas discus-
direct democracies provided by three 
forms of direct manifestation: initia-
tive, referendum (plebiscite), and recall. 
The NOSSA LEI Project (meaning “Our 
Law”) offers a web based tool to facilitate 
public participation on the enactment of 
statutory law in a virtual assembly. The 
citizens are allowed to debate, bring in, 
and vote on each and every bill addressed 
by themselves. Once reached the number 
of votes established by the Constitution, 
the bill brought in by the very citizens is 
submitted to a representative assembly 
as it comes from popular initiative. The 
NOSSA LEI project has an immediate im-
pact upon the representative democracy 
theory and upon the issues submitted to 
popular deliberation. This experience, 
though not ofﬁ  cial, has put forward valu-
able results which contributes to enhance 
the direct participation of the citizens on 
important issues of governments, and to 
theory of democracy.
4.
Pedro A. Caminos (Universidad de Bue-
nos Aires / Argentina)
The statu quo paradox and the theory of 
deliberative democracy
Abstract:
Democratic theory has both a prescrip-
tive and a descriptive function. That 
means that such a theory does not only 
pretend to take into account the “really 
existing” democracies, but also provides 
certain normative criteria related to the 
features that a democratic regime must 
have.
The theory of deliberative democracy 
developped by Carlos Nino tries to meet 
that standard. In order to accomplish 
that task, he argued that really exist-
ing social practice shoud have a second-
order place within his theory. For Nino, 
social practice creates a framework for 
action wich allows the deveolpment 
and enhancement of democracy. For 
that reason, judges may rightfully hold 
a staute unconstitutional if it threatens 
the social practice, becoming then a dan-
ger for the ground of the very democratic 
regime, even though the statute satisﬁ  es 
the regulative ideal of democratic delib-
eration.
If that is so, it could be the case that a 
judge commited with deliberative de-
mocracy ideal, and who has a subtan-
tive agreement with a statute, should 
hold it unconstitutional in orden to pro-
tect a statu quo, with wich he has only 
a goal-means commitment. This situa-
tion, wich I will call “statu quo paradox”, 
brings about some issues that point at 
the core of Nino’s thought. In this paper 
I shall examine two of them: 1) the una-
voidability of consequentialism; 2) the 
place of statu quo in a practical reason-
ing theory that has the transformation of 
that statu quo as it main aim.
5.
Luiz Philipe De Caux + David Lopes 
Gomes (Universidade Federal de Minas 
Gerais / Brazil)
Constitution, document of culture and 
barbarism
Abstract:
This article aims at discussing the rela-
tionship between history and modern 
constitutions. Based on Walter Ben- 342 343
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Session 2
8.
Vera Karam De Chueiri (Federal Univer-
sity of Paraná / Brazil)
Judicial review and technology
Abstract:
Judicial review reﬂ  ects the level of com-
mitment between constitutionalism and 
democracy in contemporary States. Yet 
democracy as the sovereign government 
of the people implies a tension with con-
s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  a s  t h e  r u l e  o f  l a w .  T h a t  
is, people ruling themselves or the gov-
ernment by the people – majority gov-
ernment – is limited by the law of law 
making, the constitution. In Brazil, the 
improvement of judicial review is nowa-
days related to increasing the number 
of decisions given by the Brazilian Su-
preme Court or rather to the capability of 
this the latter in deciding a large number 
of constitutional lawsuits no matter the 
form and content of its arguments. For 
the Court is nowadays driven by num-
bers and to accomplish its goals in terms 
of numbers (of decisions) it applied to 
technological solutions such as the digi-
talization of legal proceedings. It means 
that as many decision as Supreme Court 
issues – with the help of technology – the 
better it is. Relating the numbers of deci-
sions issued by the Court to the improve-
ment of Brazilian judicial review or Bra-
zilian constitutionalism and democracy 
is a great mistake and a false statement 
as far as it does not face the main prob-
lem of the system, which is the lack of 
justiﬁ   cation of Supreme Court’s deci-
sion. The point is that, in this case, tech-
convictions. On the other hand, accord-
ing to R. Forst (within another context, 
but also relevant here), this is not really 
a problem, because a rule can be provid-
ed with ethics, but not ethically justiﬁ  ed. 
This openness to moral makes it difﬁ  cult 
for the interpretative judicial discourse 
to be taken as claimed by K. Günther: 
as a discourse of application only, not 
of justiﬁ  cation. All these controversies, 
however, lead to a common statement: 
the constitutional jurisdiction has been 
exercising a different activity. Some con-
stitutional systems acknowledge such 
activity as legitimate, like Brazilian’s, for 
example, which states a very broad juris-
diction, provides en extensive catalog of 
basic rights and also several procedural 
mechanisms for their protection. This 
empowers the jurisdiction to exercise 
what can be called a political activity. 
Therefore, the Judiciary has discussed a 
series of moral issues which were once 
exclusive to the political arena, such 
as: gay marriage, abortion, afﬁ  rmative 
action, religious freedom, federation, 
separation of powers, distribution of 
scarce resources. In a democracy, these 
moral questions must be mainly decided 
through political choices; exceptionally 
by Judiciary. The paper discusses these 
issues, showing also how the jurispru-
dence of the Brazilian Supreme Court 
has dealt technically with this relation-
ship between law and justice, from a 
complex and pluralist society.
Abstract:
Philip Pettit’s and Quentin Skinner’s 
interpretation of republican liberty has 
been applied for the purpose of contem-
porary guidance in various works of le-
gal scholarship. Their interpretations of 
republican liberty as a non-positive con-
ception have substantially converged, 
as is demonstrated by their responses to 
Ian Carter’s and Matthew Kramer’s cri-
tiques. The critiques and responses ap-
pear in Laborde and Maynor (eds), Re-
publicanism and Political Theory (2008).
This paper adds to the critiques offered 
by Carter and Kramer by considering the 
persuasiveness of Pettit’s and Skinner’s 
responses. It also points to an interpreta-
tion of liberty that is more faithful to the 
republican tradition and more attractive.
7.
Ana Lucia Pretto Pereira (Federal Uni-
versity of Parana / Brazil)
Political activity of constitutional juris-
diction: some dimensions
Abstract:
Since the advent of what is known as 
new constitucionalism, the jurists have 
faced the difﬁ   c u l t  t a s k  o f  o v e r c o m i n g  
the failures of normative positivism. In 
this context, Judiciary Power has played 
a prominent role, by operating law as 
a science, and as a technical. This new 
role can be justiﬁ  ed on grounds of legal 
theory and institutional reasons. These 
reasons have led legal philosophers to 
a series of discussions, such as the rela-
tionship between law and ethics. As the 
Critical Legal Studies denounces, the 
j u d g e  a l w a y s  a c t s  i n f o r m e d  b y  e t h i c a l  
jamin’s reﬂ  ections about history, it ap-
proaches the modern constitutions as, 
at the same time, documents of culture 
and documents of barbarism.
To support this postulate, the article 
begins with a distinction between cul-
ture (Kultur) and cultural goods (Kul-
tergüter)¸ emphasizing the importance 
of the concept of tradition or transmis-
sion (Überlieferung): culture would not 
b e  j u s t  a n  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  p r e c i o u s  
things, but a spiritual alive relation from 
the past to the present and from the 
present to the past.
In the sequence, the article focuses on 
the relationship between memory and 
struggles for recognition. On the one 
hand, it is the memory of the injustices 
of the past that impel the present to the 
struggle for recognition. On the other 
hand, the struggles for recognition play 
a fundamental role to preserve the mem-
ory.
But the dimensions of time involved in 
the discussions about modern constitu-
tions and history are not restricted to the 
past and the present. As an inaugural 
point of a constituent project, these con-
stitutions also concern the future.
All these articulations permit to compre-
hend modern constitutions as a complex 
and tension relationship among past, 
present and future, a relationship that 
– like history itself – is interpreted and 
reinterpreted by each new generation.
6.
Eric Ghosh (University of New England 
/ Australia)
Negative republican liberty 344 345
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litically, but ultimately dependent on 
expert argumentation and especially 
on scientiﬁ  c evidence (GMOs, pharma-
ceuticals, etc.). Arguably, in the regula-
tion of technology and risk the political 
discourse is subject to the scientiﬁ  c one, 
where the conditions for consensus are 
closer to the ideal. The paper concludes 
with discussion how scientiﬁ  c discourse 
both constrains and empowers political 
actors and how it bridges certain contro-
versies while opening others.
10.
Chueh-An Yen (National Taiwan Uni-
versity / Taiwan)
Democracy and the Nature of Law
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to investigate 
the relations between democracy and 
the nature of law . Is democracy an es-
sential property of law? Most legal theo-
rists would say no, simply because law, 
as an important public institution, was 
already in existence much earlier than 
our modern political system of democ-
racy and, in the present world, law exists 
everywhere, even in countries which are 
not democratic.
H o w e v e r ,  if  d e m o cra cy  is  t o  b e  c o nsi d -
ered as identity of the ruler and those 
who are ruled, there remains much to be 
discussed whether democracy is the only 
feasible state form, at least in a reasonable 
pluralistic world in Rawlsian sense, that 
can make a ruling system not only a sys-
tem with coersion and enforcement, but a 
real legal order. This is not just a legal the-
oretical question, it has signiﬁ  cant practi-
cal relevance for many countries in east 
nology is just a tool – among others – in 
order to render legal proceedings faster 
yet not a qualitative sign of Supreme 
Court’s decisions.
9.
Vesselin Paskalev (European University 
Institute / Italy)
The Importance of Acting on the Right 
Reasons: Deliberative Democracy and 
Science-Dependent Regulation
Abstract:
The proposed paper starts with the claim 
that the deliberative democracy theory 
is the adequate theory of justiﬁ  cation of 
the acts of public authority. In the adopt-
ed version of the theory, the legitimacy 
of any single act depends on its correct 
justiﬁ  cation by arguments which are, or 
at least can be, supported by all. On this 
account the agreement of all affected cit-
izens on the reasons for the acts becomes 
crucial and the possibility of such agree-
ment is the main focus of the paper.
For the deliberative democrats the ra-
tional discourse in the public sphere can 
bring about formation of a will shared by 
all affected citizens. Interestingly, their 
reliance on rational argumentation as 
means to this end ﬁ  nds support in Au-
mann’s Agreement Theorem according 
to which rational people not only can, 
but unavoidably must agree. Of course, 
the prerequisite conditions for such 
agreements – ideal speech situation for 
deliberative democracy and common 
priors for the Agreement Theorem – are 
never met in the real political processes. 
Yet this may be more likely in the cases 
where decisions are controversial po-
Asia which adopted western legal system 
in the past two centuries, but built up 
democratic systems separately from that 
reception, like Japan or Taiwan, or still 
refuses to accept democracy, like China.
I will start with some brief elucidations 
of the theory of democracy of Kelsen 
and Dworkin, and then make some ar-
guments for the positive relationships 
between democracy and the nature of 
law. My main idea is, if the purpose of 
law is to protect freedom and sustain a 
reasonable plural society, democracy is 
the only way to maintain a reasonable 
public norm-creating system for that 
purpose.
11.
Jacob Dahl Rendtorff (Roskilde Univer-
sity/ Denmark)
Ethical principles for biomedical and 
biotechnological challenges to law
Abstract:
In a number of books and articles I have 
been promoting the ethical principles of 
respect for autonomy, dignity, integrity 
and vulnerability as four important ide-
as or values for a European bioethics and 
bio-law. Together with Professor Peter 
Kemp I was initially responsible for writ-
ing the report from the project: Basic 
Ethical Principles in European Bioethics 
and Biolaw, VOL 1-2 (Copenhagen and 
Barcelona 2000). An important resume 
of the BIOMED project was the partner’s 
Policy Proposals to the European Com-
mission, the Barcelona Declaration of, 
which is unique as a philosophical and 
political agreement between experts in 
bioethics and bio-law from many differ-
ent countries. In this presentation I want 
to discuss the ethical and legal relevance 
of the Barcelona Declaration and other 
international Documents on bioethics 
and bio-law, e.g. the Council of Europe’s 
Convention for the Protection on of Hu-
man Rights and Dignity of the Human 
Being with Regard to the Application of 
Biology and Medicine, Adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers in 1996 and The 
UNESCO Declaration on the Humana 
Genome 1997. The idea is to defend the 
argument that the basic ethical princi-
ples of the Barcelona Declaration do not 
only represent European ethical princi-
ples for bioethics and biolaw, but they 
should also be conceived as a conceptual 
clariﬁ   cation and articulation of global 
ethical principles, which are central to 
international concerns for a universal 
bioethics and biolaw.
12.
Pedro a. Caminos (Universidad de Bue-
nos Aires / Argentina)
The statu quo paradox and the theory of 
deliberative democracy
Abstract:
Democratic theory has both a prescrip-
tive and a descriptive function. That 
means that such a theory does not only 
pretend to take into account the “really 
existing” democracies, but also provides 
certain normative criteria related to the 
features that a democratic regime must 
have.
The theory of deliberative democracy 
developped by Carlos Nino tries to meet 
that standard. In order to accomplish 
that task, he argued that really exist- 346 347
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und, möglicherweise, andere Faktoren, 
beginnend mit der Ausbildung in den 
Rechtskursen, bis zu den neuen Tech-
nologien. Indessen existieren derzeit 
Mechanismen zur Reduzierung der Ver-
gerichtlichungen und der eigentlichen 
Rechtsstreitigkeiten, inklusive der Er-
laubnis an das Oberste Bundesgericht 
zur Genehmigung der Entscheidung mit 
bindender Wirkung und, zur Bildung des 
Bundesgerichtsrats, zwecks Kontrolle, 
mittels Schaffung einer Bewegung zur 
Versöhnung, mit Unterstützung von 
Zielen für Rechtsverfahren und der Ein-
führung von Schnelligkeit in der Hand-
habung von Rechtsverfahren gemäss des 
Verfassungsnachtargs von 2004, welcher 
die vernünftige Dauer der Prozesse sich-
erstellt. Hinzu kommt das Projekt zur 
Reform der zivilen Prozessgesetze, unter 
anderen analysierten Fragen.
3.
Ugochukwu Emmanuel Osuagwu (St. 
Francis Xavier Solicitors and Advocates 
/ Nigeria)
Corruption and Democracy in Nigeria
Abstract:
Nigeria’s democracy has remained gross-
ly unstable since the country returned to 
democratic form of governance in 1999. 
The political terrain has been charac-
terized by violent ethno-religious cri-
sis, contract killing and political assas-
sinations, inter and intra-party fracas 
and civil disobedience. At the heart of 
democratic instability in Nigeria is pan-
demic bureaucratic and political cor-
ruption. This study shows that political 
and bureaucratic corruptions have grave 
reﬂ  ection on the scope and how best to 
interpret the constitutional provision 
cited, a debate that, in the proposed 
article should think the ideas of pater-
nalism, authoritarianism and freedom, 
whose focus will be within the Internet, 
social networks and the Knowledge So-
ciety.
2.
Carlos Frederico Oléa (Universidade Es-
tadual de Londrina / Brazil)
Die Vergerichtlichung in Brasilien: Fra-
gen und Perspektiven
Abstract:
Das Wachstum der Vergerichtlichung 
in Brasilien ab den 90er Jahren wird in 
den ofﬁ   ziellen Statistiken gezeigt. Al-
lein im Obersten Bundesgericht wur-
den im Jahre 1990, 18.564 Verfahren 
mit 16.449 Gerichtsurteilen registriert, 
während im Jahre 2010, 71.670 Ver-
fahren mit 103.869 Urteilen registri-
ert wurden. Dieses Werk versucht die 
Möglichkeiten der Identiﬁ  zierung  von 
Faktoren zu ﬁ  nden, die für das Wachs-
tum an Vergerichtlichungen beitragen 
und die staatlichen Versuche zum Stopp 
und zur Schlichtung von Rechtsstreiten 
zu prüfen. In den Untersuchungen wur-
den Statistiken, in Diskussionen vorge-
schlagene Normänderungen und päda-
gogische Richtlinien der Rechtskurse, 
die zu einer Erklärung führen könnten, 
berücksichtigt. Das Wachstum der Ver-
gerichtlichung, nach der Verfassung von 
1988, zeigt einen möglichen Einﬂ  uss des 
demokatischen Paktes, der Verfassung-
sarchitektur, der Zusammenfassung 
von Regeln und Werten der Gesellschaft 
WORKING GROUP
WG 16 
Democratic development in 
individual countries I
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 4.202
Chair Vergara, Oscar (Galicia / 
Spain)
Lectures:
1.
José Renato Gazierro Cella + Juliana 
Vieira Pelegrini (Pontifícia Universidade 
Católica do Paraná / Brazil)
The Prohibition of the Right to Ano-
nymity on the authoritarian Brazilian 
Constitution and its Impact on Social 
Networks
Abstract:
The Constitution of the Federative Re-
public of Brazil, enacted in 1988 dur-
ing the democratization process of the 
country after the end of an authoritar-
ian regime preceded by several others 
that show a non-democratic tradition 
in the Brazilian Republic, remained still 
remains an authoritarian state Patron-
izing and Paternalist, the example of 
the ﬁ  nal part of the Article 5, item IV, 
which claims to be the free expression of 
thought, but forbids anonymity, prohibi-
tion which deserves to be rethought, es-
pecially in the internet, where the navi-
gation data of people deserve protection, 
as well as their rights to remain anony-
mous, a fact which entails the need for 
ing social practice shoud have a second-
order place within his theory. For Nino, 
social practice creates a framework for 
action wich allows the deveolpment 
and enhancement of democracy. For 
that reason, judges may rightfully hold 
a staute unconstitutional if it threatens 
the social practice, becoming then a dan-
ger for the ground of the very democratic 
regime, even though the statute satisﬁ  es 
the regulative ideal of democratic delib-
eration.
If that is so, it could be the case that a 
judge commited with deliberative de-
mocracy ideal, and who has a subtan-
tive agreement with a statute, should 
hold it unconstitutional in orden to pro-
tect a statu quo, with wich he has only 
a goal-means commitment. This situa-
tion, wich I will call “statu quo paradox”, 
brings about some issues that point at 
the core of Nino’s thought. In this paper 
I shall examine two of them: 1) the una-
voidability of consequentialism; 2) the 
place of statu quo in a practical reason-
ing theory that has the transformation of 
that statu quo as it main aim. 348 349
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legal consequences today, when talking, 
for example, about afﬁ  rmative  actions 
such as quotas for blacks in universities. 
This will require going through changes 
in the treatment of miscegenation in the 
social sciences and to demonstrate how 
such discourse empties the possibility 
of struggle for rights and recognition of 
different races and classes in Brazil. The 
role given to the mulatto as “the people”, 
which stay in the boundary between the 
social sciences, politics and law, is the 
basis for interpreting the problem of the 
identity and the masking of race rela-
tions in Brazil.
6.
Venceslau Tavares Costa Filho (Federal 
Univesity of the State of Pernambuco / 
Brazil)
The juridical Rethoric in the slavery of 
the imperial Brazil (1822–1889)
Abstract:
With an Aristotelic focus, this article 
investigates the usage of various argu-
ments apparently incompatible in the 
slavery juridical legitimation during 
the rupture with the Portuguese Em-
pire (1822) period and the proclamation 
of the Republic in Brazil (1889). Any 
problem might be presented, consider-
ing the multiple topics, as it could be ap-
plied to a general topic onto a plurality 
of issues. Such ways of topic usage are 
justiﬁ  ed regarding their usefulness due 
to their dialectic or rhetoric argumenta-
tion. Thus, two species of juridical top-
ics were used to legitimate the slavery 
of the Imperial Brazil (1822–1889): the 
historicist and the liberal. The former 
consequence of it, the public administra-
tor in Brazil is allowed to practice any act 
without possibility being held responsi-
bly, except in cases of deceit or guilty.
There is, certainly, a decrease of respon-
sibility, once it previously also reached 
results. Acts can now be dealt in a broad-
er ratio by the administrative ofﬁ  cer and 
phronesis might lay less required. 
This study tries to determine the truth of 
this last afﬁ  rmative.
5.
Thiago Aguiar Simim (Universidade 
Federal de Minas Gerais / Brazil)
Miscegenation, identity and race rela-
tions in Brazil
Abstract:
In the development of social sciences 
in Brazil miscegenation had several re-
signiﬁ   cations to suit political purposes 
of each context. This was seen between 
the homens de sciencia (men of science) 
as problem and solution – by whitening 
– according to the racial evolutionists 
theories of the late nineteenth century, 
but it is mostly in the 1930s that a few 
“interpreters of Brazil”, mainly Gilberto 
Freyre, have used the mixing between 
the three races – white, black and indig-
enous – as constitution of the nation, to 
ﬁ  ll the element of “the people” in Bra-
zil. This notion brought legal and social 
consequences, sometimes imperceptible, 
from the use of the mulatto as an “es-
cape hatch”, as Carl Degler believes, or 
as “epistemological obstacle” in refuta-
tion of Eduardo de Oliveira e Oliveira. 
The aim is to show why this discourse 
hides deep tensions and how he brings 
tem for the society. This study demon-
strates that corruption has robbed Nige-
rians, the government which they chose 
to represent and pursue their interests 
and the consequence- democratic insta-
bility is inevitable.
4.
Hugo Sabino + Júlio Oliveira (PUCMI-
NAS / Brazil)
Phronesis and the control of Public Ad-
m i n i s t r a t i o n  A c t s  i n  B r a z i l i a n  L e g a l  
System
Abstract:
Phronesis is an intellectual virtue which 
is presupposed in every moral virtue. In 
this way, it is a condition for a just act.
The Brazilian Constitution sets princi-
ples to be observed in all acts performed 
in the duties of Public Administration. 
Those principles are: legality, imperson-
ality, morality, publicity and efﬁ  ciency.
As a legal requirement, every act per-
formed by the public administration 
must also observes competence, object, 
form, reasoning and purpose.
Neither the Constituion or the law set 
standards trough which those require-
ments could be veriﬁ  ed. Therefore the 
acts performed by the public administra-
tion are due to an improbity control in 
terms of Brazilian Federal Law. This law 
determines improbity acts and levels of 
responsibility to be applied in each case.
In September 2.010 the Superior Tribu-
nal de Justiça, which is the court respon-
sible for setting national understandings 
about the federal law in Brazil, decided 
that any improbity act requires deceit or 
guilty, narrowing the terms of law. In 
implications for democratic stability in 
Nigeria. It is argued that democratic sta-
bility will be difﬁ  cult to attain as long 
as corruption remain pandemic and un-
checked. Nigeria’s democratic project 
has been under perpetual threat since 
1999 when the country returned to 
democratic governance especially as a 
result of high prevalence of corruption. 
Put differently, corruption is a major 
challenge to democratic stability in Ni-
geria. The political climate, to say the 
least has been hostile to democracy. The 
general scepticism has been whether the 
current experience will last. This cyni-
cism is justiﬁ  able when one consider the 
fact that all the factors that precipitated 
the collapse of the First and Second Re-
publics are currently at play. Widespread 
violence, electoral frauds, political assas-
sination, politically inspired ethno-reli-
gious conﬂ  ict, apathy, evitable economic 
woes and its attendant consequences 
(abject poverty, slums etc.,), ﬂ  agrant dis-
regard for the rule of law, disrespect for 
human rights and pandemic corruption 
remains the key features of Nigerian po-
litical life. These manifestations of dem-
ocratic instability are the symptoms and 
consequences of basic system pathology, 
majorly, political corruption. Corruption 
has become prevalent and has not only 
greatly eroded the basis of the authority 
of the state but also challenge the legiti-
macy of democracy as the best form of 
governance. The problem of democratic 
instability persists because the political 
system has failed to engender, maintain 
and sustain the belief in Nigerians that 
democracy is the most appropriate sys- 350 351
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crucial features of the transition and 
very quickly was transformed into the 
new pluralist political class. This posi-
tion enabled the communist elite to be 
rehabilitated and together with the new 
emerged communist elite to remain a 
strong inﬂ  uential actor in new emerged 
democracy and de facto to run in con-
tinuance the country. The purpose of 
new emerged communist elite to main-
tain control was favored inter alia by the 
absence of any new strong intellectual 
elite and was done merely by sharing the 
power among its members separated into 
different political parties and also by us-
ing the ‘pluralist’ law as a tool for social 
control over new emerging intellectual 
elites. The use of law as a tool of social 
control by the political class has severely 
damaged people’s understanding and 
expectations on the law its relations 
with the state as well as international 
community. Indeed, such experience of 
the use of law by the political class for its 
own narrow interests, have made people 
lose conﬁ  dence in law and state as well 
as has severely weaken the law enforce-
ment in the country. To conclude the 
overall purpose of this paper would be 
the analysis of understandings and de-
velopment of law in a post-communist 
society such as Albania from different 
points of view.
2.
Nezahat Demiray (Ufuk University, 
School of Law / Turkey)
Mistrust in Constitution Making Proc-
ess in Turkey 
Abstract:
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1.
Jordan Daci (Wisdom University / Alba-
nia)
Law in post-communist countries: case 
of Albania
Abstract:
Communist regimes in general and es-
pecially the one in Albania destroyed 
almost every aspect of political, social, 
cultural and economic life, including the 
notion of pluralism and intellectual elite 
of the country. In Albania the transition 
into democracy in 90’ was done through 
extrication which means that authori-
tarian government was weakened, but 
not as thoroughly as in a transition by 
defeat. As a consequence, the former 
Communist elite was able to negotiate 
cent years. Although politically full and 
economically satisfactory, Spanish tran-
sition has been considered not complete-
ly fair by some. Among the unresolved 
matters the need to exhume the mortal 
remains in numerous common graves 
spread along the country deserves an 
outstanding role. Nevertheless, besides 
this legitimate claim there are other 
claims of doubtful legality and opportu-
nity. Among other topics, this paper an-
alyzes the attempt of the judge Garzón of 
initiating a criminal process against the 
highest responsible for the coup d’état of 
1936 and the question of the validity of 
the Law of Amnesty 1977. It is also raised 
the question about whether the victims 
of the Spanish Civil war and the Dicta-
torship have received a suitable recogni-
tion from the moral point of view. For 
that purpose, it is speciﬁ  cally considered 
the so-called Law of Historical Memory. 
Furthermore, the question of the nation-
al reconciliation in a postmodern world 
in which everything seems to be revisa-
ble is also examined. Finally, it is made a 
plea for a cosmopolitan identity beyond 
the load of the old loyalties that caused 
the war of 1936-1939.
characterized the Brazilian slavery as a 
national juridical institution which had 
to exhaust its economic and social func-
tions until superseded. The latter refuted 
abolitionism for it was seen as an undue 
intervention of the State in the private 
property. Teixeira de Freitas and José de 
Alencar are examples of jurists under 
the Empire service who sustained being 
the Brazilian slavery a national juridical 
institution, not yet superseded; invoking 
the German historicism, and specially, 
Savigny´s ideas. This was the most de-
cisive juridical argument pro slavery, 
as Imperial Brazil hardly would be in-
serted in a juridical liberalism context, 
since it was refractory to the State lai-
cism, and to a notion of universal equal-
ity. The inﬂ  uence of the Roman Law on 
the Brazilian jurists, to which they used 
to appeal as subsidiary legislation, is also 
a slavery justiﬁ  cation factor during the 
imperial Brazil. The use of such argu-
ments, theoretically incompatible, seem 
to emphasize a rhetoric character of the 
j u r i di c a l  a r g u m e n t a t i o n ,  a s  i t  s u p p o r t s  
the compelling pro slavery maintenance 
more than the construction of a theo-
retic coherent basis for the positive law 
of that time.
7.
Oscar Vergara (University of Corunna / 
Spain)
Some Remarks about the Spanish Tran-
sition to Democracy and the so called 
Historical Memory
Abstract:
Spanish transition to democracy (1978-
1982) has been deemed a model until re- 352 353
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Act in 2004, so called “countermajori-
tarian difﬁ  culty” is important subject in 
the area of constitutional jurisprudence 
and political science. Now, this academic 
interest is extended to the appropriate 
understanding of rule of law. This paper 
will examine these subjects in the light 
of South Korean experiences.
5.
Omid Payrow Shabani (University of 
Guelph / Canada)
The Burgeoning Non-violence in the 
Iranian Protest Movement
Abstract:
In measuring the aftermath of the fraud-
ulent presidential election in Iran one 
question has deﬁ  ed analysis more than 
other complexities of this event: What 
can explain the non-violent character of 
the Green Movement in Iran? I propose 
that the answer lies with the following 
three learning processes: 1) The experi-
ence of loss brought about by the Iran/
Iraq war; 2) the relative opening during 
Khatami’s presidency; and 3) the work 
of the postislamist thinkers that aimed 
to make political Islam compatible with 
democracy and Islam. Together these 
learning processes fostered a new mode 
of thinking that is civic and non-violent 
in character.
6.
Li Yanping (“One Country, Two Sys-
tems” Research Center of Macao Poly-
technic Institute / China)
The subnational constitutionalism in 
the context of Chinese “one country, 
two systems:”the case of Macao S.A.R.
Session 2
4.
Hung Hwan Kim + Il Shin Hang (Yonsei 
University / Republic of Korea)
A Study on the New Relationship be-
tween Democracy and the Rule of Law 
in Korea 
Abstract:
We have some common understandings 
of the rule of law(or Rechtsstaatsprin-
zip) in legal academia; the government 
should enforce its power based on law, 
and individual rights harmed by the 
governmental actions can be redressed 
through the judicial process. With the 
development of constitutionalism, un-
derstandings of the rule of law has been 
broadened from only procedural con-
cepts to substantial ones. Now, it is rec-
ognized that even the legislative power 
should be subject to the constitutional 
review under the substantial standards 
of law. 
While the rule of law supports democ-
racy in this way, sometimes they strug-
gle with each other. Excessive work of 
the rule of law may weaken democracy. 
Since mid-twentieth century, constitu-
tional adjudication has blossomed in the 
many democratic countries. Some crit-
ics point out that by the constitutional 
court’s frequent interruptions, so called 
“judicialization of politics” or “Juris-
tocracy”, the people could not have a 
chance to develop democracy through 
the autonomous political process. Korea 
has the same problem. Especially af-
ter the judicial review in constitutional 
court about the Relocation of the Capital 
sui generis which contains a distinct le-
gal order of its own.” It would thus seem 
that EEA law has transformed into an in-
dependent legal order, and subsequently 
has a claim to validity which emulates 
the self-referential or self-legitimising 
presentation of the EU legal order. This, 
however, is not an empirically veriﬁ  -
able fact, but a particular understanding 
which arises when one adopts the view-
point of the EFTA Court. EEA law takes 
place in a different realm when inter-
preted and applied in the national order: 
this realm is essentially a construction of 
the constitutional order. Case law shows 
that the Icelandic Supreme Court is far 
from accepting some of the EEA judge-
made principles. In light of this apparent 
opposition, the EEA and Icelandic juris-
dictions seem locked in conﬂ  ict.
This study proposes a theoretical model, 
designed to manage the relationship be-
tween the EEA and Icelandic (and, mu-
tatis mutandis Norwegian) judiciaries. It 
will describe a context of legal pluralism 
by reference to the Icelandic legal system 
and its relationship with the EEA legal 
order. To illustrate the discussion, the 
most important case law relative to the 
interaction between Icelandic laws and 
EEA law will be considered in the light 
of legal pluralism - particularly the prin-
ciples of contrapunctual law designed by 
Miguel Maduro. The paper argues that 
the Supreme Court’s internal domestic 
approach to the application of EEA law 
will inevitably become a source of frag-
mentation unless it takes place within 
an institutional framework of judicial 
tolerance and judicial dialogue.
All of the Turkish constitutions had 
weak political legitimacy, because none 
of them were prepared through a process 
of negotiations, bargaining, and com-
promise. This time, a new effort might 
not be described as a missed opportunity 
to write a constitution on broad consen-
sus. Consequently, it becomes vital to 
establish trust and consent in constitu-
tion making process in Turkey. Indeed, 
in order to ﬁ  nd a way to bridge the gulf 
of mistrust that divides people, Turkey 
needs “constitutional politics”. This is-
sue that seem to be the most problem-
atic in constitutional politics in Turkey is 
establishing a broad consensus. But the 
revolution in popular communications 
is able to provide the most extensive 
participation of people in this process. 
They might be used as legitimating tech-
niques. In light of important debates on 
the preparation process for an entirely 
new constitution, Turkey offers a rich 
laboratory for an analysis of the most ex-
tensive participation of people. This pa-
per examines these debates and explores 
its legal and political ramiﬁ  cations.
3.
Ólafur Ísberg Hannesson (European 
University Institute, Law Department / 
Italy)
Legal Pluralism: Reformulation of the 
Traditional View in Iceland 
Abstract:
Doctrines developed by EFTA Court 
have placed considerable demands on 
national courts in the EFTA States. The 
Court now considers the EEA Agree-
m e n t  t o  f o r m  a n  “ i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r e a t y   354 355
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privacy lawsuits. With the permanent 
memory of the Internet and an easily 
retrievable archival system, many also 
question whether the present Web tech-
nologies and its setup have violated the 
societal belief in giving second chances 
to people to begin a new life. Recently 
in November 2011, the European Union 
proposed reform of personal data pro-
tection by advocating the “right to be 
forgotten.” If this is implemented, inevi-
tably this would have direct impact on 
Google, Youtube, Facebook and other 
social networking sites. Thus, through 
the study and analysis of the above phe-
nomenon, and an examination of the 
“right to be forgotten,” I would like to 
explore the interrelationship between 
privacy, personality right, and freedom 
of expression from a legal and social per-
spective. My tentative argument is that: 
other than adopting a substantive hu-
man right based analysis, the protection 
of personality and personal data may be 
better protected through the due process 
of information management.
3.
Yigong Liu (Institute of Jurisprudence, 
School of Humanities and Social Sci-
ences, Dalian University of Technology 
/ China)
China’s E-Democracy in Information 
Age
Abstract:
I. Deﬁ  nitions
1. Information Age
The Information Age, also commonly 
known as the Computer Age, Digital Age 
or Information Era, is an idea that the 
The paper will try to frame such dia-
logue, taking as examples two types of 
private regulation that can be found in 
the Internet: the ICANN system and the 
online auction sites model. After a brief 
description of the enforcement mecha-
nisms adopted in the two cases, the pa-
per will provide evidence of the court 
decisions concerning such regimes, 
focusing on how courts use and apply 
transnational private standards in their 
reasoning to solve a speciﬁ  c case: they 
decline their application as private rules 
do not meet national perceptions of le-
gitimacy, transparency, etc. or they ap-
ply private rules interpreting them in a 
different way.
2.
Anne Sy Cheung (Department of Law , 
The University of Hong Kong / China)
Privacy and its Discontents: The Ex-
ploitation of Shame and the Right to be 
Forgotten in the Global E-Village 
Abstract:
Since the introduction of new Web-
based technologies in the early 21st 
century, Web 2.0 has presented two 
conﬂ   i c t i n g  d i l e m m a s  f o r  m a n y  o f  u s .  
While we witness the unprecedented 
blossoming of user-generated content, 
there is also an urgent call for privacy 
protection. In particular, online sham-
ing, exposure and social sanctions im-
posed by netizens have become popular 
and worrying. This phenomenon where 
citizens “engage in social policing by 
shaming transgressions via the Internet” 
has left victims often with little recourse 
through the avenues of defamation or 
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Federica Casarosa (Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies / Italy)
Enforcement in Internet private re-
gimes: is there still a role for courts?
Abstract:
The development of new technologies 
has opened new perspectives for private 
transnational regulation. Internet can 
on different levels provide a framework 
for such regimes where international 
and national market actors interplay in 
order to regulate reciprocal behaviours.
Within these regimes the enforcement 
systems are usually based on informal 
mechanisms that escape from the expen-
sive recourse to court proceedings, in par-
ticular where alternative dispute mecha-
nisms are implemented. However, such 
systems could not completely exclude 
the interaction with courts at national or 
supranational level. The importance of a 
dialogue between courts and private reg-
ulators could be evaluated in terms of le-
gitimation of the private regime itself, or 
in terms of coordination between private 
and public rules, where courts can steer 
the development of private rules. 
Abstract:
The political idea of “one country, two 
systems” has been put in force for more 
than ten years in Macau. It is a success-
ful way to unify the Great China and to 
keep the social stability and development 
of Macau. Most of people identify with 
the policy “One country, two systems” 
is an important Chinese Constitutional 
project because Article 31 of Chinese 
constitution deﬁ  nes the basic principle 
of the policy. There are a lot of consti-
tutional spirits in the policy. It conﬁ  rms 
the legal relationship of local and central 
government and offers democracy and 
rule of law for the region which are the 
basic conditions for subnational consti-
tutionalism. But the subnational consti-
tutionalism should be incomplete if no 
support of national constitutionalism. It 
is critical for the theory of “one country, 
two systems” to promote the achieve-
ment of subnational and national consti-
tutionalism together. 356 357
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million, but compare to whole popula-
tion , it is still small. The lower classes, 
especially the poor underclass, they 
are lack of the necessary conditions for 
participating in e-democracy. The main 
groups involved in e-democracy must be 
the middle class and upper class society, 
therefore, we can not simply say that 
Internet users represent the majority of 
members of society.
III. The future of e-democracy in China
In order to increase e-democracy and 
rule of law in China, we should pay at-
tention to the following aspects.
1. To draft a more uniﬁ  ed and stand-
ardized information technology rules, 
such as “Electronic Authentication Law” 
and “Government Information Disclo-
sure law.” Electronic authentication is 
the most essential aspect of the validity 
of electronic authentication, it must be 
in legal form. For “Government Infor-
mation Disclosure Law,” Government 
Information Resources should provide 
complete and duly information to public, 
so citizens can better understand the in-
formation, and rationally participate in 
discussions and decision-making.
2. To Create a better network environ-
ment, strengthening and improving 
communication between government 
and citizens. Government departments 
may understand the real situation, prob-
lems and difﬁ  culties through dialogue, 
and then try to solve the problems, and 
promote social harmony and stability.
3. To analyse and process users com-
ments timely, guarantee the right of the 
people’s supervision, improve the rela-
tionship between government and citizens. 
(3) Strengthening the supervision of 
government and ﬁ  ghting against corrup-
tion. E-democracy also help to strength-
en public supervision, anti-corruption, 
and enhance the public’s sense of politi-
cal responsibility. 
Case I: “Sun Zhigang incident.” This case 
embodies the power of e-democracy and 
led to abolish the “urban vagrants and 
beggars in detention and repatriation 
measures” issued by the State Council in 
May 1982.
Case II: “SARS incident. “ This case led 
to the great political progress in the dem-
ocratic process. China established a com-
plete set of press spokesman for “SARS” 
from central to local.
2. The problems of e-democracy 
However, e-democracy also has some 
problems due to its virtual characteris-
tics, such as false information, users’s 
non-rational speech, and violations of 
personal privacy, etc.
(1) The false information. As the virtual 
character and concealment of Internet, 
therefore, the information spread on In-
t e r n e t  i s  h a r d  t o  i d e n t i f y .  M e a n w h i l e ,  
the Internet also has some ulterior mo-
tives deliberately create some false infor-
mation to mislead Internet users.
(2) invasion of privacy. As the publisher 
of internet information is often not easy 
to ﬁ  nd, so some people on the network 
interested in exposing someone’s pri-
vacy and “human ﬂ  esh search”, which 
may cause infringement of the privacy 
of citizens.
(3) limitation of e-democracy. E-democ-
racy is limited democracy. Although the 
Chinese Internet users has reached 300 
1. The advantages of E-democracy
E-democracy as a new form of democracy 
in information age has some advantages 
that traditional representative democracy 
cannot match. Chinese Internet users has 
reached over 300 million, ranking ﬁ  rst in 
the world, online media and communica-
tion platform for the rapid rise of all levels 
of government launched the ofﬁ  cial web-
site for Internet users to provide a pub-
lic platform for expression and political 
participation. Internet users can directly 
express their own views on public affairs, 
Internet users’ political participation en-
thusiasm continues to grow, and become 
more and more inﬂ  uential. China’s Con-
stitution gives people the right to freedom 
of expression, and the emergence of the 
Internet BBS(Bulletin Board System), 
providing an important channel for or-
dinary people to express their opinions.
The advantages of e-democracy, mainly 
as follows:
(1) Information disclosure, sharing of 
r e s o ur ce s.  T h e  a d v an ta g e s  o f  e -d e m oc -
racy is that it has the full beneﬁ  t of in-
formation sharing. Government depart-
ments have rich information resources, 
if the information resources are opened 
to public and used fully and effectively, it 
will bring signiﬁ  cant social, political and 
economic progress.
(2) The equal participation and freedom 
of expression. E-democracy provides 
citizens with more freedom and equality 
of political participation. In cyberspace, 
everyone can be equal to the exchange 
and access to information, everyone can 
express their political views and opin-
ions freely.
current age will be characterized by the 
ability of individuals to transfer infor-
mation freely, and to have instant access 
to knowledge that would have been dif-
ﬁ  cult or impossible to ﬁ  nd previously. 
In 1940’s, people began to use computer. 
The emergence and popularization of 
computers in the late 20th century has 
completely changed our way of life. The 
emergence of computers has also led to 
the third technological revolution, many 
changes have taken in information tech-
nology, biological engineering, new ma-
terials technology, marine technology. 
These new technologies are fundamen-
tally changing our social and economic 
life.
2. E-democracy 
E-democracy (electronic democracy) re-
fers to the use of information technolo-
gies and communication technologies 
and strategies in political and govern-
ance processes. Democratic actors and 
sectors in this context include govern-
ments, elected ofﬁ  cials, the media, po-
litical organizations, and citizens.
E-democracy is a new mode of political 
participation; people may express their 
political will through Internet, as elec-
tronic voting, electronic forums and e-
campaign. E-democracy aims for broad-
er and more active citizen participation 
enabled by the Internet, mobile commu-
nications, and other technologies in to-
day’s representative democracy , as well 
as through more participatory or direct 
forms of citizen involvement in address-
ing public challenges.
II. The advantages of E-democracy and 
its problems 358 359
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of limited impact due to the territoriality 
principle) and self-regulation (lacking 
enforcement and sanction mechanisms). 
These three approaches should be com-
plemented by a more technologically 
oriented regulatory approach realizing 
the principle of user friendliness (pro-
motion of PETs for the implementation 
of the “Pricay by Design”-concept). In 
particular, the “combination” of self-reg-
ulation and code-“regulation” through 
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA) merit 
more attention. After ﬁ  rst experiences 
have been made overseas, the Art. 29 
Working Party (EU Data Protection Di-
rective 95/46) has now also moved to-
wards acknowledgment of such concept.
The PIA concept must be mirrored in the 
light of an analysis of user perception of 
regulatory models. Therefore, the paper 
will look at the PIA challenges with the 
lenses of legal theory and legal sociology 
trying to establish a framework reﬂ  ect-
ing a theoretical approach based on an 
appropriate application layer. Concrete 
aspects are the development of a com-
prehensive coherent approach guaran-
teeing the right of self-determination 
and the simpliﬁ  cation harmonisation of 
notiﬁ  cation systems.
7.
Jose Maria Seco Martinez (Pablo de Ola-
vide University / Spain)
Is media consolidation a real threat to 
democracy?
Abstract:
TV, radio, newspapers, and internet are 
our main sources of news and informa-
tion. They shape our values and beliefs. 
new mode of governance in new realities.
The second part of the paper will dis-
cuss the position of independent regula-
tory agencies within a democratic ma-
trix. Since there are strong pragmatic 
reasons behind the emergence of such 
institutions it is worth asking wheth-
er th ey really are, as some adv ersaries 
claim, a challenge to basic principles of 
democratic theory. The emphasis will be 
placed on the question of their legitima-
cy and accountability. 
6.
Rolf Weber (Universität Zürich/ Sch-
weiz)
Privacy
Abstract:
Ten years ago, Jonathan Zittrain sum-
marized the political economy of pri-
vacy: „With privacy, worry has come 
largely from individual seeking protec-
tion against a whittling away of privacy 
by well-organized corporate interests.“ 
In his seminal work “Code: Version 2.0” 
Lawrence Lessig addressed the problem 
solving mechanisms of privacy be stat-
ing that the interests threatened would 
be diffuse and disorganized, notwith-
standing the fact that the values of pro-
tection (security, war against terrorism) 
would be compelling. On the basis of 
these statements, the paper looks at the 
background of legislative actions in the 
privacy ﬁ  eld. Available regulatory mod-
els are international agreements (being 
confronted with the problem of a glo-
bally not “harmonized” appreciation of 
necessity and scope of legal provisions), 
national laws (having the disadvantage 
communication – a new form of com-
munication allowed mainly by the use of 
information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT).
This study analyzes the role ICT in the 
process of legitimation of the mentioned 
invasion. Thus, the aim of this work is 
to strengthen the notion that access to 
those technologies have become a fun-
damental right in contemporary demo-
cratic systems, without which the public 
debate that allows the social construc-
tion of legitimacy becomes less compre-
hensive because a series of social dis-
courses can only be made public through 
this medium.
5.
Marta Zuralska (University of Warsaw / 
Poland)
Independent Regulatory Agencies: 
New Mode of Governance in the face of 
Technological Change
Abstract:
Over the last half-century, we have 
witnessed how signiﬁ  cant  technologi-
cal change together with parallel eco-
nomic growth brought about the transi-
tion from “the positive to the regulatory 
state”. Simultaneously, change in a role 
entails change in a mode of govern-
ance. Rule making requires scientiﬁ  c, 
engineering and economic knowledge 
combined with stability and policy con-
tinuity. These are the demands that 
traditional methods of department gov-
ernance were unable to satisfy. The ﬁ  rst 
part of the paper will examine the fac-
tors which contributed to the emergence 
of independent regulatory agencies and 
E-democracy is a new type of democracy 
in information Age, it has problems and 
it is not perfect, but we still have reason 
to believe, with the continuous improve-
ment, e-democracy will have a bright 
future.
4.
Guilherme Sena De Assuncao + Alexan-
dre Araujo Costa (University of Brasília 
[UnB] / Brazil)
How Internet changed the process of le-
gitimation of state violence in the inva-
sion of Morro do Alemão 
Abstract:
In November 2010, the Police and the 
Armed Forces carried out the invasion 
of Morro do Alemão, a slum in Rio de 
Janeiro that was dominated by drug 
trafﬁ  ckers. This situation was presented 
in the media as the return of legitimate 
state authority over the area, presenting 
little dispute about the legitimacy of this 
act, which received support from a broad 
segment of the population. This cover-
age tended to present the invasion as a 
peaceful one, giv en that it was an op-
eration aimed at arresting the trafﬁ  ckers 
based on site.
However, as it is common in operations 
marked by an intensive use of violence, 
the intervention led to a series of viola-
t i o n s  o f  ri gh t s  o f  p e o p l e  li vin g  o n  t h e  
premises: houses were searched without 
warrants, people were arrested, proper-
ties were damaged. These violations of 
individual rights, justiﬁ  ed in the name 
of the collective interest, hardly have 
been aired on mainstream media, but 
were widely disseminated by mass self- 360 361
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of rules or principles, the social is always 
part of the background and attracts few 
attention. This article believes the proce-
dural legal paradigm advanced by Juen-
gen Habermas represents an important 
breakthrough in this regards.
What is more, the Habermasian co-orig-
inality thesis reveals a neglected internal 
relationship between public autonomy 
and private autonomy. I believe the co-
originality provides the essential basis 
on which further connecting infrastruc-
ture between the legal and the social 
could be developed. In terms of the de-
velopment of the internet public sphere, 
co-originality can also help us redirect 
our attention away from the public opin-
ion formation on the national legislative 
level, and toward the local, so called gov-
ernance, which represents an emerging 
trend itself, emphasizing bottom up as 
well as dialogical approach toward law 
making.
If we can successfully develop a network 
of local, distributiv e and more f ocused 
‘local’ public sphere, these network can 
serve as the needed empirical basis for 
the public opinion formation of the na-
tionwide public sphere. In a sense, the 
co-originality thesis also suggests the 
existence of an internal mutually rein-
forcing relationship between the public 
sphere and the network of ‘local’ public 
sphere.
Based on Susan Sturm’s ideas of govern-
ance derived essentially by her three in-
stitutional empirical studies, this article 
offers three critical elements for building 
of a successful ‘local’ public sphere. First 
of all, the empowering character of the 
national regulations are similar and in 
some respects even higher than the Eu-
ropean standards. Contradictorily, wire-
tapping has become a scandalous issue 
in Turkey since 2008, especially with 
the sensational outbreak of wiretapping 
practice directed to the judiciary among 
the others. This paper intends to discuss 
the role of judiciary in the telecommu-
nication interceptions and to question 
how far the balance between the privacy 
and security is seek judicially by ana-
lysing Turkish law and jurisdiction as a 
concrete and current case, however in a 
comparative legal perspective.
2.
Chi-Shing Chen (National ChengChi 
University / Taiwan)
A Co-original Approach toward Inter-
net and Law Making 
Abstract:
There is an emerging interest to ﬁ  nd out 
whether we can develop internet into a 
public sphere where signiﬁ  cant citizen 
participation can be incorporated into 
the law making process. However, no 
well accepted e-participation model has 
prevailed. This article points out that , 
to be successful, we need serious critical 
reﬂ  ection on the legal theoretical front, 
and we also need further institutional 
construction based on the theoretical re-
ﬂ  ection.
Theoretically speaking, the contempo-
r a r y  d o m i n a n t  l e g a l  t h e o r i e s  d e m o n -
strate too strong a legal internal point 
of view to empower the informal, social 
normative development on the internet. 
No matter whether we see law as a body 
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Melike Akkaraca Kose (Istanbul Kultur 
University / Turkey)
Balance between the right to privacy 
and public security in telecommunica-
tion interceptions: a mission impossi-
ble for the judiciary?
Abstract:
Telecommunication interceptions may 
be perceived as a side-product of the col-
laboration between technology and law 
for the sake of security. In this respect, 
it straightforwardly poses the challenge 
to ﬁ  nd a delicate balance between the 
rights to privacy and public interest. Yet, 
the direct link between surveillance and 
criminal law complicates, if not pre-
vents, an effective democratic or inter -
national control over the wiretapping as 
an administrative tool. Thus, the judicial 
decisions play a decisive role in the per-
mitted practice of telecommunication 
interceptions, as the 2005 legal reforms 
o f  T u r k e y  r e g a r d i n g  s u r v e i l l a n c e  o v e r  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  d o  g i v e  t h e  r e q u i r e d  
authority to the judiciary. Addition-
ally, the legal standards set by the 2005 
Media are also essential to preserve our 
democratic values. Free speech is one of 
the fundamental pillars of our system. 
We depend upon media to get informa-
tion about our communities, to serve as 
an essential check on corporate and gov-
ernment power. Media consolidation is a 
real threat to democracy. A few corpora-
tions own most of the media. These huge 
conglomerates, i.e. News Corp, only care 
about the bottom line, not serving the 
public interest. Many civic associations 
(i.e. Free Press, Rainbow Push Coali-
tion) consider that, when governments 
allow these few corporations two much 
control over the ﬂ   ow of information, 
they undermine our democracy. We fo-
cus on the new legislative framework in 
US media and the consequences of the 
digital change. We analyze political and 
legal impact of these reforms. 362 363
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elicit more than a superﬁ  cial or instru-
mental deﬁ  nition. This paper takes an 
alternative philosophical approach to 
explore what ‘intellectual property’ is 
and how it is created and sustained by 
the tool of legal deﬁ  nition.
Drawing on techniques of metaphysical 
analysis, this paper presents a method of 
deﬁ  ning ‘intellectual property’ by seek-
ing to identify common features of the 
legal doctrines that are commonly clas-
siﬁ  ed as ‘intellectual property’ (ie. copy-
right, trademark, patent and design law). 
It suggests that core criteria to a ﬁ  nding 
of ‘intellectual propertyness’ are that an 
ideational object has been evidenced in a 
documented form and its scope has been 
deﬁ  ned through application of the relat-
ed concepts of ‘authorship’ and ‘original-
ity’. ‘Rights’ are then associated with the 
object. As such, intellectual property ob-
jects are legal constructs whose objects 
of regulation are created and sustained 
through the use of performative utter-
ances.
This paper explores the way in which 
scientiﬁ   c developments can challenge 
the boundaries of ‘intellectual property’, 
and how legal deﬁ  nitional  techniques 
ha v e been used to b ring dev el opm en ts 
such as genetic engineering within the 
ambit of intellectual property (eg. gene 
p a t e n t s )  o r  p u s h  i t  o u t s i d e  in t e ll e ct u al  
property (eg. rejection of patents over 
traditional knowledge), thus preserving 
the internal consistency of ‘intellectual 
property’.
Jahren mit dem Regelungsmodell der 
regulierten Selbstregulierung einver-
nehmlich gelöst: Im Rahmen der rechtli-
chen Vorgaben sind technische Normen 
der Industrie maßgeblich. Dieses aufga-
benteilende Regelungsmodell bewährte 
sich nachhaltig und wurde im Zuge der 
Einführung des New Approach 1985 als 
Maßnahme zur Einführung des Bin-
nenmarkts europaweit verankert.
Die durch die Entwicklung der Inter-
n e t t e c h n o l o g i e  s e i t  d e n  1 9 9 0 e r  J a h r e n  
bewirkte Medien- und Netzkonvergenz 
hat enorme soziale und wirtschaftliche 
Auswirkungen mit sich gebracht. Die 
rechtliche Reﬂ  exion erfolgte dabei eher 
anlassbezogen und unstet, ohne ver-
gleichbare Gebietsabgrenzung zwischen 
Informatikern und Juristen.
Immer häuﬁ  ger werden zudem an Stelle 
rechtlicher Regelungen technische Maß-
nahmen zur Lösung von entstehenden 
Konﬂ  ikten eingefordert.
Der Beitrag untersucht, ob das Modell 
der regulierten Selbstregulierung nicht 
auch im Umfeld der Internettechnologi-
en eingesetzt werden könnte bzw. wel-
che sachimmanenten Umstände eine 
direkte oder analoge Anwendung er-
schweren oder verhindern.
5.
Alexandra George (University of New 
South Wales / Australia)
The Metaphysics of Intellectual Prop-
erty and the Challenges of Scientiﬁ  c 
Progress 
Abstract:
It has been established that usual deﬁ  -
nitions of ‘intellectual property’ fail to 
such database leaks. They are not pri-
marily leaks of a single controversial act 
o r  d e c i s i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  s o m e  c o n t r o v e r -
sial acts or decisions may be revealed. 
Rather, they provide the raw data for an 
understanding of the wider culture and 
attitude of an institution, or a group of 
ofﬁ  cials. Is this a form of gossip and vo-
yeurism that raises privacy issues, or is 
there a clear public interest in exposing 
the mores of elites? Does it herald new 
form a “scientiﬁ  c journalism” as Julian 
Assange has claimed, in which the pub-
lic is provided with the raw data to inter-
pret for themselves, or do the traditional 
media remain essential intermediaries 
for the ﬁ  ltering and interpretation of the 
raw data? We will argue that databases 
allow for a different type of exposure 
and demand new standards of evalua-
tion.
4.
Peter Ebenhoch (Universität Innsbruck 
/ Austria)
Regulierte Selbstregulierung für digi-
tale Rechtsprobleme?
Abstract:
Erﬁ  ndungen und Innovationen techni-
scher Natur sind ohne soziale Veranke-
rung nicht überlebensfähig; was nützt 
z.B. ein Auto ohne Straßennetz und 
Tankstellen? Technische Artefakte be-
nötigen soziale Anschlusshandlungen 
und diese einen rechtlichen Bezugsrah-
men.
Der Streit um die Vorherrschaft zwi-
schen Juristen und Ingenieuren zur 
rechtlichen Ausgestaltung dieses tech-
nischen Umfelds wurde vor über 100 
state-made law is instrumental to kick 
off the governance and its associated ‘lo-
cal’ public sphere; the Harris decision of 
the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the ﬁ  eld of sexual harassment is dem-
onstrated as an example. Secondly, mul-
ti-partiality instead of neutral detach-
ment should be adopted as the criteria 
for impartiality to evaluate the legiti-
macy of the joint decision making proc-
ess of the ‘local’ public sphere. Thirdly, 
intermediaries, both institutional or in-
dividual, need be adequately deployed to 
connect disassociated social networks, 
especially when the breakdown of com-
munication occurs due to a gap caused 
by lack of data, information, knowledge, 
or disparity of value orientation. 
In the end, this article provides a criti-
cal analysis of the contemporary dig-
ital copyright law making based on the 
above discussion. 
3.
Wouter De Been + Khaibar Sarghandoy 
(Erasmus University, Erasmus School of 
Law Legal Theory / Netherlands)
Leaking by the Bucketload: The Nature 
of Database Leaks
Abstract:
The British expense account scandal, 
the recent revelations by Wikileaks and 
Al Jazeera’s disclosure of the Palestine 
p a p e r s  h a v e  in  c o mm o n  t h a t  t h e y  ar e  
all database leaks. Such leaks were not 
impossible before the information age 
– think of the Pentagon Papers – but 
they have become much simpler in the 
present day. The question we will ad-
dress in this paper is how to understand  364 365
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1.
Rafal Michalczak (Jagiellonian Univer-
sity, Faculty of Law and Administration 
/ Poland)
Transhuman and Posthuman – About 
Inﬂ   uence of “Cyborgisation” on Law 
and Ethical Issues
Abstract:
First I will deﬁ  ne a concept of “cyborgi-
sation” and show that it is not only an 
idea from a science-ﬁ  ction literature. To 
support this claim I will recall and de-
scribe experiments by K. Warwick and 
his team. These experiments were aimed 
to create a ﬁ  rst “cyborg”.
Considerations from ﬁ  rst part will be-
came premise to turn attention to a 
problem of human enhancement. I will 
describe a concept of “human enhance-
ment” in a wider context of a tran-
sumanism. I will show main features 
and aims of this project. I will also em-
phasize that this project is fully realistic. 
After providing a terminological back-
ground I will turn to law and ethical is-
sues connected with “cyborgisation” and 
transhumanism. The ﬁ  rst one will be so 
Especially after the development of in-
formation technologies in 20th century, 
the possibility of realizing this ambition 
has undergone a signiﬁ  cation transfor-
mation. 
The governments keep track of their 
citizen in order to ensure a rationalis-
tic regime and the security; enterprises 
monitor their clients for increasing prof-
itability, whereas employers watch their 
employees for getting a better perform-
ance. The consequence, however, is very 
clear: Individuals, whose lives are iden-
tiﬁ  ed with ﬁ  gures in cyber space … Such 
ﬁ  gures, varying from student numbers 
t o  c r e d i t  c a r d  n u m b e r s ,  g r a d u a l l y  a c -
quire an importance almost competing 
with our names. 
It should not be very easy to continue 
describing the pieces of a society, which 
consist of numbers, as “individuals”. The 
novels “1984” by Orwell, “Brave New 
World” by Huxley and “We” by Zamya-
tin depict how the government, which is 
ever-monitoring the people, can destroy 
human dignity. In an absolutely-planned 
world of mathematical exactness, there 
is no place for much needed creativity, 
accidentalness and a value that is pecu-
liar to humans: individual autonomy.
The modern individual, besieged by 
technology, is almost completely naked 
and requires a zone of protection in or-
der to conserve his/her private space and 
to continue his/her social life in differ-
ent guises. This is the principal value 
provided or promised by data protection 
law to individuals.
claim for the right to according to cer-
tain evidence of ‘rhetoric enthymeme’ in 
self-constituting themselves into nation 
movement, and have their forbidden ei-
detic meaning? With the international 
communication of information, is there 
a symbolic power appears out of the cy-
berspace, appeal to public opinion (dem-
ocratic discuss) and is forming ‘virtual 
justice’ to performances itself, as well as 
various liquid, fragile ‘surplus-plots’ for 
strengthening or breaking through their 
own minority? Thus, it does need to 
remixes ethics, economics and politics as 
a whole in a new ecological world view, 
and corresponds to the complexity of le-
gal values and structures. In this article, 
following above, we also inquire our ex-
pectation and understanding about the 
contemporary Left thought, and ask: are 
they showing themselves a tendency to 
cosmopolitanism? or regionalism? inter-
nationalism?
7.
Elif Küzeci (Bahçesehir University Fac-
ulty of Law / Turkey)
Digitized Personality: The Rise of the 
Surveillance, the Fall of the Personal 
Integrity 
Abstract:
Personal information has been impor-
tant for “others” throughout history. 
Even though the reasons and target in-
formation types change, other persons 
(spouses, relatives, friends, neighbors, 
etc.), certain communities (employers, 
associations etc.), administrators (either 
pre-modern or modern) have always 
w a n t e d  t o  k n o w  u s  m o r e  i n c l u s i v e l y .  
6.
Raylin Tsai (Department of Mass Com-
munication and General Education 
Center / Taiwan)
A Virtual Justice in the Documentary 
Film of ‘Rebiya Kadeer: The 10 Condi-
tions of Love’
Abstract:
Owing to the technological revolution 
with contemporary information com-
municating, we are now entering the hy-
brid world of (post-)modernity, of which 
consisted in a post-human condition of 
new media, digitization and internet 
environment. No matter what religion, 
ethics, politics and law are concerning, 
among that, there rises the phenomena 
of remixing values and transformation 
of ‘actual reality’ and ‘virtual reality.’ 
Yet, also this extension of Globalization 
faces its necessary end, and here is the 
question: should we expect a proposal 
of ‘worldly law’ with universal value, 
then adopt it in an adequate and perfect 
position of cosmopolitanism to treat the 
international events in our surrounding 
world? In a word, without the power of 
information communicating and circu-
lation of message in the net, then seem-
ingly, there are no any law and normal of 
virtual reality at all. Hence we highlight 
on an event of cultural expression, the 
Documentary Film of ‘Rebiya Kadeer: 
The 10 Conditions of Love’ in Film Fes-
tival, of the Uyghur movement for East 
Turkestan in Xinjiang, China, by which 
t o  i n q u i r e  i n t o  a n  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  ‘ t h e  
maximum of law with the minimum 
of universal frame,’ i.e., it is an require, 
whatever a nation is minority or not, to  366 367
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sibility of some legal substance). In the 
virtual world justice can be institutional-
ized by programming the interpretation 
of a rule as decided by court in criminal 
cases, into the network technology for 
automatic reapplication on all instances 
of the criminal phenomenon. 
The analysis adapts the perspective of 
Scandinavian Legal Realism. Automatic 
reapplication of legal decisions ema-
nating from court constitutes a fact of 
law, relating to empirical facts set by 
ICT. Furthermore, the legal principle of 
equality must be broadened with a tech-
nical dimension when applied to the net. 
The dimension is inherent in ICT and 
may be exploited by automatization for 
the purpose of justice. 
T h e  a p p r o a ch  is  n e w;  i t  tak e s  in t o  a c -
count that facts of the physical and vir-
tual worlds are not similar, maybe not 
even comparable, and opens new alleys 
of thought in relation to law and tech-
nology.
5.
Marie-Theres Tinnefeld + Friedrich 
Lachmayer (University of Applied Sci-
ences, Munich / Germany + Innsbruck 
University / Austria)
Transparency, State Taboo and Privacy. 
Some remarks on Plato’s “Simile of the 
Cave 
Abstract:
Principles can be directly expressed by 
law or may be found in jurisprudence, 
philosophy or literature. Often the prin-
ciples are contradictory, as in the case of 
transparency and the taboo of state in-
formation disclosure. There is also the 
leakage (or falsiﬁ  cation) demands how 
we should recognize individuals which 
l a w  s h o u l d  p r o t e c t s  a s  t h e y  h a v e  a n y  
rights.
If we express cyberspace as the bit of 
w orld, it will be full of bits, data, and 
ﬁ  rst of all people will appear and inhabit 
as assembly of bits, aggregate data in it. 
Of course, “right“ is the word to be spo-
ken attributedly to individuals, but the 
line of what right should be protected in 
cyberspace is drawn by considering the 
relation of the data with the others.
This case cyberspace raises, leads us to 
a more basic question. What law should 
treat cyberspace as, against real world? 
Is cyberspace the exceptional of real 
world, or the unexceptional?
4.
Inger Marie Sunde (Norwegian Police 
University College / Norway)
Criminal Law as Technical Fact: An 
Analytical Approach to Internet Crime
Abstract:
The paper offers an analysis of the nor-
mative signiﬁ   cance of automatization 
in relation to criminal law and Internet 
crime. The proposition is that automati-
zation removes the distinction between 
the legal rule as such and the actual 
application of the rule (i.e., the sub-
sumption). This is possible in the digital 
world, as opposed to the physical where 
each case must be individually appraised 
even if it is similar and perhaps identical 
to the previous one (e.g., heroin is ille-
gal, yet, in every case one has to check 
whether the alleged offence really con-
cerns heroin in order to rule out the pos-
legislation in this matter, we can easily 
ﬁ  nd out in which cases a certain party 
is protected by law. The modiﬁ  cations 
that follow such legislation can be usu-
ally found within contracts and range as 
far as intellectual property law acts lack 
the explicit solution. I shall analyze the 
examples of su ch sol u tions in th e per -
spective of effectiveness. I will also ar-
gue that the type of effectiveness that 
serves such contracts is not necessarily 
supposed to be the type that is implied 
by legal acts.
3.
Minobu Shimazu (Graduate School of 
Humanities and Social Science, Chiba 
University / Japan)
How law should treat Information and 
Communication Technologies and So-
ciety, against real world?
Abstract:
Rapid Progress in Information and Com-
munication Technologies and Society 
(ICT&S) has demanded us any treat-
ments of law.
This paper claims that we should turn 
our eye’s to the fact ICT&S is pressing to 
alter some major conceptions of modern 
law : the limit and possibility of jurisdic-
tion, private ownership, modern self on 
which modern law is based, and so on, 
as some study of Information ethics tells 
us so. 
F o r  e xam p l e ,  if  s o m e  da ta  w hi ch  can -
not be possibly said to be ownershiped, 
were leaked or prevailed, how and by 
what reason should law treat? And, who 
should be protected by law? In both the-
oritical phase and practical cases, data 
called “morphological freedom” consid-
ered by people involved in transuman-
ism as a civil law. I will highlight which 
parts of theory of law could be affected 
by realization of mentioned law. Espe-
cially I will focus on concept of “person” 
which could change in greatest degree. 
The second one will be “cognitive liber-
ty” considered as extension of freedom 
of thought. It will be shown in context of 
augmented cognition – one of the tran-
shumanists purpose – as issue affecting 
on concept of responsibility. 
I will summarize my considerations by 
stressing that technological changes in-
cluded in transumanism could have in-
ﬂ  u en ce  o n  co n cep ts  fro m  ea ch  area  o f  
theory of law.
2.
Aleksandra Samonek (Jagiellonian Uni-
versity / Poland)
Elaboration of a work. A gametheoreti-
cal analysis of intellectual property law
Abstract:
My paper aims to analyze the conﬂ  ict 
connected with the elaboration of a work, 
that is the one between the author of a 
source work and the author of its elabo-
ration (e.g. translation). The problem can 
be reformulated in terms of the economi-
cal analysis of law (in this case, intellec-
tual property law), which can provide 
us with a clearer view of the kind of ef-
fectiveness intended within the constitu-
tion of legal acts concerning the ﬁ  eld and 
the formulation of contracts between the 
original authors and the parties willing to 
elaborate the source work.
By taking a closer look at the European  368 369
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ments to this ‘liberal’ position are then 
shown to be ﬂ  awed, or simply too weak 
to overcome the strong case for parental 
freedom with respect to PGD. A princi-
pal theme in the analysis is that moral 
considerations which may reasonably be 
taken into account by those considering 
whether or not to avail themselves of the 
opportunities which PGD does, or may 
in the future, make available to them, 
are erroneously used to make a case for 
legal restrictions which are based on no 
more than personal moral preferences, 
anxieties or dislikes.
3.
Joao Chaves (Federal Public Defender’s 
Ofﬁ  ce School / Brazil)
Law inside biopolitics as a conceptual 
problem: a new approach on Foucault, 
Agamben and Negri 
Abstract:
The concept of biopolitics has its origin 
in the Michel Foucault works developed 
from 1975 to 1979, when he introduced 
the foundations for a new approach of a 
modern government, based in both cres-
cent correctional practices on individu-
als and the control of populations. The 
theme has attracted the attention of some 
critical political studies, with many prac-
tical uses. However, there is not enough 
consolidation about biopolitics as a con-
cept and a comprehensive theory of the 
new political mechanisms. This uncer-
tainness is more evident when the very 
role of Law is questioned in a biopoliti-
cal model, due to the archaic nature that 
Foucault gives to it. Therefore, the aim of 
the paper is to identify the theorethical 
seem to comply with the international 
s t a n d a r d s ,  i t  i s  y e t  h a r d  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  
the same is true for the issues related to 
the bioethics which has still been a ne-
glected area in Turkey so far. Especially 
ethical concerns related to the women’s 
rights deserves more attention and need-
less to say more regulation.
2.
Tom Campbell (Charles Sturt University 
/ Australia)
The Liberal Case for Permitting Pre-
implantation Genetic Diagnosis
Abstract:
Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis 
(PGD) is a process of selecting embryos 
arising from in vitro fertilisation (IVF) 
for implantation in a womb and the in-
tended development and birth of a child, 
the selection being done on the basis of 
scientiﬁ  c evidence relating to the genetic 
constitution of the embryos available for 
implantation. This distinguishes PGD 
from both pre-natal diagnosis followed 
by the termination of the pregnancy, and 
from genetic alteration of embryos. This 
paper is a critique of state regulation of 
PGD which points to some weaknesses 
in reasoning commonly used to support 
narrow and restrictive regulative control 
of PGD. It sets out a presumptive case 
for broad parental reproductive rights 
with respect to PGD along the lines that 
prospective parents should be free to 
take such steps as they think ﬁ  t to have 
what they regard as healthy and capable 
children, provided this does not cause 
undeniable serious harm to these chil-
dren or to other people. Counter argu-
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Session 1
1.
F a t m a l  I r e m  C a g l a r  G u r g e y  ( K o c a e l i  
University Law School / Turkey)
New Reproductive Technologies in 
Turkey and Bioethics Regulations
Abstract:
As advancements in reproductive tech-
nology have been at a break neck speed 
for the past few decades in the world as 
well as in Turkey, the Turkish govern-
ment introduced detailed regulations in 
particular with regards to the technical 
aspects of reproductive technology and 
regulatory oversight of the medical in-
stitutions. Although these regulations 
matter of business secret and disclosure.
We are also concerned with privacy and 
disclosure of information at the individ-
ual level. sense and purpose of privacy 
may compliment each other. As we all 
know, the rise of cyberspace blures the 
distinction between privacy and public. 
The core value of privacy in personal live 
is fading.
The development of the internet and of 
the social networks can alter the once 
apparently stable legal situation, bring-
ing a new dynamic into play in both 
state and individual spheres. In the con-
text of the internet it is as though the se-
cret workings of the state are projected 
on its “walls and facades”, reminding us 
of Plato’s “ Simile of the Cave”. As Plato 
described, disillusionment and reﬂ  exive 
defensiveness can follow. 370 371
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ance is neglected and the Courts operate 
without the necessary critique of legal 
doctrine. The recognition of these limi-
tations and the adoption of new theo-
retical and philosophical references are 
essential. The research of the Brazilian 
Supreme Court decisions on questions of 
Bioethics is an interesting way to empiri-
cally analyze the problem and compare 
with the solutions of legal doctrine.
Session 2
7.
Anna Vezeleva (Saint-Petersburg State 
University / Russia)
Biopolitics and social-psychological 
approach to Law as a methodology
studying Law as psy-technology
Abstract:
The article is an attempt to apply the con-
cept of power and biopolitics of Michel 
Foucault as one of the possible meth-
odologies for studying the evolution of 
modern government practices, the foun-
dation of which is targeted psychotronic 
and information impact on the collective 
consciousness. In addition, we consider 
the functional role of law as a mecha-
nism for orientation behavior of subjects 
in the communicative interaction. In the 
evolution of concept of power Foucault 
can be distinguished, depending on the 
intentions of the authorities, two main 
stages: disciplinary power over the body 
and biopower – the power of conscious-
ness and life itself. However, we consider 
the development of socio-psychological 
approach to the law, presented by Rus-
sian scientists, lawyers, Leo Petrazycki 
these principles to biomedical cases with 
conﬂ   icting interests in order to deter-
mine which of them must be preferred. 
Therefore, instead of the different, varied 
moralities coexisting in our globalized 
societies, it would seem possible to agree 
on a minimal, procedural Ethics that 
would enable us to solve our biomedi-
cal moral dilemmas. Yet, is the agree-
ment on the Four Principles so universal 
as Principlism claims? Can they subsist 
divorced from the substantive compre-
hensions of the good life? And – more 
interesting – does Principlism enables us 
to solve hard bioethical cases?
6.
Otavio Luiz Rodrgues-Junior (Federal 
Fluminense University / Brazil)
Life, Science and Law: Dialogues and 
Shortcomings
Abstract:
The human personality begins at the 
hour of birth. This is an axiomatic truth 
that several Civil Codes repeat, in order 
to establish legal certainty to natural 
phenomenon. Technological develop-
ments, introduction of new means of 
reproduction and of different uses for 
the human genetic material overcome 
traditional legal concepts. Legal regula-
tion of this theme has three characteris-
tics: a) legislative principles of minimal 
intervention; b) judicialization; c) use 
of biological or philosophical categories 
made by the judges. Philosophy of Law 
has failed to contribute to the Civil Law 
for the renewal of theoretical frame-
works derived from Bioethics. So the 
legal function of the legislator as guid-
reproductive ‘forum shopping’. Depart-
ing from this empirical diagnosis, I will 
highlight the evaluative and normative 
issues at stake for the couples and indi-
viduals involved. In particular I will re-
ﬂ  ect upon the concepts of reproductive 
autonomy and reproductive justice and 
ask whether they are (or rather: should 
be) seen as part of the right to establish 
a family or the right to respect for one’s 
private and family life. From a primarily 
German perspective, I will thus illustrate 
the tensed relationship between medical 
and technological progress, individual 
rights and democratic biopolitical deci-
sion-making within a multilevel legal 
order. I then go on to analyse recent pro-
posals of how legislators can meet these 
challenges in a way respecting both the 
requirements of legal ethics and democ-
racy. To this end, I propose and discuss a 
tableau of potential normative critera of 
good biopolitical law-making that possi-
bly may not only apply to ART regula-
tion.
5.
Carolina Pereira Sáez (Universidad de A 
Coruña / Spain)
“Principlism: Bioethics as a Proce-
dure?“
Abstract:
«Principlism», a particular comprehen-
sion of Bioethics inﬂ   uenced by Rawls’ 
Theory of Impartiality, tries to address 
the problem of the multiplicity of moral 
codes in our societies. To this end, four 
general moral principles are proposed 
as universally accepted. Principlism un-
derstands Bioethics as the application of 
comprehension of biopolitics in two con-
temporary authors – Giorgio Agamben 
and Antonio Negri – to show the differ-
ences among them and the original idea 
of Michel Foucault. I propose that both 
Agamben and Negri have the same difﬁ  -
culties to deal with legal theory and Law 
inside biopolitics. After a critical review 
on selected works of these three authors, 
I conclude that a settlement of the con-
cepts of Law and biopolitics depends on 
(i) the surpassing of the Foucaldian ver-
sion of Law as sovereignty, (ii) a clear 
delimitation of a common core among 
the authors and (iii) the research and af-
ﬁ  rmation of the concept of Law in Ag-
amben and Negri, better reﬁ  ned  than 
in Foucault’s one. A right answer to this 
last point can be decisive to a biopolitical 
understanding of Law.
4.
Katja Stoppenbrink (Université du Lux-
embourg / Luxemburg)
Reproductive technologies, parental 
choice and legal limbo. On the ethics of 
biopolitical law-making
Abstract:
The legal landscape regulating assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART) such 
as in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and intra-
cytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) is a 
very rocky and rutted terrain both on a 
worldwide and a European scale. Faced 
with a situation of legal limbo as far as, 
e.g., age restrictions, cryopreservation 
options and prenatal screening prohibi-
tions are concerned, desperate childless 
would-be parents increasingly resort to 
fertility clinic tourism that amounts to  372 373
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premises his rejection on teleological 
grounds which also serve to justify its 
own obligations, permissions and prohi-
bitions on genetic engineering. But the 
i d e a  o f  a u t o n o m y  San d e l  re j e cts  is  th e  
conventional one which Kantians argue 
is confused and mistaken. But, even as-
suming Kantians can agree on Kant’s 
clear and correct idea of autonomy, 
which is not free of controversy, the cru-
cial question which this paper explores 
is left open: Can teleological grounds 
justify the regulation of genetic engi-
neering against Kant’s idea of autonomy 
properly understood?
WORKING GROUP
WG 22 
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Session 1
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location IG 0.457
Chair Lohmann, Ulrich (Berlin / 
Gemany)
Session 2
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time 15.30 h – 18.00 h
Location IG 0.457
Chair Montero-Sanchez, Sara 
(Madrid / Spain)
integrated with the “Interim Measures 
on Management of Human Genetic Re-
sources” and the most recent of draft 
“Regulations for the Administration of 
Human Genetic Resource.” This discus-
sion will outline core essential problems 
related to the protection of human ge-
netic resources and explore options for 
selecting reasonable management and 
protection policies including: (1) issues 
on “Right to Know”, privacy protection, 
beneﬁ  t sharing and intellectual property 
protection in obtaining and conserv-
ing genetic resources. (2) balancing the 
interests and coordinating the relation-
ships between individuals, families, 
researchers, and national interests in 
terms of the “consent” and manage-
ment of providing genetic resources. (3) 
the design of framework and policies for 
coordinating legal, regulatory, and tech-
nical aspects for the development of hu-
man genetic resources for biotechnology.
9.
Eugene Dais (University of Calgary / 
Canada)
Kant On Autonomy And The Case Of 
Genetic Engineering: The Teleological 
Challenge
Abstract:
The continuing and contentious debate 
over the use of scientiﬁ  c research and 
medical technologies to alter the hu-
man genetic structure (DNA) widely 
use the idea of autonomy convention-
a l l y  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  K a n t  t o  d e f e n d  h o w  
genetic engineering should be regulated. 
Michael Sandel famously rejects the idea 
of autonomy as itself morally wrong. He 
respect for human dignity. Therefore 
r e g u l a t i o n s  s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  t h a t  c o n -
sider the legal, technical, and ethical is-
sues, inherent in the collection, process-
ing, storage, and use related to human 
genetic resources.
China has one of the richest human 
genetic resources in the world and has 
attached great importance to its conser-
vation. Protecting the human genetic 
resources in China and safeguarding the 
national gene resource for human health 
has taken on signiﬁ  cant strategic impor-
tance. However, the legal framework 
for this protection of human genetic re-
sources appears to lag behind. As early 
as June 10, 1998, the Ministry of Sci-
ence and Technology and the Ministry 
of Public Health jointly formulated the 
“Interim Measures on Management of 
Human Genetic Resources”, but it still 
cannot meet the needs for the develop-
ment of biotechnology. To this end, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology has 
been actively promoting the drafting and 
revising of “Regulations for the Admin-
istration of Human Genetic Resources”. 
In 2009, the “Action Plan on Intellec-
tual Property Protection in China” has 
set clear requirements for “accelerating 
the drafting of the Regulations for the 
Administration of Human Genetic Re-
sources, improving the system of the 
protection, development and utilization 
of human genetic resources as required 
by law and creating a reasonable mecha-
nism in access to and beneﬁ  t-sharing ge-
netic resources.”
This paper will discuss issues related to 
China’s current legislation and practice, 
an d  Ni ch o l a s  Tim a s h e ff .  B o th  o f  th e s e  
approaches (biopolitics and social-psy-
chological approach to law) are pre-
sented as one of the supposed key ideas 
in the way of the study modern psycho-
technology, including the author’s at-
tempt to consider law itself and the 
practice of his constituents as a tool of 
psychological inﬂ  uence. The paper also 
contains the author’s assessment of the 
possible practical signiﬁ  cance of the pro-
posed approach and analysis of examples 
of psy-technologies in the modern infor-
mation society.
8.
Chunyan Wu (Huazhong Univ. of Sci-
ence & Tech. / China) + Haibin Qi 
(Huazhong Univ. of Science & Tech. / 
China) + Xiaoning Fan (Yale University 
/ USA)
On legal protection of human genetic 
resources – from a China’s legislation 
and practice perspective
Abstract:
While biotechnology has had a broad 
impact and far-reaching consequences 
in human health, the biotechnology in-
dustry has a strong dependency on hu-
man genetic resources. As human genet-
ic resources are important for the future 
of biotechnology progress and can be 
viewed as an irreplaceable strategic re-
source, there is a undeniable basis to ob-
tain intellectual property rights. Howev-
er, it is not easy to balance the protection 
of human genetic resource intellectual 
property needed by the biotechnology 
industry, with reasonable and practical 
observance of basic human rights and  374 375
ABSTRACTS
Working Groups
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
–
 
A
b
s
t
r
a
c
t
s
that this medication can deter sexual of-
fences by decreasing offenders’ sexual 
drive. It must be pointed out, however, 
that this medication is merely grounded 
on biological reductionism and a sexual-
ity interpretation, which is centered on 
genitals and heterosexuality.
4.
Ulrich Lohmann (Alice-Salomon-Hoch-
schule Berlin / Germany)
Das neue Gesetz über Patientenverfü-
gungen in Deutschland – ein Überblick
Abstract:
Der Deutsche Bundestag hat 2009 ein 
Gesetz über Patientenverfügungen ver-
abschiedet. Dem war eine lange wech-
selhafte Entwicklung und eine bis zu-
letzt streitige Diskussion vorausgegangen. 
Kernpunkte der Auseinandersetzung 
waren u.a. der Indizcharakter bzw. die 
bindende Wirkung einer früheren Wil-
lenserklärung, Formerfordernisse, Gel-
tung in jeder Lebenslage oder nur bei 
nahendem Tod, eine vorlaufende Pﬂ  icht, 
sich aufklären und beraten zu lassen oder 
schließlich die Beteiligung der Betreu-
ungsgerichte bei der Umsetzung von Pa-
tientenverfügungen. Im Falle des Fehlens 
einer (hinreichenden) Patientenverfü-
gung haben Patientenvertreter (Betreuer, 
Bevollmächtigter) Behandlungswünsche 
bzw. hilfsweise den mutmaßlichn Willen 
des Patienten festzustellen und auf dieser 
Grundlage zu entscheiden.
5.
Ana Maria Marcos + José Ramón DIEZ 
(Department of Philosophie of Law, Fac-
ulty of Law / Spain)
Abstract:
This paper aims a critical overview of 
how medical and criminal law knowl-
edge came to be in collusion with each 
other as discursive powers in a recent 
Korean enactment of July 2010 for pun-
ishing sex offenders who are described 
as ‘monsters’. The Law on Medication for 
Sex Offenders Sexual Impulse stipulates 
that the court can order chemical cas-
tration treatment for a patient of sexual 
perversion who raped a person under 16 
and has the risk of recidivism.
While under discussion in the legisla-
ture, the law on chemical castration was 
supported by many citizens arguing for 
physical castration because of their rage 
to child sex offenders. Chemical castra-
tion order holds the meaning of strong 
‘punishment’ for offenders, but can be 
justiﬁ  ed as a ‘treatment’ according to the 
professional arguments with expertise 
on law, psychology, medical science. In 
other words, While treating sexual of-
fence as a disease, chemical castration 
attempts to inﬂ  ict a harsh punishment 
on sexual offenders in the name of treat-
ment. 
According to the law, the court selects 
appropriate sex offenders for the medi-
cation depending on the diagnosis of a 
psychiatrist. Medication used through 
the court’s order is a ‘treatment’ which 
brings physical changes in offenders’ 
body, eventually with some side effects, 
however, surprisingly it is performed 
without their consent. Medication for 
sexual impulse is the same hormone 
drug employed by males who want to 
be a transgender. Medical experts argue 
Perspecitve that can allow us to follow 
closely the various implications ELSI 
(Ethical, Legal and Social Implications) 
that can be derived.
2.
Hasan Atilla Güngör (Istanbul Kultur 
University / Turkey)
The Effect of the science on „person-
hood“ debate; „when does human life 
begin?”
Abstract:
The beginning of “human life” or “per-
sonhood” has been one of the most con-
t r o v e r s i a l  i s s u e s  f o r  s c i e n c e ,  r e l i g i o n s ,  
philosophy and law in the last century 
and probably it will be so in this century 
too. The technological and scientiﬁ  c de-
velopments on this matter will keep the 
heat of the debate just as before, because 
they are generally used to inﬂ  uence 
public opinion and to shape the law on 
matters related to “beginning of the hu-
man life”, such as abortion. Thus, these 
scientiﬁ  c-based arguments have the po-
tential to inﬂ  uence, limit or enhance the 
scope of human rights and especially of 
the rights of women. This work will dis-
cuss the inﬂ  uence of technological and 
scientiﬁ  c developments on the debates of 
abortion and on the law regulating it in 
a chronological perspective.
3.
Jihye Kim (Ewha Institute for Biomedi-
cal Law & Ethics / Republic of Korea)
Chemical Castration Treatment for 
Sex Offenders: Bio-Medical Power’s 
Wrongful Encountering with the Pow-
er of Criminal Justice
Lectures:
Session 1
1.
Javier Blàzquez (Universidad Pública de 
Navarra / Spain)
Legal philosophical implications of 
nanotechnology applied to the ﬁ  eld of 
health
Abstract:
Nanotechnologies have seen a constant 
development in recent years. Its vari-
ous and numerous applications open 
endless possibilities, both in the car 
and computer industry, like in the en-
vironment and telecommunications. 
The same can be said referring to the 
speciﬁ  c ﬁ  eld of health in which nanote-
chnology will greatly inﬂ  uence when it 
comes to establish more accurate clini-
cal diagnoses, or prevent the onset of 
disease and facilitate various therapies. 
They will also enable design and pro-
duce speciﬁ  c prostheses that may con-
tribute to improve the quality of life for 
people affected by various pathologies. 
But at the same time that the nanom-
edicine opens up multiple possibili-
ties, it is also a unavoidable challenge 
to legal analyse, which can not remain 
outside the rise of these new technolo-
gies. If their potential is not regulated 
and channeled, in some cases the re-
spect and the protection of fundamen-
t a l  r i g h t s  s u c h  a s  d i g n i t y ,  i n t i m a c y  
and privacy could be affected. Hence 
the need and desirability of explicitily 
raise the relationship between applica-
tions of nanotechnology and the ﬁ  eld of 
health, from a legal philosopher view.  376 377
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of responsibility and the precautionary 
principle
Abstract:
The approach to science and technology 
as a paradigm of change shows how per-
ceptions of scientiﬁ  c and technological 
progress, although they are permeable, 
are charged with fear because science 
and technology are viewed with am-
bivalence.
The limiting components formulated in 
this paper are the resistances or limita-
tions to autonomy and the true determi-
nants and motors of decisions regarding 
biotechnological applications. For this, 
the main objectives of this paper are to 
attempt to establish, ﬁ  rst of all, the as-
sociation and the kind of relationship 
that exist between information and au-
tonomy, in second place, those that exist 
between responsibility and autonomy; 
in third place, between freedom and au-
tonomy; in fourth place the relationship 
between the precautionary principle and 
the principle of autonomy and ﬁ  nally, 
those that exist between the social link 
and autonomy. 
Context:
During the 1980s, the German philoso-
pher Hans Jonas further developed the 
ethical implications of vorsogeprinzip, 
and it subsequently entered the English 
language as the precautionary principle. 
Jonas argued that, formerly, humans 
were a part of nature. They understood 
t h e m s e l v e s  a s  i n t e g r a l  t o  n a t u r e ,  a n d  
could not act so as to seriously disrupt 
their environment. The Enlightenment 
revolutions in science, technology and 
economics changed that way of think-
gung und Ehrgeiz verbunden. Um den 
Forschungsgegenstand in diesem Sin-
ne präzise einzugrenzen, beschränken 
wir uns auf die Analyse der juristisch-
philosophischen Sprache und Ideologie, 
die zum Thema der „Euthanasie“ und 
des Rechts damals entwickelt wurden. 
Um dieses Thema zu vertiefen, muss 
man auch Fragen der Soziologie und 
Geschichte der politischen Ideen be-
trachten, auch wenn die Analyse sich 
darauf beschränkt, die Hauptthemen, 
Argumente und Gründe aus rechtstheo-
retischer Sicht darzustellen und kritisch 
zu beleuchten. Vorliegende Darstellung 
soll folgende vier Aspekte beinhalten: 
a) Darstellung im Überblick der Situa-
tion bis etwa 1850 sowie Formulierung 
von Hauptzügen und -ideen im Zusam-
menhang mit den Begriffen Recht, „Eu-
thanasie“ und Eugenik, b) Vertiefung 
des sozialen Darwinismus, der Eugenik 
und der Rassenhygiene im Rahmen des 
biologischen Positivismus und der fo-
rensischen Anthropologie, c) bestimm-
te rechtstheoretische Auffassungen von 
Franz von Liszt und Karl Binding als 
hauptsächliche Vorläufer der unmittel-
bar darauf folgenden Ereignisse, d) Be-
wertung der Entwicklung der vorhin 
deﬁ   nierten Bereiche sowie Auslegung 
der Faktoren, die den schrittweisen mo-
ralischen Niedergang jener Epoche be-
günstigten.
Session 2
7.
Sara Montero-Sanchez (UNED / Spain)
Autonomy in Bioethics: the principle 
not become out-dated by developments 
on science and technology.
From another point of view, but closely 
related to technology, following aspects 
should also be mentioned: the way living 
will records work, the possibility to use 
electronic records and, overall, the ac-
cess to the data contained on the records 
that may affect the privacy of individu-
als.
And last, it will also be proposed the pos-
sibility to create a European living will 
record. Since in an open society where 
citizens are constantly moving across 
different countries and the existence of 
the European convention on Human 
Rights and biomedicine (Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Dignity of the Human Being with regard 
to the Application of Biology and Medi-
cine, made in Oviedo, 4th April 1977), it 
should be ensured the effective applica-
tion of the individual’s autonomy prin-
ciple and respect, in any country within 
the European Union, their wills that 
have been freely expressed.
6.
José-Antonio Santos (Universität Rey 
Juan Carlos / Spain)
Philosophie des Strafrechts, Rechts-
positivismus und Eugenik in der Wei-
marer Republik
Abstract:
Der Versuch, die Gesamtheit der zer-
streuten Doktrinen und Ideen des phi-
losophisch-juristischen und strafrecht-
lichen Denkens, welches zu Zeiten der 
Weimarer Republik entwickelt wurde, 
zu systematisieren, ist mit viel Anstren-
Bioethics and Healt Law: the living 
will. Proposal to create a Living Will 
Record in Europe
Abstract:
Developments in science and technology 
have strongly contributed to one of the 
main human’s aspirations: to increase 
people’s life expectancy. However, this 
phenomenon is resulting in new situa-
tions where individuals are deprived of 
their capacity and autonomy to decide 
whether to apply a medical treatment or 
not. 
For this reason, the ﬁ  gure of the “living 
will” is of particular signiﬁ  cance,  al-
lowing individuals to express their will 
if they are deprived of that capacity. In 
other words, the living will represents a 
form of consent in advance of a possible 
future event regarding the application of 
any medical treatment.
The ﬁ  gure of the so-called “living will” 
is not exempt from controversy and big 
questions, such as issues related to the 
truly autonomy of the individual that 
draws it up, is it possible to be done by 
minors? is it possible to appoint a per-
son to act on their behalf in those cases? 
What is the role of the representatives? 
Should they be a mere guardian of the 
will previously expressed by the indi-
vidual?, or are they allowed to replace 
their will? 
Another important aspect that has to be 
taken into account in order to ensure the 
individual’s autonomy (as an essential 
bioethics’ principle), is determined by 
whether to introduce the legal require-
ment of regularly updating the living 
will, so that those legal documents do  378 379
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ines the questions posed by recent tech-
nological developments and provides 
insights into the ways the whole law is 
transformed by policy decisions at the 
intersection of law and technology. They 
discuss how legal analysis should adopt 
a ﬂ  exible and forward-looking approach 
that broadly considers the interplay be-
tween technology and law to protect val-
ues and interests when they are threat-
ened by technological developments. 
Recognizing that the interplay between 
law and technology is complex and in-
teractive, an increased cooperation 
among the members of the legal and sci-
entiﬁ  c professions is advocated to rem-
edy the lack of understanding on the 
part of scientists about the role of law . 
The fundamental point that scientists 
a s  w e ll  a s  l a wy e rs  m u s t  un d e rs tan d  i s  
that both the dialectic method of law 
and the empiric method of science are 
merely means of gathering and helping 
to organize data, and that date may an-
swer some speciﬁ   c questions but they 
do not provide answers to all problems, 
particularly of the kind with which law 
and government deal. As the empiric 
and dialectic are complementary meth-
ods, and as there is a growing need for 
the study and use of science in law, no 
science is coming to the stage where it 
confronts problems that cannot be met 
wholly by its own methods. Despite the 
protestations of some scientists that sci-
ence is inherently ethical, science is now 
confronting problems which are neither 
soluble by any empirical data nor by any 
of the principles inherent in the empiric 
method. It cannot be claimed that the 
Less dramatically, but just as thoroughly, 
law has permeated modern life. Law, al-
though it has sometimes been called a 
“science”, has little in common with the 
quantitative study of physical phenom-
ena that is generally denoted by the term 
science. Initially, both law and science 
seem to have relied more on prayer and 
incantation than on observation. Today, 
science is empirical, law is dialectical. 
Science is descriptive, law is normative 
or prescriptive. Conclusions in science 
are always probable and tentative. Con-
clusions in law are usually certain and 
dogmatic. Science is necessarily inde-
pendent of politics and ideologies, law is 
increasingly becoming a part of politics. 
Law has always been dependent upon 
legislation which is a political phenom-
enon. But is the legal rule scientiﬁ  c?
Law still inﬂ  uences and reacts to tech-
nological change. Technological devel-
opments can undermine important in-
terests the law seeks to protect. Given 
a current or anticipated technological 
landscape, how can legal rules ensure 
that fundamental values are protected? 
Science and Technology Studies, for 
instance, investigate how social, politi-
cal, and cultural values affect scientiﬁ  c 
research and technological innovation, 
and how these in turn affect society, pol-
itics, and culture. STS seeks to overcome 
the divisions, particularly between the 
two cultures of humanities (interpretive 
inquiry) and natural sciences (rational 
analysis). 
Other scholars stress the need for the 
development of a proper theory of law 
and technology which critically exam-
Autonomy is something that is gradual 
and dynamic. It is an issue of degree not 
only because of the information, but 
also because of the consideration of how 
push and limiting factors, which make 
this an issue of degrees, are articulated. 
 Autonomy and information in liberal 
bioethics:
The contractual basis on which liberal 
bioethics stands has judicialized the 
philosophical concepts of this discipline.
The apparent reduction of autonomy to 
information has been promoted by in-
formed consent as the way this exalta-
tion of information materializes and as 
the formula that promotes autonomous 
decisions.
8. 
Sieglinde Pommer (Oxford University 
Faculty of Law / UK)
Regulating Responsibility: Health Law 
in the Wake of Science and Technology
Abstract:
Both law and sci-tech have had an im-
mense impact on modern society. Our 
social environment has been created and 
shaped by science, technology, as well as 
law. Most obvious have been the techno-
logical changes. Science and technology 
are not separate ﬁ  elds but merely differ-
ent aspects of the same discipline. Tech-
nology can be understood as applied sci-
ence; science being the theoretical and 
research sibling of technology. Modern 
science depends upon technology and 
technology is helpless without science. 
Indeed, the distinction is not always evi-
dent, as is also reﬂ  ected in the abbrevia-
tion “sci-tech”.
ing and our capacity to destroy the en-
vironment upon which society depends. 
We humans are now able to intervene in 
nature in ways not previously possible. A 
number of these technological interven-
tions can cause irreversible harm to hu-
man health and that this demands more 
sustained ethical reﬂ   ection from every 
stakeholder, those who beneﬁ  t and those 
who are harmed by these technologies. 
Jonas proposed that humans now suffer 
from an ethical gap, and that traditional 
understandings of ethics do not provide 
sufﬁ  cient guidance. In his mind, the gap 
exists between our technological capabil-
ities and our capacity for exercising moral 
responsibility, to other forms of life and 
future generations. Jonas and the pre-
cautionary principle offer a major contri-
bution from the ﬁ  eld of applied bioethics, 
and address a fundamental challenge of 
environmental ethics: most ethical prin-
ciples were created to arbitrate problems 
within the human community.
Research Problem:
The autonomy of the subject of bioethics, 
being an abstract formulation, is a prob-
lem that cannot be observed directly; it 
thus needs to be made into something 
that can be dealt with using research 
tools. 
Thus, it is not autonomy that is observed, 
but rather: 
1) the components from which autono-
my has been constructed 
2) the way these components are articu-
lated 
3) and also the relationship of the «unit 
o f  o b s e r v a t i o n »  t o  c o n c r e t e  a s p e c t s  o f  
the problem. 380 381
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Session 1
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time 15.30 h – 18 h
Location RUW 1.301
Chair De Paula Oliveira, Maria 
Lucia (Rio de Janeiro / 
Brazil)
Session 2
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time 15.30 h – 18 h
Location RUW 1.302
Chair Kabashima, Hiroshi 
(Sendai / Japan)
Lectures:
Session 1
1.
Jaqueline Sena (University of São Paulo 
/ Brazil)
The relations between legal doctrine 
and technology: an analysis of the inef-
fectiveness of environmental law
Abstract:
The close relationship between law and 
ethics, science and technology is evi-
dent when the problem of preserving the 
environment is discussed. And in this 
case, countries like Brazil, which have 
important natural resources, appear in 
the center of this debate. However, the 
effectiveness of environmental law is 
questioned when the technical and le-
gal instruments that aim to preserve the 
b e  s e e n  a s  an  in t e r e s t  in  t h e  F e in b e r -
gian sense. If death is an interest, then 
the physician’s role in the death, patient 
consent, and the difference between 
killing and letting die comes to the fore 
in a new light. 
My paper argues from Feinberg’s moral 
limits of the law for death to be an inter-
est. If death is seen as an interest, then a 
number of things follow. First, consent 
would be absolutely essential to one’s in-
terest in death. Second, if death were an 
interest, it would have to be regulated. 
Everyone considering suicide would re-
quire counseling, and this counseling 
is more likely to prevent people from 
mistakenly ending their lives. Third, if 
death were seen as an interest, and if 
the proper requirements of consent and 
counseling were met, then the physi-
cian’s role in the death would not be 
considered a harm, but furthering an 
interest. If death were an interest, the 
moral preference for allowing death in a 
patient would no longer have the same 
hold over killing a terminally ill patient 
at the patient’s request.
rent thoughts and repetetive ritualistic 
behaviours typical of OCD, the patient 
nonetheless felt much better. He indicat-
ed to feel more cheerful and optimistic 
and to think and deliberate more clearly 
than before the start of the treatment. 
We ask: ought the doctor to continue the 
treatment? We will consider this ques-
tion from different perspectives: the 
moral obligations typical of the medical 
professions, the autonomy of the patient 
and the professional, and the justice and 
fairness of access to health care. Finally, 
we will reﬂ  ect upon the impact of this 
discussion for the general discussion on 
cognitive and affective human enhance-
ment.
10.
Sophia Stone (Purdue University / USA)
Death as Legal Problem in the Age of 
Medical Science 
Abstract:
From the beginning of the Hippocratic 
Oath born in S. Italy, 5th Century B.C.E, 
doctors have taken an oath not to harm 
their patients. Killing a patient is gen-
erally thought of as harming a patient. 
If we look at Joel Feinberg’ s deﬁ  nition 
of harm, he narrowly deﬁ  nes harm as 
unjustly impeding another’s interest. 
Following Mill, Feinberg argues that 
the moral limit in allowing the law to 
impede one’s liberty is when the law 
prevents that individual from harming 
others. The question my research ad-
dresses is not whether a person’s auton-
omy entails that she has a right to die, 
as arguments for euthanasia seem to do, 
but rather whether one’s own death can 
dialectic method of law will provide sci-
entists with any sure guide to a proper 
course in problem areas, any more than 
employment of the empiric method 
will provide certain solutions to legal 
problems. However, as the underlying 
concepts of the empiric method are ap-
propriate, and perhaps indispensable, to 
consideration of some of the problems 
confronting the law, so concepts of the 
legal dialectic are equally applicable to 
such ethical problems of science. 
New developments in science and tech-
nology require us to make value judg-
ments. This is a dynamic process that 
continually adjusts to the changes 
caused by new knowledge of science and 
by new tools of technology. Taking ex-
amples from the ﬁ  eld of health law, one 
of the areas where science and technol-
ogy produce some of the most difﬁ  cult 
problems, we explore in how far sci-tech 
and law are rival systems, investigate 
the changed role of law in the wake of 
science and techonology, highlighting 
an  e t hi c s  o f  r e s p o n s i b ili ty  b e y o n d  ri s k  
regulation suitable for our area of legal 
globalization.
9.
Anton Vedder + Laura Klaming (Tilburg 
University / Netherlands)
Moral Responsibilities and Accidental 
Enhancement
Abstract:
A patient with severe Obsessive Com-
pulsive Disorder (OCD) receives Deep 
Brain Stimulation (DBS) treatment. 
While the treatment soon turned out to 
be ineffective with regard to the recur- 382 383
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indigenous rights to a wider set of con-
cerns about local and regional autonomy, 
security, and sustainability. It does this 
in three ways. First, it utilizes the notion 
of ecological regions (rather than states) 
to legitimate sovereignty claims against 
existing states, under certain conditions. 
Second, it rejects the ideal of the nation-
state in favor of a concept of state legiti-
macy rooted in local and regional com-
munities, ecologically deﬁ  ned.  Third, 
it combines the concern for indigenous 
life worlds with similar concerns about 
the security of intact environments and 
the sustainability of local forms of devel-
opment. In these ways, the principle of 
ecosovereignty establishes a new agenda 
for international and environmental law.
5.
Shizhong Zhou (Guangxi Normal Uni-
versity / China)
The Development of Laboratory Ani-
mal Science and Animal Care of Legis-
lation and Consummation
Abstract:
Laboratory animal science is the use of 
non-human animals in experiments to 
obtain new knowledge and new tech-
n o l o g i e s  i n  b i o m e d i c a l  r e s e a r c h  a n d  
testing. In order to develop science and 
technology, the human carried out a 
large number of animal experiments, 
theses experiments greatly expanded 
the vision of related research ﬁ  eld, and 
make a great contribution to human be-
ings. Meanwhile, animal experiments 
also bring us a certain extent of negative 
effects. Countries around the world have 
adopted legislative measures to regulate 
simultaneity and immediateness do not 
answer to the new dimension of human 
action, therefore demanding an ethics of 
prediction and responsibility for the for-
mulation of new limits with high reach, 
due to the amplitude of human power 
and the need for anticipated awareness.
Session 2
4.
Omar Dahbour (City University of New 
York / USA)
Fr o m  In di g e n o u s  Ri g h t s  t o  Ec o s o v e r -
eignty: A New Agenda for International 
and Environmental Law
Abstract:
This paper articulates a principle of ecos-
overeignty as an entailment of political 
self-determination in the 21st century. 
Ecosovereignty is distinguished from 
earlier ideas of sovereignty based on 
concepts of state authority, national 
identity, or indigenous rights. These 
earlier notions are either conceptually 
ﬂ   awed, inappropriate for the problems 
of the current era, or too restricted in 
scope. Ecosovereignty constitutes a new 
legal principle for adjudicating claims 
in twenty-ﬁ  rst  conﬂ   icts over natural 
resources, territorial boundaries, and 
c u l t u r a l  t r a d i t i o n s .  B u i l d i n g  u p o n  t h e  
20th-century discourse of anticolonial-
ism, ecosovereignty provides an alterna-
tive to the statist concept of sovereignty, 
as well as that based on the idea of na-
tional self-determination. Furthermore, 
while acknowledging the importance of 
the protection of indigenous life worlds 
and practices, it generalizes the notion of 
capacities of its “active” citizens, as pre-
sented in the ﬁ  rst Part of the Metaphys-
ics of Morals. In the Kantian paradigm, 
the environmental risk becomes a “pub-
lic” concern, not subsumed to a individ-
ual decision, based on a calculus. 
3.
Clarissa Marques (ASCES / Brazil)
The Environment And Future Genera-
tions: The Past, The Future And A New 
Individual
Abstract:
This study proposes to analyze if soli-
darity acts as a limitation between gen-
erations used by the Law, as well as the 
implication of such an issue: control 
would occur with the actions of exist-
ing individuals, however, in the name of 
unborn ones. In view of the proposal of 
precaution which guides the promotion 
of the human right to the environment, 
and that is fundamented on the duty of 
a moral order of today’s individuals to-
wards those of tomorrow, it is possible 
to use the idea of an ampliﬁ  ed analysis 
of the future starting from the construc-
tion of a new human responsibility, a 
new ethical theory as theoretical fun-
dament for the hypothesis that solidar-
ity constitutes a limiting bond between 
genera tions. Th us, when speaking of a 
new ethical theory, it is assumed that 
mankind has never acted as being de-
prived of technique, but it is necessary to 
analyze how modern technique changed 
human actions and the consequences of 
this change in relation to nature. Once 
more, the paradigmatic transition is un-
der observation. Therefore, the ethics of 
environment are absorbed and appropri-
ate by the capitalism logic, in order not 
to to preserve the environment, but the 
capitalist production system itself. This 
article aims to discuss the intricate rela-
tionship between legal doctrine and eco-
nomic policy issues, focusing on the ef-
fectiveness of environmental law in the 
Brazilian case.
2.
Maria Lucia De Paula Oliveira (Universi-
dade Federal do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 
/ Brazil)
Law, Environmental Policy and Kan-
tian Philosophy
Abstract:
Is the Kantian philosophy, and its basic 
principle of respect for persons, hostile to 
the protection of environmental values 
? Answering this question, this paper 
elucidates how the Kantian ethics can 
take seriously environmental values. In 
the period opening with the Critique of 
Judgment in 1790 and closing with the 
Metaphysics of Morals in 1797, the sub-
ject would be presented by Kant in a dif-
ferent manner; although the respect that 
we may owe to non-human nature is 
still grounded in our duties to mankind, 
the basis for such respect ﬁ  elds in na-
ture’s aesthetic properties, and the duty 
to preserve nature lies in our duties to 
ourselves. In opposition to the “market 
paradigm”, as it is called by Gillroy, the 
Kantian philosophy can offer a better 
explanation of the relationship between 
environmental policy and the theory of 
justice. Kantian justice deﬁ  nes the “just 
state” as the one that protects the moral  384 385
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margins of legal instrumentalism, op-
pose technological rationality of legal 
system and bring back law to society 
through acceptance of spontaneous legal 
orders, “living law” (to misquote Eugen 
Ehrlich) of communities and nature.
2.
Morag Goodwin (Tilburg Law School / 
Netherlands)
Mutual-shaping and notions of prog-
ress: law and technology in the devel-
opment context
Abstract:
Technology and the law have played an 
inauspicious role in the history of devel-
opment. Technological superiority and 
the law came together to provide the 
joint means of colonial domination; and 
the implicit understanding of progress 
and superiority that they inspired were 
used to justify those colonial ventures. As 
part of a broader project examining the 
interaction and mutual shaping of law, 
technology and development, this paper 
considers the place of law and technology 
in the development context through the 
prism of the notion of ‘progress’. Progress, 
and the notions of modernity and superi-
ority that it contains, has been intimately 
associated with – indeed, built into – the 
concept of development since Harry S. 
Truman delivered his Inaugural Address 
in 1949 calling for greater production as 
the key to prosperity and peace for all. 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
has shown that technology, regulation 
and ethical perspectives interact and 
shape one another in a continuous and 
dynamic process. If this is the case, how 
Abstract:
Increasing processes of juridiﬁ  cation 
(Verrechtlichung) of life-world have led 
to legal instrumentalism operating in 
different spatial and functional areas of 
modern societal system. World society, 
once conceived by Niklas Luhmann as 
functionally differentiated network of 
balanced social communications, based 
on self-regulation of respective social 
subsystems, becomes dominated by cer-
tain functional rationalities, including 
economy, politics and technology and 
is exposed to dangers of external-regu-
lation coming from particular internal 
dynamics of the given societal subsys-
tems. Inﬂ   uence of economic rational-
ity, political power and technological 
developments are transforming, radi-
cally narrowing and even marginalising 
the boundaries of modern society, what 
totally disregards the role of nature in 
modern world. The logic of technologi-
cal revolutions has also dominated the 
essence and even substance of legal sys-
tem. Natural law as totality of universal 
values, operating beyond time and space, 
looses the normative character and reg-
ulatory strength under the technocratic 
d o minan ce .  “T e chn o l ogi cal  la w”  is  n o t  
responsive towards social and natural 
values and demands, stands even in op-
position to the “law of nature” . Nature 
itself, as for a long time neglected source 
of human existence needs to be recon-
sidered in legal terms for being declared 
as the most important values under (le-
gal) defence. It will be argued in the es-
say that the idea of legal pluralism can 
still be used productively to break the 
gression. The GDP growth 10% a year 
means that it will be 2.59 times as large 
in ten years, whereas technology could 
resolve problematic concerning ﬁ  ve ele-
ments at highest in arithmetical progres-
sion.Remarkable would be that the mod-
ern industrial civilization has brought 
social damages in form of global warm-
ing. Developed nations have not payed 
for it yet. All the people in the world 
should have right to economical growth 
at any rate, which would however be 
limited by those ﬁ  ve conditions. Conclu-
sion: the developed nations should give 
up the consumption lifestyle for the sake 
of the equal right of every citizen in the 
world to reasonable standard of living.
WORKING GROUP
WG 24 
Technology and Law – general 
questions
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 4.101
Chair Bregvadze, Lasha 
(Tbilisi / Georgia + Frankfurt 
/ Germany)
Lectures:
1.
Lasha Bregvadze (Goethe University 
Frankfurt am Main / Germany)
Natural Law and Law of Nature: 
Emerging Plural Legal Orders of the 
Technological World Society
behavior of animal experiments, but in 
the process of legislation and enforce-
ment are not satisfactory in many places. 
On the basis of present situation of labo-
ratory animal science and existing prob-
lems, with the comparison of animal 
welfare act between Europe and China, 
the author puts forward the ideas of per-
fecting experimental animals’ laws and 
its enforcement proposals.
6.
Hiroshi, Kabashima (University Tohoku 
/ Japan)
Social costs, limits to growth, right to 
growth: approacing global environ-
ment oriented to philosophy of law
Abstract:
Question: how can we tackle the global 
warming in accordance with the eco-
nomical growth especially in emerging 
countries?
K .  W .  K a p p ,  “ T h e  S o ci al  C o s t s  o f  Pri -
vate Enterprise” (1950), deﬁ  nes the so-
cial costs as direct or indirect damages 
which are not compensated by the pro-
ducer, but added to the third parties. An 
example might be the disaster of the BP 
plant in April 2010, in which the pol-
luter can hardly cover all the damages 
so as to make the seawater clean, to re-
generate the harmed natural lives and to 
recover the jobs and the everyday life of 
the residents on site.The Club of Rome, 
“The Limits to Growth” (1972), makes 
us aware of the ﬁ  ve conditions which set 
the limits to growth: population, indus-
trialization, pollution, consumption of 
food and natural resources, which ten-
dentiously increase in a exponential pro- 386 387
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and is referred to in various contexts 
which range from safety level of nuclear 
plants, antibiotics, GMO foods, or pan-
demic like bird ﬂ  u to anti-terrorist meas-
ures and ﬁ  nancial crisis. Main objectives 
of this paper are to scrutinize the shifts 
in legal thought with the term “risk” and 
“precaution” as guiding indexes, which 
subsequently lead to a critical analysis of 
an era of uncertainty.
Three issues will be presented. Firstly, 
the notions of “risk” and “precaution” 
will be re-situated in the context of his-
tory of epistemology with special refer-
ence to the notion of “probabilistic rev-
olution” and the study of emergence of 
the welfare state, pioneered by F. Ewald. 
Secondly, diverse usages of the word 
“risk” will be sorted out and located be-
tween two poles, i.e. risk-objectivism 
and risk-constructivism. Importance of 
the distinction made by F. Knight be-
tween calculable “risk” and incalculable 
“uncertainty” will also be touched upon.
Thirdly, relevant topics in respective are-
as will be connected. Those include; pros 
and cons of the “precautionary princi-
ple” in environmental law; increasing 
aspirations of deliberative democracy 
in face of incalculable risks in constitu-
tional law; conﬂ  icts between preventive 
measures and protection of liberties and 
human rights in criminal law; and loose 
and ﬂ   exible confederation of the peo-
ples (which Kant and Rawls dreamed of) 
against global risks in international law.
Every single topic mentioned above in-
evitably evokes fundamental questions 
as to the possibilities and limits of hu-
m a n  a g e n t s  e q u i p p e d  w i t h  r a t i o n a l  
has been provided a security standard of 
technology. The standard must be based 
on a relative security level. The relative 
level would premise on the ordinary, 
lawful and ethical usage of technology. 
Most technology has been opened to 
the public without any technology im-
pact assessment. Technology would have 
some defect, which the producer has 
overlooked. The users might often meet 
with the accidents caused on the defects. 
Then, law should provide a technology 
security standard to exclude the defects 
as possible as many. The security stand-
ard must be reﬂ  ected on the structure 
standard of technology. The structure 
standard may be a yardstick whether the 
producer can evade the responsibility for 
the accidents. The standard would also 
premise on the ordinary, lawful and eth-
ical usage of technology. The ordinary 
usage means that the users should use 
normally technology within the extent 
of the structure standard. The ethical 
usage means that the users should use 
technologies being conscious of the de-
fects in order to avoid the accidents. The 
relative security level may be the sum of 
the structure standard and the ethical 
usage of technology.
5.
Ryuichi Nakayama (Osaka University / 
Japan)
Developing a Philosophy of Precaution 
in the Age of Risk
Abstract:
The term “Risk Society”, which was in-
troduced in 1980s by a German sociolo-
gist, U. Beck, is now used worldwide, 
4. The country has also generated in the 
last 40 years a solid and strong free mar-
ket economy, which has led the univer-
sities to privilege innovation. It is a track 
the has been slowly consolidating and 
growing ﬁ  rm in the academic mentality.
A country can have very high social or 
economic indicators, but may be more 
undevelopped than another with lower 
signals, but stronger institutions. And 
that´s another issue of the paper, starting 
from the chilean example: technology 
helps social institutions, as democracy, 
human rights respect, Rule of Law, but, 
in order to be really effective, it must rely 
upon pre-existing institutions. In other 
words: technology creates a unitarian 
world, everything is here, everywhere 
is close. Technology makes the world 
a place without territories, and conse-
quentially without distances. But the 
Law is a condition of this effect: there 
can be no association between Law and 
Thechnolog if the social institutons pro-
tectd by Law do not work efﬁ  ciently. 
4.
Kitahara Munenori (Hiroshima Shudo 
University / Japan)
Law and Technology Security Standard
Abstract:
Laws would often follow technologies. 
Information technology has an elec-
tronic rapidity and a legislation technol-
ogy has a paper one. There might be a 
lag between law and technology. I will 
deal with the relationship between law 
and technology from the viewpoint of 
technology security standard. One of the 
relationships can be found in that law 
can we steer the relationship between 
law, technology and the dominant ethi-
cal framework in the development con-
text in order to break away from the no-
tion of progress that arguably continues 
to underpin current international regula-
tory systems and that continues to justify 
the developed/ developing dichotomy?
3.
Raúl Madrid (Pontiﬁ  cal Catholic Univer-
sity of Chile / Chile)
Small is beautiful. Some reasons to 
consider chile the future of law and 
technology in latinamerica
Abstract:
This paper intends to expose the reasons 
why the small Republic of Chile, placed 
very far away from the big decission 
centers, can despite become the most 
important and developped settlement 
for Law and Technology researchers in 
Latinamerica.
The causes to justify such assertion are 
the following:
1. Chile has developped throughout its 
history very strong social and juridical 
institutions, like a long lasting democ-
racy, a neat separation of powers, and a 
great respect for Law.
2. This last issue is very important: due 
to historical and cultural reasons, Chile 
is a country where the Rule of Law is of 
greatest importance.
3. Chile has also, with Brazil, some of 
the most successfull universities in the 
area, like the Pontiﬁ  cal Catholic Univ-
erisity, with a graet capacity to develop 
interdiscipline, which is undoubtly the 
base of Lae and Technlogy patterns. 388 389
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sal Juridical Grammar can provide a 
return to physis
Abstract:
The idea that humans share a Universal 
Grammar has launched the bases for a 
revolution in the study of linguistics, 
beneﬁ   tting from an intense process of 
rapprochement with biology and cog-
nitive sciences. Recent studies based on 
neuroethology and evolutionary psy-
chology have argued that right to prop-
erty has a biological origin, working as 
some kind of property instinct. Ecologi-
cal rationality can also contribute to that 
assumption. The patterns presented by 
property regulation can suggest that we 
are dealing with ecological rationality 
and heuristics: possibly fast and frugal 
heuristics, environmentally adapted. 
I f  t h a t  a s s u m p t i o n  b e  c o n ﬁ  rmed,  and 
expanded to other rights, neuroscience 
can provide a basis to prove that some 
human rights have not only a biologi-
cal origin, but are also universal, with 
great impact on Legal Philosophy. Those 
human rights could function as Chom-
sky’s principles and parameters theory, 
leading toward a truly Universal Juridi-
cal Grammar. Ancient greek philosophy, 
especially the soﬁ  st movement, has de-
veloped the distiction between two phil-
osophical categories: nomos and physis. 
The concept of natural rights was once 
inﬂ  uenced by the idea of physis. The dec-
adence of a jusnaturalistic approach in 
legal philosophy was also accompanied 
by the obliviousness of physis as a legal 
category. Human rights have replaced 
natural rights as the most common le-
gal term and the notion of human rights 
opposed by the socalled autonomy view 
(e.g. Max Weber, Jacques Ellul), which 
understands technology as assuming 
socially irresistible ends of its own. At 
worst, and paradoxically, the identiﬁ  ca-
tion between legal instrumentalism and 
technology reinforces the inexorable 
process of ‘enframing’ that characterizes 
the autonomy view of technology. This 
happens as law, absorbed by a process 
of rationalization, becomes, in Ellulian 
terms, dissolved in the technological 
phenomenon and, due to its limited re-
ﬂ  exivity, rests incapable of responding to 
its own dissolution. The answer to such 
a dehumanizing prospect, which I bring 
from Martin Heidegger’s work, lies in 
a thoughtful reﬂ  etion on the origins of 
techne – in understanding enframing as 
poiesis and law as technology and yet as 
art.
WORKING GROUP
WG 25 
Science, Technology and Law
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 4.201
Chair Ferreira, Flavio (Juiz de Fora 
/ Brazil)
Lectures:
1.
Ana Rosa Amorim (Centro de Estudos 
Superiores de Maceió / Brazil)
Neurolaw: how the concept of a Univer-
human and recognition of super indi-
viduality.
Traditional belief about natural rights 
will disappear. There is necessity of re-
vision of such concept as right of free-
dom. Liberal belief about freedom as a 
condition of human existence is chang-
ing. Prospects of technical development 
make justiﬁ  ed R. Dworkin‘s reﬂ  ections 
about superiority of right of equality in 
comparison with right of freedom. Using 
J. Baudrillard‘s works, I discuss different 
meanings which can have the notion of 
right of equality in a context of modern 
civilization development.
7.
Marcelo Thompson (University of Ox-
ford / Hong Kong S.A.R.)
Resisting Enframing: Law and the Poi-
esis of Techne
Abstract:
Contemporary critiques of legal instru-
mentalism identify the understanding of 
law as merely a means to an end with a 
technological view of the law (see, inter 
alia, Robert Summers, “Law as a Ma-
chine Type Technology”). Here, technol-
ogy itself is seen as an instrument and 
law as an instantiation of it. This paper 
will focus on the shortcomings of those 
critiques. At best, I will argue, they ig-
n o r e  t h a t  t h e  v i e w  o f  t e c h n o l o g y  a s  
merely a means to an end is itself chal-
lenged in the ﬁ  eld of science and tech-
nology studies. There, theories that un-
derstand technology as entirelly socially 
constructed – as an empty vessel, a met-
aphor that occurs both to Brian Tamana-
ha, in Law, and to John Law, in STS – are 
choice and free will, which has served as 
the foundation of the modern law.
6.
Igor Nevvazhay (Saratov State Law 
Academy / Russia)
Technical Development and Natural 
Rights
Abstract:
Scientiﬁ  c and technical achievements in 
the last decades can cause deep changes 
in spheres of morals and law. I am going 
to discuss some philosophical conclu-
sions which follow from two signiﬁ  cant 
ideas of contemporary civilization. First 
of them is a thesis about indistinguish-
ability of natural from artiﬁ  cial, and the 
second one is an opportunity of creation 
of artiﬁ  cial human.
The ﬁ  rst thesis is a consequence of the 
principle of relativity of physical real-
ity to conditions and a way of observa-
tion, on which both interpretations of 
quantum theory and Einstein’s theories 
of relativity are based. I show that the 
given principle deprives us of objective 
criteria to distinguish natural from ar-
tiﬁ  cial, freedom from necessity, freedom 
from violence.
Today power of technique is directed 
not only on the external world, but 
also on a person. Owing to informa-
tion technology and biotechnology an 
opportunity of creation of artiﬁ  cial and 
controlled individual increases. So hu-
man loses many features of a person 
and transforms to a part of a collective 
super individual subject. In modern 
time a search of the transcendental ba-
sis of law and power leads to impersonal  390 391
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to concrete cases given the amount of 
information which would be needed to 
render adequate judgments. The relative 
value of precedents and old laws will be 
discussed in this paper, taking into ac-
count the tacit cost-beneﬁ  t analysis em-
bedded in such instruments which may 
or may not serve the interests of welfare 
maximization in an environment with 
constantly renewed accident prevention 
technology.
5.
Marcelo Galuppo (Pontifícia Universi-
dade Católica de Minas Gerais / Brazil)
To witch extent has technology and sci-
ence urged for new concepts in the Ju-
risprudence?
Abstract:
Jurisprudence helps lawyers to clarify le-
gal concepts, and provide a guide to solve 
many problems and misunderstandings 
that happen to legal argumentation. 
Nevertheless, not everybody realize that 
the emergence, developing and death of 
the concepts it utilizes depend on his-
torical events. Although some historians 
have perceived the inﬂ  uence of econom-
ical and political history on those con-
cepts life, very few have perceived that 
the development of science and technol-
ogy has also contributed to their change. 
A good sample of this kind of inﬂ  uence 
can be found in the radical changing of 
the juridical concept of personality. The 
evolution of diagnosis’ techniques has 
modiﬁ  ed the criteria by which we can 
decide on the beginning and the ending 
of personality. On the other hand, the 
evolution of genetics and fertilization in 
is established by the norm itself, while 
in the scientiﬁ  c legality they consist in 
the reward or the punishement derived 
from the efﬁ  cacy or inefﬁ  cacy to reach 
the end pursued by the action. The way 
of legitimation also differs: while legal 
norms have to have followed the formal 
procedures and must not have contra-
vened any fundamental right, technical 
norms‘ validity depend on its theoreti-
cal foundations or on its efﬁ  cacy. Nowa-
days, scientiﬁ   c knowledge has become 
and important feature in policy-making. 
Problems of antinomy can arise between 
these legal systems. These conﬂ  icts are 
specially grave when the recognition or 
exercise of fundamental rights is instru-
mentally used, or when they are violated 
in order to increase the policies‘ efﬁ  cacy. 
A political system is technocratic, when, 
i n  c a s e  o f  c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  t h e  s c i e n t i ﬁ  c 
law ﬁ  nally prevails.
4.
Flavio Ferreira (Faculdade de Direito da 
Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora / 
Brazil)
Technological Change, Accident Pre-
vention and Civil Liability
Abstract:
The improvement of accident prevention 
technology in many ﬁ  elds of social life 
has spurred new challenges to the doc-
trinal tools of fault and strict based civil 
liability in the law of torts. Amid these 
challenges lie the identiﬁ   cation of the 
proper scope of the respective criteria 
of liability in a changing factual envi-
ronment, their suitability as doctrinal 
tools, as well as their actual application 
when one mark uses the same or alike 
name or logo. FMRI analysis proved that 
each mark owns a space in our brain, 
which might be suppressed by another, 
with legally doubtful methods. That it 
why fMRI analysis along with neuro-
science can improve law as far as trade-
mark protection is concerned, checking 
if some subconscious prerequisites don’t 
affect our decision making process in a 
way forbidden by the law.
3.
Juan Ramon Fallada (Universitat Rovira 
I Virgili, Catalonia / Spain)
Technocracy inside the rule of law: 
challenges in the foundations of legal 
norms
Abstract:
Technocracy is usually opposed to de-
mocracy. Here, another perspective is 
taken: technocracy is countered with the 
rule of law. In trying to understand the 
c o n t e m p o r ary  d yn ami c s  o f  th e  rul e  o f  
law, two main types of legal systems (in 
a broad sense) have to be distinguished: 
ﬁ  rstly, the legal norm, studied by the sci-
ence of law; secondly, the scientiﬁ  c laws 
(which includes the legalities of the dif-
ferent sciences and communities). They 
both contain normative prescriptions. 
But their differ in their subjects‘ source: 
while legal norms are the will’s expres-
sion of the normative authority, tech-
nical prescriptions that can be derived 
from scientiﬁ  c laws, which are grounded 
over the commonly supposed objectiv-
ity of the scientiﬁ  c knowledge about re-
ali ty .  T h e y  b o th  im p o s e  s an cti o n s  t o o ,  
but in the legal norm they refer to what 
has progressively moved toward a rhe-
torically build concept of right, enforcing 
its conection to ancient idea of nomos. 
Neuroscience can help philosophers es-
tablish a new and scientiﬁ  c based theory 
of natural law, rescuing the concept of 
physis from ostracism.
2.
Katarzyna Eliasz (Jagiellonian Univer-
sity / Poland)
Struggle for neuronal territory, or how 
to apply neuroscience in trademark 
protection law
Abstract:
From some time on, neuroscience have 
been applied in law, however limited to 
criminal law and crime detection. The 
area of trademark protection law has 
been passed over by both jurists and sci-
entists, and there are only few publica-
tions treating of this issue, which is quite 
confusing as the process of choosing a 
mark, or associating logos is strictly con-
nected with psychological and neuronal 
processes. Revealing a neuronal process 
of decision making and the results of M. 
Morrin and J.Jacoby experiment ( which 
shows how alike mark names confuse 
consumers brain ) proves that judge’s 
decision in trial concerning trademark 
infringement shall be enriched with sci-
entiﬁ  c evidence. Such foundation would 
show that the processes of blurring asso-
ciations is not always obvious, and might 
be omitted by human mind, but not the 
b r a i n .  T h i s  w i l l  l e a d  u s  t o  c o n c l u s i o n  
that trademark can be both infringed 
and diluted. Dilution is an unconscious 
process in our brain, which might occur  392 393
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about the harmful effects of this technol-
ogy is producing fear and uncertainty in 
the people. This dual context is negative 
for the development of a complex science 
such as nanotechnology. 
T h e  p e culi ar  f e a tur e s  o f  n an o p arti cl e s ,  
due its behavior ruled more by the quan-
tum than classical mechanics, produce 
several uncertainties related to the ef-
fects of these particles that are not total-
ly addressed by the scientiﬁ  c community 
yet. 
Because these uncertainties, appears as 
the proper tool to regulate this technol-
ogy the precautionary principle that es-
tablishes that the lack of ﬁ  rm evidence 
or scientiﬁ   c uncertainty related to the 
existence or the extent of a risk is not 
a reason to delay the adoption of pre-
ventive measures to protect the human 
health or the environment.
The paper will analyze the interplay be-
tween this new technology and the law, 
adressing the issue whether the adop-
tion of a precautionary measure requires 
a minimum set of indications showing 
that the suspected risk is well founded 
and, therefore, the public authorities are 
not relieved of the requirements to de-
liver proof when confronted to risk.
2.
Samir Chopra (Brooklyn College of the 
City University of New York / USA)
Pragmatist Humanism and the Law
Abstract:
I argue that armed with a ‘humanist’ 
metaphysics, we can understand how 
law creates, promulgates, and reiﬁ  es, the 
central concepts by which we organize 
ziell einer staatlichen Entscheidung, in 
den Hintergrund getreten. Das dezent-
rale Funktionieren der digitalen Tech-
nik hat zu der Vorstellung verleitet, dass 
auch die Gesellschaft keiner zentralen 
Entscheidungsinstanz bedürfe. Unter 
dem Einﬂ   uss dieser Vorstellung verla-
gert sich diese Instanz immer mehr von 
der Politik in die pluralistisch agierende 
Wirtschaft
WORKING GROUP
WG 26 
Technology and Law – selected 
problems
Date MON 15 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location IG 0.254
Chair t.b.a.
Lectures:
1.
Jorge Alzamora (Andres Bello Univer-
sity / Chile)
The application of the precautionary 
principle on the use of nanoparticles
Abstract:
Nanotechnology is not only a novel sci-
ence that promises beneﬁ  ts for human-
k i n d  b u t  a l s o  r a i s e s  m u l t i p l e  c o n c e r n s  
about its likely effects for people and the 
environment. Governments, universi-
ties and companies around the world 
are investing billions in research and 
development in nanotechnology and re-
lated technologies. However, speculation 
by revisiting legislative techniques. It is 
implicit that legislative techniques are 
the determinants of legislative process 
including; deﬁ   ning the problem, goal 
setting, determine means to achieve the 
goals, drafting, promulgation, imple-
mentation or enforcement, monitoring 
and evaluation of legislation. Generally, 
the techniques serve as good means to 
eliminate problems occasioned by ICT 
change and convergence. 
7.
Sibylle Tönnies (Universität Potsdam / 
Germany)
Der Einﬂ  uss der Naturwissenschaften 
auf die Rechtsphilosophie
Abstract:
Die Rechtsphilosophie möchte gern Ein-
ﬂ  uss nehmen auf die Naturwissenschaf-
ten. Tatsächlich verläuft der Einﬂ  uss in 
umgekehrter Richtung: Die Rechtsphi-
losophie wird (wie alle Philosophie) von 
den naturwissenschaftlichen Erfolgen 
ihrer Epoche geprägt. Das lässt sich von 
den ersten Erfolgen der Physik in der Re-
naissance über die Entdeckung des Pro-
toplasmas im 19. bis zur Entdeckung der 
Selbstregulierung im 20. Jahrhundert 
nachweisen. In den letzten Jahrzehnten 
haben die Technik (Kybernetik) und die 
Biologie (Autopoiesis) die Bilderwelten 
geliefert, in denen sich die Rechtsphilo-
sophie bewegt hat.
In der Gegenwart wird sie dominiert 
von dem Triumph, den das Konzept von 
Dezentralität und Vernetzung in der di-
gitalen Welt feiert. Darüber ist das Be-
wusstsein für die Notwendigkeit einer 
zielgerichteten zentralen Führung, spe-
vitro can have brought about the human 
nature to a changing itself, which urges 
also for a revision of the concept of per-
sonality. This paper intends to deal with 
those problems, mapping its state of art 
and proposing a redeﬁ  nition of the hu-
man personality.
6.
Ubena John (Stockholm University / 
Sweden)
Legislative Techniques and ICT: In the 
Wake of Law keeping pace with Tech-
nology
Abstract:
This paper investigates a relation be-
tween legislative techniques and ICT. In 
particular, the paper explores how tra-
ditional reactive legislative technique 
affects ICT innovation. Moreover, it ex-
plores how change and convergence of 
ICT is impacting upon legislation which 
is a supreme social control and steering 
mechanism. The paper envisages that 
embracing the legislative techniques vi-
tally guarantees a possibility of pursuing 
ICT innovation parallel to maintaining 
quality and stable legislation. Moreo-
ver, the paper is litmus under which the 
legislative techniques are tested against 
various challenges resulting from ICT 
change and convergence. E.g., cyber 
crimes prone situations or where advent 
of ICT threatens fundamental rights, 
which technique is realistic? Conversely, 
where competition and innovations are 
encouraged which techniques are ideal? 
In so doing the paper seeks to investi-
gate the question whether the change 
and convergence of ICT can be overcome  394 395
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the experts: The legitimacy of such re-
ports is not situated only in the technical 
capacity his authors, but also in the im-
partiality of there recommendations. In 
numerous occasions, nevertheless, the 
effective presence of this note is situated 
today under suspicion.
It owes to the economic importance of 
the decisions to adopting, but also to 
the entail of the experts of some areas 
to the societies interested in introducing 
certain technologies in the processes of 
production and of consumption.
This problem can be solved in different 
ways. First reinforcing the mechanism 
of which it rests the evaluation techno-
cratic of the risk. For example, across the 
transparency in the experts selection. 
Secondly, by means of the incorporation 
of democratic mechanisms in the scien-
tiﬁ  c-technological politics.
The exhibition of the internal conditions 
to the dynamics of the technological 
change that they make possible the in-
stitutionalized implication of the society 
in the control of the risk, as well as of the 
mechanisms to realize it are the princi-
pal matters of this work.
5.
Adriana Spengler (Universidade do Vale 
do Itajaí / Brazil)
The transnational criminal investiga-
tions with new technology and the rel-
ativization of fundamental rights
Abstract:
This work focuses on economic macro-
criminality and restrictions on funda-
mental rights and guarantees, in relation 
to the transnational criminal investiga-
to mankind. Arguments are considered, 
and sistematicaly given from the period 
of ancient roman law untill modern 
days.
The conclusion of the paper is that Law 
remains related to every possible science 
that involves human and non human 
position in nature and society, but as 
well provides future existence of morally 
accepted scientiﬁ  c experiments. Further 
this paper gives argumented discussion 
about the special legal personhood and 
status for non human, able to be capable 
and usefull for society.
4.
Raúl Sanz Burgos (Universidad Nacional 
de Educación a Distancia / Spain)
Democracy and technological politic in 
the risk society
Abstract:
The new technologies generate risks that 
affect directly in the spheres protected of 
the fundamental rights. To control and 
to mitigate such risks, and in conform-
ity with the protection duty that many 
in force Constitutions at present impose 
to the States, there are made diverse 
mechanisms. 
The most frequent, the advice to the or-
gans entrusted to decide on the implan-
tation or not of a technology, on the part 
of commissions of experts. There mis-
sion consist of evaluating the magnitude 
of the threat that they accompany on the 
introduction of a new technology on the 
spheres protected by the fundamental 
rights.
The political instances adopt later their 
decisions in the light of the reports of 
3.
Lliya Manasiev (Faculty of Law “Iustini-
anus Primus”, University of St. Cyril and 
Methodius / Republic of Macedonia)
Towards a constructive Law, Science 
and Technology coexistence
Abstract:
The aim of this scientiﬁ   c paper is an 
interdisciplinary approach to the se-
lected topic, from the perspective of the 
following three sciences: Legal Theory, 
Legal philosophy and Sociology of law. 
We already know that one of the func-
tion of the law itself, is to manage and 
organize the social and legal status of the 
human being and its natural and social 
surrounding. That is why law and the 
legal proffesion is very closely related to 
other social and natural sciences. The 
ﬁ  rst thesis that is to be examined in this 
paper is the relation law and social sci-
ences as relations to ethics and sociol-
ogy. At one point also some certain legal 
aspects, but as well as many moral and 
ethical dillema are being discussed in 
matter of using newest tehnologies and 
human social welfare. 
The second thesis is that law should be 
more realistic towards new tehnologies, 
in a sense of providing theoretical and 
practical approach towards redeﬁ  ning 
legal personhood. As it is mostly com-
mon at the moment, the majority of the 
legal scholars set legal person to be only 
human or corporations and human as-
sotiations as an entity. One of the points 
of this paper proposes arguments that a 
certain legal personhood is supposed to 
be given to advanced technological ro-
bots and machines, capable or usefull 
human and social interaction. In this 
picture, law is not a set of rules, but a 
set of evolving behavioral co-ordination 
strategies, which require for their suc-
cess the belief in a certain set of entities. 
Without the concept of a person possess-
ing agency and free-will and committing 
acts for which he can ascribed responsi-
bility and held to be the cause of, this set 
of co-ordination strategies that binds us 
together fails to exercise traction. These 
metaphysical concepts are inter-related; 
‘person’ get its traction from respon-
sibility, agency and blame, and not the 
other way around, for it is only a ‘legal’ 
society, which needs concepts like these; 
‘person’ is parasitic on social/moral con-
cepts and there is thus an unavoidable 
historicity in any talk of personhood. 
When debate about the meaning of these 
metaphysical concepts is divorced from 
the conceptual scheme dependent on 
them and an attempt is made to ground 
them wholly naturalistically, incoher-
ence results. 
The law, by its practices, emergent legal 
theory, and its larger expressive impact, 
the intuitive grounding for a cluster of 
metaphysical concepts. In enacting posi-
tive legislation, in rulings on case-law, 
in undertaking statutory interpretation, 
the law gives rise to a set of practices, a 
language which anchors these concepts 
and is the repository for our intuitions 
about them. I will argue therefore, that 
the pragmatist humanist’s argument that 
legal reality is socially constructed ena-
bles an understanding of the grounding, 
traction, and plasticity of crucial meta-
physical concepts in the moral domain. 396 397
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practice of regulation. Built on Rawl’s 
th e o ry  o f  p r o c e d ur al  j u s ti c e ,  thi s  aim s  
to provide a critical analysis on: (i) what 
is the role for fairness in applying regu-
lation of technically and scientiﬁ  cally 
complex in nature? (ii) how far have the 
divergent regulatory approaches to food 
safety been connected or fragmented 
due to neglect of homogeneity in inter-
national law?, and (iii) how can fairness 
be a catalyst for the regulation of risk 
and safety in nano-food? In conclusion, 
fairness is critically essential to shaping 
the interests of regulators in managing 
nanotechnological risks in food.
age to the 21st century will be utilised 
to substantiate the claims of the paper, 
including the changes in time measure-
ment methods, information processing 
systems or production technologies. On 
a theoretical plane, the paper will adopt 
a sociological view of the law, informed 
by concepts from Luhmann’s version of 
systems’ theory, most importantly the 
„Technologiedeﬁ   zit“ thesis, pertainting 
to the fundamental uncontrollability of 
individuals by social systems. By means 
of a conclusion, a number of theoretical 
observations will be offered, regarding 
the nature of relationships between the 
criminal law and technology and allow-
ing for a critical encounter with some 
other social theories utilised in the ﬁ  eld.
8. 
Nizam Muhammad Awang (Brunel Law 
School, Brunel University / UK)
Fairness and Regulation of Nanotech-
nological Risk in Food: A Reinvigora-
tion to Safety Approach
Abstract:
Key perspectives in nano-food safety and 
regulation of risk are narrowly polarized 
between technological risk standards 
and scientiﬁ  c uncertainties. In view of 
lacking toxicological studies, resort to 
precautionary measure is set to continue 
framing the discourse in governing nan-
otechnology. At the outset, commitment 
to ‘safe and responsible development’ 
appears to be shaping the very core na-
notech policy. This is all very well, but 
the negotiated approach to food safety 
is still arguably trade-centric, sidestep-
ping fairness as the ultimate goal in the 
prints of the bearer embedded in an 
RFID-chip in the cover of the passport. 
The Netherlands, however, takes four 
ﬁ   ngerprints, and next to embedding 
them in an RDIF-chip in the cover of a 
passport they are stored in one central-
ised database which is directly accessible 
for law enforcement and security serv-
ices.
A number of general cases voicing com-
plaints about the mandatory storage of 
four ﬁ   ngerprints in a centralised da-
tabase have been ﬁ  led at lower courts, 
none of which have been declared ad-
missible up to now. Next to that several 
cases of people refusing to give ﬁ  nger-
prints are in courts at the moment.
In my presentation I will give an over-
view of both the EU- and Dutch-legisla-
tion and elaborate on the different cases 
in court at the moment.
7. 
Jan Winczorek (University of Warsaw-
Faculty of Law and Administration / Po-
land)
Technological transformations and the 
anthropologies of criminal law
Abstract:
The paper attempts to trace the long-
term historical parallels between the ev-
olution of criminal law and technologi-
cal developments. The emphasis will be 
put on how the visions of the individual, 
explicitly or implicitly formulated in the 
law and organizing the criminal proc-
ess and punishment systems, change 
together with developments in various 
ﬁ   elds of technology. Broad historical 
material, streching from early modern 
tion with the new technology. It seeks 
to offer a reﬂ  ection, by means of collated 
doctrine, on the relativization of intima-
cy fundamental right, in the taking of 
evidence in global therms, through vari-
ous types of violation of secrecy, and tel-
ephone tapping. It begins with a study of 
the characteristics of economic criminal 
law, followed by the main characteristics 
of so-called economic Macrocriminality, 
consubstantiated in injury to supra-indi-
vidual judicial property, lack of visibility 
of damages, the new modus operandi, 
and connections with the public inter-
nacional authorities. Next, it collates, by 
way of illustration, the main economic 
crimes that exist today around the world, 
namely, crimes against the international 
ﬁ  nancial system and the crime of money 
laundering. This is followed by a focus 
on fundamental rights and their relativ-
ity, in terms of their concepts, theories 
and principles. Next, it discourses on the 
principle of proportionality as a mecha-
nism for applying restrictions on funda-
mental rights in the concrete case, fol-
lowed by its application to punitive law. 
Finally, it deals with telephone tapping 
and violation of bank secrecy as forms 
of concrete restrictions on the intimacy 
fundamental right. 
6. 
F.W.J. Van Geelkerken (Stockholm Uni-
versität / Sweden)
Biometrics in the Dutch passport; secu-
rity measures or measuring security?
Abstract:
EU-regulation stipulates that all EU-
passports should contain two ﬁ  nger- 398 399
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bodied a crisis of political theory,1 and 
in particular, a crisis of liberal political 
theory. Since liberalism appears in our 
times as an uncontested overlapping 
consensus of political theory, and a uni-
versal guide that informs political prac-
tice, I will start by questioning a familiar 
narrative that tells the unremitting suc-
cess story of liberalism. I will then show 
that the debate between Carl Schmitt 
and Hans Kelsen may serve to reveal a 
crisis of theory. In presenting their de-
bate, I will frequently make reference to 
contemporary developments in order to 
show that the problems that appear in 
this debate are still relevant today, and if 
they do not develop into a crisis it is only 
because of contingent reasons. I will end 
with a reﬂ  ection on the boundaries of 
political theory.
4.
Yongliu Zheng (China-EU School of Law 
/ China)
Kelsen in China
Abstract:
Eine quantitative Uebersicht ueber die 
chinesische Kelsenrezeption der letzten 
80 Jahre ergibt das folgende Bild: sechs 
uebersetzte Baende und 16 uebersetzte 
Schriften aus Kelsens Werk, eine chi-
nesische Monographie ueber Kelsen, 66 
Aufsaetze und 22 Doktor- sowie Magis-
terarbeiten. Darueber hinaus ﬁ  nden sich 
Darstellungen und 
Analysen von Kelsens Werk in dut-
zenden von Lehrbuechern und Mon-
ographien zur westlichen juristischen 
Ideengeschichte und Rechtsphilosophie.
Die Kelsenrezeption in China begann 
Therefore, the exploration of their cor-
relation and its implication is necessarily 
required.
In order to carry out this task, this paper 
starts with the analysis of core meaning 
of these two concepts. In Part I, I will 
demonstrate the differences between 
two propositions in methodological as-
pects and from substantial perspective 
by tracing the changes of his concep-
tion of ‘Institution’ and institutional 
terminology. Part II seeks to establish 
the correlation between two theses. 
MacCormick’s early conception of ‘Law 
as Institutional Facts’, is deﬁ  ned as the 
concrete concept which is ontologically-
oriented and embodies the notion of le-
gal professionals. The later thesis, ‘Law 
as Institutional Normative Order’, on 
the other hand, embodies a philosophi-
cal and sociological conception as well 
as a general conception of law. Finally, I 
will brieﬂ  y point out the theoretical and 
practical implication of MacCormick’s 
destination-conception of ‘Law as Insti-
tutional Normative Order’ in the context 
of multi-layered and dynamic character-
istics of modern legal system.
3.
Detlef von Daniels (Universität Witten/
Herdecke / Germany)
The Jurisprudence of Crisis. The dis-
pute between Schmitt and Kelsen in 
the light of contemporary political the-
ory
Abstract:
The Weimar Republic was certainly a pe-
riod characterized by a series of political 
crises. I want to argue that it also em-
sic Norm, says Kelsen, is “the typical case 
of a ﬁ  ction in the sense of Vaihinger’s 
Philosophie des Als-Ob.” In his last pub-
lished book, The The0ory of Norms, he 
further states that the Basic Norm is a 
self-contradiction. In this paper we shall 
consider what this means and some of its 
problems. According to many exponents 
of “paraconsistent logic,” a system of log-
ic that tolerates self-contradictions, there 
can be true self-contradictions (dialethe-
ism). But does Kelsen need to maintain 
s o m e  f o r m  o f  d i a l e t h e i s m ?  M o r e o v e r ,  
does Kelsen need to reject the principle 
of ordinary logic that anything follows 
from a contradiction, ex contradictione 
quodlibet? Most importantly, how can a 
self-contradiction function normatively 
and epistemologically? We shall attempt 
to answer this question.
2.
Hyun Kyung Lee (Seoul National Uni-
versity, College of Law / South Korea)
From Institutional Facts To the Institu-
tional Normative Order - Reﬂ  ecting on 
the Changes in Neil MacCormick’s In-
stitutional Conception of Law 
Abstract:
Neil MacCormick who is well known as 
the initial advocator of the Institutional 
Theory of Law has provided an alterna-
tive conception of law, which supple-
ments defects of previous major legal 
theories. His presentation of law consists 
of ‘Law as Institutional Facts’ and ‘Law 
as Institutional Normative Order’. Al-
though these two kinds of theses share 
the same logical structure, they are dif-
ferent in their meaning and content. 
Group D: History of Philosophy; Hart, 
Kelsen, Radbruch, Habermas, Rawls, 
Luhmann; General Theory of Norms, 
Positivism
WORKING GROUP
WG 27 
Kelsen and analysis of the „Pure 
Theory of Law”
Session 1
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time 15.30 h – 18.00 h
Location HoF 3.36/ Chicago
Chair Golding, Martin (North 
Carolina / USA)
Session 2
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time 15.30 h – 18.00 h
Location HoF 3.45 / Sydney
Chair Marcelo Solon, Ari 
(São Paulo / Brazil)
Lectures:
1.
Martin Golding (Duke Univerity / USA)
The Basic Norm as Fiction: Kelsen’s Fi-
nal Doctrine
Abstract:
The Basic Norm is central to Kelsen’s 
theory of law. It serves two functions: a 
normative function, whereby it infuses 
the laws of a given legal system with 
their “oughtness”; and an epistemologi-
cal function, whereby one is able to cog-
nize the elements of the system. The Ba- 400 401
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Abstract:
This paper aims to investigate the con-
tribution offered by the work Knowledge 
and Human Interests of Jürgen Haber-
mas in the analisys of legal positivism of 
Hans Kelsen. The intention is to explore 
the notion of neutrality of the ideas of 
the Austrian jurist, similar to the ideas of 
neutrality of modern science and reason. 
It is expected to result in a understand-
ing of the relationship between knowl-
edge and interest in the construction of 
legal knowledge, as much as it is done 
in the understanding of modern science.
WORKING GROUP
WG 28 
Habermas, Honneth
Session 1
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location IG 251
Chair Ekardt, Felix (Rostock / 
Germany)
Session 2
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time 15.30 h – 18.00 h
Location RUW 4.101
Chair Mastronardi, Philippe A. 
(St. Gallen / Switzerland)
cle Zur Theorie der juristischen Fiktio-
nen (1919), in the ﬁ  rst (1934) and in the 
second (1960) edition of the Reine Re-
chtslehre and in his posthumous work, 
Allgeimeine Theorie der Normen (1979). 
This paper aims to investigate the alleged 
change of position occurred in Kelsen’s 
thinking, who would have ﬁ  rst  classi-
ﬁ  ed the basic norm as a logical-transcen-
dental hypothesis in the manner of Kant 
and the “Philosophy of As-if” by Hans 
Vaihinger (“Die Philosophie des Als-
Ob”) before conceiving it as a ﬁ  ction, in 
the same line of Herman Cohen’s ideas. 
We intend to demonstrate that such an 
interpretation is mistaken, since the path 
followed by Kelsen isn’t from hypothesis 
to ﬁ  ction, as commonly sustained, but 
from ﬁ  ction to hypothesis; 
2) Present critics to both conceptions of 
the basic norm (hypothesis or ﬁ  ction) 
based on current literature, regarding 
the works of Amselek, Celano, Dreier, 
Edel, Goyard-Fabre, Höffe, Honoré, Luf, 
Paulson, Raz and others; 
3) Propose a new theoretical under-
standing of the basic norm, seeing it as a 
scientiﬁ  c postulate; 
4) Discuss the relevance of the basic 
norm in the juridical practice, question-
ing the relation between science and so-
cial reality.
7.
Wilson Levy (University of São Paulo / 
Brazil)
For a critique of legal positivism of 
Hans Kelsen: the relationship between 
knowledge and interest in Jürgen Hab-
ermas 
ist character of the hermeneutics carried 
out by the Prague jurist, who was fully 
committed to a social justice ideology 
that instigates popular sovereignty, as 
originally conceived in Greece and Is-
rael, in the 5th Century B.C.
Schmitt is fully right in both criticisms. 
Kelsen, not being a great jurist, became 
famous as a great philosopher of the so-
called science of law. In fact, however, 
what motivated him was an ideological 
passion for democracy and for social-
ism and, to a lesser extent, for German 
nationalism. However, the ideological 
interference is not speciﬁ  c to the work 
of Hans Kelsen. As the foundation of the 
Pure Doctrine reveals itself as an ideol-
ogy of a justice of redemption, it is possi-
ble to notice in Schmitt an ideology that 
moves in the opposite direction.
Under the pretext of establishing a new 
meaning to Nomos, Schmitt makes 
founded.
6.
Andityas Soares De Moura Costa Matos 
(Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais / 
Brazil)
Deus ex machina? A critical discussion 
about the nature, function and impor-
tance of the basic norm.
Abstract:
The basic norm of Hans Kelsen is the 
most controversial element of his scien-
tiﬁ  c project of fundamentation of Law. 
The present paper is divided into four 
parts, in which is sought: 
1) Discuss the nature and the function of 
the basic norm, as it evolves throughout 
Kelsen’s work, in particular in the arti-
in den 1930er Jahren; richtig bekannt 
wurde Kelsen in juristischen Fachkre-
isen aber erst mit dem Beginn des 21. 
Jahrhunderts. Die ‚Reine Rechtslehre‘ 
stand seit jeher im Mittelpunkt der Stu-
dien und Uebersetzungsbemuehungen. 
Die Verzoegerung in der Rezeption von 
Kelsens Werk laesst sich vielleicht damit 
erklaeren, dass seine Schriften einerseits 
keine Verwendung fuer die Rechtspraxis 
ﬁ  nden und andererseits auch nicht die 
‚Needham-Frage‘ der chinesischen Re-
chtsstaatlichkeit beantworten konnte.
Session 2
5.
Ari Marcelo Solon (Universidade de São 
Paulo (USP) / Brazil)
Judaism and Antidudaism in Jurispru-
dence (Schmitt versus Kelsen)
Abstract:
My intention is to research the contribu-
tion of Judaism in the work of Hans Kel-
sen and his school and of antijudaism in 
the work of Schmitt and his school fol-
lowing these data.
On October 3th, 1936, at a Conference 
given under the general theme Das Ju-
dentum in der Rechtswissenschaft, then 
made into an article entitled Die Deut-
sche Rechtswissenschaft im Kampf ge-
gen den jüdischen Geist, Carl Schmitt 
refers to the Viena School and to Hans 
K e l s e n  ( 1 8 8 1 – 1 9 7 3 )  a s  “ d i e  W i e n e r  
Schule des Juden Kelsen”.
Certainly, Schmitt didn’t intend to draw 
attention to the Jewish ancestry of the of 
Auguste Lowi’s and Adolf Kelsen’s son, 
but strived to uncover the non positiv- 402 403
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neth’s “The Struggle for Recognition”, 
“Reiﬁ  cation” and “La Société du Mépris” 
(respectively), are used in Honneth’s 
reconstruction of Hegel’s “Philosophy 
of Right” – as it is elaborated in “Suffer-
ing from Indeterminacy”. The distorted 
character of life forms in western mo-
dernity and its requirements for self-
preservation and social reproduction 
will be approached in the ﬁ  rst section. 
It will be demonstrated that the concep-
tual and evaluative structure that, when 
internalized, constitutes subjects capa-
ble of rational deliberation is pathologi-
c a l :  i t  p r o v i d e s  p a t h o l o g i c a l  l i f e  f o r m s  
by producing social suffering as a result 
of failing in taking in to account the 
requirements of recognition and its ex-
pectations of self-realization. In the sec-
ond section the paper discuss Honneth’s 
theory on social recognition as it is pre-
sented in “The Struggle for Recognition”. 
Then, the concept of reiﬁ  cation, deﬁ  ned 
as forgetfulness of recognition, will be 
approached. Finally, concepts formulat-
ed in the dynamics of the reconstruction 
of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right” will be 
articulated, recognition spheres and ac-
tion spheres will be connected in order 
to deepen the epochal diagnosis to pro-
ceed a proposal for a theory of justice.
5.
Felix Ekardt (University of Rostock, Bal-
tic Sea Institute for Environmental Law 
/ Germany)
Toward a New Approach in Discourse 
Theory of Justice and Law
Abstract:
This contribution describes a new ap-
of it. Her main thesis is the denial of the 
constitutive relation between discourses 
and validity: the truth or correctness of 
our empirical or normative (moral) be-
liefs, or to put it in discourse-theoretical 
terms, the validity of our claims of truth 
and correctness, do not depend on these 
being accepted by everyone (or the af-
fected regarding moral norms), not even 
in a discourse under ideal conditions. 
Therefore, discourse is neither sifﬁ  cient 
nor necessary condition for the truth or 
correctness of our beliefs. I will try to de-
fend here that this strategy, followed to 
explain within the terms of the discourse 
theory the concepts of truth and moral 
correctness, just as the rol of discourses 
as justiﬁ  cation and test procedures for 
our beliefs, not only can help the under-
standing of some relevant concepts for 
the conception of legal argumentation 
as a rational legal discourse (Sonderfall-
these), but also allows a realist (objec-
tive) interpretation of legal discourse, in 
which the central concept is not that of 
consens, but the realist presuposition of 
legal correctnes, as something to what 
every validity claim formulated in legal 
discourses aspire.
4.
Rafael Schincariol (University of São 
Paulo / Brazil)
Recognition, reiﬁ   cation and social 
pathologies in Suffering from indeter-
minacy
Abstract:
This paper investigates how the con-
cepts of recognition, reiﬁ  cation and so-
cial pathologies, discussed in Axel Hon-
through a new articulation of Jürgen 
Habermas’ discursive theory of law and 
his most recent studies on the concept of 
political public sphere, such as in Ach, 
Europa (2008). This articulation will 
suggest some remarks on an internal re-
lation between law and political public 
sphere, which is implicitly present, but 
insufﬁ  ciently explored in Faktizität und 
Geltung (1992). The theoretical section 
gives normative and procedural criteria 
for the last section of the paper, which 
consists on a critical analysis of the pro-
cedures and practical cases of public 
hearings held at the Brazilian Supreme 
Court, constituting the ﬁ  rst  scientiﬁ  c 
study on the Court’s use of this legal 
instrument to date. This last discussion 
attempts to evaluate the latter’s capac-
ity to compensate the legitimacy deﬁ  cits 
of supreme courts in democratic rules 
of law , as well as to give expression to 
the publicity of law claims that become 
evident in this new articulation between 
discursive theory of law and political 
public sphere.
3.
José Manuel Cabra Apalategui (Univer-
sidad de Málaga / Spain)
A realist interpretation of the theory of 
legal discourse
Abstract:
In this paper, I will focus on the inter-
pretation of the discourse theory propos-
sed by Habermas pupil Cristina Lafont. 
Lafont’s interpretation strengthen the 
realist and cognitivist presupositions of 
discourse theory at the expense of the 
constructivist and consensualist aspects 
Lectures:
Session 1
1.
Eduardo Bittar (University of São Paulo 
/ Brazil)
Democracy and social utopias: a study 
about Albrecht Wellmer and Axel Hon-
neth
Abstract:
This work intends to analysis the phi-
losophy of history and to discuss the 
consequences of its death to the Critical 
Theory. The concept of reason and the 
devices of democracy and human rights 
are discussed in a revision of the histori-
cal debate about the end of history oper-
ates the life in the interior of the modern 
society, especially about the intellectual 
condition at the information society.
2.
Viktor Blotta + Ines Prado Soares (Uni-
versity of São Paulo Law School / Brazil)
Public hearings as publicity of the con-
stitution policies in supreme courts. An 
intersubjective approach
Abstract:
This paper aims to discuss in which 
sense public hearings in supreme courts 
of democratic rules of law can be seen 
as publicity of the constitution policies. 
These policies constitute expressions of a 
normative claim for a wider “publiciza-
tion of law” by democratic states’ insti-
tutional powers and organs; a claim that 
becomes evident when one undertakes 
an intersubjective interpretation of law. 
T his  th e o r e ti cal  argum e n t  will  be  p r e -
sented in the ﬁ  rst section of the paper  404 405
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actually require the meaning to be up-
dated at the moment of its interpretation 
rather than to be based on its historical 
origin.
8.
Claudio Corradetti (University of Rome 
“Tor Vergata” and European Academy / 
Italy)
Discursive Dialectics and Human Rights
Abstract:
This paper advances a dialectic reformu-
lation of the Habermasian notion of dis-
cursive theory. A justiﬁ  cation of a theory 
of human rights is then derived from the 
proposed normative model, aiming at 
combining procedural mechanisms of 
justiﬁ  cation with substantive ones. The 
intention is to advance a “post-meta-
physical” or a “post-natural” law doc-
trine capable of integrating a standard 
f o rm  o f  uni v e rs aliza ti o n  wi th  a  m ul ti -
plicity of “exemplarily” valid possibilities 
of human rights conﬁ  gurations. While 
largely indebted to several classical and 
contemporary scholars, this argument 
attempts an original interpretation of 
traditional categories of political thought 
and a distinctive model of human rights 
validity and of normative political valid-
ity in general. 
9.
Philippe A. Mastronardi + Florian Win-
disch (Universität St. Gallen Law School 
/ Switzerland)
Wie vernünftig entscheiden? Die Ver-
fassung des interdisziplinären (interra-
tionalen) Diskurses
was promulgated many years ago? The 
originalists would answer this question 
in the negative, for they believe judges 
should prioritize the original meaning 
of the text. In this paper I intend to put 
forward a competitive theory of legal 
interpretation, using speech-act theory 
as its theoretical basis. I argue that the 
theory, despite neglecting the differ-
ences between spoken and written lan-
guage, may be used as a descriptive tool 
for legal language. It would, however, 
involve an adaptation to embrace writ-
ten language. My analysis is focused on 
re-describing speech acts as they occur 
in written communication, i.e. while the 
audience is distant in time and/or space 
from the speaker. The result will prove, 
I believe, that the impact of a speech act 
must be shifted beyond the moment of 
utterance to the moment of reception of 
the message by the reader.
In the second part of the paper I argue 
that the modiﬁ  ed speech act theory ap-
plied to written communication in legal 
acts does not support the originalist po-
sition. This is so because written text, 
as opposed to oral communication, can 
be an object of interpretative reﬂ  ection 
without the presence of its author; i.e. il-
locutionary uptake happens as a result 
of an interaction between the text and 
its contemporary reader rather than be-
tween the reader and the author. This 
approach entails treating the reader’s 
contemporary context as a crucial part 
of interpretative work. Thus it can be 
concluded that the written character of 
the communication through law and the 
detachment of the text from its author 
philosophical ideas of Jürgen Habermas 
with brazilian democratic experience, 
especially in the post-dictatorship. Jür-
gen Habermas, with his theory of com-
municative action and speech, supports 
the need for autonomy and strengthen-
ing of public spaces for political delib-
eration, in order to rescue the primary 
functions. The idea sustained by the Au-
thor of undeniable character procedural, 
is that the discursive confrontation be-
tween the political actors to decide on 
their own living, introduce network ne-
gotiations with several possibilities, not 
necessarily formatted and attached to 
the supremacy of State face of the Civil 
Society. Under this bias, we wanted to 
analyze the historical foreshortening of 
democratic experience in Brazil, with 
special emphasis on the role played by 
civil society. Meanwhile, considering 
the philosophy of institutional perform-
ance , it will give highlight the current 
situation faced by Brazil, where the pow-
ers are working together to achieve the 
fundamental freedoms of individuals 
and as a consequence the fullness of the 
Democratic State of Law.
Session 2
7.
Marcin Matczak (University of Warsaw 
/ Poland)
Legal interpretation, context and speec 
act theory
Abstract:
Is it justiﬁ   ed to interpret a legal text 
according to the meaning the words 
of the text have today even if the text 
proach toward discourse ethics, deﬁ  ned 
as a discourse theory of justice or the 
right law respectively. It is signiﬁ  cantly 
different from the classic discourse theory 
of Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, 
to some extent also from Robert Alexy. 
Those differences concern (1) some as-
pects of demonstrating why objective or 
universal norms can exist at all and (2) 
the content of those norms, particularly 
of the principle of freedom including its 
intergenerational and global extension. 
Altogether, it still seems true that dis-
course theory is the most promising ap-
proach toward a modern universalism 
and a modern law of reason in times of 
pluralistic and technological civilizations 
(also including rules for balancing and 
risk assessment). In any case, the contro-
versy about theories of discourse ration-
ality should bring about much clearer 
arguments than the conventional debate 
about “positivism or law of nature” (the 
very notion seems misleading), in favor 
of and against universalism. At the same 
time, the contribution criticizes some as-
pects of economic theories of efﬁ  ciency 
which actually do not concern “another 
aspect besides justice” but rather describe 
a (wrong) ethics.
6.
Tiago Pinto Alberto + Sabrina Pinto Al-
berto (Pontifícia Universidade Católica 
do Paraná, Faculdade de Direito Tuiuti 
/ Brazil)
The contribution of Jürgen Habermas ‘s 
ideas to Brazilian Democracy 
Abstract:
The work to be presented will analyse the  406 407
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tion in the legal system of a modern state 
is embroiled in human nature, then, the 
whole outﬁ  t has become one of moral-
ity. By this reasoning, we estimate from 
the moral point of view the process of in-
ward derivation which is inherently em-
bedded in epistemic consciousness in the 
process of application,interpretation and 
analysis of the law.All this have mean-
ing in the process governed by human 
ability.Both the theoretical and practi-
cal understanding of the law,require 
the sense in which it has been accepted 
and the functions the law is expected to 
serve.
This epistemic consciousness captures 
the conditions for justice beyond policy 
decision but rests on matters of detail. 
The implications of this is that judjmen-
tal utterances take root from legal inter-
pretations and the streams of thought 
c a n n o t  c o n c l u d e  w i t h o u t  s o m e  i n t e r -
vening moral factors. It is upon this that 
moral issues in the rules of recognition 
are to be analysed in this work.
The position upon which this work is 
grounded is that it is morally obligatory 
and morally coherent to expect that the 
criteria of validity within the legal sys-
tem of the society to should be morally 
sustained.
2.
Carla Henriete Bevilacqua Piccolo (Uni-
versity of São Paulo / Brazil)
Morality and the concept of law in 
H.L.A. Hart’s works
Abstract:
The contemporary debate in Jurispru-
dence is a eminently methodological 
this case, the criteria of validity may not 
be ascertained within the parameters of 
general acceptance. The secondary rules, 
apply not directly to conduct but to other 
rules to which a society is authoritatively 
identiﬁ  ed.The concept of morality in this 
work is considred as a procedure that 
seeks for convenience between reason 
and justiﬁ  cation of decision. It is agreed 
that what legal counsel has to sell is skill 
in law and legal argumentation but the 
exercise of these cannot be facilitated 
properly without reference to moral im-
pressions.
In this paper , w e f ocus on th e rule of 
recognition as a dimension of secondary 
rules and analyze moral issues involved 
in it. As Hart puts it, the actual rule of 
recognition in a given society may be ex-
tremely intricate; they may not, indeed, 
even be stated or easily statable, but may 
remain implicit in a variety of proce-
dures for determining which rules are 
valid rules of that system. As stated here, 
the element of intricacy is, as Taylor says, 
inwardly delivered, personal, original 
identity doesn’t enjoy this recognition a 
priori. It has to win it through exchange.
Since there is a strong link between the 
law and its interpretation ,there some 
factors that are which cannot be side-
lined in the of the judge. These include 
the position of interest within the sub-
jective terrain,the strenght of predis-
positions and the seeming conﬂ  ict be-
tween the subjective and the objective.
It is within this framework that morality 
concept has been used to estimate the 
aspects of the rule of recognition.
Since the essence of the rule of recogni-
Der materiellen Verfassung: Inhaltliches 
Argumentarium guter Gründe im Dis-
kurs (bewährte Argumente aus bisheri-
gen Diskursen).
WORKING GROUP
WG 29 
Dworkin, Hart, Luhmann, Raz, Rawls
Session 1
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 2.102
Chair Chein Feres, Marcos 
Vinicio (Juiz de Fora / 
Brazil)
Session 2
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time 15.30 h – 18.00 h
Location RUW 2.102
Chair Chang, Chia-yin (Taipei / 
Taiwan)
Lectures:
1.
Raphael Adebisi Akanmidu (University 
of Ilorin / Nigeria)
Moral issues in the rule of recognition
Abstract:
It is generally believed that the distinc-
tive character of the legal order of the 
modern state is to be acknowledged in 
the manner in which it combines its 
primary and secondary rules. Primary 
rules are those that directly regulate the 
conduct of the members of a society. In 
Abstract:
Es ist die Aufgabe der Wissenschaft, 
richtige, d.h. möglichst vernünftige Ent-
scheidungen anzuleiten. Der Anspruch 
auf wissenschaftliche Gültigkeit umfasst 
immer sowohl einen Wahrheits-, wie ei-
nen Wert- und einen Gerechtigkeitsan-
spruch.
Vernünftige Entscheidungen lassen sich 
nur in einem zugleich rationalen und in-
terrationalen Diskurs erreichen:
1. Im rationalen Diskurs wird der An-
spruch erhoben, innerhalb einer be-
stimmten Rationalität richtige Antwor-
ten auf ausgewählte Fragen zu ﬁ  nden 
(meist innerhalb der Grenzen bestimm-
ter institutionalisierter Schulen oder 
Disziplinen).
2. Der interrationale Diskurs setzt bei 
der Relation zwischen verschiedenen 
Fragen mit unterschiedlicher Rationali-
tät an und versucht, 
a. zwischen diesen Fragen eine wechsel-
seitige Verständigung herzustellen (Dis-
kurs zur Verständlichkeit), bevor er 
b. auf den Diskurs über die Richtigkeit 
von Antworten verschiedener Fragestel-
lungen im Zusammenhang eintritt (ma-
terieller interrationaler Diskurs).
Der interrationale Diskurs bedarf der 
richtigen Verfassung:
1. Der formellen Verfassung des Diskur-
ses
a. Institutionelle Strukturen und Prozes-
se (z.B. Gleichberechtigung aller Betei-
ligten, Symmetrie der Strukturen).
b. Methodische Argumentationsstruk-
turen und -abläufe (z.B. Wahrheit, Wert 
und Gerechtigkeit; Fragen- und Ant-
wortdimension). 408 409
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attempt is made to develop the idea of 
moral reading of legal rules and consti-
tutional principles. So as to accomplish 
this methodological tool, it is necessary 
to revaluate Dworkin’s idea of integrity 
in Law, adding substantial moral content 
to “the dimension of ﬁ  t” not only from 
the viewpoint of the qualitative distinc-
tion of value in Taylor’s proposal but also 
from the viewpoint of living lawfully 
as in Bankowski’s legal theory. To sum 
up, the ﬁ  nal intent is to ﬁ  gure out new 
means of interpreting legal economic 
regulations and ﬁ  nding new grounds for 
the legitimate evaluation of public poli-
cies.
5.
Wojciech Ciszewski (Jagiellonian Uni-
versity / Poland)
Rawls‘ difference principle and its crit-
ics 
Abstract:
John Rawls based his theory of justice on 
the conception of a hypothetical original 
position. People being in the original 
position behind a “veil of ignorance” ap-
prove two principles of justice. The ﬁ  rst 
one is the principle of equal freedom. It 
provides that each individual should be 
allowed as much freedom as possible, 
as long as it is not interfering with the 
freedom of others. The second one is the 
difference principle, claiming that eco-
nomic and social inequalities should be 
adjusted in the way that would improve 
the situation of the worst-off. On one 
hand, this principle provides for the way 
of distributing economic goods in a just 
society, on the other hand, it serves as 
ganization could not be taken seriously, 
since it afﬁ  rms that is an objective and 
neutral (and strangely mysterious) en-
tity – the social or the legal systems – the 
one empowered to organize and rule 
people’s lives. When assuming this po-
sition as scientiﬁ   c, Luhmann conceals 
the ideological sense of his theory, since 
there will always be someone operating 
the system and ruling it.
4.
Marcos Vinício Chein Feres (Universi-
dade Federal De Juiz De Fora / Brazil)
Law as integrity and law as identity: le-
gal theory, state intervention and public 
policies.
Abstract:
State intervention in economy is natu-
rally fulﬁ   lled by the formulating of 
public policies. In this context, an im-
portant question must be raised: is state 
intervention in the market, by the use 
of public policies, legitimate taking into 
account both ordinary regulations and 
constitutional principles? Obviously, the 
legitimate use of public policies, as far as 
state intervention is concerned, will be 
analysed taking into consideration the 
legal procedures and the necessary le-
gal interpretation. Methodologically, the 
theoretical object of this research is to 
conciliate the idea of law as integrity, de-
veloped by Dworkin, with the idea of law 
as identity, complemented by Taylor´s 
idea of identity and Bankowski´s idea of 
living lawfully. In fact, the methodologi-
cal approach consists of reconstructing a 
system of analytical concepts based on 
contemporary legal theory in which an 
by H.L.A. Hart, but as natural and, why 
not, obvious consequences of Hart’s own 
arguments
3.
Josue Mastrodi (Faculdades de Campi-
nas / Brazil)
Taking the concept of autopoiesis seri-
ously: why Law cannot be understood 
under Niklas Luhmann’s paradigm
Abstract:
According to the concept of autopoiesis, 
society and the law system have been cre-
ated by themselves. This is not the very 
problem of the Theory of Systems, since 
man y  th eo ri es  gro un d ed  o n  posi ti vism  
poses likewise (e.g., the Kelsenian Pure 
Theory of Law).A system can be logically 
understood by the presence of two char-
acteristics: the element of unity (what 
belongs to it) and the element of order 
(in which form the elements are related 
to the whole system and to one another).
Hans Kelsen worked speciﬁ  cally  with 
the element of unity: any points related 
to order were not considered part of Law, 
but elements of politics. Niklas Luh-
mann, however, used the autopoietic as-
sumption to found both elements of any 
social or legal system. By the autopoietic 
paradigm, the Luhmannian system cre-
ates the conditions for depicting all and 
every components that belong to it (ele-
ment of unity) and also the criterion for 
internally organizing its elements under 
a predetermined order given by system 
itself (element of order).The assumption 
according to which a social system (that 
is not formed by human beings) has the 
keys of either social or legal internal or-
one and perhaps its most crucial point 
resides in the so called separability the-
sis, defended by legal positivists and at-
tacked by almost everyone else. H.L.A. 
Hart provides us with one of the clearest 
expositions and defenses of such the-
sis, reafﬁ  rming in his Postscript to The 
Concept of Law the possibility of a le-
gal study totally disengaged from moral 
considerations. 
But what does it mean to assert that law 
is different from morality? Isn’t that a 
most trivial observation, which no sound 
legal theory would dare deny? What is 
then there left for controversy in it? The 
ﬁ  rst aim of this paper is to address these 
questions and provide a clearer picture 
of what the separability thesis really 
represents. However, the main purpose 
of this paper is far more ambitious: that 
is to demonstrate, through a thorough 
study of Hart’s works, embracing not 
only his famous jurisprudential texts 
but also giving a special attention to 
his unfairly less known works in moral 
philosophy and criminal law, that all of 
his arguments for the separability thesis 
are normative ones, regarding the mor-
al merits of a positivist approach, and 
not epistemological arguments, as one 
would expect. 
If the arguments presented here are 
right, then the role played by legal posi-
tivism in the contemporary jurispru-
dential agenda must be revisited in the 
light of such arguments and not only 
ethical positivism, but also several forms 
of pos-positivism, must be hence under-
stood not as deviations from a more or-
thodox legal positivism such as exposed  410 411
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tic traits of Dworkin’s theory of moral 
truth, i.e. morality’s independence from 
metaphysics and the individualist moral 
virtue of responsibility, in order to ques-
tion the concept of knowledge implied 
by this theory.  
Finally, it attempts to draw some conclu-
sions about truth in morals.
8.
Dragica Vujadinovic (Faculty of Law 
University of Belgrade / Serbia)
The Role of European Civil Society in 
Building the European Polity
Abstract:
Discourse on civil society has become a 
structural part of debates about the dem-
ocratic legitimacy deﬁ   cit of the EU gov-
ernance. One of the main answers to the
question of how the democratic deﬁ   cit of 
the EU may be restituted – is connected 
with civil society, another with improv-
ing the democratic quality of governance
in the EU.
The role of European civil society in 
the process of Europeanization “from 
below”, in building“ an integrated Eu-
ropean society”, in generating a demo-
cratic political culture, in developing a 
European public and genuine European 
media, as well as in generating European
citizenship and a genuine European 
democratic polity will be in the focus of
analysis.
The rebirth of civil society belongs to the 
trend of the liberal-democratic tradition
which interprets constitutional democ-
racy in the most deliberative, partici-
patory, republican way, and connects 
deliberative, communicative and repub-
The author conﬁ  rms his thesis that mo-
rality is an interpretive enterprise and 
argues that moral claims as well as in-
terpretive judgments can be true. He 
further suggests that truth is to be un-
derstood as an interpretive concept. In 
the light of Peirce’s theory of truth, he 
proposes a “very abstract statement” of 
the concept of truth, i.e. “truth as the in-
trinsic goal of inquiry”, as “what counts 
as the uniquely successful solution to 
a challenge of inquiry”, as well as the 
formulation of “more concrete speciﬁ  -
cations of truth for different domains 
by ﬁ   nding more concrete accounts of 
success tailored to each domain”. Dis-
tinguishing between interpretation and 
science, the author considers “value the-
ory” as a “candidate account of success” 
in the domain of interpretation, and the 
theory of “moral responsibility” as “a 
candidate application of the value theory 
to the more speciﬁ  c interpretive domain 
of morality”; a “different account of suc-
cess and hence truth would be offered 
for science”. 
This paper explores, ﬁ   rst, the relation 
between Dworkin’s theory of moral 
truth and contemporary philosophy of 
knowledge, i.e. the dominant paradigm 
since the “axiological turn”, according 
to which knowledge is more than “justi-
ﬁ  ed true belief” (cf. Tiercelin). With this 
a i m ,  i t  f o c u s e s  o n  P e i r c e ’ s  p r a g m a t i s t  
theory of truth, contemporary theories 
of knowledge as “inquiry” and recent 
theories which promote a “social” model 
of knowledge, challenging the individu-
alist approaches.
Second, it focuses on two characteris-
– which, ultimately, can provide us with 
projections of images of law itself. All 
the images are projected and processed 
in a feeling that works, in the language 
of systems theory (our ﬁ  rst theoretical 
framework) as a medium for the produc-
tion of these images as forms.
Thus, the theory of images try to argue 
that the traditional distinction between 
rational / irrational is an expression of 
feeling, although the use of such a dis-
tinction can not understand their own 
blind spots, ie, the feeling in perception. 
That dinstinction creates the crystalliza-
tion of something “rational”, even though 
the statement involves something irra-
tionalizable in understanding. The im-
age, therefore, is a paradox, in which the 
feel of where it rises can be understood 
as a dark side of what models of ration-
ality do not like to establish themes, ie, 
as something that belongs to every con-
science, while contingent mainly by the 
paradox of self-observation and mutual 
inaccessibility of conscience.
7.
Sophie Papaefthymiou (Institute for Po-
litical Science in Lyon / France)
On Dworkin’s Theory of Moral Truth 
Abstract:
In his latest book, Justice for Hedgehogs 
(2011), Professor Dworkin defends the 
metaphysical independence of value and 
offers an account of “Hume’s Principle” 
as supporting morality “as a separate 
department of knowledge, with is own 
standards of inquiry and justiﬁ  cation”, 
and as independent “from science and 
metaphysics”.  
an incentive for the talented to use their 
skills in a way that is socially beneﬁ  cial.
The difference principle is undoubtedly 
one of the most controversial elements 
of Rawls’ theory. This paper analyses the 
most signiﬁ  cant objections to the prin-
ciple of difference formulated from the 
point of three other contemporary con-
ceptions of justice: libertarian, marxian 
and communitarian. In the summary 
of the dispute on the difference princi-
ple the author makes a claim that the 
presented conceptions of justice may be 
perceived as ways of rationalizing their 
underlying intuitions. Among those 
intuitions the one concerning private 
property and its relation to subjects of 
law is of primary importance. Various 
justice theories taking various approach-
es towards the nature of the property 
law will subsequently, within their re-
spective theoretical systems, ascribe var-
ious functions to it.
6.
Alexandre Da Maia (Federal University 
of Pernambuco´s Law School / Brazil)
Legal Rights As Image: A Possibile Ap-
proach
Abstract:
In this article we will see some projec-
tions of certain speciﬁ  c images on the 
legal rights from two theoretical frame-
works (Luhmann and Ferraz Jr.) who 
ﬂ   ee foundationalist appeals of those 
seeking to make the legal theory a 
manual adjustment to the wishes of the 
Ministers of ulterior Supreme Courts. 
Therefore the proposal is to show vari-
able forms of imagining the legal rights  412 413
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that open texture is not the only reason 
to explain the hard cases.In this paper 
w h i l e  m e n t i o n i n g  t o  H a r t ’ s  o p e n  t e x -
ture concept brieﬂ  y and try to present 
Dworkin’s criticism on this theory with 
its consequences, it is aimed to try to put 
forth the importance of this debate in 
both theory and practice of law.
11.
Miklós Könczöl (Pázmány Péter Catholic 
University, Budapest / Hungary + Dur-
ham University / UK)
As Heads of Families: Rawlsian Per-
spectives on Future Generations
Abstract:
The Rawlsian notion that parties to the 
o r i g i n a l  c o n t r a c t  s h o u l d  b e  c o n c e i v e d  
of as heads of families has met vigorous 
criticism from several directions. Part of 
this criticism was developed by scholars 
working on the problem of future gen-
erations. Alongside those reproaching 
Rawls’ ‘psychological assumption’ as im-
permissible, some argued that principles 
of justice as reciprocity have nothing to 
say about intergenerational justice. Oth-
ers again tried to establish reciprocity 
outside of a contractarian context.It is the 
contention of this paper that Rawls’ con-
ception of the original position may pro-
vide a useful starting point for address-
ing the problems raised by the apparent 
lack of inter-generational reciprocity. In 
the ﬁ  rst part, a brief reconstruction of 
the Rawlsian framework isfollowed by a 
summary of the main points of Liberal 
and Communitarian critique in terms 
of future generations. The second part 
of the paper discusses, on the one hand, 
this, between the internal and external 
points of view.
10.
Zeynep Ispir Toprak (Ankara University 
Faculty of Law, Ankara / Turkey)
Dworkin’s Criticism to Hart’s Open 
Texture Theory
Abstract:
H.L.A. Hart – Ronald Dworkin debate 
is a very well-known debate in Philoso-
phy of Law literature. Hart, who is one 
of the most important ﬁ  gure and a cor-
nerstone in legal positivism, has been 
criticized by Dworkin. Some parts of 
these critics are related to Hart’s open 
texture theory and its consequences.
Hart explains law by means of a model 
of rules in general while Dworkin pro-
poses a comprehensive explanation of 
law that contains principles and policies 
together with rules. It is possible to ﬁ  nd 
“right answers” for hard cases in such 
kind of a legal system includes principles 
as a key concept in Dworkin’s theory.
Hart indicates that in some cases legal 
rules can not determinate legal conse-
quences because of the open texture of 
law. Judges have to use their discretion 
and have to act as a law maker to reach 
a decision in these “penumbral cases”. 
As Hart said in Concept of Law, Dworkin 
criticizes Hart’s open texture theory and 
especially judicial discretion approach. 
He mentions some disadvantages such 
that it may cause a form of law making 
process which is “undemocratic” and he 
also asserts another complaint about the 
theory that it causes “retrospective or ex 
post facto lawmaking”. He also thinks 
of whether legal rules provide content-
independent reasons turns, in part, on 
how content-independence is under-
stood. I contrast two different under-
standings, which I call weak and strong 
content-independence: weak content-
independent reasons are reasons that 
do not depend on the nature and merit 
of the action that law requires. Strong 
content-independent reasons are rea-
sons that do not depend on the nature 
and merit of the action law requires or 
on any other substantive law-following 
value; this notion implies that the mere 
fact that law requires an action must it-
self count in the practical reasoning of its 
subjects. I argue that, while legal rules 
do (or at least can) give rise to content-
independent reasons in the weak sense, 
whether they can be said to generate 
strong content-independent reasons 
turns on some further distinctions: (1) 
a distinction between statements about 
reasons which focus on what Hart en-
titled the internal point of view and 
statements about reasons which focus 
on the external point of view; (2) a dis-
tinction between reasons for action and 
reasons for adopting certain attitudes. 
Strong content-independence, I argue, is 
a sound notion only when it ﬁ  gures in 
internally focused reason-statements (as 
opposed to externally focused reason-
statements) with regard to actions (as 
opposed to attitudes). Finally, I uncover 
what I consider to be a deeper dimension 
of the answer by drawing attention to an 
underlying connection between the dif-
ferent senses in which law provides con-
tent-independent reasons, and, as part of 
lican inspirations with citizens` civil so-
ciety activism.
The concept of European civil society 
will be considered starting from the (re-
publican) understanding of the essential 
interrelationship of liberal-democratic 
political order/constitutional democracy,
universal human rights and civil society. 
Empirical manifestations of a European 
civil society will be analyzed in their 
multiple forms, starting from the groups 
of non-governmental organizations and 
networks, which have been involved 
into the “social dialogue” with EU ofﬁ  -
cials, then through huge European civic 
protests, European countersummits and 
social forums, and up to continually re-
appearing grassroots initiatives, protests, 
movements, NGOs and networks (espe-
cially in regard of actual civic responses 
to the current global economic crisis).
Session 2
9.
Noam Gur (Lincoln College, University 
of Oxford / UK)
Are Legal Rules Content-Independent 
Reasons?
Abstract:
Since HLA Hart introduced them and 
Joseph Raz espoused them, content-
independent reasons have occupied a 
central place in the discourse about legal 
normativity. There is, however, a cru-
cial ambiguity in the notion, which has 
tended to hinder clarity in discussions 
concerning its bearing and soundness. 
In this paper, I suggest that the question  414 415
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distinctive paradigm of legal theory, but 
possesses the potentialities to clarify its 
relationship to the Dworkinian Theory.
WORKING GROUP
WG 30 
Philosophy of Law 19th century 
and before
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time 15.30 h – 18 h
Location HOF E.21 / Paris
Chair Städtler, Michael 
(Münster / Germany)
Lectures:
1.
Pawel Banas (Jagiellonian University / 
Poland)
Akrasia – status of weak willed actions 
in philosophy of law
Abstract:
Akrasia, or weak-will, is a term describ-
ing a phenomenon when one acts freely 
and intentionally contrary to his or her 
better judgment. Discussion on the pos-
sibility of akrasia originates in the Plato’s 
Protagoras where he states that “No one 
who either knows or believes that there 
is another possible course of action, bet-
ter than the one he is following, will ever 
continue on his present course”. Howev-
er, in his inﬂ  uential article from 1970, 
D o n a l d  D a v i d s o n  a r g u e d  t h a t  a k r a s i a  
is theoretically possible yet irrational. 
Some other critics of Plato’s stance point 
out that phenomenon of akrasia is com-
can be purely descriptive and called his 
theory a “descriptive sociology”. One of 
his great contributions to the modern le-
gal theory is his emphasis of internal as-
pect of social rules. According to him, a 
theory of law can be built on the basis of 
the description of the participants’ view 
without sharing with it. This descriptiv-
ism is totally rejected by Dworkin, who 
propagates a theory that denies a sharp 
separation between a legal theory and its 
implications for adjudication. For Dwor-
kin is a legal theory only possible as a 
theory with “the internal, participants’ 
point of view”. Dworkin’s position im-
plies a radicalization of legal theory that 
will necessarily transform the statement 
of external point of view to be that of 
internal. For Dworkin based legal posi-
tivist view of law on the sociological 
concept of law, which is an “imprecise 
criterial concept” and is “not sufﬁ  ciently 
precise to yield philosophically interest-
ing essential features.” We take up the 
challenge of Dworkin. Hart’s position is 
vulnerable because it takes an impure 
f o r m  o f  D e s c r i p t i v i s m  t h a t  s t i l l  d r a w s  
a categorical distinction between fact 
and norm. This theoretical impurity re-
sults from the ambiguity by interpreting 
the internal aspect of rules. A strategy 
to rescue the Hartian project is to radi-
calize his Descriptivism with Luhman-
nian system theory. Adapting the system 
theoretical distinction between internal 
and external observing of law with all 
its implications for the explanation of 
the legal system and legal communica-
tions, the Hartian Descriptivism attains 
ﬁ  nally its pure form, which is not only a 
müsse man diese Regel bei Seite lassen, 
und die passende Regel des Gewohn-
heitsrechtes aufsuchen und anwenden. 
Gibt es eine solche gewohnheitsrechtli-
che Regel nicht, oder komme man zur 
Meinung, dass sie ebenso „offensichtlich 
ungerecht“ sei, so müsse man im Einzel-
fall nach der Gerechtigkeit, also dem 
Rechten und Gerechten selbst entschei-
den. Diese Rechts- und Rechtsanwend-
ungsauffassung hat Bogišic auch in dem 
von ihm ganz abgefassten Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch für das Fürstenturm Mon-
tenegro aus dem Jahr 1888 vertreten. 
Der Sache nach ist dies eine zivilistische 
Vollversion des Radbruch´schen Formel.
Der Rechtswissenschaft ist ein Streit 
um die letzte oder eben die erste Urhe-
berschaft in der Sache fremd. Bogišic 
konnte seine Auffassung auch in der 
Haltung der Bevölkerung in Montene-
gro und des dortigen Fürsten bekräfti-
g e n.  Man  d ürf e ,  a u ch  im  Hinsi ch t  d e r  
anderen „ethnogenen“ Rechtstraditio-
nen, wie der römischen, nur behaupten, 
dass auch historisch das Recht durch 
die Radbruch´sche Formel nach dem 2. 
Weltkriege in sein „Naturzustand“ wied-
erversetzt wird. Dort ist das Recht eben 
das rechte und Rechte; das was recht 
und Recht ist.
13.
Chia-Yin Chang (Faculty of Law, Shih-
Hsin University / Taiwan)
Two Paradigms of Legal Theory and 
their Relationships: A system theoreti-
cal observation
Abstract:
H. L. A. Hart thought that a theory of law 
some alternatives aimed at furnishing 
sufﬁ  cient grounds for inter- and trans-
generational obligations and, on the 
other, the limits of conceptualising such 
obligations. Finally, the third part seeks 
to highlight the virtues of the Rawlsian 
approach by showing the answers it pro-
vides to at least certain questions related 
to present decisions with a potential im-
pact on the life circumstances of future 
generations.
12.
Luka Breneselvoic (Institut für Rechts-
vergleichung, Belgrad / Serbia + Frank-
furt am Main / Germany)
Über ein mögliches Rudiment der 
Radbruch´schen Formel im 19. Jahr-
hundert
Abstract:
Im großen Streit zwischen den Kelseni-
anern, auf der einen, und Eugen Ehr-
lich auf der anderen Seite, warf man 
dem Ehrlich aus Wien vor, er solle den 
südslawischen Kodiﬁ  kator  Valtazar 
Bogišic als seinen rechtssoziologischen 
Vorgänger verschwiegen haben. Der 
Name von Bogišic taucht sonst in der 
europäischen Rechtsdebatte nach dem 
1. Weltkrieg nur selten auf. Nach Bogišic´ 
Auffassung war das Recht das bonum et 
aequum selbst. Die Rechtsregeln (Nor-
men) seien allein die nach dem Tatbe-
stand-Folge-Schema gestraftes Recht. 
Die Regeln kommen entweder durch 
die ausproﬁ   lierte Tätigkeit der Ges-
etzgebung (Gesetzregeln) oder durch 
Einwöhnen (Gewohnheitsregeln) zu 
Stande. Wird eine Regel des Gesetzes als 
„offensichtlich ungerecht“ bewertet, so  416 417
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is just a tool and does not have its own 
purpose. The ideal positive legal order is 
absolute justice, an ideal never reached, 
and that of the legal norm is positive le-
gal order. Both the positive legal rule and 
the legal norm in order to be fair must be 
consistent with, as far as possible, with 
the universal principles of absolute jus-
tice. Sociality is a fundamental principle, 
but it tells us nothing by itself, because it 
must be a simple way to achieve a higher 
goal, namely that of spiritual impera-
tive. True imperatives of social life are 
two: the spirit must exist to afﬁ  rm itself, 
as the ultimate progressive value, and 
I must exist to afﬁ  rm myself as a pro-
gressive value. Hence it is inferred that 
the supreme imperative is the need for 
compliance with the human person in 
general, individuals regarded as a real 
center of values.
5.
Michael Städtler (Exzellenzcluster ‘Reli-
gion und Politik’, Philosophisches Semi-
nar, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität 
Münster / Germany)
Technische und gesellschaftliche Ent-
wicklung als Herausforderung fürs Re-
cht bei Hegel
Abstract:
Hegels Rechtsphilosophie reagiert wohl 
als erste auf die technische Moderni-
sierung der Gesellschaft. Obwohl Hegel 
entsprechend vage bleibt, lassen sich 
doch Konsequenzen für den modernen 
rechtsphilosophischen Umgang mit der-
artigen Problemen ziehen.
In den Abschnitten über die bürgerli-
che Gesellschaft und ihre Institutionen 
Begriff des Rechtes, sondern auch auf 
dessen Verwirklichung. Schon deshalb 
ist das Werk Grundlinien der Philoso-
phie des Rechtes nicht einfach neben 
anderen Werken zur Rechtstheorie ein-
zustufen. Hier möchte ich diskutieren, 
inwiefern Hegels Rechtphilosophie gera-
de insofern als Sozialphilosophie inter-
pretiert werden kann, als sie die philo-
sophische Reﬂ   exion einer Gesellschaft 
darstellt, die sich selbst als durch das 
Recht bestimmt versteht. Die Philoso-
phie des Rechtes wäre dann nicht bloss 
als genitivus objectivus, sondern auch 
subjectivus zu verstehen.
4.
Badescu Mihai (Police Academy / Roma-
nia)
Spirit and Law in the view of the Ro-
manian Thinker Eugene Sperantia
Abstract:
Eugeniu Sperantia was a leading ﬁ  gure 
of the Romanian legal thinking in the 
interwar period, especially from the per-
spective of the philosophy of law. Based 
on the Kantian conception regarding the 
categorical imperative and the a priori 
elements, Sperantia based his beliefs on 
legal imperatives arising from the very 
structure of our minds, which are deﬁ  -
nitely imposed to us.
Sperantia conceives the social order or 
social normativity, as resulting from the 
logical consistency of the self with itself. 
Thus, the commitments are only one 
form of another imperative, namely the 
need for logical consistency to us.
Positive legal order, in turn, forms a 
whole in relation to which legal rule 
deﬁ  cit due to “this aging society” (Wil-
l i a m  C .  C o c k e r h a m ) .  J a p a n e s e  g o v e r n -
ment recently admitted that its failure 
to recover the formerly largest economy 
next to US partly resulted from the lack of 
appropriate policies for gerontic society.
My paper purports that, with the in-
creased proportion of the aged in de-
mographic constitution, the traditional 
legal principles related to the aged per-
sons’ capacity are no more valid, that we 
must set ourselves a task to rebuild the 
legal systems on new foundations, and 
t h a t  C i c e r o ’ s  C a t o  M a j o r  d e  S e n e c t u t e  
will provide philosophical explanations 
for the possibility of the aged people’s ac-
tive participation in social, economical 
and political activities. By refuting the 
conventional view on the aged people’s 
capacity, Cicero argues that, in spite of 
old age, we can pursue various activities, 
that we can keep our intelligence nor-
mal, that deprivation of physical pleas-
ures contributes to a right development 
of this intelligence, and that even death 
cannot hinder us in true happiness.
3.
Miriam Madureira (Universidad Au-
tónoma Metropolitana – Cuajimalpa, 
Mexico City / Mexico)
Hegels Rechts- als Sozialphilosophie 
Abstract:
Die Auffassung des Rechtes in Hegels 
Rechtsphilosophie weicht bekanntlich 
von dem ab, was üblicherweise unter 
Recht verstanden wird: Für Hegel geht 
es ja um die Idee des Rechtes, und diese, 
seiner Auffassung des objektiven Geistes 
gemäss, bezieht sich nicht nur auf den 
mon in our everyday experience, there-
fore it must be possible. 
These two arguments in favour of akra-
sia existance – theoretical and empirical 
– will be discussed from both – philo-
sophical and psychological points of 
view. Especially, George Ainslie’s argu-
ment that akrasia results from hyperbol-
ic discounting will be taken into consid-
aration to show how it affects traditional 
thinking about weak-willed actions.
Finally, the paper will discuss how may 
the contemporary notion of akrasia af-
fect the idea of responsibility and free 
will. Implications for the philosophy of 
law will be shown, i.a. to which measure 
it is possible to claim that a given exam-
ple of a weak-willed action was indeed 
free and intentional and one should be 
hold responsible for its results.
2.
Ki-Won Hong (City University of Seoul / 
Republic of Korea)
Social Capacity of the Aged People Re-
considered: A Reading of Cicero’s Cato 
Major de Senectute
Abstract:
Law has treated the aged people as the 
socio-economically incapable. Retire-
ment as well as social security system can 
only be justiﬁ  ed on this legal principle. 
By the way, the growth in aged popula-
tions, a phenomenon witnessed all over 
the world, is undermining the founda-
tions of such social institutions, and we 
are facing thus the need to restructure 
the whole set of institutions related to the 
aged. Many of the OECD member coun-
tries are undergoing huge governmental  418 419
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sis about the means of execution as a 
kind of legal sanction. Finally, the paper 
critically analyses the said viewpoints 
and seeks to strengthen the said thesis.
3.
Andre Santos Campos (Faculty of Law, 
Lusiad University of Lisbon / Portugal)
New dimensions of legal validity
Abstract:
Robert Alexy, in his Begriff und Geltung 
des Rechts, identiﬁ  es a threefold division 
of the idea of validity in legal theory: the 
moral concept of validity; the juridical 
concept of validity; and the sociological 
concept of validity.
In fact, however, there are several differ-
ent approaches to the problem of validity 
in jurisprudence:
(1) The ontological approach (‘in what 
way can a normative pronouncement be 
considered law?);
(2) The axiological approach (‘in what 
way can a normative pronouncement be 
said to posit a value that was not there 
before?);
(3) The analytical approach (‘in what 
way can a normative pronouncement ﬁ  t 
into the conceptual framework generally 
named law?);
(4) The systematic approach (‘in what 
way can a normative pronouncement be 
considered part of a whole recognizable 
as a legal system?);
(5) The productive approach (‘in what 
way can a normative pronouncement be 
enforceable?);
(6) The political approach (‘in what way 
can the enforcement of a normative pro-
nouncement be justiﬁ  ed?).
that what he called the inner morality of 
law is in this sense a procedural version 
of natural law and that these principles 
do not pertain to the substantive aim of 
law, but to the procedural aspect of it. So 
it can be said that the inner morality of 
law is neutral towards ethical, political or 
moral issues. At this point the foremost 
question is whether these principles are 
procedural or substantive. In this paper 
my aim is to discuss whether it is pos-
sible to think of the principle of gener-
ality regardless of its substantive aim. 
Secondly, I argue that the ‘view of man’ 
Fuller describes as implicit in the inner 
morality of law needs to be thoroughly 
examined. I will try to address these is-
sues by ﬁ  rst dwelling on the meaning 
of generality, secondly of generality in 
relation to equality, and third on the 
relationship between general rules and 
Fuller’s ‘view of man’.
2.
Luka Burazin (Faculty of Law , Univer-
sity of Zagreb / Croatia)
Reply to Criticism of the Thesis about 
the Means of Execution as a Kind of Le-
gal Sanction
Abstract:
The paper ﬁ   rst introduces the thesis 
about the means of execution as a kind 
of legal sanction. It then sets forth basic 
theoretical arguments for rejecting the 
view according to which the legal sanc-
tion in the case of damage causation is a 
legal duty of repair. This is followed by a 
presentation of the viewpoints of several 
legal theorists (Bucher, MacCormick, 
Padjen, Pokrovac) who criticize the the-
WORKING GROUP
WG 31 
General Theory of Law, General 
Theory of Norms
Session 1
Date THU 18 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location RUW 3.101
Chair Kim, Marie Seong-Hak 
(Minnesota / USA)
Session 2
Date FRI 19 Aug 2011
Time 15.30 h – 18 h
Location RUW 3.101
Chair Guibourg, Ricardo A. 
(Buenos Aires / Argentina)
Lectures:
Session 1
1.
Emine Irem Aki (Ankara University / 
Turkey)
Examination of Fuller’s Generality 
Principle and Its Relation to His ‘view 
of man’
Abstract:
Lon L. Fuller offers eight principles as 
necessity of the inner morality of law. 
These principles are generality, publicity, 
clarity, consistency, applicability, con-
stancy, prospectivity, congruence. Ac-
cording to Fuller “a total failure in any 
one of these eight directions does not 
simply result in a bad system of law; it 
results in something that is not properly 
called a legal system at all.” Fuller says 
notiert Hegel die Koinzidenz technisch 
gesteigerter Produktivität mit zuneh-
mender Armut in der Bevölkerung. Die-
ser Zusammenhang, der in den späteren 
Vorlesungen immer größeren Raum 
einnimmt, war kurz zuvor von Malthus 
und Ricardo beschrieben worden. Hegels 
Darstellung mündet in widersprüchliche 
Formulierungen zur Gesellschaftsstruk-
tur (‚übermäßig reich aber nicht reich 
genug‘ u.ä.), die innerhalb der Gesell-
schaft nicht aufgelöst, sondern bloß 
kompensiert werden durch institutio-
nelle Fürsorge oder durch Kolonisation. 
Die grundsätzlichen Konﬂ  ikte partiku-
larer Interessen in der Gesellschaft sol-
len schließlich auf der Ebene des Staates 
ideell vermittelt werden. 
Es ist, auch mit Blick auf den Stand tech-
nischer und gesellschaftlicher Entwick-
lung damals und heute, zu prüfen, wie 
weit Hegels Gesellschaftsbegriff trägt 
und wo seine Grenzen liegen. Vor al-
lem aber ist die Möglichkeit zu prüfen, 
diese Grenzen staatsphilosophisch bzw. 
staatsrechtlich zu überwinden.
Diese Überlegungen, die mit der Frage 
der Selbstbestimmung zusammenhän-
gen, dürften Impulse für die Diskussion 
moderner sozialstaatlicher Regulierung 
technisch induzierter gesellschaftlicher 
Probleme geben. 420 421
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mining what constitutes valid beliefs 
on what should be necessary for a given 
community. Fourthly, it means that the 
law and its ofﬁ  cials are constantly en-
gaged in a process of self-justiﬁ  cation 
towards a supporting political process 
– courts, for instance, can no longer be 
considered institutions whose legitimacy 
is given by an idea of sovereignty, since 
the latter is traditionally attached to an 
exclusive state-like form. Instead, they 
should be regarded as the embodiment 
of the most visible part of the life of the 
law, insofar as they apply the law and, 
while doing it, engage in a process of self-
justiﬁ  cation that is also a process for the 
validation of the law they intend to apply 
(sovereignty is only one of those possible 
self-justiﬁ  cations). Finally, it means that 
the concept of validity is not necessarily 
bound to a liberal idea of (constitutional) 
democracy, since all political processes 
coming out of that equilibrium of con-
sensus and conﬂ  ict end up being valid, 
whether in a democratic, aristocratic, or 
even tyrannical form. However, it also 
means that validity is best achieved the 
more stable is the political community 
between consensus and conﬂ  ict – and, 
in this sense, since there can be degrees 
of political effectiveness in this regard, so 
there are also degrees of legal validity, in 
which the democratic regime with the 
highest active participation by all actors 
is the one with the most valid law.
The metaphysical concept of validity, on 
the other hand, requires the fusion of the 
search for a fundamental groundwork 
of the law with the search for the ele-
ment of efﬁ  ciency in the law. Typically, 
political community – which means that 
its acceptance can be measured socio-
logically, but must be constructed nor-
mativelly in the political realm. But how 
can a source be measured as politically 
legitimate? The answer must lie in the 
actual processes of political decision-
making (whether institutional or extra-
institutional) and in their effectiveness 
– the law accepted by a political commu-
nity is that normative expression imma-
nently resulting from the interplay of the 
equilibrium of consensus and conﬂ  ict 
taking place between political actors.
There are several consequences to this 
idea. Firstly, it means that the law, inso-
far as it is politically valid, is made out 
of the beliefs of what should be consid-
ered necessary by the several agents in a 
collectively organized community, and 
not simply by those that are ofﬁ  cials of 
the law in that community. Secondly, 
it means that a legal system is neither 
something transcendent nor independ-
ent to the actual political interplay of 
forces between productive agents in a 
community – it is not an object by itself 
simply observable in nature, but rather 
something made. It seems much like Nor-
bert Elias’s notion of ﬁ  guration in sociol-
ogy. Thirdly, it means that legal ofﬁ  cials 
(whether judges, lawyers, jurisprudents, 
etc.) must be considered active politi-
cal agents, and that the results of their 
performances function as the unfolding 
of a political process for the validation of 
legal normative pronouncements – they 
do not simply describe what is already 
valid, but rather engage in a new stage 
of the political decision-making deter-
as such than others. In the third place, 
because efﬁ  cacy is usually accepted as 
an important criterion for valid law, 
even by those theorists that present their 
preference for the moral and the juridi-
cal concepts of validity (such as John 
Finnis in the ﬁ  rst case, and Hans Kelsen 
in the second – a just law, or a law that 
conforms to the Grundnorm, that are 
continually neglected or violated with-
out a general belief in their obligatory 
force cannot usually be simply accepted 
as valid law). And efﬁ  cacy, insofar as it 
requires sociological analysis that is ul-
timately statistical without measuring 
unanimous compliances or violations 
but rather majoritarian beliefs of obli-
g a ti o n,  cann o t  be  s ha pe d  in  an  all -o r -
nothing fashion. These three different 
challenges to legal validity are enough 
to induce a consideration of a concept 
of validity that is mostly dealt with in a 
matter of degrees.
In this sense, besides those three con-
cepts of validity identiﬁ  ed by Alexy in 
contemporary legal theory, there should 
be at least two others that, more gener-
ally, are above those three and determi-
nant of them (applicable to whoever has 
preferences for the moral, the juridical 
or the sociological concept of validity). 
I shall call them the political concept of 
validity and the metaphysical concept of 
validity.
The political concept of validity involves 
the element of efﬁ  ciency and makes the 
problem of legal validity to be necessar-
ily bound to the problem of political le-
gitimacy. A legal source is valid insofar 
as it is justiﬁ  ed as legitimate in a given 
Overall, these different approaches con-
sistently deal with legal validity in re-
sponse not simply to the doubtful deter-
mination of what can ﬁ  t into the concept 
of law, but mostly to the identiﬁ  cation 
of what rules are backed up by a sufﬁ  -
cient belief of obligation that ultimately 
justiﬁ   es their enforcement. Hence, the 
problem of validity is usually dealt with 
in search for the discovery of what is 
justiﬁ  ably obligatory (‘is this legal rule 
obligatory or not?’) and of what is justi-
ﬁ  ably enforceable (‘is this legal rule en-
forceable or not?’). In legal theory, then, 
the problem of validity is always treated 
in an all-or-nothing fashion.
This position, however, is more and 
more faced with additional challenges. 
In the ﬁ  rst place, because legal systems 
in a multicultural and globalized world 
can no longer be traced exclusively to 
their state-like form, since there is an 
increasing pluralism of legal sources 
coexisting (and often conﬂ  icting)  in 
the public sphere. Hence, quite often 
the problem can no longer be reduced 
to the questions ‘is this rule obligatory 
or not’, ‘is this rule enforceable or not’, 
but rather to the questions ‘which of 
these legal rules is more valid than the 
other’, or ‘which of these legal sources 
is more justiﬁ   ably enforceable in this 
situation’. In the second place, because 
all of Alexy’s identiﬁ  ed concepts of legal 
validity are hierarchical in kind, which 
means that there are moral values more 
determinant than others in the ethical 
realm, that there are competence rules 
higher than others, and that there are 
legal rules more accepted and followed  422 423
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cepts and there is thus an unavoidable 
historicity in any talk of personhood. 
When debate about the meaning of these 
metaphysical concepts is divorced from 
the conceptual scheme dependent on 
them and an attempt is made to ground 
them wholly naturalistically, incoher-
ence results. The law, by its practices, 
emergent legal theory, and its larger ex-
pressive impact, the intuitive grounding 
for a cluster of metaphysical concepts. In 
enacting positive legislation, in rulings 
on case-law, in undertaking statutory 
interpretation, the law gives rise to a set 
of practices, a language which anchors 
these concepts and is the repository for 
our intuitions about them. I will argue 
therefore, that the pragmatist human-
ist’s argument that legal reality is social-
ly constructed enables an understanding 
of the grounding, traction, and plasticity 
of crucial metaphysical concepts in the 
moral domain.
6.
Marie Seong-Hak Kim (St. Cloud State 
University / USA)
Custom and Reason: A Comparative 
Discussion of Sources of Law in Europe 
and East Asia
Abstract:
This paper aims to discuss the evolu-
tion of sources of law in a comparative 
perspective, focusing on modern East 
Asian law . Emphasis will be placed on 
examining how Japan and other East 
Asian countries in the late nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries adopted the no-
tions of custom and reason–fundamen-
tally European concepts–and thereby 
Above mentioned relates to aspects of 
effectiveness of law that is at least to 
some measure dependent on existence 
of shared values and value judgment. 
Multiculturalism, value relativism and 
diminishing of core of shared values rep-
resent therefore a challenge for effective-
ness of law and for law and legal science 
as a whole. The very law at the same 
time represents an instrument of crea-
tion and maintenance of a core of shared 
values. Effectiveness of law in this sense 
could be grasped as self-replicating.
5.
Samir Chopra (Brooklyn College of the 
City University of New York / USA)
Pragmatist Humanism and the Law
Abstract:
I argue that armed with a ‘humanist’ 
metaphysics, we can understand how 
law creates, promulgates, and reiﬁ  es, the 
central concepts by which we organize 
human and social interaction. In this 
picture, law is not a set of rules, but a 
set of evolving behavioral co-ordination 
strategies, which require for their suc-
cess the belief in a certain set of entities. 
Without the concept of a person possess-
ing agency and free-will and committing 
acts for which he can ascribed responsi-
bility and held to be the cause of, this set 
of co-ordination strategies that binds us 
together fails to exercise traction. These 
metaphysical concepts are inter-related; 
‘person’ get its traction from respon-
sibility, agency and blame, and not the 
other way around, for it is only a ‘legal’ 
society, which needs concepts like these; 
‘person’ is parasitic on social/moral con-
ceptance – much like Wittgenstein’s ex-
planation of the rule in his writings On 
Certainty. This implies that one should 
speak more of validation in legal theo-
ry, rather than in validity, and also that 
there is no opposition validity-invalidity 
but rather distinct degrees of validity (it 
is more valid the law that is the greatest 
expression of a permanent natural ef-
ﬁ  ciency – and ultimately, this will con-
nect it with an intrinsic rationality and 
some requirement of democracy).
4.
Petr Cechák (The University of Finance 
and Administration, Prague / Czech Re-
public)
Values, Value Judgments and Effective-
ness of Law
Abstract:
Values or more precisely value judgment 
play a signiﬁ  cant role in relation to ef-
fectiveness of law. Judgment relating to 
question of realization of formal justice 
could be used as an example. Realization 
of formal justice as a value is probable to 
be demanded no matter whether there 
would exist altruism as an anthropologi-
cally based tendency of human behavior. 
In case of other values and value judg-
ments relating to these values altruism 
can play a signiﬁ  cant role as a motiv e 
of human conduct. As good or desirable 
there is probable to be judged such a con-
duct that is supposed to be an effective 
means in relation to reaching of purpose 
of preservation and reproduction of in-
formation that is shared by members of 
concrete community but also in a society 
as a whole.
it is possible to distinguish between the 
fundamental and the foundational. The 
f o r m e r  i n t e n d s  t o  i d e n t i f y  a n  e l e m e n t  
that stops the continuous regression of 
justiﬁ  able arguments (a is so because b, 
b is so because c, ad inﬁ  nitum) for be-
ing self-justiﬁ  ed, such as Aristotle’s un-
movable mover, the Scholastics’s causa 
sui, the political concept of sovereignty, 
Kelsen’s Grundnorm, etc; the latter en-
gages in a justiﬁ  cation of things by their 
actual existential procedures. Hence, the 
problem here in legal validity is how to 
stop the continuous regression of jus-
tiﬁ   able arguments (the fundamental) 
while simultaneously stressing the im-
portance of efﬁ   ciency and self-making 
for the actual existence of the law (the 
foundational). Ultimately, what matters 
is to ﬁ  nd a concept of validity that is self-
justiﬁ  catory and non-exclusive, that has 
its groundwork in a conception of Na-
ture involving causation and efﬁ  ciency. 
In this sense, the valid law is any given 
normative realm that invokes any given 
justiﬁ  able criterion for being integrated 
into an enforceable concept of law – that 
is, any given normative pronouncement 
that endeavors to solve the problem of its 
own capacity for demanding compliance.
Consequently, in this mixture between 
the traditions of the fundamental and of 
the foundational, the idea of validity is 
inherent to the very concept of law. The 
metaphysical concept of legal validity 
implies then that the law is a process for 
the evaluation of the normative efﬁ  cien-
cy in play. The legal rule is a valid rule 
insofar as it is supposed in its own mak-
ing, which is achieved by general ac- 424 425
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mative order, Organization of American 
States and African Union normative or-
der) and plural normative order of each 
nation states (normative orders of UN 
member states).
II. Single Positive Law or Legal Monism 
(Public Positive Law and Private Positive 
Law) indicates how public bodies and 
private persons ought to act.
Plural Normative Order or Normative 
Pluralism (Public Normative Order and 
Private Normative Order) shows how 
public bodies and private persons acts, 
based on giant Goethe’s formula: “Im 
Aufang war die Tat”.
Legal Monism (what ought to be) and 
Normative Pluralism (what is) never 
coincide. Generally, my theory of dia-
lectical jurisprudence is founded on the 
laws of dialectics of Hegel. They are: the 
law of the unity and conﬂ  ict of oppo-
sites; the law of the passage of quanti-
tative changes into qualitative changes; 
the law of the negation of the negation. 
Dialectical Jurisprudence is a sphere of 
science, which explore dialectics of law 
and order separately and together, and 
propose a model of dialectics of law and 
order separately and together. 
III. The “legal families” theory or Com-
parative Law ignores the phenomenon 
of normative order. Almost all scientists 
operating in comparative law and legal 
theory ignore any role of practice of in-
dividual normative acts of public bod-
ies and private persons in formation of 
normative order. However, the state and 
certain combination of practice of indi-
vi d u a l  n o r m a t i v e  a c t s  o f  p u b l i c  b o di e s  
and private persons construct individual 
the pivotal case in normative human 
orders. Accordingly, in light of Raffael-
lo’s brilliant artistic expression of per-
soniﬁ  cation, this essay attempts to argue 
that the seven virtues (fortitude, char-
ity, temperance, faith, prudence, hope, 
and justice) presented in the fresco are 
aptly correspondent to the three differ-
ent aspects of law, that is, the authorita-
tiveness of law, the normativity of law, 
and the legitimacy of law. Through the 
critical reﬂ  ection on the legal theories of 
John Austin, Joseph Raz, H.L.A. Hart, 
and Ronald Dworkin, the essay tries to 
analyze and interpret the humanistic 
implication in these aspects of law.
8.
Bizina Savaneli (St. Grigol Peradze Uni-
versity / Georgia)
General Plan of Mutual Transition, 
Spiral and Evolutionary Development 
of Positive Law and Normative Order
Abstract:
In contemporary world we have three 
levels of Single Positive Law: single in-
ternational law of all states (common 
international law), single international 
law of group of states (for example, the 
E u r o p e a n  U n i o n  l a w ,  O r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  
American States and African Union law) 
and single laws of nation states (laws of 
UN member states).
In contemporary world we correspond-
ently have three levels of Plural Nor-
mative Order: plural transnational 
normative order of all states (common 
international order), plural transna-
tional normative order of group of states 
(for example, the European Union nor-
7.
Shi-Tung Chuang (Department of Law, 
Fu Jen Catholic University / Taiwan)
The Picture of Law: A Humanistic 
Analysis and Interpretation
Abstract:
Raffaello Santi, the great artist in the era 
of the Renaissance, endeavored to com-
plete his renowned fresco “The Cardinal 
and Theological Virtues” with a strong 
attempt to revive the classical legal 
thoughts of Greek and Rome. For Raf-
faello, human beings share a common 
rational character with Law and Nature. 
They can establish a good legal system 
only if they fully develop their intrinsic 
rational nature and pursue the moral ex-
cellence of human virtues. In this way, 
the fresco apparently reveals a human-
centered, humanistic legal thought. By 
contrast, contemporary mainstream 
legal thoughts not only deny any con-
nection between the moral excellence of 
human virtues and the investigation of 
the nature of law, but also see the law as 
some independent entity whose nature 
can only be surveyed from an observer’s 
or a participant’s point of view. As such, 
contemporary legal scholarships are in-
clined to a law-centered, legalistic legal 
thought.The development of analytical 
legal philosophy mainly revolves around 
the debate on the central issue ‘what is 
law’, which gives rise to the antinomy of 
legal positivism and anti-legal positiv-
ism. Nevertheless, behind this antinomy 
lies a common intellectual foundation, 
namely, the legalistic legal thought that 
characterizes law as an independent ob-
ject (social fact or moral value) and as 
transformed their law and legal systems 
in the framework of the civil law tradi-
tion. The establishment of the hierarchy 
of legal norms in Meiji Japan bore pow-
erful imprints of European legal science 
but it also revealed a distinctive force of 
acculturation at work. In 1875, Japan 
declared custom and reason to be sup-
plementary sources of law, almost thirty 
years before the Swiss Civil Code. This 
led to active jurisprudential interpreta-
tions that denied the validity of custom 
which lacked conformity to reason. It 
was something akin to the development 
in the late Middle Ages in Europe: the 
medieval canonists subjected the author-
ity of jus consuetudinis to strict ethical 
criteria, equating custom with usus ra-
tionabilis. The emerging royal courts in 
England and France contributed to the 
centralization of the realm by exercising 
the royal prerogative of determining the 
reasonable character of custom. Like-
wise, the Meiji courts actively resorted 
to the notion of reasonable custom and 
created a legal hierarchy controlled by 
the state. In Japan, custom and reason 
played the role of key machinery in the 
process of adjusting imported European 
law to the indigenous legal tradition. The 
civil codes of China and Korea, modeled 
on Japanese law, both enshrined custom 
and reason as sources of law. A histori-
cal and comparative examination of the 
sources of law can help understand the 
development of civil law on the global 
level. 426 427
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which consumes in idea of convention 
as social interaction, understood as ei-
ther coordination equlibrium or shared 
cooperative activity. Recently J. Dick-
son challenged once again the idea of 
conventionality of hartian power-con-
ferring rule, arguing that the conven-
tionalist approach in positivism is char-
acteristic for Hart’s Postscript only, and 
is not essential to his original approach. 
Thus, the paper discusses her account in 
opposition to Marmor’s idea of rules of 
recognition understood as the constitu-
tive conventions of partly autonomous 
social practices, which stands in some 
opposition to coordination approach. 
The intrinsic contestation points in in-
dicated debates show clearly that no no-
tion of convention, as well as the idea of 
legal conventionalism, is trivial enough 
for law to be seen as a banality.
11.
Ricardo A. Guibourg (University of Bue-
nos Aires / Argentina)
On the Knowledge and the Use of Law
Abstract:
Most of the theoretical discourse on law 
deals with this question: is it possible to 
reach a deﬁ  nition of law which enables 
us to describe and explain legal reality as 
it results from practice and at the same 
time ensure the function of law as a pro-
tective element for mankind?This can be 
seen as a set of two functions: we want 
a description of law as a speciﬁ  c social 
phenomenon, able to explain and pre-
dict legal facts or decisions, and a set of 
argumentative rules, able to justify the 
acceptance, rejecting or balancing of le-
body.The example considered in the 
article concerns the interface between 
ethical and legal norms against selected 
rulings of the Constitutional Court. The 
doubts that arise in this context may be 
in future av oided or perhaps, if neces-
sary, resolved by adopting a two-aspect 
model of legal norm. This model in its 
vertical approach has an evaluative ele-
ment.
10.
Adam Dyrda (Jagiellonian University / 
Poland)
The Banality of Law? – Some Remarks 
on Legal Conventionalism
Abstract:
Many legal philosophers are convinced 
that no legal system is conceivable with-
out substantial conventional elements at 
its foundations. The idea of convention 
is however of great ambiguity. The pa-
per discusses the idea of convention as a 
resolution to coordination problem, pro-
posed by Lewis and applied within legal 
theory by Postema and Coleman. This 
approach (as one possible explication of 
„the conventionality thesis“) has been 
developed as the crucial one for legal 
positivism, but also for some non-posi-
tivistic accounts. In those theories the 
notion of convention (or coordination) 
seems to be a junction between desrip-
tive nature of socio-legal facts and their 
normative force (resp. with appriopriate 
emphasis on its descriptive or normative 
layer). Positivistic rule of recognition is 
pervasively perceived as a profoundly 
convenional rule. It is useful to examine 
all strenghts and vices of such approach, 
the East and West, North and South, 
ethics and religions, public and private 
life, technologies and environment, and 
the myriad problems, which have never 
been exist in the history of Humankind 
in widespread aspect.
Session 2
9.
Hanna Debska (Jagiellonian University 
Institute Sociology of Law / Poland)
The apparent dilemma – dangerous 
consequences. Between the legal and 
ethical standards.
Abstract:
Democratic rule of law has been strug-
gling with the occurring problem of plu-
ralism of values. It is therefore still faced 
with the dilemma of ordering the rela-
tionship of law and ethics, namely with 
the question whether in the issue of legal 
solutions the priority is granted to ethics 
or to law. In the case of dominance of the 
positivist paradigm, it is all the more im-
portant because the ethical issue is mar-
ginalized in it. It turns out that the same 
authority, deciding on similar issues, 
at the junction of two areas: ethics and 
law, can make mutually contradictory 
decisions: once giving priority to ethics, 
whereas – at different times – to positive 
law. On a closer analysis, this contradic-
tion proves illusory because under the 
guise of protection of a positive para-
digm, the hidden fact is that the axio-
logical decision underlies the resolution 
concerning law. This decision protects 
the values that have priority in the scale 
of preferential value of decision-making 
legal face of country, which is always 
different from normative orders of other 
countries, disregard that both could be 
even entered in the same legal family. So 
it is necessary to introduce a new branch 
of legal science: Comparative Normative 
Orders Study, which at the beginning 
should not be investigating in the frame-
works of Comparative Law Study. In this 
sense I put forward an idea of practical 
jurisprudence. Comparative Law is the 
part of Comparative Jurisprudence. An-
other part of Comparative Jurisprudence 
is the Comparative Normative Order.
IV. It is a deep mistake to consider posi-
tive law as decisive factor of conﬂ  ict pre-
vention and resolution, because unjust 
law of legislative power could be factor 
of conﬂ  icts. Important factor of conﬂ  ict 
prevention and resolution is the formu-
la: “Making just law makes a dry tree 
green”, as Shota Rustaveli - the famous 
Georgian philosopher and poet of the 
XII Century - proclaimed. The Idea of 
Just Law suggest what sort and kind of 
law legislators (in Roman-Germanic le-
gal space) or judges (in Anglo-American) 
should make, so that any laws would be 
just from the Universal Human Rights 
Law.
V. The Mutual-Transition of Legal Mon-
ism, Normative Pluralism and Idea of 
Just Law must be based on the Univer-
sal Human Rights Law as Basic Norms’ 
System, and this process must be re-
peated dialectically, i.e. spirally, evolu-
tionary and endlessly. Therefore, we the 
people of the world need a New Human 
Philosophy under the auspice of Uni-
versal Human Rights Law, which links  428 429
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WORKING GROUP
WG 32 
Positivism, The Normativity of Law
Session 1
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location IG 0.454
Chair Sousa Brito, José (Lisbon / 
Portugal)
Session 2
Date TUE 16 Aug 2011
Time 14.30 h – 18.30 h
Location IG 0.254
Chair Sellers, Mortimer N.S. 
(Maryland + Washington, 
D.C. / USA)
Lectures:
Session 1
1.
João Maurício Adeodato (Faculdade de 
Direito – Universidade Federal de Per-
nambuco / Brazil)
Answers Of Legal Dogmatics To Two 
Important Problems Of The Philosophy 
Of Law
Abstract:
Philosophy of law has had many ques-
tions to handle. Concerning universal-
istic all-encompassing theories, the ﬁ  rst 
one would be what law “is”. To rhetori-
cians this “ontological question” does 
not make sense, but we may try to ﬁ  gure 
out which problems come to light when 
the word is used.
The thesis here is that, if the ontologi-
‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ in 
order to ascertain Von Hayek non-ar-
ticulated rules as a form of “knowing 
how” knowledge and to which extend 
such a knowledge can guarantee the 
predictability of legal decision. Thirdly, 
I will compare Von Hayek non articu-
lated rules with Dworkin’s principles. 
The main purpose of this passage will be 
to evaluate the objections of Hart about 
dworkinian principles, as if principles 
increases the unpredictability within 
the system of law. The third way offered 
by Von Hayek gives the opportunity for 
legal theory to asses in a critical manner 
the disadvantages of formal approach to 
the problem of legal certainty. It will lead 
to better understanding of evolutionary, 
dynamic conception of law, where the 
value of legal certainty can provide for 
an equivalent between the value of pre-
dictability and (moral) acceptability of a 
legal decision.
law. The second requires a strong, cou-
rageous introspection in order to review 
and order the personal preferences of 
each one facing the facts as they are, and 
then an open, sincere, permanent debate 
to negotiate a common set of resulting 
preferences, which could be agreed to 
as rules, legislated or interpretative. The 
ideal of democracy is very close to this 
last attitude.
12.
Marcin Jakub Weisbrot (University of 
Silesia in Katowice / Poland)
Legal certainty, objectivity of law in 
view of Von Hayek’s concept of non-
articulated rules 
Abstract:
The purpose of the speech is not merely 
to describe the concept of non-articulat-
ed rules and Von Hayek’s well known 
criticism of legal certainty, legislative 
method of law-making and formalistic 
approach to the legal reasoning. I would 
like to go beyond in order to set up an 
alternative approach to the concept of le-
gal certainty and objectivity of law. The 
theoretical assumptions of Von Hayek 
theory relates to the foundation of mod-
ern science founded by Descartes.First-
ly, I will endeavor to develop the basics 
and distinct features of non-articulated 
rules and its place in Von Hayek theory 
of spontaneous order and in particular, a 
concept of “a third class of phenomena”, 
which is the result of human actions but 
not of human design, in addition to the 
nature-convention distinction. Second-
ly, I will try to link typology of knowl-
edge offered by Gilbert Ryle between 
gal opinions and arguments. None of the 
current theories of law satisfy these two 
purposes, and each one of such purposes 
makes difﬁ  cult the fulﬁ  lment of the oth-
er. The result is a chaotic practice, where 
methods of interpretation and, in a less 
intense way, general theories of law are 
us e d  b y  e a ch  o b s e rv e r  in  th e  m e as ur e  
they allow a justiﬁ   cation for her own 
opinions or interests in a determined in-
dividual case or general issue.   
A description of law able to reach the 
goals of empirical sciences, like expla-
nation and prediction, could only be a 
realistic theory, which includes prevail-
ing ideologies and psychological dispo-
sitions, such as the idea of a hierarchi-
cal structure of law and certain moral 
or political preferences, but is not built 
into those ideologies or dispositions nor 
depend on them. Instead, a set of rules 
for argumentation seems similar to a 
set of game rules: several argumenta-
tive games are played at the same time, 
within a same ﬁ  eld, and each player feels 
free to change her game at any moment. 
Within this chaotic situation, the posi-
tivistic game provides more general and 
permanent (though imperfect) rules, 
while other games seem more incom-
plete and act as detractions or exceptions 
for the principal game. If we want to en-
sure rationality within legal discourse, 
two actions are to be undertaken. The 
ﬁ  rst is to separate description from ambi-
tion. The second is to redeﬁ  ne ambition 
on the basis of description, but without 
trying to get a justiﬁ  cation from it. The 
ﬁ  rst is theoretically easy, though contra-
ry to a customary practice in the ﬁ  eld of  430 431
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Postpositivist Theory of Law – Genesis 
and Programme
Abstract:
The paper consists of four parts:
The concise classiﬁ  cation of the contem-
porary positivist and non-positivist con-
ceptions of law, based on the relations 
between law and morals.
The historical remarks concerning the 
beginning of postpositivist legal theory, 
with special attention to the proposals 
made by Neil MacCormick, Albert Cal-
samiglia, Manuel Atienza and Juan Ruiz 
Manero.
The outline of the programme of post-
positivist legal theory:
3 A. Methodology of postpositivist legal 
theory
3 B. Substantial claims of postpositiv-
ism.
Conclusions – the rise and fall of the 
Separability Thesis.
Session 2
5.
Luis Lloredo (Universidad Carlos III de 
Madrid / Spain)
Die Frage des Rechtspositivismus unter 
dem Gesichtspunkt der Wissenschaft-
sphilosophie Thomas S. Kuhns 
Abstract:
Der Ausdruck „Rechtspositivismus“ ist 
seit seinem Ursprung in Frage gestellt 
worden. Die Frage lautet: Was sollen wir 
unter Rechtspositivismus verstehen? Ein 
neues Paradigma oder eine bloße kon-
junkturelle Bewegung? Außerdem, wie 
sollen wir ihn bezeichnen? Als ein wis-
senchaftliches Programm oder als eine 
limits of technological rationality in le-
gal discourse.
3.
Juan Alberto Del Real Alcalá (University 
of Jaen / Spain)
The Ideal of the Certainty in Law
Abstract:
The doubt about certainty like an ab-
solute value in law and as an ideal full 
in legal system (argument about impos-
sibility) is a controversial fact in con-
temporary legal theory. I examine some 
contemporary doctrines about the classic 
understanding (in critical sense) of this 
ideal. I have selected the most represent-
ative doctrines: doctrine about “open 
texture of Law” (H.L.A. HART), start-
ing point in this discussion; doctrine 
about “Il Diritto mitte” (G. ZAGREBEL-
SKY), from the continental European 
legal tradition at present; and doctrine 
about “vagueness in Law” (T.A.O. ENDI-
COTT), this doctrine is the most recent, 
from the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. 
Finally, in Conclusions, I analyze if this 
doubt (argument about impossibility) 
contaminates (in some sense) to the con-
cept of law or to the characteristics that 
describe law, and therefore, if this doubt 
constitutes a bigger thesis: a “conceptual 
thesis” about contemporary law or, on 
the contrary, if this doubt constitutes a 
smaller thesis: a “linguistic thesis” about 
language in law.
4.
Andrzej Grabowski (Chair of Legal The-
ory Faculty of Law and Administration, 
Jagiellonian University, Cracow/Poland)
São Bernardo do Campo- Faculdade de 
Direito da Fundação Armando Alvares 
Penteado - FAAP / Brazil)
Legal technologies or interpretive ap-
proaches? 2 ways to discuss the relation 
between law and reason 
Abstract:
The debates about the interrelations be-
tween reason and law have undergone 
a change after the eighteenth century. 
References to the recta ratio of jusnatu-
ralistic tradition have not disappeared, 
but other comprehensions of legal reason 
have developed. The European debate 
over legal positivist science has contrib-
uted to this in a peculiar way. It has cre-
ated conditions for legal dogmatics to be 
taken, de per se, as one manifestation of 
the rationality of law. This transforma-
tion may be considered the basis for the 
development of true “legal technologies” 
throughout the twentieth century. On 
the other hand, in the context of theo-
ries of positive law which have taken the 
relation between ethics and legal reason 
as a problem, the formation of discours-
es on coercion (Austin and Holmes), on 
validity (Kelsen and Hart) and on justi-
ﬁ  cation (Alexy and Dworkin) has also 
contributed to the emergence of new 
models of legal rationality. In this paper, 
it is highlighted that the construction of 
these models is linked to the “points of 
view” which theories have proposed as 
legitimate for the interpretation of legal 
phenomenon. Finally, it is suggested that 
the discussion over points of view (de-
ﬁ  ned as “focuses”, term which is close 
to the notion of “ attitude” or “place of 
speech”) may aid in the identiﬁ  cation of 
cal approach is left aside, there remain 
two traditional questions: one concerns 
knowledge (epistemological) and the 
other addresses ethics (axiology).
First question: what would be the lim-
its, if there are any, for the decision of a 
concrete case, that is, if the general law 
expressed by the constitution and other 
legal texts can play this limiting role, be 
it by means of Kelsen’s frame theory, 
the rational postulates from Alexy or 
the Judge Hercules suggested by Dwor-
kin. In other words: is all law really 
created by legislatures or are their texts 
only random input data for the effective 
creation of law in the casuistic decision-
making process?
Second question: if there are any and 
which are the limits for the choices of 
the original constitutional power, that 
is, if there are subjective rights that are 
valid in themselves, above positive law, 
which has to recognize them. Moreover, 
when social groups do not agree about 
these rights, what would be the available 
criteria to decide between incompatible 
ethical positions that also have to hov-
er above positive law. Even if we could 
speak of an universal ethical consensus, 
which would already be problematic – 
like the rejection of genocide – there are 
many more controvertible themes, even 
inside the same culture, like the death 
penalty, ﬁ  delity in marriage or the ex-
istence of professional politicians. The 
question always is to decide which deci-
sion would be “the correct one“.
2.
Carlos Costa (Faculdade de Direito de  432 433
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early publicists understood it) of human 
nature or politics to the “science” (as 
they saw it) of justice, to create a “sci-
ence” of law. This paper will apply these 
early insights to contemporary doctrine 
and argue that international law can-
not be understood or effective without 
recourse to the early conception of law 
as a “science” that undergirds the most 
basic rules and assumptions of modern 
international law.
8.
José Sousa Brito (Lisbon / Portugal)
Legal positivism: a self-effacing theory
Abstract:
Legal positivism should be deﬁ  ned  by 
the two theses of the conceptual separa-
tion of law and morals and of the social 
sources of law, the second implying the 
ﬁ  rst. The thesis of judicial discretion by 
fulﬁ  lling the gaps of the law whenever 
they are not coverable by analogy or by 
existing legal principles, that Hart de-
fended as essential, and the thesis that 
there is no objective morality, that Alf 
Ross considered as essential, should not 
be retained for the deﬁ   nition of legal 
positivism.It is argued that Coleman’s 
attempt to dispense with the separation 
thesis, because legal positivism can ac-
cept that governance by law has a moral 
value, will not do.The separations thesis 
stays and falls with the social sources 
thesis. According to inclusive legal posi-
tivism in a rule of law state the validity 
of a law may depend on its compatibility 
wi t h  c ri t i c a l  m o r a li t y  o r  e t hi c s .  E t hi c s  
may be critical of a law, despite all social 
facts relevant to the validity of such a 
overdue by the contemporary paradigm 
of Constitutional and Democratic Rule of 
Law.
7.
Mortimer N.S. Sellers (University Sys-
tem of Maryland and Visiting Professor, 
Georgetown University School of Law / 
USA)
The Science of International Law 
Abstract:
The founders of modern international 
law understood law as a science, aris-
ing from the study of “those rules of 
conduct which reason deduces as conso-
nant to justice and common good from 
the nature of the society existing among 
independent nations” (Henry Whea-
ton). Each word in this tightly packed 
deﬁ   n i t i o n  i s  w o r t h y  o f  s t u d y ,  b u t  t h e  
underlying understanding, shared by 
Grotius, Vattel, Puffendorf and all the 
ﬁ  rst great publicists in the ﬁ  eld was that 
international law arises from the social 
imperative in human nature, applied to 
humanity as a whole. I propose to take 
this ﬁ  rst proposition seriously, as the ba-
sis of modern international law. Seeking 
to understand the social requirements of 
international community, in the absence 
of universal political authority, generates 
a few obvious questions: ﬁ  rst, how to es-
tablish the fundamental requirements of 
just human society as law; second, how 
to implement this law in a world of dif-
fuse and deeply unjust political power; 
third, how to separate the province of 
international law from the jurisdiction 
of local politics. All three problems con-
cern the application of a “science” (as the 
sidade Católica do Paraná/ Brazil)
The needed conection between mo-
rality and Law and the consequential 
overdue of Legal Positivism: The face of 
new constitucionalism.
Abstract:
The theme of this paper is one of the 
most intriguing and fundamental, dis-
cussed for a long time on legal theory 
and one which divides contemporary 
doctrine in three major trends:
The theories which understand the re-
lationship between Law and morality as 
contingent or circumstantial, within a 
positivist paradigm in the understand-
ing of the legal phenomenon, as stated 
in Herbert Hart’s soft positivism theory 
or in its improved version, Will Walu-
chow’s inclusive positivism.
The theories which state an absolute sep-
aration between morality and Law, even 
without sharing Hans Kelsen’s view of 
the science of law, as is the case of the 
Joseph Raz’ so called exclusive positiv-
ism or hard positivism, a kind of under-
standing about the legal phenomenon, 
in which the Law can relate to morality, 
but the last do not deﬁ  ne its existence 
and validity, since its validity and identi-
ﬁ  cation can only be deﬁ  ned by the social 
sources thesis.
And ﬁ  nally, those theories that consider 
that between morality and law there is 
a needed and conceptual relation in the 
sense that morality plays an important 
role in the identiﬁ  cation and validity of 
the law. These theories are inserted in 
the context of the so called post-positiv-
ism, in which the thesis of Law’s sepa-
rability and, therefore, its neutrality, is 
Strömung politischer Art? Alle diese 
Fragen – und gewiß noch andere – sind 
seit Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts mit der 
Frage des Wertes (oder der Wertlosig-
keit) der Rechtswissenschaft verbunden. 
In den letzten Jahren ist auch die Fra-
ge in der rechtsphilosophischen Debatte 
stark aufgetaucht, ob der Rechtspositi-
vismus durch den sogenannten Neukon-
s t i t u t i o n a l i s m u s  ü b e r w u n d e n  s e i .  D a s  
Ziel dieses Referats ist, diese vermeinte 
Überwindung zu überprüfen, indem 
man den Rechtspositivismus als ein Pa-
radigma im Sinne der Wissenschafts-
philosophie Thomas S. Kuhns darstellt. 
Demgemäß wären alle die Versuche, aus 
dem Rechtspositivismus zu ﬂ  iehen, nur 
innere Bewegungen innerhalb des Para-
digmas. So verlieren wir ja einerseits die 
Präzision des Ausdruckes „Rechtspositi-
vismus“, gewinnen wir jedoch anderer-
seits eine umfangreichere geschichtliche 
Perspektive, die uns hilft, die grund-
sätzliche Fundamente des Rechtsposi-
tivismus – sowohl wissenschaftlicher 
als politischer Art – in seinem Kern zu 
b e g r e i f e n .  K u r z u m :  e s  w i r d  s i c h  z e i -
gen, wie der Rechtspositivismus noch 
die unvermeidliche Rechtsauffassung 
unserer Zeit bleibt – wenigstens für die 
westliche Kultur. Dabei wird das Referat 
versuchen, die Angemessenheit der Wis-
senschaftsphilosophie Thomas S. Kuhns 
für die Erklärung der rechtshistorischen 
und rechtsphilosophischen Fragen zu 
prüfen.
6.
Amélia do Carmo Sampaio Rossi + Dan-
ielle Anne Pamplona (Pontifícia Univer- 434 435
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istics. The logical validity of a certain 
rule means that its obligation for behav-
ior is substantially compatible with the 
obligations for behavior of other norms 
from the same legal system. The logical 
compatibility includes not only lack of 
contradictions, but as well existence of 
coordination, coherence or symmetry 
between two behaviors, prescribed by 
two rules. The logical validity of a prin-
ciple means that the judge may use it as 
a starting point for the following logi-
cal proceedings: selection of one of two 
juridically contradicting or logically in-
compatible legal rules; creation by the 
way of deduction of a new rule; formula-
tion by the way of analogy and induction 
of an individual right or obligation with 
regard to the factual situation.
of the legal rules. It means application of 
the legal sanction of a certain rule to a 
certain case. That is why the juridical 
validity is always concrete and speciﬁ  c. 
In this sense, a rule is juridically valid if 
its sanction is applicable in case of non-
compliance with the behavior prescribed 
as binding by this rule. It is obvious, that 
not all legal rules possess juridical valid-
ity. Non-compliance with the secondary 
rules, binding upon acceptance does not 
create legal sanction. Because it is deter-
mined on the basis of the momentary 
status of the legal system (so-called “mo-
mentary legal system”) the applicability 
of a certain legal rule to certain case, the 
juridical validity of this rule could be 
named “momentary validity”. In opposi-
tion, the factual validity could be named 
“general (or abstract) validity”. The ju-
ridical validity of the rules is determined 
on the basis of their factual validity and 
(in case of conﬂ  ict) by the application of 
a set of special conﬂ  ict rules. The legal 
principles, which are binding upon ac-
ceptance within the legal system, do not 
possess factual validity. They do not pos-
sess juridical validity as well, since they 
do not prescribe a certain behavior and 
do not provide legal sanctions in case of 
non-compliance with this behavior. The 
logical validity of the norms should be 
carefully distinguished from the more 
broad area of the logical justiﬁ  cation of 
the judicial decision. The judge must ﬁ  rst 
prove that a particular norm is logically 
valid and only after that he can use it as 
a logical argument for his decision. The 
logical validity of the rules and princi-
ples has completely different character-
law. In such a case legal positivism must 
retire the social sources thesis, because 
of the way the law is socially understood 
as ethically justiﬁ  ed. So legal positivism 
remains coherent. It is not self-defeated, 
but in this case it is self-effacing.
9.
Rossen Tashev (Soﬁ  a University St. Kli-
ment Ohridski / Bulgaria)
Forms of Validity of the Legal Norms
Abstract:
The paper accepts the existence of three 
forms of validity of the legal norms: fac-
tual, juridical and logical. H. Hart admits 
the possibility of existence of a factual 
validity because the result of the rec-
ognition of a rule (its validation) is that 
this rule obtains factual binding force. 
Secondly, H. Hart connects the “inter-
nal” statement concerning the valid-
ity of a particular rule of a system with 
the “external” statement of fact that the 
system is generally efﬁ   cacious. To the 
group of norms binding upon accept-
ance three other kinds of norms ought 
to be added: accepted primary rules, for 
which no explicit rule of recognition ex-
ists; secondary rules “other” than those 
enlisted by H. Hart (i.e. the competence 
rules, which determine the validity of 
the legal actions); and most importantly 
legal principles. In conclusion, the fac-
tual outlook of the legal system reveals 
at least three binding normative spe-
cies: valid primarily rules for behavior, 
binding secondary rules upon validity of 
rules and actions, binding legal princi-
ples. The juridical validity takes place in 
the realm of the controversial application 437
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Oxford / UK, Title t.b.a., SW 18
Fleerackers, Frank, Brüssel/ Belgium, 
The Role of Lawyers in Interaction: 
Inﬂ  uences of ADR practice on Legal 
Thinking and Legal Education, 
SW 20
Fleerackers, Frank, Brussels / Belgium, 
Legal Education, Negotiation and 
Conﬂ  ict Analysis, SW 20
Fleurke, F., TILT, Tilburg University / 
The Netherlands, The EFSA. Risk-
Assessment on GMOs, SW 71
Flores, Imer B., Ciudad de México / 
Mexico, H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept 
of Law Reconsidered, SW 21
Flores, Imer B., Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México / Mexico, 
H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law: 
Between the Nightmare and the 
Noble Dream, SW 21
Follesdal, Andreas, University of 
Oslo / Norway, The Principle 
of Subsidiarity as a strategy for 
legitimate international problem-
solving, for and against: The case of 
human rights treaties, SW 28
Fonseca Dias, Maria Tereza, Federal 
University of Ouro Preto, UFOP / 
Brazil, How researches are done in 
the ﬁ  eld of Law? Reﬂ  ections from 
the study of monographs of the 
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Gerais / Brazil, Law as Literature: 
memory and oblivion, SW 24
Galuppo, Marcelo Campos, Minas 
Gerais / Brazil, The Latin American 
Legal Thinking in front of the 
challenges of Globalization, SW 25
Galuppo, Marcelo Campos, 
Universidade Federal de Minas 
Gerais – Pontifícia Universidade 
Católica de Minas Gerais / Brazil, 
The Judge as Storyteller, SW 24
Galuppo, Marcelo, Minas Gerais 
/ Brasil, To witch extent has 
technology and science urged for 
new concepts in the Jurisprudence?, 
WG 25
Gantner, Felix, Röhrenbach / 
Österreich, Die Interpretation von 
Rechtstexten und der Stufenbau der 
Formatierungen, WG 4
Garcez Ghirardi, José + 
Neuenschwander Magalhães, 
Juliana, Universidade Federal do Rio 
de Janeiro / Brazil, Your Husband, 
your Sovereign: the Violent Prince 
in the Taming of Shrew, SW 24
Gaziero Cella, José Renato + Lara 
Zequinão, Cassiana, Curitiba / 
Brazil, Reason Crisis in the 20th 
and cultural relativism: it is possible 
to establish an universal ethic for 
human rights?, WG 13
Gaziero Cello, José Renato + Pelegrini, 
Juliana Vieira, Curitiba / Brazil, 
The Prohibition of the Right to 
Anonymity on the authoritarian 
Brazilian Constitution and its 
Impact on Social Networks, WG 16
Gazziero Cella, José Renato + Bianchi 
Wojciechowski, Paola, Brazil, The 
undergraduate course., SW 32
Forst, Rainer, University of Frankfurt 
/ Germany, Transnational Justice, 
Democracy and Human Rights, 
SW 28
Fossen, Thomas, Utrecht University / 
Netherlands, The Virtual Reality of 
Voting Advice Applications, SW 30
Francis, Leslie + Francis, John, 
University of Utah / USA, 
Surveillance without borders, SW 22
Francis, Leslie, Utah / USA, New 
Developments in Technology: 
challenges for the law and ethics of 
privacy and conﬁ  dentiality, SW 22
Friedrich, Toepel, Germany, Which 
function does the legitimation of a 
human right fulﬁ  ll?, SW 47
Frydman, Benoit + Restrepo Amariles, 
David, Université Libre de Bruxelles/
Belgium, Teaching Global Law, 
SW 72
Funke, Andreas, Universität 
Köln, Radbruchs Rechtsbegriff 
und Radbruchs Methode zur 
Bestimmung des Rechtsbegriffs, 
SW 7
Gaakeer, Jeanne, Erasmus School of 
Law / Netherlands, Control, Alt and/
or Delete? Some observations on 
new technologies and the human, 
SW 23
Gaakeer, Jeanne, Rotterdam / The 
Netherlands, Normative and 
epistemological implications of 
data science, proﬁ  ling and smart 
environments ‘Code as Law’ meets 
‘Law as Code and Law as Literature’, 
SW 23
Galuppo, Marcelo Campos, Minas 
Dispute Between Universalism 
and Relativism: Is it Possible a 
Cosmopolitan Project of Human 
Rights?, SW 25
George, Alexandra, Sydney / Australia, 
The Metaphysics of Intellectual 
Property and the Challenges of 
Scientiﬁ  c Progress, WG 19
Gerner-Beuerle, Carsten, London 
School of Economics / UK, 
Comparative Corporate Governance 
for the 21st century, SW 14
Ghanavizi, Nazanin + Falasiri, Arash, 
University of Sidney / Australia, 
From E-citizenship to E-democracy? 
Case study of Internet Use in Iran, 
SW 30
Ghosh, Eric, Armidale / Australia, 
Negative republican liberty, WG 15
Godoy, Miguel, Universidade Federal 
do Paraná, Brazil, Constitutionalism 
and deliberative democracy in Nino, 
SW 3
Golding, Martin P., Duke University, 
Durham, NC / USA, The Force of 
Arguments in the Law, SW 64
Golding, Martin, North Carolina / USA, 
The Basic Norm as Fiction: Kelsen’s 
Final Doctrine, WG 27
Goldoni, Marco, University of 
Antwerp / Netherlands, Code as 
Undemocratic Law? An Assessment 
from a Legal Theory Perspective, 
SW 30
Golecki, Mariusz Jerzy, Univ. of 
Łódź / Poland, The Supremacy 
Claim within Judicial Rulings of 
the National Constitutional and 
Supreme Courts in the EU, SW 39
Golecki, Mariusz Jerzy, University 
of Lodz / Poland, Synallagma as 
a paradigm of exchange: from 
Aristotelian to Game Theoretic 
Categorisation in Contract Law, 
SW 11
Golecki, Mariusz, Lodz, Poland, 
Between interpretation and 
intuition: cognitive sciences and the 
model of decision making process in 
law, SW 26
Golecki, Mariusz, University of 
Lódz / Poland, Foundationalism 
vs. Antifoundationalis: some 
remarks on law and economics as 
jurisprudential theory, SW 14
Golecki, Mariusz, University of Lodz, 
Faculty of Law and Administration 
/ Poland, Homo Oeconomicus vs. 
Homo Iuridicus. Towards a General 
Theory of Linguistic Categorisation 
Within the Law and Economics 
Scholarship, SW 26
Gontijo, Lucas de Alvarenga, Minas 
Gerais / Brazil, Workshop on 
Biopolitics, SW 58
Gonzalez de la Vega, Geraldina, 
Düsseldorf / Germany, 
Verfassungswandel als dynamische 
Verfassungsinterpretation, WG 2
González Pascual, Alberto, 
Complutense University of Madrid / 
Spain, Title t.b.a., SW 60
Gonzalez Pascual, Maria Isabel, Univ. 
Pompeu Farba, Barcelona / Spain, 
Interpretation of principles framed 
as competence conﬂ  icts (Spain, 
Germany and Italy), SW 39
Good, Christoph, Luzern / Switzerland, 
Legal Theory and Education: The 
Way Ahead, SW 72
Index of Lecturers and Organizers 456 457
ABSTRACTS
Germany, Wrongful Sanctions, 
SW 46
Greczner, Bartosz, Wroclaw University/
Poland, The inﬂ  uence of judges’ 
responsibility for the dialog and 
judicial independence on providing 
justice to the society in the 
European Union, SW 1
Gregório, Assagra de Almeida, 
University of Itaúna / Brazil, The 
new Summa Divisio of the Brazilian 
Law: individual and collective laws, 
SW 32
Greppi, Andrea, Madrid / Spain, 
Legitimacy 2.0. E-democracy and 
Public Opinion in the Digital Age, 
SW 30
Greppi, Andrea, Universidad Carlos 
III Madrid / Spain, Ignorance and 
Representation in the Net, SW 30
Gruber, Malte, Frankfurt am Main / 
Germany, Recht am technisierten 
Körper / Recht an verkörperter 
Technik, SW 31
Gruber, Malte, Universität Frankfurt 
/ Germany, Teilrechtssubjekte des 
elektronischen Geschäftsverkehrs, 
SW 33
Grunewald, Ralph, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison / USA, The 
Narrative of Innocence, or: Lost 
Stories, SW 27
Gruschke, Daniel, Aachen / Germany, 
Zur vagheitstheoretischen 
Modellierung unbestimmter 
Rechtsbegriffe, SW 5
Gümplova, Petra, Justus-Liebig-
University, Gießen / Germany, 
Deliberation and the Politics of the 
Extraordinary: The Constitution 
Goodwin, Morag, Tilburg / Netherlands, 
Mutual-shaping and notions of 
progress: law and technology in the 
development context, WG 24
Gordon, Randy, Gardere Wynne 
Sewell LLP / Southern Methodist 
University / USA, Fictional Fraud: 
Reliance and the Myth of Efﬁ  cient 
Markets, SW 16
Gordon, Randy, Gardere Wynne Sewell 
LLP and Southern Methodist 
University / USA, Institutionalizing 
Exemplary Narratives: A Kansas 
Case, SW 27
Gordon, Randy, USA, Exemplary 
Narratives: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives, SW 27
Gould, Carol C., City University of New 
York / USA, Is there a Human Right 
to Democracy?, SW 28
Gould, Carol C., New York / USA, 
Human Rights, Global Justice, 
and Democracy: Issues at their 
Intersection, SW 28
Grabowski, Andrzej, Kraków / Poland, 
Postpositivist Theory of Law – 
Genesis and Programme, WG 32
Grafsky, Vladimir, Institute of State 
and Law of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences Moscow / Russia, 
Axiological image of law: Nikolai 
Alekseev’s contribution, SW 29
Grafsky, Vladimir, Moskau / Russia, 
Legal Philosophy of Nikolai 
Alekseev and European scientiﬁ  c 
tradition, SW 29
Gray, James, United Kingdom, The 
presence of the past: Law, Literature 
and Cynthia Ozick, SW 24
Grechenig, Kristoffel, MPI Bonn / 
Making in Czech Republic, 1992, 
SW 1
Güngör, Hasan Atilla, Istanbul / 
Turkey, The Effect of the science on 
„personhood“ debate; „when does 
human life begin?“, WG 22
Günther, Klaus, Goethe University, 
Frankfurt/Main, Unviolability as a 
Legal Concept, PL
Guibourg, Ricardo A., Buenos Aires / 
Argentina, On the Knowledge and 
the Use of Law, WG 31
Gumplova, Petra, Liebig University 
Gießen / Germany, Carl Schmitt: 
Democracy and Sovereign 
Constitutional Politics, SW 4
Gur, Noam, Oxford / UK, Are Legal 
Rules Content-Independent 
Reasons?, WG 29
Gustin, Miracy, Minas Gerais / Brazil, 
Methodology of Jurisprudence and 
the impact of new technologies, 
SW 32
Győrﬁ  , Tamás, Univ. of Aberdeen 
/ UK, The moral reading of the 
constitution and its alternatives: 
methods of constitutional 
interpretation or judicial strategies?, 
SW 39
Haar, Brigitte, Goethe-Universität 
Frankfurt am Main / Germany, 
Anerkennung und Economic 
Behaviour, SW 43
Haase, Marco, China University of 
Political Science and Law, Peking / 
China, Civil Law as a Legal System, 
SW 74
Haaz, Ignace, University of Fribourg / 
Switzerland, Eduard von Hartmann 
and criminalization, SW 17
Hage, Jaap, Maastricht / The 
Netherlands, Legal Constructivism 
and the Institutional Theory of Law, 
SW 15
Hannesson, Ólafur Ísberg, European 
University Institute/Italy, Legal 
Pluralism in the EEA legal order: 
The role of the EFTA Court and 
the Icelandic national courts in the 
European Judicial Dialogue, SW 1
Hannesson, Ólafur Ísberg, Firenze / 
Italy + Iceland, Legal Pluralism: 
Reformulation of the Traditional 
View in Iceland, WG 17
Hänni, Julia, Institut für Europarecht 
der Universitäten Bern, Neuenburg 
und Fribourg / Schweiz, Recht, 
Biomedizin, Technik und die 
autonome Leiblichkeit des 
Menschen, SW 9
Hansen, Thomas Obel, United States 
International University, Kenya, 
Revisiting Nino’s Justiﬁ  cations for 
Punishing State-Sponsored Violence, 
SW 3
Hanser, Matthew, University of 
California at Santa Barbara / 
USA, Practical Reason and Moral 
Mereology, SW 61
Harel, Alon, Hebrew University 
Jerusalem / Israel, 
Commensurability and Agency: Two 
Yet-To-Be-Met Challenges for Law 
and Economics, SW 14
Hasegawa, Miyuki, Chiba / Japan, 
Can expressive social disapproval 
generate the wider sense of 
responsibility over apathetic people?, 
WG 7
Hatzistavrou, Antony, University of 
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Literature. A new command for the 
establishment of public policies. The 
emergence of a new decision maker 
body. The politisation of the justice. 
The Brazilian experience, SW 25
Heuer, Ulrike, University of Leeds / UK, 
Acting for the Right Reasons, SW 61
Hildebrandt, M., VU Brussels / 
Belgium, Experts, Experience, 
Representation, and pTA, SW 71
Hildebrandt, Mireille, Erasmus School 
of Law and Radboud University 
Nijmegen / Netherlands, From 
Galathea 2.2 to Watson – and back?, 
SW 23
Hildebrandt, Mireille, Rotterdam / 
The Netherlands, Normative and 
epistemological implications of 
data science, proﬁ  ling and smart 
environments ‘Code as Law’ meets 
‘Law as Code and Law as Literature’, 
SW 23
Hilgendorf, Eric, Universität Würzburg / 
Germany, Title t.b.a., SW 31
Hilgendorf, Eric, Würzburg / Germany, 
Person, Verantwortung, Grenzen 
des Rechts – alte Debatten im neuen 
Kontext „Robotik und Künstliche 
Intelligenz“, SW 33
Hillerbrand, Rafaela, Aachen 
/ Germany, Epistemische 
Unsicherheiten und das Recht, 
SW 35
Hillerbrand, Rafaela, RWTH Aachen 
/ Germany, Risiko, Unsicherheit 
und Ungewissheit in der 
Technikfolgenforschung, SW 35
Hiroshi, Hattori, Tokyo / Japan, 1953 
– ein Markstein der juristischen 
Methodenlehre in Japan und 
Deutschland, WG 2
Ho, Anita + Silvers, Anita + Stainton, 
Tim, University of British Columbia 
/ Canada + San Francisco State 
University / USA + University 
of British Columbia / Canada, 
Continuous Surveillance of Persons 
with Disabilities: Conﬂ  icts and 
Compatibilities of Personal and 
Public Goods, SW 22
Hoffmann, Florian, Erfurt / Germany, 
Theology and the Political: a new 
debate on community, politics, and 
law, SW 4
Hoffmann, Thomas, Magdeburg / 
Germany, Human Rights and 
Human Nature, SW 2
Hoffmann, Thomas, University of 
Magdeburg / Germany, Human 
Dignity and Human Nature, SW 2
Hofmeister-Pich, Roberto, Porto Alegre 
/ Brazil, Title t.b.a., SW 18
Holmes Chaves, Pablo, Flensburg / 
Germany + Brazil, Global Law 
and Global Exclusion: Dilemmas 
of constitutional semantics in the 
World Society, WG 12
Hong, Ki-Won, City University of Seoul 
/ Korea, Recta ratio in Ciceronian 
Philosophy of Law, SW 36
Hong, Ki-Won, Seoul / Korea, Orthos 
logos, Recta ratio, or Right Reason 
in the Philosophy of Law from 
Aristotle to Dworkin, SW 36
Hong, Ki-Won, Seoul / Korea, Social 
Capacity of the Aged People 
Reconsidered : A Reading of Cicero’s 
Cato Major de Senectute, WG 30
Hong, Quoc Loc, Amsterdam / 
Netherlands, The Role of Courts in 
the War on Terror, WG 12
Hong, Quoc Loc, VU University 
Amsterdam / The Netherlands, The 
Role of Courts in the War on Terror, 
SW 58
Horn, Hans-Rudolf, Wiesbaden / 
Germany, Judicial Review in 
Democratic Systems, WG 3
Horta, José Luiz, Minas Gerais / Brazil, 
Cultural Turn and Philosophy of 
Law and State, SW 37
Hsu, Yu-An, Taipei / Taiwan, Die 
subjektive Zurechnungslehre 
von Aristoteles und Strafrecht 
(Aristotle’s Theory of Subjective 
Imputation and Criminal Law), 
WG 7
Hsu, Yue-Dian, Department of Law, 
National Cheng Kung University, 
Tainan / Taiwan, Religiös-
weltanschauliche Neutralität in 
öffentlichen Räumen, SW 42
Huppes-Cluysenaer, Liesbeth, 
Amsterdam / The Netherlands, 
Aristotle and the Philosophy of Law 
– Theory, Practice and Justice, 
SW 11
Huppes-Cluysenaer, Liesbeth, 
University of Amsterdam / The 
Netherlands, Reasoning against 
a deterministic/mechanistic 
conception of the world, SW 11
Hurd, Heidi, University of Illinois 
/ USA, Interpreting Without 
Intentions: How the Limits of 
Interpretation Deﬁ  ne the Limits of 
Legal Authority, SW 61
Hurri, Samuli, Helsinki / Finland, 
Justice kata nomos and justice as 
epieikés (legality and equity), SW 11
Hull / UK, Reconsideration and 
Exclusionary Reasons, SW 61
Haugen, Hans Morten, Sandnes / 
Norway, Human rights in scientiﬁ  c 
professions‘ codes of conduct?, 
WG 14
Häußler, Stefan, Göttingen / Germany, 
Early 20th Century Theories of 
Legal Education: Psychology and 
“Civilpolitik”, SW 20
Heather, Michael + Rossiter, Nick, 
Northumbria University, Newcastle / 
UK, Law as Exact Science, WG 1
Hegyi, Szabolcs, University of Miskolc 
/ Hungary, The scope and limits 
of consequencitalist reasoning: a 
philosophical approach, SW 14
Hegyi, Szabolcs, University of Miskolc 
/ Hungary, The Scope and Limits 
of Consequentialist Reasoning – a 
Philosophical Approach, SW 46
Hegyi, Szabolcs, University of Miskolc 
/ Hungary, The theoretical grounds 
of „constitutional matters” and their 
role in public legal reasoning, SW 45
Henrich, Daniel C., IZEW, Universität 
Tübingen / Germany, Bioethik und 
Selektion. Die Herausforderung der 
‚neuen‘ Eugenik, SW 34
Heper, Altan, Universität Würzburg 
/ Germany, Brauchen wir einen 
Menschenwürdebegriff in einer 
pluralistischen Gesellschaft?, SW 34
Herdy, Rachel, Federal University of 
Rio de Janeiro / Brazil, Peirce’s 
Contribution to Legal Philosophy: A 
Threefold Distinction, SW 66
Hermann, Monica + Beçak, Rubens, 
Universidade de São Paulo / Brazil, 
The XXIth Century Juridical 
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Recht an verkörperter Technik, 
SW 31
Kasozi, Ferdinand M., Makerere 
University / Uganda, Inferential 
Grounds of Badanda Court 
Processes – Logical Guidance 
for Contemporary Legal System 
Efﬁ  cacy, SW 54
Katja, Langenbucher, Goethe-
Universität Frankfurt am Main / 
Germany, Title t.b.a., SW 41
Kazanavičiūtė, Rūta, Vilnius University 
/ Lithuania, Lithuanian legal 
system, SW 59
Keller, Bertram, Köln / Germany, 
Private Law Theory (PLT) – Politics 
of Private Law in a Technological 
Age, SW 74
Keller, Bertram, University of Cologne 
/ Germany, Private Law as Political 
Deliberation, SW 74
Kiikeri, Markku, Rovaniemi / Finland, 
Science and law as collective 
intentionality, WG 5
Kilanowski, Marcin, Toruń / Poland 
+ Massachusetts / USA, On 
Pragmatism, Politics and Objectivity 
of Ethics, WG 11
Kim, Gunoo, Seoul / South Korea, 
What Jurisprudence Must Learn 
from History and Philosophy of 
Science, WG 5
Kim, Hung Hwan + Kang, Il Shin, 
Seoul / South Korea, A Study on 
the New Relationship between 
Democracy and the Rule of Law in 
Korea, WG 17
Kim, Jihye, Korea, Chemical Castration 
Treatment for Sex Offenders: 
Bio-Medical Power’s Wrongful 
of law, WG 23
Kähler, Lorenz, University of Göttingen 
/ Germany, Contractual Consent 
under the Condition of Information 
Overload, SW 74
Kalisz, Anna + Szot, Adam, Sosnowiec 
/ Poland + Lublin / Poland, Mental 
models theory and a paradigm of 
law application process, WG 3
Kamemoto, Hiroshi, Kyoto University 
/ Japan, How should Legal 
Philosophers make Use of Economic 
Thinking?, PL
Kamminga, Peter, Stanford / USA, 
Toward a new kind of highly 
interactive lawyer: The promise of 
collaborative Lawyering?, SW 20
Kaniowski, Andrzej M., Universität 
Lodz / Poland, Kants Konzept 
der Menschenwürde und die 
Zuständigkeit des Staates in 
bioethischen Fragen, SW 34
Kaptein, Hendrik, Leiden Law School, 
Leiden University / The Netherlands, 
Analogy, Precedent, Paradigm, 
Metaphor: So Many Cases of 
Unintentional Inexistence (and why 
this des not always really matter), 
SW 64
Kaptein, Hendrik, Leiden University /
The Netherlands, Retribution as a 
fundamental human right, SW 47
Karam de Chueiri, Vera, Curitiba 
/ Brazil, Judicial review and 
technology, WG 15
Karanovic, Daniel, Frankfurt / 
Germany, Moral Laws, Duties and 
Certainty in Moral Reasoning, WG 1
Karavas, Vagias, Luzern / Switzerland, 
Recht am technisierten Körper / 
Ispir Toprak, Zeynep, Ankara / Turkey, 
Dworkin’s Criticism to Hart’s Open 
Texture Theory, WG 29
Jaeckel, Liv, Universität Leipzig 
/ Germany, Neutralisiert das 
Recht das Risiko – eine Reise ins 
Ungewisse?, SW 35
Jakab, András, Hungary, Constitutional 
Reasoning: Theoretical Perspectives, 
SW 39
Jakl, Bernhard, Münster / 
Germany, „Rechtsentwicklung“ 
in Rechtstheorie und 
Rechtsphilosophie. Ein Vergleich am 
Beispiel der Transnationalisierung 
des Rechts, SW 5
Joensoo, Juho, Helsinki University 
/ Finland, Law and Calculative 
Thinking, SW 65
Joerden, Jan C., Frankfurt, Oder 
/ Germany, Menschenwürde - 
Menschenbild - Verantwortung: 
Analyse von Leitbegriffen der 
bioethischen Debatten, SW 34
Joerden, Jan C., Universität Frankfurt/
Oder / Germany, Könnten dereinst 
auch Maschinen Würde haben?, 
SW 34
Jouanjan, Olivier, University of 
Strasbourg / France, The philological 
Turn: History and Metaphysics in 
Savigny, PL
Jovanovic, Miodrag A., University 
of Belgrade Faculty of Law / 
Serbia, Does Jurisprudence Need 
Anthropology?, SW 53
Kabashima, Hiroshi, Sendai / Japan, 
Social costs, limits to growth, 
right to growth: approacing global 
environment oriented to philosophy 
Hwang, Shu-Perng, Taiwan, Zur 
Inhaltsbestimmung des Gesetzes 
unter Ungewißheitsbedingungen, 
WG 2
Iancu, Bogdan, University of Bucharest 
/ Romania, Romanian legal system, 
SW 59
Idowu, William, Ile-Ife / Nigeria, For 
Each a Crumb of Right, For Neither 
the Whole Loaf’: African Legal 
Thought and the Jurinomics of 
Reconciliation, WG 4
Imbrisevic, Miroslav, Heythrop College, 
University of London / UK, Hart and 
Nino on Punishment, SW 3
Imbrisevic, Miroslav, London / UK, 
Hart and Nino on Punishment, 
WG 7
Imer B., Flores, UNAM / México, 
Legislatures Not-Judging in their 
Own Cause. On the principle 
nemo iudex in sua causa applied to 
Legislation, SW 75
Indaimo, Joseph, Perth / Australia, 
Human Rights & the Law: the 
Unbreachable Gap between the 
Ethics of Justice and the Efﬁ  cacy of 
Law., WG 14
Inoue, Masako, Kanagawa University 
/ Japan, Civil Society and Family – 
from Feminism Point of View, 
SW 52
Inoue, Tatsuo, Graduate School of 
Law and Politics, The University 
of Tokyo / Japan, Legitimacy, 
Critical Democracy and Political 
Transformation of Japan, SW 68
Isabel, Feichtner, Goethe-Universität 
Frankfurt am Main / Germany, Title 
t.b.a., SW 41
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Könczöl, Miklós, Budapest / Hungary 
+ Durham / UK, The Language of 
Law: Classical Perspectives, SW 40
Könczöl, Miklos, Budapest / Hungary + 
Durham, UK, As Heads of Families: 
Rawlsian Perspectives on Future 
Generations, WG 29
Kozicki, Katya, Curitiba / Brazil, 
Human Rights and Justice in a 
Multicultural World, WG 13
Kozuka, Souichirou, Gakushuin 
University / Japan, Soft Law, Private 
Authority and Social Norms: When 
and how non-state law replaces the 
private law of the State?, SW 74
Krajewski, Jakub, Kraków / Poland, 
Virtue Jurisprudence and the 
Question of Multiculturalism?, WG 
9
Krell, Andreas, Alagoas / Brazil, 
Diskussionswandel über juristische 
Hermeneutik: Voraussetzung der 
Ziele des Sozialen Umweltstaates in 
Brasilien, WG 2
Kristan, Andrej, Slovenia, Legislative 
Choice and Its Justiﬁ  ability, SW 75
Kristan, Andrej, University of Genoa / 
Italy, Slovenian legal system, SW 59
Krohling, Aloísio + Freire Soares, 
Ricardo Maurício, Faculdade 
de Direito de Vitória / Brazil + 
Universidade Federal da Bahia / 
Brazil, Dussel’s ethics of liberation 
as rhizomatic matrix and original 
source of human fundamental rights 
as root principles of postpositivistic 
philosophy of law, SW 25
Krygier, Martin, University of New 
South Wales / UK, Philip Selznick’s 
Pragmatism, SW 66
Encountering with the Power of 
Criminal Justice, WG 22
Kim, Marie Seong-Hak, Minnesota 
/ USA, Custom and Reason: A 
Comparative Discussion of Sources 
of Law in Europe and East Asia, 
WG 31
Kim, Young-Whan, Hanyang Univ., 
School of Law / Rep. of Korea, Die 
gegenwärtige Diskussion um die 
Sterbehilfe in Korea - anhand eines 
aktuellen Falls, SW 42
Kim, Young-Whan, Seoul / Korea, 
Sterbehilfe aus ethischer und 
rechtlicher Sicht / Die Religion im 
öffentlichen Bereich, SW 42
Kirste, Stephan, Andrássy Universität 
und Universität Heidelberg, 
Radbruch’s Idea of Law and the 
Elements of Justice, SW 7
Kjus, Audun, The Norwegian Museum 
of Cultural History / Norway, Lucifer 
and Adam: A Royal Example, SW 27
Klinowski, Mateusz, Jagiellonian 
University Krakow / Poland, Title 
t.b.a., SW 30
Kloosterhuis, Harm, Erasmus School 
of Law, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam / The Netherlands, 
On the Rhetorical Use of Analoy-
Argumentation in Legal Decisions, 
SW 64
Kloosterhuis, Harm, Rotterdam / The 
Netherlands, The Pragma-Dialectic 
Perspective on Legal Argumentation 
and the Rule of Law, SW 15
Knauer, Nancy, Temple University 
/ USA, Legal Fictions and the 
Constitutive Power of Law: Slavery 
and the Doctrine of Discovery, SW 16
Krygier, Martin, University of 
New South Wales/ Australia, 
Constitutionalism afer Communism: 
Fears, Hopes, Achievements, and 
Disappointments, SW 78
Künzler, Adrian, Yale Law School / 
USA, Cost-Beneﬁ  t-Analysis and the 
Quest for Wealth Maximization: 
How to Embrace Complexity and 
Uncertainty (IVR Prize Lecture), PL
Küzeci, Elif, Istanbul / Turkey, Digitized 
Personality: The Rise of the 
Surveillance, the Fall of the Personal 
Integrity, WG 19
Kurlanda, Ewa, London / UK, ADR 
clauses – The effects of changing 
relationships between parties”, 
SW 20
Langenbucher, Katja, Frankfurt am 
Main / Germany, Disciplinary 
Perspectives and Legal Truth, SW 41
Lanneau, Régis, Université Paris X / 
France, What is ‘law’ from the law 
and economics point of view?, 
SW 14
Leczykiewicz, Dorota, Oxford / UK, 
Law and Science in the Proof 
of Causation: Redeﬁ  ning the 
Boundaries between Law and Fact, 
WG 5
Lee, Hyun Kyung, Seoul / South 
Korea, From Institutional Facts 
To the Institutional Normative 
Order - Reﬂ  ecting on the Changes 
in Neil MacCormick’s Institutional 
Conception of Law, WG 27
Lee, Junghoon, Ulsan / South Korea, 
Japan’s Inﬂ  uence on Korea’s Judicial 
Modernization : Examination of the 
Reality of Judicial Modernization 
through the Analysis of Legal Cases 
in late 19th Century, WG 9
Lee, Win-chiat, Department of 
Philosophy, Wake Forest University 
/ USA, Political Obligations as 
Associative Obligation, SW 68
Lee, Win-chiat, Wake Forest University 
/ USA, Citizens as Appellate Judges: 
Dworkin’s Protestantism about Law, 
SW 45
Leenes, Ronald + van den Berg, Bibi, 
Tilburg University / Netherlands, 
Abort, Retry, or Fail: Scoping 
techno-regulation and other techno-
effects, SW 23
Legarre, Santiago, Buenos Aires / 
Argentinia, Title t.b.a., SW 18
Leopes Lerna, Monica, Finland, From 
Amnesty to Memory, SW 24
Lernestedt, Claes, University of Örebro 
/ Sweden, Victim, offender, and 
society: sharing wrongs, but how, 
and in which roles?, SW 17
Leszczynski, Leszek, Univ. of Lublin / 
Poland, The Interpretational Role 
of Constitutional Principles: Impact 
on the Process of Interpretation and 
Scale of Judicial Discretion, SW 39
Levy, Wilson, São Paulo / Brazil, For a 
critique of legal positivism of Hans 
Kelsen: the relationship between 
knowledge and interest in Jürgen 
Habermas, WG 27
Linhares, José Manuel, Universidade 
de Coimbra / Portugal, Is 
law’s practical-cultural project 
condemned to fail the test of 
‘contextual congruence’? A 
dialogue with Hans Albert’s social 
engineering, SW 62
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/ USA, Democratic Equality and 
Public Legal Reason, SW 45
Mak, Elaine, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam / The Netherlands, 
Dialogue in Judicial Decision-
Making, SW 1
Maksimov, S., National University, 
Law Academy of Ukraine / 
Ukraine, The issue of recognition 
in phenomenological and 
hermeneutical perspective, SW 65
Małecka, Magdalena, Polish Academy of 
Science, Graduate School for Social 
Research / Poland, Disappointment 
and Promise of Neuroeconomics 
Applied to Law, SW 26
Malte, Gruber, Universität Frankfurt 
/ Germany, Teilrechtssubjekte des 
elektronischen Geschäftsverkehrs, 
SW 33
Manasiev, Ilija, Skopje / Macedonia, 
Towards a constructive Law, Science 
and Technology coexistence, WG 26
Maratea, Lorenzo, Sapienza Roma / 
Italy, New values and order in the 
examination of the questions before 
the judge. La «ragione più liquida» 
in Italian Constitutional Court 
jurisprudence, SW 39
Marcelo Solon, Ari, São Paulo / Brazil, 
Judaism And Antidudaism In 
Jurisprudence (Schmitt Versus 
Kelsen), WG 27
Marcilla, Gema, University of Castilla-
La Mancha / Spain, The Areas of 
Legislative Argument, SW 75
Marcos, Ana Maria + Diez, José Ramón, 
Madrid / Spain, Bioethics and 
Healt Law: the living will. Proposal 
to create a Living Will Record in 
Cultural Differences for Business 
Ethics, SW 44
Lutz-Bachmann, Mathias, Frankfurt / 
Germany, Title t.b.a., SW 18
Macedo Jr, Ronaldo, São Paulo / 
Brazil, Overcoming orientalizing 
views of Latin American Law. New 
approaches to new legal experiences 
in Brazilian Law, WG 8
Machimura, Yasutaka, Hokkaido 
University / Japan, Civil 
Society in the World of Internet 
Communications – its Legal Aspects, 
SW 52
Mackor, Anne-Ruth, Faculty of Law, 
University of Groningen / The 
Netherlands, Norm-descriptions, 
norm-contentions and norm-
recommendations, SW 67
Macleod, Alistair, New York / USA, 
Human Rights, Global Justice, 
and Democracy: Issues at their 
Intersection, SW 28
Macleod, Alistair, Queen’s University / 
Canada, Human Rights, Equality of 
Opportunity, and Justice, SW 28
Madrid, Raúl, Santiago / Chile, Small 
is beautiful. Some reasons to 
consider chile the future of law and 
technology in latinamerica, WG 24
Madureira, Miriam, Mexico City 
/ Mexico, Hegels Rechts- als 
Sozialphilosophie, WG 30
Magnúsardóttir, Lára, University of 
Iceland / Iceland, Roman legal terms 
in Mediaeval Iceland: The case of 
contumacia, SW 40
Mahoney, Jon, Kansas / USA, Public 
Legal Reason, SW 45
Mahoney, Jon, Kansas State University 
über Patientenverfügungen in 
Deutschland – ein Überblick, WG 22
Lohse, Eva, Friedrich-Alexander-
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg 
/ Germany, Gesetzgeberische 
Pﬂ  ichten für den verantwortlichen 
Umgang mit (noch) ungewissen 
Risiken am Beispiel der 
Regelungsoptionen für die 
Nanotechnologien, SW 35
Long, Roderick T., Auburn University / 
USA, Reasonable Pluralism, Public 
Reason, and Anarchist Legal Theory, 
SW 45
Lopes, Mônica Sette, Minas Gerais 
/ Brazil, Jurists and journalists: 
impressions e judgements, WG 8
Lopes, Monica, Minas Gerais / Brazil, 
Methodology of Jurisprudence and 
the impact of new technologies, 
SW 32
López-García, José Antonio, Jaén 
/ Spain, Die Wandlung der 
Souveränität und die Grundrechte, 
WG 14
López-Medina, Diego, Universidad de 
los Andes / Colombia, Hart in Latin 
America: Toward a Diffusionist Map 
of (Mis)Readings of his Work, SW 21
Lorenzo, Javier, Universidad Carlos 
III, Madrid / Spain, ICT and 
Voting Abroad. An Analysis of 30 
Countries, SW 30
Lüderssen, Klaus, Frankfurt am Main 
/ Germany, Wirtschaftsethik und 
Rechtsquellenlehre, SW 43
Lütge, Christoph, München / Germany, 
Business Ethics and Law, SW 44
Lütge, Christoph, TU München / 
Germany, Some Implications of 
Lin-Hi, Nick, Universität Mannheim 
/ Germany, The Market and the 
Incompleteness of Contracts: 
Implications for CSR, SW 44
Linneberg, Arild, University of Bergen 
/ Norway, The Rhetoric of the Data 
Retention Directive; Hermeneutic 
and Epistemological Implications, 
SW 23
Lipovetsky e Silva, Nathália, Minas 
Gerais / Brazil, The place of 
philosophy of law between justice 
and efﬁ  ciency, WG 4
Lister, Andrew, Queen’s University / 
Canada, Reciprocity, Relationships, 
and Global Justice, SW 28
Liu, Shing-I, Taipei / Taiwan, 
Sterbehilfe aus ethischer und 
rechtlicher Sicht / Die Religion im 
öffentlichen Bereich, SW 42
Liu, Shing-I, Taipei University, 
Taipwi / Taiwan, Sterbehilfe aus 
strafrechtlicher und rechtsethischer 
Sicht, SW 42
Liu, Yi, Beijing / China, Science as 
„Ideology“ and Modern Chinese 
Law, WG 5
Liu, Yigong, Dalian / China, China’s 
E-Democracy in Information Age, 
WG 18
Llano, Fernando, Universidad de Sevilla 
/ Spain, Cicero and Natural Law, 
SW 12
Lloredo, Luis, Madrid / Spain, Die 
Frage des Rechtspositivismus 
unter dem Gesichtspunkt der 
Wissenschaftsphilosophie Thomas S. 
Kuhns, WG 32
Lohmann, Ulrich, Berlin / 
Gemany, Das neue Gesetz 
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Studies: Outline of a Research 
Program, SW 30
Mitrovic, Dragan + Vukadinovic, 
Gordana, Belgrade / Serbia + Novi 
Sad / Serbia, The new path of law - 
From Theory of Chaos to Theory of 
Law, WG 1
Moellendorf, Darrel, San Diego State 
University / USA, Rights and 
Climate Change”, SW 28
Montero-Sanchez, Sara, Madrid / 
Spain, Autonomy in Bioethics: the 
principle of responsibility and the 
precautionary principle, WG 22
Montgomery, John Warwick, Patrick 
Henry College, Virginia / U.S.A., 
The Justiﬁ  cation of Home Schooling 
vis-à-vis the European Human 
Rights System, SW 48
Montgomery, John Warwick, University 
of Bedfordshire / UK and Christian 
Thought Patrick Henry College, 
Virginia / U.S.A., Restrictions on 
Religious Freedom: When and How 
Justiﬁ  ed?, SW 47
Montgomery, John Warwick, Virginia 
/ USA, The Philosophy of Home 
Schooling and Its Legal Implications 
Today, SW 48
Mora, Gotzone, Universidad del País 
Vasco / Spain, Title t.b.a., SW 60
Moreno-Cruz, Diego, University of 
Genoa / Italy, Three Explanatory 
and Predictive Realistic Strategies 
Confronted, SW 14
Mori, Toru, Kyoto University / 
Japan, Democratization of the 
Administration – from the top down 
and/ or from the bottom up, SW 52
Morigiwa, Yasutomo, Nagoya / 
human right? Secular and religious 
responses to the legitimacy question, 
SW 47
Meregko, O., Lublin’s Catholics 
University / Ukraine, Five worlds of 
Law, SW 65
Mertens, Thomas, Universität Nijmegen, 
Betrayal and Continuity in 
Radbruch’s Formula, SW 7
Mestmäcker, Ernst-Joachim, 
Max-Planck-Instituts für 
ausländisches und internationales 
Privatrecht, Hamburg / Germany, 
Wettbewerbsfreiheit oder 
Wohlfahrt, SW 43
Michalczak, Rafał, Kraków / Poland, 
Transhuman and Posthuman – 
About Inﬂ  uence of “Cyborgisation” 
on Law and Ethical Issues, WG 20
Mieles González, Ernesto Fabián, 
Freie Universität Berlin / Germany, 
Strategic Litigation, Social 
Mobilization, and Memory Building 
in Colombia, SW 73
Mihai, Badescu, Bucharest / Romania, 
Spirit and Law in the view of 
the Romanian Thinker Eugene 
Sperantia, WG 30
Milkin-Skopets, Mikhail, Yaroslavl 
State University / Russia, Law and 
Mathematics. On the relation of 
their methods, SW 29
Miller, Dallas, Canada, The New 
Mandate for Human Rights, SW 47
Mindus, Patricia, Uppsala / Sweden, 
Legitimacy 2.0. E-democracy and 
Public Opinion in the Digital Age, 
SW 30
Mindus, Patricia, Uppsala Universitet 
/ Sweden, Updating Democracy 
Mathis, Klaus, Luzern / Switzerland, 
Law and Economics – Foundations 
and Applications, SW 46
Mathis, Klaus, Luzern / Switzerland, 
Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts, 
SW 5
Mathis, Klaus, Universität Luzern / 
Switzerland, Law and Economics 
Today – Some Introductory 
Remarks, SW 46
Mathis, Klaus, University of Lucerne 
/ Switzerland, Sustainability, 
efﬁ  ciency, and the law, SW 19
Matos, Andityas Soares de Moura 
Costa, Minas Gerais / Brazil, Deus 
ex machina? A critical discussion 
about the nature, function and 
importance of the basic norm., 
WG 27
Matwijkiw, Anja + Matwijkiw, 
Bronik, USA + USA, Stakeholder 
Jurisprudence: The New Way in 
Human Rights, WG 13
McCammon, Christopher, Nebraska / 
USA, Public Legal Reason, SW 45
McCammon, Christopher, University 
of Nebraska / USA, Republican 
Foundations for Public Legal 
Reasoning, SW 45
Meder, Stephan, Leibniz Universität 
Hannover / Germany, Francis Lieber 
(1800-1872) und die Begründung 
der modernen Hermeneutik, SW 10
Mena, Jorge, Mexico City / México, The 
use of politic science methods in 
jurisprudence, WG 4
Mendonça, Marco Amaral, Brazil, On 
the Direito Achado na Rua, SW 25
Menuge, Angus, Wisconsin / USA, 
When is the exercise of an interest a 
Europe, WG 22
Marques, Clarissa, Brazil, The 
Environment And Future 
Generations: The Past, The Future 
And A New Individual, WG 23
Martin, Margaret, Western Ontario 
University / Canada, Hart’s The 
Concept of Law: Between Fact and 
Value, SW 21
Martínez Cabezudo, Fernando, Pablo de 
Olavide University of Seville / Spain, 
Title t.b.a., SW 60
Martire, Jacopo, King’s College London 
/ United Kingdom, Is There a 
Biopolitical Approach to Law?, 
SW 58
Marulewska, Kinga, Academic 
Institution: Nicolaus Copernicus 
University / Poland, Delegate 
or Trustee? Carl Schmitt and 
Eric Voegelin’s Theories of 
Representation, SW 4
Maslovskaya, Elena, Nizhnii Novgorod 
/ Russia, Jeffrey Alexander’s 
Theory of the Civil Sphere Between 
Philosophy and Sociology of Law, 
WG 9
Mastrodi, Josué, Campinas / Brasil, 
Taking the concept of autopoiesis 
seriously: why Law cannot be 
understood under Niklas Luhmann’s 
paradigm, WG 29
Mastronardi, Philippe A. + Windisch, 
Florian, St. Gallen / Switzerland, 
Wie vernünftig entscheiden? Die 
Verfassung des interdisziplinären 
(interrationalen) Diskurses, WG 28
Matczak, Marcin, Warsaw / Poland, 
Legal interpretation, context and 
speech act theory, WG 28
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La Rioja / Spain, Argumentation in 
Lawmaking Debates, SW 75
Ollero, Andrés, Madrid / Spain, 
Sterbehilfe aus ethischer und 
rechtlicher Sicht / Die Religion im 
öffentlichen Bereich, SW 42
Onazi, Oche, Dundee / UK, The 
Relevance Of African Legal Theory 
To Contemporary Problems, SW 54
Onazi, Oche, University of Dundee 
/ UK, African Legal Theory and 
Contemporary Problems, SW 54
Origgi, Gloria, CNRS Paris / France, 
Title t.b.a., SW 30
Ospino, Javier Ferreira, Atlantico / 
Colombia, Analysis Of The First 
Sentence Of The Justice & Peace 
Law –Mampujan Case- And Its 
Contribution To The Design Of A 
Policy Of Memory As Justice For 
Victims In Colombia, WG 9
Osuagwu, Ugochukwu, Abuja / Nigeria, 
Corruption and Democracy in 
Nigeria, WG 16
Ozcan, Mehmet Tevﬁ  k, Istanbul / 
Turkey, The Rule of Law After 
Globalisation: Is Myth or Reality?, 
WG 12
Pacheco, Mariana, Recife-Antigo / 
Brazil, On the excessive role of 
technocracy (from a gadamerian 
perspective), WG 5
Padjen, Ivan, Zagreb / Croatia, Student 
rights and revival of immaturity: 
Can jurisprudence account for 
coercion?, WG 9
Pagallo, U., Bologna / Italy, AICOL – 
Artiﬁ  cial Intelligence Approaches 
to the Complexity of Legal Systems, 
SW 8
Ohno, Tatsuji, Tokyo / Japan, Roles 
of Citizen/ Civil Society and 
Responsibility of State, SW 52
Oji, Sulieman I., Usmanu Danfodio 
University / Sokoto-Nigeria, African 
concepts of Law, Commnuity and 
Justice as a Pancea to Contemporary 
Global Challenges, SW 54
Oklopcic, Zoran, Carleton University, 
Ottawa / Canada, Title t.b.a., SW 53
Oklopcic, Zoran, Ottawa / Canada, 
Rethinking the foundational 
concepts of constitutional and legal 
theory from ‚the semi-periphery’, 
SW 53
Oléa, Carlos Frederico, Parana / Brazil, 
Die Vergerichtlichung in Brasilien: 
Fragen und Perspektiven, WG 16
Oliveira, Julio + Lessa, Barbara, 
Pontiﬁ  cia Universidade Catolica de 
Minas Gerais / Brazil, Hans Kelsen 
and the Tradition of Natural Law: 
Why Kelsen’s Objections to the 
Natural Law Doctrine Do Not Apply 
Against Aquinas’ Theory of Natural 
Law, SW 12
Oliveira, Julio + Sampaio Jr., 
Rodolpho, Belo Horizonte / 
Brazil, Good fences make good 
neighbors: an investigation on the 
place of law and its limits in the 
context of the Brazilian private 
law movement Escola do Direito 
Civil-Constitucional (Private-
Constitutional Law School), WG 4
Oliver-Lalana, A. Daniel, La Rioja / 
Spain, Legisprudence – Rethinking 
Legislation and Regulation in the 
Light of Legal Theory, SW 75
Oliver-Lalana, A. Daniel, University of 
Technical Development and Natural 
Rights, WG 24
Niemi, Matti Ilmari, Lappeenranta / 
Finland, Objective Legal Reasoning 
– Is It Possible?, WG 4
Nierhauve, Christian, Hagen / Germany, 
Zur Rechtsklugheit, SW 5
Niesen, Peter, Germany, Freedom of 
Speech and Intellectual Property: 
Conceptualizing the conﬂ  ict(s), 
SW 51
Novak, Marko, Nova Gorica / Slowenia, 
The (Ir)rationality of Judicial 
Decision-Making, SW 15
Nozaki, Akiko, Hiroshima City Univ. / 
Japan, The Inﬂ  uence of Relationship 
on Relational Rights, SW 63
Obligation and Political Obligation, 
SW 68
Odunsi, Babafemi, Obafemi Awolowo 
University / Ife-Nigeria, Pychic 
Witness as an American Approach 
to solving Crimes: A case for 
revisitng Indigenous African 
Criminology System in Nigeria, 
SW 54
Ofer, Raban, Univ. of Oregon / USA, 
Capitalism, Liberalism, and the 
Constitutional Right to Privacy, 
SW 39
Oh, Byung-Sun, Seoul / South Korea, 
Relevance of Moral Sense to Legal 
Reasoning: A Critical Appraisal of 
Korean Debate, WG 4
Ohno, Tatsuji, Hosei University / 
Japan, Introduction – The general 
theoretical and practical Situation 
about Civil Society and State, 
especially in Japanese Legal 
Institutions and Movements, SW 52
Japan, Producing Justice: social 
responsibility of the legal profession 
in the age of globalization, SW 49
Morita, Akihiko, Japan, Neo-
Communitarian approach on 
human rights as cosmopolitan 
imperative in the East Asia, SW 79
Mototsugu, Nishino, Aichi-ken / 
Japan, Menschenwürde und 
Menschenleben, WG 14
Much, Susanna, Universität Bremen 
/ Germany, Der Umgang mit den 
Risiken der CCS-Technologie in der 
Gesetzgebung, SW 35
Müller-Mall, Sabine, Berlin / Germany, 
Performative Rechtserzeugung, 
SW 5
Munenori, Kitahara, Hiroshima / 
Japan, Law and Technology Security 
Standard, WG 24
Munenori, Kitahara, Hiroshima / 
Japan, The Fusion of law and 
Information Technology, SW 50
Muñoz L., Fernando, Universidad 
Austral de Chile / Chile, Autonomy 
and responsiveness as competing 
forms of constitutional reasoning 
and rhetoric, SW 39
Muntjewerff, Antoinette, Amsterdam / 
The Netherlands, An explicit model 
for learning to structure and analyze 
decisions by judges, WG 3
Nakayama, Ryuichi, Osaka / Japan, 
Developing a Philosophy of 
Precaution in the Age of Risk, 
WG 24
Nasu, Kosuke, Setsunan University 
/ Japan, Civil Society and its 
Nonpolitical Foundation, SW 52
Nevvazhay, Igor, Saratov / Russia, 
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and Kelsen, SW 55
Patterson, Dennis, European University 
Institute [EUI] / Italy, Meaning and 
Truth in Law, SW 56
Patterson, Dennis, Firenze / Italy, 
Meaning, Truth and the Concept of 
Law, SW 56
Paul, Tiedemann, Verwaltungsgericht 
Frankfurt/Main / Germany, Gibt es 
ein Menschenrecht auf Leben?, 
SW 34
Paulson, Stanley L., St. Louis / USA, Is 
Kelsen Caught between Discovery 
and Justiﬁ  cation?, SW 15
Paulson, Stanley L., University of 
Washington at Saint Louis / USA 
and Kiel University / Germany, A 
‘Justiﬁ  ed Normativity’ Thesis versus 
‘Modal Normativity’”. An Enquiry 
into Normativity in Kelsen’s Pure 
Theory of Law, SW 61
Paulson, Stanley L., Washington 
University in St. Louis / USA, The 
Very Idea of Legal Positivism, PL
Paulson, Stanley L., Washington 
University in St. Louis, MO, 
Zur nichtpositivistischen 
Kontinuitätsthese bei Gustav 
Radbruch, SW 7
Paulson, Stanley, Washington 
University in St. Louis / USA, Nino 
on ‘Justiﬁ  ed Normativity’ and a 
Reply , SW 3
Pavčnik, Marijan, University 
of Ljubljana / Slowenia, 
Methodologische Klarheit und/
oder gegenständliche Reinheit 
des Rechts? Bemerkungen zur 
Diskussion Kelsen – Pitamic 
/ (Methodological Clarity or 
Pagano, Sebastian, Universidad 
Nacional de La Plata, Argentina, 
Interpretation, truth and the 
imperative need to live with each 
other, SW 3
Palmer Olsen, Henrik, University of 
Copenhagen / Denmark, Title t.b.a., 
SW 66
Palmirani, Monica, Bologna / Italy, 
AICOL – Artiﬁ  cial Intelligence 
Approaches to the Complexity of 
Legal Systems, SW 8
Pamplona, Danielle Anne + Rossi, 
Amelia Sampaio, Parana / Brazil, 
The knowledge of judges of 
disciplines outside the law and their 
responsibility for the image of the 
Judiciary Branch, WG 3
Papaefthymiou, Sophie, France, On 
Dworkin’s Theory of Moral Truth, 
WG 29
Papaefthymiou,Sophie, (Institute for 
Political Science in Lyon / France, 
On Dworkin’s Theory of Moral 
Truth, WG 29
Parmigiani, Matías, UNC/Conicet / 
Argentina, The Consensual Theory 
of Punishment: A Justiﬁ  catory 
Theory or an Interpretative 
Scheme?, SW 3
Paskalev, Vesselin, Florence / Italy, The 
Importance of Acting on the Right 
Reasons: Deliberative Democracy 
and Science-Dependent Regulation, 
WG 15
Pass, Jonathan + de Olavide, Pablo, 
University of Manchester / UK + 
University of Seville / Spain, Title 
t.b.a., SW 60
Pattaro, Enrico, Bologna / Italy, Hart 
Substantial Purity? Notes on the 
Discussion between Kelsen and 
Pitamic), PL
Pavlakos, George, University of 
Antwerp / Belgium and Glasgow / 
UK, Title t.b.a., SW 61
Pavlakos, Georges, Antwerp / 
Belgium and Glasgow / UK, Legal 
Normativity and the philosophy of 
practical reason , SW 61
Payrow Shabani, Omid, Guelph / 
Canada, The Burgeoning Non-
violence in the Iranian Protest 
Movement, WG 17
Penski, Ulrich, Siegen / Germany, 
Menschenrechte im Zeitablauf, 
WG 13
Pereira Coutinho, Luís Pedro, Lisbon 
University / Portugal, Theology and 
the foundational: the American 
foundation in Hannah Arendt, SW 4
Pereira e Silva, Maria Teresinha, 
PUC, Rio de Janeiro / Brazil, The 
evolution of Supreme Federal Court 
(STF) of Brazilian system of justice 
concerning social rights and the 
philosophical and social approach, 
SW 32
Pereira Sáez, Carolina, Galicia / 
Spain, “Principlism: Bioethics as a 
Procedure?“, WG 21
Pereira, Aline, UFMG / Brazil, Law, 
language and science, SW 32
Pereira, Ana Lucia Pretto, Paraná 
/ Brazil, Political activity of 
constitutional jurisdiction: some 
dimensions, WG 15
Peréz Daza, Abraham, Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México, 
México, Justiﬁ  cation of the 
moral discourse in Carlos Nino. 
On purpose of the liberalism’s 
fundamentation, SW 3
Perez de la Fuente, Oscar, Madrid / 
Spain, What kind of theoretical 
agreements are needed in resolving 
judicial cases?, WG 3
Pessôa, Leonel, Brazil, Inequality, 
Ability to Pay and the theories of 
equal and proportional sacriﬁ  ces, 
WG 10
Petersen, Niels, MPI Bonn / Germany, 
The Role of Law and Economics in 
Constitutional Adjudication, SW 46
Petroski, Karen, Saint Louis University 
/ USA, Legal Fictions, Legal 
Facts, and the Limits of Legal 
Communication, SW 16
Petroski, Karen, St. Louis / USA, 
Making Public Meaning: The 
Legal Use of Technical and Textual 
Expertise, WG 5
Peukert, Alexander, Germany, Freedom 
of Speech and Intellectual Property: 
Conceptualizing the conﬂ  ict(s), 
SW 51
Pfersmann, Otto, Université Paris 1/
France, Title t.b.a., SW 72
Phiri, Madalitso, Human Sciences 
Research Council HSRC, Cape 
Town, Mozambique’s Post-Conﬂ  ict 
Political Economy: Africa’s Success 
Story? – 1992-2009, SW 54
Pichlak, Maciej, University of Wroclaw 
/ Poland, SW 41
Pieniążek, Marcin, Andrzej Frycz 
Modrzewski University, Cracow / 
Poland, Ricoeur on Sophocles and 
Aristotle, SW 40
Pieniążek, Marcin, Faculty of Law 
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reason: for a progressist dialogue 
with contemporary hermeneutics, 
WG 2
Poole, Diego, Universidad Rey Juan 
Carlos / Spain, Democracy and 
Moral Relativism: A Reply to Hans 
Kelsen, SW 12
Poole, Diego, Universidad Rey Juan 
Carlos / Spain, Recta ratio in 
Thomist Philosophy of Law, SW 36
Poort, L.M., VU Amsterdam / The 
Netherlands, The Role of Expert-
committees in Controversial 
Decision making, SW 71
Poort, Lonneke, Amsterdam / The 
Netherlands, Involving the Experts 
- A Critical Analysis of the Role 
of Expert Committees in Legal 
Decision Making concerning 
Complex Technological Issues with a 
Strong Moral Impact -, SW 71
Poort, Lonneke, VU University 
Amsterdam / The Netherlands, An 
Ethos of Controversies operating in 
a Two-Track Approach. Analysis of 
an Interactive Model of Legislation., 
SW 66
Porto Macedo, Ronaldo, Universidade 
de São Paulo and Fundação Getúlio 
Vargas / Brazil, Overcoming 
orientalizing views of Latin 
American Law. New Approaches 
to the new Legal Experiences in 
Brazilian Law, SW 25
Portuese, Aurélien, Université Paris II 
/ France, The case for a principled 
approach to law and economics: 
efﬁ  ciency analysis and general 
principles of EU law, SW 14
Portuese, Aurélien, Université Paris II 
and Administration, Andrzej Frycz 
Modrzewski Krakow University / 
Poland, Paul Ricoeur’s dialogue of 
“Sein und Sollen” and its possible 
contribution to the philosophy of 
law, SW 67
Pinelli, Cesare, Sapienza Roma / Italy, 
Constitutional reasoning and 
political deliberation, SW 39
Pinheiro Faro, João + Fabris, Daury 
César, Faculdade de Direito de 
Vitória/Brasil, How to do Thing with 
the Constitution, SW 24
Pinto Alberto, Tiago + Pinto Alberto, 
Sabrina, Curitiba / Brazil, The 
contribution of Jürgen Habermas ‘s 
ideas to Brazilian Democracy, 
WG 28
Piotukh, Volha, University of Leeds 
/ United Kingdom, Power over 
Life: the Concept of Biopolitics in 
Foucault, Agamben, and Esposito, 
SW 58
Pogorzelski, Oskar, Kraków / Poland, 
Modeling of concepts in criminal 
law using cognitive linguistic., WG 2
Polanowska-Sygulska, Beata Maria, 
Kraków / Poland, John Gray and the 
Implications of Value-Pluralism for 
Legal Philosophy, WG 11
Polyakov, A., St. Petersburg State 
University / Russia, Normative fact 
as the object of phenomenological 
analysis, SW 65
Pommer, Sieglinde, Oxford / UK, 
Regulating Responsibility: Health 
Law in the Wake of Science and 
Technology, WG 22
Pontes, José Antonio S., São Paulo / 
Brazil, Some advances in practical 
/ France, The Case for a Principled 
Approach to Law and Economics: 
Efﬁ  ciency Analysis and General 
Principles of EU Law, SW 46
Poscher, Ralf, Albert-Ludwigs-
Universität Freiburg / Germany, 
An Agonal Account of Legal 
Disagreement, SW 56
Postema, Gerald, University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill / USA, Hart 
and His Legacy, SW 55
Pribytkova, Elena, Ruhr-Universität 
Bochum / Germany, Justice in a 
Pluralistic World: John Rawls’ Ideas 
of Public Reason and an Overlapping 
Consensus, SW 45
Prochownik, Karolina, Krakow / 
Poland, Law and disgust. Is it 
reasonable for a lawyer to be 
disgusted?, WG 11
Przybylski-Lewandowski, Filip, Gdansk 
/ Poland, Application of game theory 
in predicting court decisions, WG 5
Puiu-Nan, Rares-Sebastian, Brasov / 
Romania, On Suprainterpretation 
Concept And Lawyer’s Work, WG 2
Purnhagen, Kai P., Ludwig-
Maximilians-Universität München 
/ Germany, Never the Twain Shall 
Meet – Cultural Limits Between 
Continental Dogmatism and Law 
and Economics Theory?, SW 46
Qi, Chunyi, Frankfurt am Main / 
Deutschland, Methodischer Ansatz 
der Gesetzgebung mit chinesischer 
Prägung – Erfahrungen und 
Probleme, WG 9
Quinn, Michael, University College 
London / UK, Fuller on Legal 
Fictions: A Benthamic Perspective, 
SW 16
Raban, Ofer, Eugene, Oregon / USA, 
Capitalism, Liberalism, and the 
Constitutional Right to Privacy, 
WG 14
Raban, Ofer, University of Oregon 
School of Law / USA, The Legal 
Principle of Public Reasoning, 
SW 45
Ramis, Rafael, Universidad de las 
Islas Baleares / Spain, Alasdair 
Macintyre: “Legal Philosophy and 
Natural Law Tradition”, SW 12
Rashidi, Hadayat, Tehran / Iran, Blood 
money in the yesterday and today 
Islam, WG 8
Ratai, Balazs, University of Pécs / 
Hungary, Title t.b.a., SW 72
Raza, Ali Hassan, Lahore / Pakistan, 
Global peace in the view of religion, 
WG 13
Reinhardt, Jörn, Hamburg / Germany, 
Human Rights and Human Nature, 
SW 2
Reinhardt, Jörn, Hamburg / Germany, 
Transformationen der Demokratie, 
SW 5
Reinhardt, Jörn, University of 
Hamburg/ Germany, From 
Naturalism to Political 
Anthropology.The Role of Nature in 
Kant’s Theory of Rights, SW 2
Rendtorff, Jacob Dahl, Roskilde / 
Denmark, Ethical principles for 
biomedical and biotechnological 
challenges to law, WG 13
Rendtorff, Jacob Dahl, Roskilde / 
Denmark, Hannah Arendt and the 
ethics of legal administration and 
judgment, WG 15
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of Pablo de Olavide de Sevilla / 
Spain, Toward a Complex Approach 
to Subjectivity. The Common, 
Constituent Power and Human 
Needs, SW 4
Rodriguez Prieto, Rafael, Sevilla 
/ Spain, Net Neutrality or Not 
Neutrality? Law, Politics & Internet, 
SW 60
Rodríguez Prieto, Rafael, Universidad 
Pablo de Olavide de Sevilla / Spain, 
Title: Individualization without 
individualism. A critical analysis 
of identity in the framework of the 
Alliance of Civilizations, SW 79
Rodriguez, José Rodrigo + Barbosa, 
Samuel Rodrigues, São Paulo / 
Brazil, The ambivalent relation 
between science and law in 
narratives of justiﬁ  cation of the 
Brazilian Law, WG 5
Rodriguez-Blanco, Veronica, 
Birmingham / UK, Legal 
Normativity and the philosophy of 
practical reason , SW 61
Rodriguez-Blanco, Veronica, University 
of Birmingham / UK, Legal 
Authority and the Paradox of 
Intention in Action, SW 61
Rohrmann, Carlos Alberto, Faculdade 
de Direito Milton Campos / Brazil, 
On line Privacy Protection under a 
Brazilian Court Perspective: A Case 
Study, SW 25
Romanowicz, Marcin, University of 
Warsaw / Poland, Psycholinguistic 
perspective and the positivist idea of 
legal interpretation“, SW 26
Ronkainen, Anna, University of 
Helsinki, Department of Modern 
Renzikowski, Joachim, Universität 
Halle, Die Hart-Radbruch-
Kontroverse – nur eine Frage der 
Kompetenz?, SW 7
Renzo, Massimo, York Law School, 
The University of York / UK, 
Fairness, Self-deception and Political 
Obligation, SW 68
Ribeiro, Luis Antonio Cunha, Minas 
Gerais / Brazil, Workshop on 
Biopolitics, SW 58
Rivera López, Eduardo, Universidad 
Torcuato Di Tella - CONICET, 
Argentina, Subjective and objective 
moral duties. Further thoughts 
Carlos Nino’s Quatrilemma of 
Consequentialism, SW 3
Rizvi, Ali M., Universiti Brunei 
Darussalam / Brunei Darussalam, 
Biopower, governmentality, and 
capitalism through the lenses of 
freedom: A conceptual enquiry, 
SW 58
Robl Filho, Ilton Norberto+ Frota, 
Pablo Malheiros da Cunha, Paraná 
/ Brazil, Post Legal Positivism: 
New Paradigm of Legal Science 
(Jurisprudence) and Practice in 
Brazil, WG 8
Roca, Victoria, Alicante University / 
Spain, The Role of Legality in the 
Struggle for Democracy, SW 73
Rodak, Lidia, Katowice / Poland, 
Objectivity in Legal Discourse. The 
Comparative Perspective, SW 59
Rodrigues-Junior, Otavio Luiz, Rio de 
Janeiro / Brazil, Life, Science and 
Law: Dialogues and Shortcomings, 
WG 21
Rodriguez Pietro, Rafael, University 
Languages / Finland, Dual-process 
cognition and legal reasoning, 
SW 26
Roth, Laura C., Universidad Pompeu 
Fabra, Spain, Towards a deliberative 
criminal process, SW 3
Rotolo, Antonino + Roversi, Corrado, 
Bologna / Italy, Constitutive 
Rules and Coherence in Legal 
Argumentation, SW 15
Rottleuthner, Hubert (Institut 
für Rechtssoziologie und 
Rechtstatsachenforschung, Freie 
Universität Berlin/Germany, Gustav 
Radbruch und der ‚Unrechtsstaat’, 
SW 7
Rottleuthner, Hubert, Institut 
für Rechtssoziologie und 
Rechtstatsachenforschung, Freie 
Universität Berlin / Germany, 
Gustav Radbruch und der 
„Unrechtsstaat“, SW 7
Rubel, Alan, University of Wisconsin / 
USA, Information Access, Privacy, 
and Positive Intellectual Freedom, 
SW 22
Ruiz Ruiz, Ramón, Jaén / Spain, 
Globalization, law, and citizen 
political participation, WG 12
Ruiz-Resa, Josefa Dolores, University 
of Granada / Spain, Jurisprudence 
and the society of knowledge (how 
to adapt a dogmatic knowledge 
to the demands of the collective 
intelligence), SW 32
Ruiz-Resa, Josefa-Dolores, Granada 
/ Spain, Connections between 
Education for Citizenship and 
equality between women and men 
(Analysis of the claims against this 
subject before the Spanish courts 
and their rulings), WG 9
Ruiz-Resa, Josefa-Dolores, Granada / 
Spain, Jurisprunce and the society 
of knowledge (how to adapt a 
dogmatic knowledge to the demands 
of the collective intelligence), WG 10
Rundle, Kristen, London School of 
Economics / UK, Before the debate: 
reading Fuller through eunomics, 
SW 66
Rundle, Kristen, London School of 
Economics / UK, Pathology as 
Teacher: Fuller’s Distinctive Starting 
Point, SW 16
Sabino, Hugo + Oliveira, Júlio, Minas 
Gerais / Brazil, Phronesis and the 
control of Public Administration 
Acts in Brazilian Legal System, 
WG 16
Saito, Yukiko, Kitasato Univ / Japan, 
Who can give consent to use/make 
one’s gametes?, SW 63
Sakurai, Tetsu, Kobe University/ 
Japan, Should Society Guarantee 
Individuals a Right to Keep ‘Normal 
Functioning’? Liberal Eugenics Is 
Confronted With the Challenge of 
Global Justice, SW 2
Salaymeh, Lena, University of Berkeley 
/ USA, Narrating Legal Change: 
An Exemplary Story from Rabbinic 
Historiography, SW 27
Salazar, Pedro, UNAM / Mexico, 
Democracy, Transparency, and 
Public Opinion in the “Latin 
American Triangle”, SW 30
Salcedo Repolês, Maria Fernanda, 
UFMG / Brazil, Law in theory and 
law in practice with the recognition 
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statutes of limitations? , SW 3
Santacolma, Andrés, Bogotá / 
Colombia, “I Don’t Suppose You 
Can Bluff a Bacterium”; How the 
Law has to Deal with Science, Junk 
Science, and Scientism to Pursue the 
Truth, WG 5
Santiago, Willis, Pontiﬁ  cal Catholic 
University of São Paulo / Brazil, 
Antigone or the Poetical Dissolution 
of Politics, SW 4
Santos, José-Antonio, Madrid / 
Spain, Philosophie des Strafrechts, 
Rechtspositivismus und Eugenik in 
der Weimarer Republik, WG 22
Sanz Burgos, Raúl, Spain, Democracy 
and technological politic in the risk 
society, WG 26
Sartor, G., Bologna / Italy, AICOL – 
Artiﬁ  cial Intelligence Approaches 
to the Complexity of Legal Systems, 
SW 8
Savaneli, Bizina, Georgia, General 
Plan of Mutual Transition, Spiral 
and Evolutionary Development of 
Positive Law and Normative Order, 
WG 12
Scattola, Merio, Padua / Italy, Title 
t.b.a., SW 18
Schaber, Peter, Universität Zürich 
/ Switzerland, Würde und 
Lebensschutz, SW 34
Schafer, Burkhard, University of 
Edinburgh / UK, Bentham and Zalta 
on Reasoning with Fiction, SW 16
Schaumburg-Müller, Sten, Aarhus 
/ Denmark, The challenges of 
technology and a three leveled 
protection of freedom of speech, 
WG 14
of new social actors, SW 32
Saliger, Frank, Bucerius Law 
School, Hamburg / Germany, 
„Institutionelle Tatsachen“, SW 43
Samokhina, Ekaterina, National 
Research University, Higher School 
of Economics, Faculty of Law, Saint-
Petersburg / Russia, The problem of 
a romanticized vision of law in legal 
education, SW 72
Samonek, Aleksandra, Jagiellonian 
University / Poland, Criminal law 
agency and STIT Theory, SW 62
Samonek, Aleksandra, Kraków / 
Poland, Elaboration of a work. 
A gametheoretical analysis of 
intellectual property law, WG 20
Samonek, Aleksandra, Krakow / 
Poland, Philosophy of science and 
legal philosophy- a blending or a 
clash?, SW 62
Sampaio Ferraz Junior, Tercio, 
University of São Paulo / Brasil, 
Erosion of subjective rights by 
reason of technical development 
(Patent, Copyright), PL
Sánchez Cámara, Ignacio, Universidad 
de La Coruña / Spain, Perspectivism 
and Natural Law, SW 12
Sanella, Elena, Decolonising Legal 
Theory: The way ahead for the 
breakthrough of African Legal 
Theory, SW 54
Sangero, Boaz, Jerusalem / Israel, 
Towards Safety in the Criminal 
Justice System, WG 7
Sangero, Rinat Kitai, The Academic 
Center of Law and Business / Israel, 
Does and should the State forgive 
perpetrators of heinous crimes via 
Schiess, Loisima + Miranda, Lossian, 
Brazil, Physikalische und 
mathematische Verbindungen von 
Justiz Division, WG 10
Schiess, Loisima Miranda + 
Miranda, Lossian, Brasilianischer 
Richterverband / Brazil, 
Bundesinstitut für Eziehung, 
Wissenschaft und Technologie 
Piauí / Brazil, Physikalische und 
Matematische Verbindungen von 
Justiz Division, SW 26
Schincariol, Rafael, Sao Paulo / Brazil, 
Recognition, reiﬁ  cation and social 
pathologies in Suffering from 
indeterminacy, WG 28
Schirrmacher, Thomas, State 
University of the West / Romania, 
Compulsory Education—in Schools 
Only? Divergent Developments in 
Germany, SW 48
Schmidt, Aernout, Leyden University / 
Netherlands, Aiming for evidence-
based legal theory (with an 
application to legal domestication of 
a multi-phenomenon, co-emerging 
with data storing, -mining and – 
processing capabilities), SW 23
Schnüriger, Hubert, Basel / Switzerland, 
Eine Statustheorie subjektiver 
Rechte, WG 11
Schuhr, Jan C., Erlangen-Nürnberg / 
Germany, Rechtswissenschaft mit 
axiomatischer Methode?, WG 1
Schuhr, Jan, Universität Erlangen / 
Germany, Willensfreiheit, Roboter 
und Auswahlaxiom, SW 33
Schwartz, Alexander, Queens 
University, Kingston / Canada, 
Nested Nomos: Tensions between 
Sub-state Constitutionalism and the 
Integrity of Law, SW 53
Scott, Brewer, Harvard Law School / 
USA, Title t.b.a., SW 41
Seco Martíne, José María, Pablo de 
Olavide University of Seville / Spain, 
Title t.b.a., SW 60
Seco Martinez, Jose Maria, Spain, Is 
media consolidation a real threat to 
democracy?, WG 18
Seinecke, Ralf, Frankfurt am 
Main / Germany, Recht und 
Rechtspluralismus – Perspektiven 
von Rechtsphilosophie und 
Rechtswissenschaft?, SW 5
Sellers, Mortimer N.S., Maryland + 
Washington, D.C. / USA, Title: The 
Science of International Law, WG 32
Sena de Assunção, Guilherme / Araújo 
Costa, Alexandre, Brasilia / Brazil, 
How Internet changed the process 
of legitimation of state violence in 
the invasion of Morro do Alemão, 
WG 18
Sena, Jaqueline, Sao Paulo / Brazil, The 
relations between legal doctrine 
and technology: an analysis of the 
ineffectiveness of environmental 
law, WG 23
Sena, Jaqueline, University of Sao 
Paulo, Brazil, Brasilian legal system, 
SW 59
Seoane, José Antonio, A Coruña / 
Spain, Human rights and disability: 
a question of justice, WG 10
Seoane, José Antonio, Universidad de A 
Coruña / Spain, Hermeneutik und 
Typus, SW 10
Serbena, Cesar Antonio, Parana 
/ Brazil, Is Ethics with moral 
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Einsatzregeln als Hybride zwischen 
Recht, Politik und Technik, WG 12
Sieckmann, Jan, Bamberg / Germany, 
Is Balancing a Method of Rational 
Justiﬁ  cation?, SW 15
Sieckmann, Jan-R., University of 
Erlangen-Nürnberg / Germany 
and University of Buenos Aires 
/ Argentina, Legislation as 
Implementation of Constitutional 
Law, SW 75
Silungwe, M. Chikosa, Malawi 
Law Commission Silungwe is 
participating in his personal 
capacity, On ‘African’ Legal Theory: 
A possibility, An impossibility or 
Mere Conundrum?, SW 54
Silva, Dennis Franco, Minas Gerais 
/ Brazil, From human rights to 
person rights: legal reﬂ  ections 
on posthumanism and human 
enhancement, WG 13
Silveira Siqueira, Gustavo + Andrade 
Neto, João, UFMG / Brazil, The 
revolution will be tweeted: how the 
Internet can stimulate the public 
exercise of freedoms, SW 32
Sim, Woomin, Institute of Legal 
Studies, Yonsei Law School / 
South Korea, Disagreement and 
Proceduralism in the Perspective of 
Legisprudence, SW 75
Simim, Thiago Aguiar, Minas Gerais / 
Brazil, Miscegenation, identity and 
race relations in Brazil, WG 16
Simon, Judith, Institut Jean Nicod, 
ENS Paris / France, E-democracy 
and Values in Information Systems 
Design, SW 30
Siqueira, Gustavo, Minas Gerais / 
dilemmas possible? A paraconsistent 
proposal, WG 11
Serra, Juan Pablo, University 
Francisco de Vitoria, Madrid / 
Spain, Epistemic Justiﬁ  cation 
of Democracy: A Hidden 
Epistemocracy or Just Another 
Legitimization of Democracy?, 
SW 30
Sette Lopes, Mônica, UFMG / Brazil, 
Jurisprudence under the perspective 
of the new media and its effect on 
the communication of Law, SW 32
Shiffrin, Seana Valentine, University 
of California, Los Angeles / USA, 
A Thinker-Based Approach To 
Freedom Of Speech, PL
Shimazu, Itaru, Chiba / Japan, The 
Scope of Liberalism in Bioethics; the 
limit of concenting will, SW 63
Shimazu, Itaru, Chiba Univ. / Japan, 
Limitting the Scope of Consent by 
Unarticulated Reasons, SW 63
Shimazu, Minobu, Chiba / Japan, How 
law should treat Information and 
Communication Technologies and 
Society, against real world?, WG 20
Shiner, Roger A., Kelowna / Canada, 
Law’s Naive Realism, WG 1
Shiner, Roger A., University of British 
Columbia Okanagan and Okanagan 
College / Canada, Hart and the 
Senses of Discretion, SW 21
Shoshan, Moshe, The Rothberg School, 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
/ Israel, Between Structure and 
Subversion: The Two Faces of Legal 
Exemplary Anecdotes, SW 27
Siciliano, Domenico, Florence / Italy, 
Global Governance des Militärs: 
Brazil, Experience, Culture and 
Legal History, WG 8
Skąpska, Grażyna, Jagiellonian 
University, Krakow / Poland, 
Postcommunist Constitutionalism 
Twenty Years After. A Critical 
Reﬂ  ection on My Book, SW 78
Skąpska, Grażyna, Poland, 
Constitutionalism After 
Communism: Author meets her 
critics, SW 78
Škop, Martin, Czech Republic, Milan 
Kundera and Franz Kafka – How not 
to Forget the Everydayness, SW 24
Smith, Carel, Leiden / Netherlands, 
Analogical and Exemplary 
Reasoning in Legal Discourse, 
SW 64
Smith, Carel, Leiden Law School, 
Leiden University / The Netherlands, 
The Rhetoric of Literallity: Rules and 
Metaphor in Law, SW 64
Smith, Carel, Leiden Law School, 
Leiden University / The Netherlands, 
Understanding Value-conﬂ  icts in 
Law: Towards a Cultural Vocabulary 
of Law, SW 67
Soares de Moura Costa Matos, 
Andityas, Universidade Federal de 
Minas Gerais – FEAD / Brazil, From 
Literature to Cinema, from Cinema 
to Reality. Law and Dystopia in 
Contemporary World, SW 24
Soares de Moura Costa, Andityas, 
UFMG / Brazil, For a legal 
ideology criticism: State and Law 
as a theological and conservative 
concept, SW 32
Soares, Rafael, UFMG / Brazil, The 
law and ethical act of judging 
as a guideline for harmonious 
relations between the values: a 
phenomenological view, SW 32
Soluch, Paweł, University of Warsaw 
/ Poland, The perspectives of 
eyetracking research in legal 
sciences, SW 26
Sorares Pereira, Rui, Lisbon / Portugal, 
Challenging The “Cause-In-Fact”/ 
“Cause-In-Law” Dichotomy, WG 5
Sousa Brito, José, Lisbon / Portugal, 
Legal positivism: a self-effacing 
theory, WG 32
Souza, Herivelto P., Universidade de 
Brasília – UnB / Brazil, Primacy 
of anomalousness: life, norms 
and politics in Canguilhem and 
Foucault, SW 58
Spaak, Torben, Uppsala University, 
Robert Alexy, the Radbruch 
Formula, and the Separation Thesis, 
SW 7
Spengler, Adriana, Itajai / Brazil, The 
transnational criminal investigations 
with new technology and the 
relativization of fundamental rights, 
WG 26
Spranger, Tade, IWE Bonn / Germany, 
Roboter und Cyborg in der 
Grundrechtsordnung, SW 33
Städtler, Michael, Münster / Germany, 
Technische und gesellschaftliche 
Entwicklung als Herausforderung 
fürs Recht bei Hegel, WG 30
Stavang, Endre, University of Oslo / 
Norway, Some experience-based 
thoughts on the relevance of 
economic analysis of law, SW 14
Stave, Yukiko, Japan, Confucianism 
and Rule of Law: Their 
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its philosophical Ground, SW 52
Sun, Guoqiong + Saliceti, Alessandro 
Ianniello, EC, European Union, 
Brüssel / Belgium, Precautionary 
principle, uncertainty and the 
principle of legal certainty in EU 
Law and in China, SW 35
Sunde, Inger Marie, Oslo / Norway, 
Criminal Law as Technical Fact: 
An Analytical Approach to Internet 
Crime, WG 20
Swan, Peter, Ontario / Canada, “There’ll 
be the breaking of the ancient 
western code”?: Explorations of Law 
at the End of History, WG 11
Szerlics, Antal, University of Essex / 
UK, Hungarian legal system, SW 59
Taekema, Sanne, Erasmus School of 
Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam 
/ The Netherlands, The Neglect of 
Facts, SW 67
Taekema, Sanne, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam / The Netherlands, 
A Pragmatist Account of Legal 
Dynamics, SW 66
Taekema, Sanne, Rotterdam / The 
Netherlands, Dynamics of Law 
and Society: The Promise of 
Interactionism and Pragmatism, 
SW 66
Taekema, Sanne, Rotterdam / The 
Netherlands, The Fact/Value 
Separation and its Relevance for 
Interdisciplinary Research in Law, 
SW 67
Taitslin, Anna, University of Canberra / 
Australia, Right Reason in the Stoic 
thought from Zeno to Seneca, SW 36
Taitslin, Anna, University of Canberra 
/ Australia, The competing sources 
Compatibility and Inherent 
Injustice, WG 14
Stawecki, Tomasz + Staskiewicz, 
Wieslaw, Warsaw / Poland, Impact 
of new forms of collecting legal 
information to the process of legal 
interpretation, WG 2
Stepien, Mateusz, Jagiellonian 
University Krakow / Poland, The 
Relation between Human Nature 
and Human Rights. The Confucian 
example, SW 2
Stone, Sophia, U.S.A., Death as Legal 
Problem in the Age of Medical 
Science, WG 22
Stoppenbrink, Katja, Walferdingen 
/ Luxembourg, Reproductive 
technologies, parental choice 
and legal limbo. On the ethics of 
biopolitical law-making, WG 21
Stovba, Aleksei, Kharkov’s National 
University / Ukraine, N.N. Alekseev: 
special way in the phenomenology 
of law, SW 29
Stovba, O., Kharkov’s National 
University / Ukraine, Law and “Ge-
stell”, SW 65
Stovba, Oleksiy, Kharkov / Ukraine, 
Recht, Wissenschaft und Technik: 
phänomenologisch-hermeneutischer 
Ansatz, SW 65
Stranz, Katelijne, University of 
Hamburg / Germany, German legal 
system, SW 59
Suehisa, Toshihiko, Aoba-ku / Japan, 
The Right of Self-determination and 
Its Functions, WG 14
Sugawara, Yasuhiro, Hokkaigakuen 
University / Japan, Meaning of the 
Communication in Civil Society and 
of Aquinas’ Natural Law: Aristotle, 
Roman Law and early Christian 
Fathers, and the vitality of Suarez’ 
critique, SW 12
Takeshita, Ken, Kansai Universität, 
Osaka / Japan, Der kulturelle 
ethishe Hintergrund der 
Abschätzung des Selbstmords in 
Japan, SW 42
Takikawa, Hirohide, Graduate School of 
Law, Osaka City University / Japan, 
Free Riders Play Fair, SW 68
Takikawa, Hirohide, Osaka / Japan, 
Political Obligation, SW 68
Takikawa, Hirohide, Osaka, City 
University / Japan, Title t.b.a., 
SW 68
Talcott, Samuel R., University of the 
Sciences in Philadelphia / United 
States of America, Canguilhem, 
Jacob, and Foucault: the Emergence 
of Biopower as Concept, SW 58
Taniguchi, Koichi, Tokyo Metropolitan 
University / Japan, Paradox of 
Solidarity and Coersion – global 
Impact on Communities, SW 52
Tashev, Rossen, Bulgaria, Forms of 
Validity of the Legal Norms, WG 32
Tavares Costa Filho, Venceslau, 
Pernambuco / Brazil, The Juridical 
Rhetoric in the Slavery of the 
imperial brazil (1822-1889), WG 16
Teifke, Nils, Kiel / Germany, 
Menschenwürde als Prinzip, SW 5
Ten, Yulia, Taganrog / Russia, 
Symbolic representation of the legal 
concepts in culture: the problem of 
interpretation”, WG 9
Tenenbaum, Sergio, University of 
Toronto / Canada, The Rationality of 
Vague and Indeterminate Ends and 
Legal Discretion, SW 61
Tepe, Harun, Hacettepe University 
Ankara / Turkey, A New concept of 
Human Nature as a Basis for Human 
Rights, SW 2
Thea, Federico, Universidad de Buenos 
Aires, Argentina, A deliberative 
conception of authority, SW 3
Thompson, Marcelo, Hong Kong S.A.R. 
/ China, Resisting Enframing: Law 
and the Poiēsis of Technē, WG 24
Tierney, Stephen, University of 
Edinburgh / UK, ‘Sub-state nations 
on the semi-periphery: discrete 
expressions of pouvoir constituant 
through the referendum’, SW 53
Timoshina, E., St. Petersburg State 
University / Russia, The Tradition 
of Phenomenological Interpretation 
of L. Petrazycki’s Legal Philosophy, 
SW 65
Tinnefeld, Marie-Theres + Lachmayer, 
Friedrich, München / Germany + 
Innsbruck / Austria, Transparency, 
State Taboo and Privacy. Some 
remarks on Plato’s “Simile of the 
Cave, WG 20
Tönnies, Sibylle, Brandenburg 
/ Germany, Der Einﬂ  uss der 
Naturwissenschaften auf die 
Rechtsphilosophie, WG 25
Toprak, Musa, Ankara / Turkey, 
Implementation as a Key Concept 
for International Courts (of Human 
Rights), WG 14
Travessoni, Alexandre, Belo Horizonte 
/ Brazil, Discretion and the claim of 
correctness: effects of the relation 
between law and morality in legal 
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Tuzet, Giovanni, Bocconi / Italy, Truth 
on Trial –- Inquiry or Advocacy in 
Legal Argumentation?, SW 15
Twining, William, University College 
London / UK and Miami / USA, 
Fuller’s Legal Fictions: Introductory 
Remarks, SW 16
Ubena, John, Stockholm / Sweden, 
Legislative Techniques and ICT: In 
the Wake of Law keeping pace with 
Technology, WG 25
Üskül Engin, Zeynep Özlem, Istanbul 
/ Turkey, Genetically Modiﬁ  ed 
Organism and Different Legislations, 
SW 69
Unnerstall, Herwig, Evangelische 
Akademie Hofgeismar / Germany, 
Legal and philosophical problems of 
intergenerational justice, SW 19
Urayama, Seiko, Tokyo / Japan, 
Immigration Justice as a Theory of 
Global Distributive Justice, WG 12
Uygur, Gülriz, Ankara / Turkey, Legal 
Discourse and Human Rights, SW 70
van Beers, B., VU Amsterdam / The 
Netherlands, Role of Experts in 
Decision Making on Artiﬁ  cial Pro-
creation, SW 71
Van Beers, Britta, Amsterdam / 
The Netherlands, Involving the 
Experts - A Critical Analysis of 
the Role of Expert Committees in 
Legal Decision Making concerning 
Complex Technological Issues with a 
Strong Moral Impact-, SW 71
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SW 40
Trujillo, María Guadalupe, México, 
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Stereotypes and Prejudices Versus 
Human Rights in An Advanced 
Technological World, WG 13
Turkbag, Ahmet Ulvi, University of 
Galatasaray / Turkey, The Bare Life 
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Sweden, Biometrics in the Dutch 
passport; security measures or 
measuring security?, WG 26
Van Gerven, Walter, University of 
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Way Ahead, SW 72
Van Hoecke, Mark, University of Ghent 
/ Belgium, European Court of 
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SW 67
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Exemplary Narratives and the 
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Venema, Derk, Radboud University 
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rationality in the standardization 
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/ Germany, Public Dimension of 
Licencing, SW 74
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Wahrheit, SW 5
Winczorek, Jan, Warsaw / Poland, 
Technological transformations and 
the anthropologies of criminal law, 
WG 26
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Legisprudence – Rethinking 
Legislation and Regulation in the 
Light of Legal Theory, SW 75
Wintgens, Luc J., University of Brussels 
HUB-KUB / Belgium, Rationality 
of Legislation and Legislative 
Evaluation, SW 75
Wojciechowski, Bartosz, Łódź / Poland, 
Legal recognition of minority groups 
in light of social sciences, SW 76
Wolenski, Jan, Jagiellonian University 
of Cracow / Poland, Kelsen and Hart 
in 20th-century Legal Philosophy in 
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Wu, Chunyan + Qi, Haibin + Fan, 
Xiaoning, Wuhan / China + 
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USA, On legal protection of human 
genetic resources – from a China’s 
legislation and practice perspective, 
WG 21
Xigen, Wang, Hubei / China, On the 
right to be free from poverty – a 
perspective of global justice, WG 12
Yang, Bei, Beijing / China, The Role of 
Reasonableness in Law, WG 3
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Law New York / USA, Legal Vices 
and Civic Virtues, SW 11
Yankah, Ekow, Yeshiva University, 
Cardozo Law School / USA, Civic 
Vices and the Rule of Law”, SW 61
Yanping, Li, Macao / China, The 
subnational constitutionalism in the 
context of Chinese “one country, 
two systems”: the case of Macao 
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Yen, Chueh-an, Taipei / Taiwan, 
Democracy and the Nature of Law, 
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/ Japan, Intrinsic Value of Law and 
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of Legal
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Japan, Technological Evolution and 
the Method of Conﬂ  ict of Laws, 
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Yoon Kang, Hyo, Universität Luzern / 
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Young, Diana, Carleton University / 
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Żuralska, Marta, Warsaw / Poland, 
Independent Regulatory Agencies: 
New Mode of Governance in the 
face of Technological Change, 
WG 18
Canada, Law, Film and the Abject: 
Representing the Unknowable, 
SW 27
Yowell, Paul, Oxford / UK, Title t.b.a., 
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